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Dissertation Abstract 
This dissertation examines the ways in which workers and peasants access to housing 
has been shaped under different political regimes over the past two centuries (1805-
2011). Up until 1952, Egypt did not have an official housing. policy leaving housing 
needs to be met locally. The rapid rise in population by mid twentieth century and the 
rural-urban migration during World War II and after resulted in a rising demand for 
affordable housing. Under Nasser's regime, workers and peasants experienced the 
first national housing policy and progressive pro-tenant laws. Under Anwar Sadat's 
regime, as the private sector's role in housing production increased, access to 
affordable housing in urban centres became limited leading to the expansion of 
informal housing, a phenomenon that continued to become a permanent feature of 
Egypt's urban spaces. In the post 1990s, after the liberalization of the Egyptian 
economy, the state began dismantling rent control laws and promoting a private 
sector-led rental housing market supported by private mortgages. The liberalization of 
land and housing markets through the adoption of Law 96/1992 and Law 4/1996 
dismantled tenancy rights and shifted the balance of power in favour of landlords and 
property developers. These developments expanded the crisis of housing to rural 
areas as over a million peasants and farmers were forcefully evicted from their 
houses. Evidence presented here suggests that neoliberal policies in land and housing 
facilitated capital accumulation through policies of dispossession. The privatization 
of state enterprises and the agricultural sector resulted in the transfer of land and 
resources to the private sector. Over the course of two decades of neoliberal policies, 
property developers and agribusiness experienced a boom as the Egyptian economy 
became closely integrated with the global economy. Workers and peasants, however, 
had a fundamentally different experience as unemployment levels continued to rise 
and an increasing numbers of Egyptians fell into poverty. The crisis of housing that 
intensified in the 1990s and after reflected a deeper restructuring of power relations 
and resource redistribution away from workers and peasants and to landlords and 
developers. The strategy of accumulation by dispossession, however, undermined the 
fragile legitimacy that the Mubarak regime had experienced leading to the end of his 
regime in 2011. 
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Part I. Capitalism and Development in the Middle East 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Why Egypt? Egypt has been an important country playing a significant regional role 
at least since the revolution of 1952. Whether through the spread of ideals of Arab 
Socialism or through its role as a peace mediator in the region, scholars of the region 
cannot afford to ignore Egypt. For me personally, the radical social change that began 
as a result of economic liberalization of post 1991 was a crucial reason to take up the 
study of Egyptian politics. The extent of impact of economic liberalization on 
transforming class relations and changing the balance of social power deserve to be 
documented as the contemporary political history of Egypt. 
Why Housing? I chose to study the changing nature of access to housing by 
different classes as a reflection of the changing social relations in the context of 
economic liberalization. The idea for studying housing occurred to me after my first 
visit to Egypt in December of 2005. Initially I was struck by the extent of urban slums 
and informal housing that shaped the landscape of Cairo. Upon further investigation, I 
realized that the crisis of housing was more than what appeared to the naked eye. My 
research and further visits to Egypt revealed the complex nature of housing problems 
as I came to realize the historical roots of the contemporary problems. In fact, housing 
problems were undergoing further transformation as I was conducting fieldwork in 
Egypt due to the changes in tenancy laws and rent liberalization policies. A few 
problems struck me during my research: that the problem of housing as it appeared 
(i.e. slums and informal housing) and as it constituted itself across space and time was 
not very clear. Equally important, the relationship between the intensification of the 
housing crisis and the neoliberal development policies was not immediately apparent 
to the observer. In other words, the challenge was then to move beyond the problem 
of housing as it appeared (i.e. slums) and to study it as it constituted itself across 
space and time. More immediately, my concern was to study the relationship between 
neoliberalism and the intensification of housing crisis across urban and rural areas. 
Thus, I began my study of housing as an aspect of social property relations by 
linking the study of housing problem to the economic policies adopted in the context 
of neoliberalism. I also was interested to reach back historically to trace the 
2 
developments in social property relations that had shaped access to housing since the 
emergence of the modem state in Egypt. In short, my goal was not to study urban 
housing and urbanization in itself, but to approach the study of the housing problem 
through a study of the changing nature of the state and class struggle, i.e. changing 
nature of power relations. The methodology for my research.is discussed later on in 
this chapter. I will now attempt to establish the link between the apparent problem of 
housing and the underlying political and economic decisions:ofthe Mubarak period. 
Egyptian society experienced a fundamental transformation and social 
polarization since 1991when the government embarked on the path of 'free market' 
liberalization.1 The polarization was apparent in the organization of social space 
reflected in the proliferation of luxury villas, American style cities and 'megamalls' 
on the one hand, and expansive slums characterized by dilapidated and make-shift 
housing, on the other. Indeed, over 20 million homes in Egypt are considered to be in 
a dilapidated condition, posing risks for the safety of the residents (Habitat for 
Humanity 2012). An increasing number of Egyptians cannot afford the high cost of 
housing - a reality that affects their ability to get married and start families. With 
poverty levels rising over the last decade, reaching twenty two per cent across the 
country, housing remains a pressing issue for many (World Bank 2010). In 2012, it 
was estimated that 2.5 million affordable housing units - on top of the resources 
needed to repair the millions of dilapidated homes across the country - were needed 
to solve the housing problem (Habitat for Humanity 2012). 
Despite the pressing nature of the problem, government policies over the last 
three decades have failed to meet the need for affordable housing. In fact, the 
Egyptian state exacerbated the problem through the adoption of neoliberal policies 
that resulted in the liberalization of rents and the privatization of land. 2 The 
1 
'Free market' under capitalism in no sense implies a free market given that neoliberals deny the 
politically constituted nature of capitalist markets and the differential access experien.ced by different 
classes. Equally important, capitalist markets act as mediators of class interest and thus prior power 
determines the degree of access that different classes enjoy in such markets. As such 'free markets' 
should be seen as an ideological construct that aims to mask the nature of class rule that shapes an 
reproduces such markets. It is for this reason that I will be using 'free market' inverted commas. 
2 The term neoliberalism refers to a set of ideas and policy practices that became dominant in the 
course of the 1980s after the financial crisis of the 1970s. Proponents of neoliberal policies criticized 
the state and public sector as playing a distortionary role in the market and instead proposed 
privatization of public sector firms and services, liberalization of trade and deregulation of the private 
sector. For a detailed discussion ofneoliberalism see Harvey (2005) and Gamble (2009). 
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privatization of land in rural areas has pushed millions off their land and out of their 
homes, forcing them to migrate to urban centres like Cairo. The arrival of new 
migrants has placed further pressures on an already declining and dilapidated stock of 
housing in urban areas. Consequently, millions of workers and peasants have lost 
access to their housing while a future generation has no hope of adequate and 
affordable housing anytime soon. In this way, the Egyptian state not only failed to 
meet the need for housing for low income workers in urban areas, it also facilitated its 
expansion into rural areas and the housing crisis for peasants and rural workers. The 
housing crisis in Egypt is now an urban and rural phenomenon. 
In urban areas, landlords succeeded in dismantling rent control laws and now 
charge competitive rents on new buildings. Older buildings covered by rent control 
policies implemented in the period under President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1952-70) 
have been allowed to deteriorate to the point of collapse in order to allow landlords to 
erect new buildings covered under the new liberalized rent law.3 Every year, 
numerous deaths and injuries resulting from collapsing buildings are reported across 
the country. In rural areas, the Agrarian Reform lands of the Nasser period had 
extended secure tenure and subsidized non-market access to land and housing. 
However, the privatization of agricultural land and the abolition of land reforms 
delivered a double blow to over a million peasants and small farmers who lost their 
livelihoods as well as their housing beginning in 1997. 
The 'New Village Program' of 2006-11 embodied these new forms of 
exploitation and surplus extraction in rural Egypt. One of many pro-investor projects, 
the program set up 400 new villages in the desert to house peasants who had been 
evicted after the liberalization of agriculture. 4 The program reclaimed 1 million 
feddans of desert land. The government policy clearly stated that only a small 
percentage of this land was to be redistributed to peasants who had worked on the 
land. After the completion of the reclamation project by property-less peasants, the 
land was repossessed by state authorities and transferred to investors for agribusiness 
projects. 
3 In ,the post- WWII period, Egyptian society witnessed radical change under the rule of three long 
serving presidents: Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970, Arab Socialist Union Party); Anwar Sadat (1970-
1981, National Democratic Party) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011, National Democratic Party). 
4 Egypt State Information Service, 'Agriculture', http://www.sis.gov.eg (accessed October 27, 2010). 
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This example demonstrates the link between the neoliberal model of 
development and the crisis of rural housing. Neoliberal policies significantly extended 
the commodification of agricultural land at the behest of large agribusiness, and the 
subsequent expropriation of a large portion of the rural population. As a result, rural 
producers not only lost access to their means of subsistence, and thus their potential. 
for non-market forms of production, but also their non-market access to housing, 
resulting in their market dependence for subsistence and housing. s 
As such, the specific character of the rural housing crisis is intrinsically linked 
to the process of dispossession that has accelerated since the introduction of the 
neoliberal reforms of 1991. The relationship between the rural and urban housing 
crises and the transformation of social property relations in the Egyptian economy at 
large, therefore, needs to be conceptualized. In essence, capitalist social property 
relations were being introduced through the policies of an authoritarian state, with the 
intention of creating not only property markets but also a housing market. The 
outcome of this process was the imposition of market dependence on peasants and . 
workers as producers as well as tenants and homeowners. 
State Formation6, Property Rights and Housing 
The housing policies implemented by different Egyptian regimes were significantly 
influenced by the economic policies that were dominant in different phases of 
development in Egypt. Between the 1850s and the 1920s, the Egyptian economy was 
oriented towards the production of cotton for export to England. This export oriented 
economic pol~cy was a result of Egypt's integration into the British Empire during 
this period. From the 1920s to the early 1950s, a policy of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI hereafter) was pursued with the intent of developing an 
indigenous industrial economy. In the post-colonial period, the Egyptian state under 
Nasser adopted a planned economic model that scholars have characterized as either 
statism or state capitalism (Aoude 1994; Cooper 1982; Wahba 1994). Under 
5 The notion of market dependence will be discussed at length in Chapter Two. 
6 State formation is the contested historical process by which social power is institutionalized 
politically. 
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President Anwar Sadat (1970-81 ), Egypt embarked on a path of limited economic 
liberalization (or infitah) which lasted from 1971to1981. After a decade of 
economic crisis during the 1980s, a radical dismantling of the remnants of the statist 
model and the adoption of a neoliberal development model occurred under Mubarak 
(1981-2011). Each of these economic phases impacted housing policy in distinct 
ways. In the following paragraphs, I briefly chart out the housing policy trends and 
developments in each of these periods. 
Housing problems prior to the 1950s have been mentioned only indirectly in 
studies dealing with a variety of different social issues. 7 As a social issue in its own 
right, however, access to housing, or the right to housing more generally, has been 
overlooked in the scholarly literature. Older parts of Cairo and Alexandria were left 
undeveloped and unaffected by urban development. During the first part of the 19th 
century urban planning was geared to protect elite districts from the emerging housing 
ghettos.8 In the second half of the 19th century, the beautification of Cairo became the 
focus of official urban policy, but resources were devoted primarily to the 
construction of palaces. Within the literature on housing, there has been little 
discussion of how these developments affected the popular classes, with the exception 
of a few cases that discussed demolition of houses to make way for the construction 
of thoroughfares in Cairo (Raymond 2001 ). 
Through the course of the 19th century, the urban population of Egypt did not 
increase rapidly. Between 1821and1907, the proportion of the urban population of 
Egypt rose from 9.5 per cent to 14.3 per cent of the entire population (lssawi 1969: 
109). But between 1917 and 1947, Cairo's population grew three times faster than the 
whole of Egypt (Botman 1991: 21-22). Thus, in the first half of the 20th century, 
housing problems began to surface as rural-urban migration became more prominent. 
7 For example, with reference to: rural poverty and the state of rural housing; women's social status and 
the structure of the household; and the impact of colonialism on urban planning. 
8 Timothy Mitchell (1988: 14) discussed housing in the nineteenth century as1 an example of how the 
formation of the modem state coincided with a disciplinary strategy intended to 'enframe' the 
population. Rural housing in the form of model villages and urban spatial reorganization, such as the 
building of thoroughfares, were mechanisms of establishing a 'diffused' form of state control over the 
population (Mitchell 1988: 174-75). Judith Tucker's account of 19th century housing however, shows 
that the state did not have as much control over housing policy and that in fact, Mohammad Ali and his 
dynasty during the nineteenth century were only interested in building infrastructure to facilitate export 
of cotton and were not so keen on shaping the urban or rural space (Tucker 1985; Raymond 2001; 
2005). However, the state's attempt to establish its authority over Egypt remains undisputed. 
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Population density in urban centres began to rise as mortality rates declined and more 
rural immigrants came to Cairo and port cities in search of opportunities. The foreign 
capital coming in under British colonial rule was primarily invested in infrastructural 
development, with investment in urban housing restricted to housing for the colonial, 
bureaucratic and comprador elites. An exemplary case was Heliopolis City which was 
built by Baron d'Empain of Belgium in the 1910s (Mitchell 1988). By 1947, it was 
estimated that thirteen million Egyptians, out of a population of nineteen million, 
lived in the countryside in huts or mud brick housing (Botman 1991: 73). After 1947, 
rural-urban migration increased dramatically. Abu-Lughod (1969: 168) points out 
that in 1917, "Cairo residents of rural Egyptian origin numbered fewer than 200,000." 
By 1947, however, "there were more than 600, 000 rural-born Egyptians living in 
Cairo; by 1960 there were over 1, 000, 000."9 With the demographic explosion of the 
1950s, the need for an official housing policy could no longer be evaded (Abu 
Lughod 1971; Bayad 1979; Hanna 1985; 1996; Issawi 1969; Soliman 2004). 
After 1952, urbanization increased even further in response to a number of 
factors. Most important was the increase of urban employment resulting from the 
creation of a number of nationalized industries as part of the state-led development 
model.10 As a result of Nasser's industrial policies, the govemorates located in the 
Delta region (including Alexandria and Cairo) became the centre of industrial activity 
and a source of attraction for migrant workers in the countryside. 11 This led to a rise 
in demand for housing for workers who worked in the various industries promoted by 
Nasser, which in turn led to the development of Egypt's first housing policy enshrined 
in the National Charter of 1962. In accordance with this policy, the state provided 
housing for civil servants, engineers and industrial workers. This often took the form 
9 Abu Lughod noted that until 1937, migration was often temporary whereby migrants would return to 
their villages after work season. However, after 193 7, she observed a permanence in the nature of 
migration whereby migrants decided to settle in urban areas. She called this new strand of migrants as 
rurban-migrants who were neither urban nor rural but a combination; 70 per cent of Cairo's 
population fell into this category (Abu-Lughod 1969: 178, emphasis added). Issawi (1969: 111-12) 
noted a shift from inner cities towards coastal towns in the same period. 
10 Egypt's population went from 15.9 million in 1937 to 30.07 million in 1966, virtually doubling in 
twenty-nine years, then reached an estimated 57 million in 1990, doubling again (Abu Lughod 1971: 
118; Raymond 2001: 342). 
11 Egypt is divided into 27 administrative units called govemorates, each of which has its own capital, 
often with the same name as the govemorate. The govemorates are subdivided into regions and further 
subdivided into villages and towns. 
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of New Cities built to accommodate an expanding working class. Access to affordable 
housing for low income earners was guaranteed through rent control and state 
investment in affordable public housing. Despite these policies, problems of urban 
housing remained, as Nasser's state building strategy centralized industrial 
development projects within a few major urban ar~as resulting in the concentration of 
population in the main urban centres (Chatterjee 1990). For instance, the 
concentration of government services in Cairo transformed it into the main centre of 
culture, finance, commerce and education, serving as a magnet for future rural-urban 
migration over the coming decades (Ibrahim 1987). Already by the late 1960s, 
Charles Issawi (1969) was contending that Cairo and Alexandria would transform into 
one of the megapolitan centres of the world system. Issawi (1969: 113-17) and Abu-
Lughod (1969: 177) identified a host of factors leading to a dramatic increase in the 
rate of urbanization such as: administrative centralization and bureaucratization, state 
investment in Cairo, the economic spillover from wealthy communities of foreign 
nationals, a centralization of education centres, ~d a decline in mortality rates due to 
modem medicine. 
The lack of affordable housing forced many new migrants to rely on the 
informal housing market, thus, new migrants working in state factories often found 
housing near their work-places, as this was the most convenient way to maintain a 
steady supply of labour; many others searching for work found temporary shelter in 
the Cities of the Dead and the Old Quarters of Cairo, Alexandiia and others. Lack of 
affordable housing was becoming a pressing issue throughout the 1960s leading an 
astute observer of Egypt to warn about the spill over effect of informal housing on 
agricultural land on the outskirts of cities (Abu Lughod 1969). However, government 
action remained insufficient to deal with the lack of affordable housing for the new 
migrants arriving in the cities. 
Under Sadat, housing problems in urban areas continued to remain a challenge 
as urbanization picked up pace. To deal with housing shortages, Sadat adopted a mix 
of private and public sector solutions. These included a further expansion of New 
Urban Communities or the New Cities as well as relaxing rent control regulations to 
allow for furnished apartments that could cater to Arab investors (Feiler 1992; Bayad 
1979). The New Cities embodied Sadat's new economic strategy of infitah or 
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economic opening. Built by the private sector with the state assuming responsibility 
for infrastructure, the New Cities were viewed as the solution to Egypt's two pressing 
problems: urban housing and unemployment. However, the lielaxation on limits to 
property ownership resulted in the growth of speculative investment in urban 
property. The New Cities did not solve the housing shortage or unemployment; 
instead, most of them became ghost towns due to a lack of jobs, affordable 
transportation and housing for workers (Raymond 2001). Despite an increase in the 
total stock of housing from the New Cities agenda, Sadat's economic policy was 
continuing to marginalize both the urban and rural popular classes who had no access 
to the formal housing market and were losing traditional dwellings. 
By 1975, the housing shortage was estimated at 1.4 million units, and 
continued to increase over the next decade. Older, inner city areas such as Masr al-
Qadinia, Sayyida Zeinab, Darb al-Ahmar, Gamalia, and Bulaq, were also being 
neglected, resulting in a further deterioration of the urban infrastructure and housing 
stock (Richards and Waterbury 1990: 274-75). During the 1980s, housing shortages 
and the failure of state housing policy left the informal sector as the main source of 
housing provision. According to Andre Raymond (2001: 353), 82 per cent of housing 
fell into the 'unregulated' category between 1976 and 1982. 
The 1990s witnessed a radical shift in the role of the state vis-a-vis the 
definition and enforcement of absolute private property rights. The adoption of a 
neoliberal model of economic development exacerbated existing economic 
inequalities by redistributing wealth towards the wealthier classes. The 
implementation of the neoliberal model represented a strategy of 'accumulation by 
dispossession' whereby the Egyptian state engaged in a wide range of "structural, 
institutional and legal changes" in order to facilitate capital accumulation (Harvey 
2003: 153). The main form that 'accumulation by dispossession' assumed was 
through policies of privatization which accelerated the extension of private property 
rights into traditional common property forms. The privatization of public sector firms 
also clawed back the post-war gains of urban workers while the return to promotion of 
export-oriented agriculture dispossessed large numbers of the peasantry and small 
farmers. The latter entailed the state policy of the transfer of various forms of land 
(including state land, Agrarian Reform land and other forms of customary tenure such 
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as Wad el Yad) to private developers (Jorgens 2000; Owen 2000; Sait and Lim 2006; 
See Appendix B). 
In the context of the sharp turn toward a "free market" model, housing policy 
underwent radical changes. For instance, during the first decade of liberalization, 
fixed rents and tenants' rights were abolished as a result of Law 96 of 1992 which 
liberalized the agricultural sector and ended secure rural tenancies. Similarly, four 
years later, Law 4of1996 liberalized the urban housing market and ended secure 
urban tenancies. 12 As a result, in 1997 alone, over a million peasants were evicted 
from their lands. In urban areas, those living under fixed rents were not forced out in 
the same manner as the inhabitants of rural Egypt, however, the urban working classes 
were subjected to uncertainties associated with the deregulation of the rental market. 
Landlords exploited their new found powers by neglecting the upkeep of old buildings 
and by refusing to renew old contracts, forcing many out of rent-controlled housing. 
Already in 1995, an estimated one million people lived in Cairo's City of the Dead; 
another million or more were estimated to inhabit the rooftops of buildings in Cairo 
and Alexandria (Stewart 1996). Astonishingly, these numbers radically increased 
over the next decade and a half. Poor, densely populated neighbourhoods in Cairo 
and other major cities lack basic urban services such as sewage, running water and 
regular solid waste collection. As government investment in housing and urban 
services declined over the years, infrastructure has collapsed, forcing the lower classes 
to rely on non-governmental organizations and charities. At the other end of the 
social spectrum, the phenomenon of vacant housing became commonplace in Egypt. 
According to the 2006 census, in the early 2000s an estimated 6 million units lay 
vacant across the country (El Kouedi and Madbouly 2007). 
While the state claimed that the private sector would resolve the housing 
problem, the opposite is true. As public investment in housing radically declined, the 
private sector responded to the high end of the market by building luxury housing, 
villas and tourist resorts. The state actively encouraged foreign nationals to invest in 
the Egyptian property market by privileging their interests over the interests of their 
own popular classes. Thus, as the demand for popular housing remained unmet by the 
12 These laws will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
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market, and as the state continued to withdraw from the provision of affordable 
housing, informal housing expanded in the poorer areas of Egypt. 
Some argue that the government expressed no interest in developing a 
sustainable housing policy because the housing crisis primarily affected a 
constituency of marginalized, lower class Egyptians. Under Mubarak, the rich saw . 
their incomes increase substantially, enabling them to easily afford housing costs. 
The working class and the poor, however, suffered from stagnant wages, inflation and 
unemployment. Therefore, even fixed rents remained increasingly beyond their 
means (Hanna 1985; Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003). The continuous flow of rural-urban 
migration only exacerbated this crisis. As Milad Hanna (1985: 206) pointed out, 
"There [was] no clear plan to control or guide this flow, nor [was] there a plan to 
solve the housing problem for these country people." 
I argue that the housing problem under Mubarak has to be understood in the 
context of the reconstitution of ruling class interests and a neoliberal restructuring of 
the state and the market. The shift to neoliberalism empowered landlords and private 
developers, enabling them to create markets in land and housing - in both urban and 
rural areas - monopolize the provision of formal housing, while eliminating peasants' 
and workers' direct access to housing as well as to their means of subsistence. This 
trend of accumulation by dispossession was deeply political and carried the potential 
for igniting social conflict across the country. 
A number of research questions guide this dissertation. First, what is the 
relationship between the changes in ruling class interests and strategies of 
accumulation and the larger social property relations that reflect the relations between 
ruling classes and producers (peasants and workers) in different historical periods? 
Second, what is the social basis of the state in different socio-economic and historical 
periods and what role did it play vis-a-vis the ruling classes and producers? Third, 
how do workers and peasants respond to ruling class strategies of accumulation and 
how do their responses affect the nature of state and ruling class power in society? In 
light of these questions, a broad historical synopsis of these developments will be 
presented to introduce some of the concepts necessary to understand the historical 
transformation of housing as it primarily served societal needs for shelter to its 
transformation into a commodity whose price becomes determined by the capitalist . 
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market. It is only through such a broad historical study that we can understand the 
evolution of the housing problem and the qualitative transformation of the housing 
problem as housing sector took centre stage in the contemporary strategies of 
capitalist accumulation. 
Studies of Egyptian Housing 
While studies of rural housing remain predominantly limited, most studies of housing 
in Egypt fall roughly into three categories; the first category primarily focuses on 
demographic trends and the impact of these changes on urban housing. Most studies 
of housing have mainly focused on the urban problems associated with 
overpopulation in major urban centres such as Cairo (Abu Lughod 1971; Chatterjee 
1990; Hanna 1985; 1992; 1996; Soliman 2004). Due to the centralization of 
administrative services over the last half of the century, Cairo has absorbed most of 
the rural migrants (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003: 208-10).13 These studies offer a 
sociological analysis of the problem of housing by focusing on rural-urban migration 
and how the urbanization trend intensified the need for housing, while government 
policy lagged behind thus resulting in a housing crisis. 
A second set of studies explore the housing question through a study of 
informal housing and its proliferation in the context of rising urbanism. Informal 
housing constitutes the subject of a significant portion of studies of housing in Egypt. 
Given that informal housing is not legally recognized by the state and not integrated 
into the formal economy, proposed solutions to housing problem in this category are 
framed within a neoliberal paradigm that emphasizes the extension of property rights 
to informal housing (de Soto 2001; Soliman 2004; Chatterjee.1990).14 Lata 
Chatterjee's (1990) study of the historical evolution of housing policy from Nasser to 
Mubarak proposes the development of financing schemes for individual households as 
a way of resolving the housing problem. Most of these studies are influenced by the 
13 Cairo was initially planned to support five million people. However, over the last half century, its 
population multiplied many times. While the urban population of the capital city increased rapidly, no 
official planning occurred to absorb the expanding population (Stewart 1996: 461). 
14 It is noteworthy that Ahmed M. Soliman's training was both in architecture and in engineering. His 
work involves city planning and urban development. 
12 
World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); 
their proposals suggest the creation of private housing finance schemes and self-help 
projects as a way to resolve the housing crisis through the private sector (Hassan 
1992). For instance, a USAID funded study of informal housing, prepared in 
collaboration with the Egyptian government, proposed that the government should 
encourage the private sector while removing rent control laws to allow for the creation 
of a private housing market (ABT Associate et al. 1982). 
The third category of studies offers micro-level analyses of housing. 15 Gil 
Feiler's (1992) work on the successes and failures of the 'New Cities' (also known as 
desert cities), for instance, provides details on various desert cities, but assesses them 
in isolation from the framing economic policies of the state. Other studies offer 
valuable insights into the housing sector, but suffer from a similar micro-level focus, 
or are simply out-of-date (Bayad 1979; Hyland 1984; Housing in Egypt 1979; 
Seminar on Core Housing and Site and Service Projects for Low Income Groups 
1979; Fathy 1973). They are, therefore, unable to explain the current crisis of housing 
which extends beyond urban areas in the context of a neoliberal in Egypt. 
In terms of coverage of rural housing, some of the prominent studies are those 
in the field of architecture. These studies offer a detailed picture of rural housing, 
particularly in terms of its design and construction. But they do not deal with 
problems of access to housing that rural residents are faced with (Bayad 1979; Fathy 
1973). But even in studies that deal with access to rural housing an overriding 
emphasis is placed on problems stemming from rapid population growth and the 
associated pressures that the spread of informal housing places on scarce agricultural ' 
land (Soliman 2004). 16 
If the existing literature on housing in Egypt provides a rich description of the 
scope and nature of the current housing crisis, there is a lack of analysis that situates 
15 An exception is the work done by Eric Denis ( 1996) whose insights are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapters Three and Eight. 
16 Egypt's population increased from 15.9 million in 1937 to 81 million in 2011, placing significant 
strains on infrastructure and arable land (Nassar and Mansour 2003; El Batran and Arandel 1997). Of 
the one million square kilometres that constitute Egypt, only 4 per cent is arable land and the remainder 
is desert. 
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housing policy within the context of competing interests and social struggles. 17 
Housing needs to be seen both as a specific field of struggle, and in relation to wider 
social struggles about capitalism and market dependence in the meeting of social 
needs. Furthermore, the capacity of powerful actors to achieve, their interests needs to 
be placed in a larger context of Egypt's political economy. 
The spread of housing problem beyond the urban areas into rural Egypt in the 
1990s has been closely associated to the changes in economic and social property 
relations which have rendered the producing classes market dependent. In Egypt, this 
process which rendered workers and peasants market dependent was consolidated 
after the demise of post-war statist model, on the one hand, and the consolidation of 
the power of capitalists and landlords via neoliberal development strategies, on the 
other. Therefore, the housing crisis in Egypt today needs to be understood in terms of 
this historical development of capitalism in Egypt and the associated changes in 
property regimes that constituted the hallmark of these contemporary social 
transformations. 
Housing Policy and Politics 
Politics is about the uneven distribution of power in society, how the struggle over 
power is conducted, and how it impacts on the creation and distribution of resources, 
life chances and well-being. I adopt a historical political analysis which does not 
assume static rules of the game, but rather views rules as context dependent. Through 
such a historical political analysis, I aim to demonstrate the existence and effect of 
historical legacies in the political processes and institutions of the present. Politics 
concerns the distribution, exercise and consequences of power. Political analysis then 
should draw attention to power relations that are implicated in social relations. In this 
sense, politics is not defined by its locus (i.e. within government circles or restricted 
to the realm of policy) but by its nature as a process. My goal has been to produce an 
empirically rich and theoretically informed historical narrative which seeks to 
17 Studies that have examined the problem of housing within a larger framework of political economy 
often interpret the crisis of housing as a result of policy of rent control. They also argue that this 
unequally benefited public sector workers (Hanna 1985; Harik 1997; Richards and Waterbury 1990). 
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empirically rich and theoretically informed historical narrative which seeks to 
preserve and capture the complexity and specify the process of change, examining the 
inter-play of actors, ideas and institutions. 
Method, Key Concepts, Sources and Structure 
This dissertation is situated within the critical realist tradition of social science as it 
formed in relation to Marxism (Marsh and Furlong 2002; Hay 2002; Brown 2001; 
Sayers 1992). According to critical realism, there is a world that exists independently 
of our perception of it, but it does not present itself to us as it really exists. This 
ontological and epistemological position was summed up by Marx when he wrote: 
"All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things 
directly coincided" (Marx 1967: 817). If it is possible to identify causal relationships, 
analyses of these causal relationships defy any deterministic structuralist account of 
cause and effect. It is necessary neither to treat agents as passive respondents to 
external stimuli, nor dissolve any notion of structure or external constraint into some 
unfettered agency. It is important to situate "reflexive agents who interpret and change 
structures" within pre-existing social contexts (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 31 ). As 
Marx (1973: 143) famously stated in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past." The simplicity of Marx's observation belies the 
complexity of its implications for any social scientific analysis. As Hay (2002: 118) 
points out, despite the proliferation of literature on the issue of structure and agency, 
there is "little to the question of structure and agency which is not already well (or 
even better) captured by Marx" in this passage. 
Structure and agency should be treated as distinct phenomena rather than as 
two sides of the same coin. In this approach, structure is clearly the starting point. 
Action only takes place within a pre-existing structured context which is strategically 
selective, that is, it favour certain strategies over others. Such contexts are not like 
level playing fields; they have sloping contours which act to advantage certain 
'players'. 
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Actors are reflexive and can formulate strategy on the basis of partial 
knowledge of the structures. It is possible for actors to formulate strategies which 
overcome the problems created for them by strategically selective contexts. Actions 
can then lead to changes in the structural contexts which are unanticipated or 
unwanted. Structures do not determine the actions of agents, rather they constrain and 
facilitate them. Agents are reflexive can deconstruct and reconstruct structures just as 
structures compel the agents to act and respond in specific ways. A such agents have 
the capacity to influence the course of social and political change. In turn, 
acknowledging such a role for agents, means that we have to recognize the spatially, 
and temporally contingent nature of social systems and institutions. 
In my study of housing policy, I adopt a process-oriented method which 
demonstrates the complexity and the unpredictability of social and political change. In 
a sense, this is an inductive study and not one concerned with producing theoretical 
models. The study is inductive in the sense that I prioritize empirical evidence and do 
not start with testable hypotheses, but unlike positivists I prefer complexity over 
parsimony and do not treat the outcome of my research as generalizable to other 
cases. My method is informed by a Marxian approach which views reality as more 
than appearances and argues that focusing exclusively on appearances can be 
extremely misleading. To move beyond appearances to the essences requires a 
dialectical way of thinking that "brings into focus a full range of changes and 
interactions that occur in the world" (Ollman 2003: 12). 
To put it in other words, there is a real world out there, i.e. there are essential 
processes and structures that shape and cause contemporary social existence. The task 
of a social scientific research is to uncover these essential processes and structures. 
These processes and structures may not be directly observable. The surface may 
obscure the reality and promote particular economic interests. 
Adopting a dialectical method means that we expand our thinking by looking 
beyond the immediate common-sense appearance of an object/thing to examining the 
complex processes and relations that have historically shaped the object/thing. The 
production of knowledge, i.e. our interpretation of social processes, struggles and 
institutions are theory laden as well as specific to our philosophical traditions, our 
cultural backgrounds amongst other factors that shape our lenses. 
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To operationalize this method required deciding what was the appropriate 
sources of information on the changes that were under way in Egypt in the 1990s and 
after, how to gather information that required fieldwork and which social agents to 
interview. As I earlier pointed out, both a Marxian approach and a critical realist 
approach accept that there is a reality out there, but that our perception of the reality_ is 
colored by ideology among other factors. In order to gain access to the reality out 
there and to reproduce it in all its complexity required being aware of biased 
documents that distorted the reality or reported a narrow version of the actual social 
change that was under way. Reports and studies that discussed the policies that the 
Mubarak regime adopted in the 1990s and after were heavily influenced by neoliberal 
ideas from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF henceforth). 
As such, mobilization of knowledge inside Egypt which informed Egyptian policy 
makers was carried out through the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies (ECES 
henceforth). Despite the limitations of the official documents and reports, I carried out 
a thorough investigation of a diverse range of reports and studies produced by the 
Egyptian research centres and influential financial centres as well as by the IMF and 
World Bank. My task as a critical researcher was to take the evidence produced by 
these organizations and subject it to scrutiny and situate the 'facts' that they produced 
within a broader context of the changes that were affecting social relations in Egypt. I 
also attended an important conference in 2007 which was organized by the ruling 
classes, in the process of which I gained insight into what the ruling classes intended 
to do through their policy proposals, and how they wanted to reform the state to 
further their interests. 
By situating my study of contemporary changes of the 1990s historically, I 
intended to do precisely what I often found missing in studies of political economy of 
Egypt, i.e. to ·trace the contemporary developments in state and class rule to their 
historical roots and identify the struggles that characterized the history of state and 
class rule in Egypt. As Ollman (2003) in his discussion of Marx's method pointed out, 
often policy analysis or ideologically-tainted explanations of political phenomenon 
tend to adopt a narrow focus, resulting in placing the blame on an individual (i.e. bad 
president or policy makers) or make the problems appears as trans-historical (i.e. 
Orientalist explanations). I intended to analyse the processes of social change and the 
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struggles around property relations in the specific context of the development of 
modem capitalism. 
Class Analysis 
Any class analysis needs to move beyond the sociological approach that conceives 
class primarily as a structure or category and instead conceptualize it as a relationship 
and a process that is fundamentally historical (Thompson 1991 ). As Ellen M. Wood 
(1995: 81) has argued, the "main burden of a Marxist theory of class must be less on 
identifying class 'locations' than on explaining processes of class formation." On 
this matter it is worthwhile quoting Wood (1995: 98) at length: 
The notion of class as 'structured process', in contrast, 
acknowledges that while the structural basis of class 
formation is to be found in the antagonistic relations of 
production, the particular ways in which the structural 
pressures exerted by these relations actually operate in 
the formation of classes remains an open question to be 
resolved empirically by historical and sociological 
analysis. Such a conception of class also recognizes that 
this is where the most important and problematic 
questions about class lie, and that the usefulness of any 
class analysis - as either a sociological too or a guide to 
political strategy - rests on its ability to account for the 
process of class formation. This means that any 
definition of class must invite, not foreclose, the 
investigation of process. 
Two aspects of this conceptualization of class and class analysis are important for this 
study. The first relates to the twofold character of what Thompson (1963) refers to as 
'class as a relationship'. And as Thompson emphasizes, understanding class relations 
requires a historical approach: "If we stop history at a given point, then there are no 
classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if 
we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in 
their relationships, their ideas, and their institutions. Class is defined by men as they 
live their own history, and, in the end, this is its only definition" (Thomspon 1963: 
Preface). Class analysis then incorporates the relations between classes as well as 
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among members of the same class. This latter component of class analysis becomes 
particularly important to an analysis of the self-transformation of the Egyptian 
propertied class in the context of neoliberalism. The second important point is that 
conceptualizing class as a process necessarily entails a class analysis appropriate to 
analyzing class formation. 
This dissertation therefore adopts an historical, or 'diachronic' as opposed to a 
'synchronic' approach to class analysis. The latter approach views history as a series 
of what Hay (2002) calls 'comparative statics', and reveals little about the character, 
pace or temporality of change over time. What is actually taken as 'change' is not the 
continuous evolution of the subject, but rather a comparison of two or more 
differentiated states in the development of the object under examination (Ollman 
2003). The historical approach to class analysis adopted in his study raises questions 
about the relationship between structure and agency and the prospects of 'path 
dependency' that this entails (Hay 2002; Katznelson 1998; Haydu 1998). 
Understanding the problem of housing as ~ qualitatively new development 
linked to specific phases of state and class formation, rather than a quantitative change 
linked to demographic shifts, requires the adoption of this particular approach. As 
mentioned in the literature review, the majority of housing studies adopt a 
'comparative static' approach and view the problems of housing as technical or 
logistical problems with little concern for history and social context. Most housing 
studies do not examine change through a study of social processes, but rather through 
a study of selective periods; the differences found between the selected periods is 
called 'change'. This quantitative focus results in a narrow conception of change and 
tells us little about the nature of these changes, the agents involved in issuing in these 
changes, or the ,forms of resistance to these changes. This, in turn, precludes an 
understanding of the real causes of change that constitute the problem in the first 
place. 
This dissertation aims to go beyond the existing literature on housing by 
examining the relationship between neoliberalism, the commodification of land and 
the privatization of tenure in Egypt. In order to highlight the significance of the social 
transformations under way since 1991, I situate it within the context of the 
contestation of property rights beginning in the nineteenth century. I argue that the 
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current housing crisis in Egypt has been transformed and exacerbated by the 
neoliberal reforms that began in 1991. While problems of housing pre-date the 
introduction of neoliberalism, the current crisis is now both rural and urban in 
character and strikes at the very nature of tenure in Egypt. Both of these 
developments are novel. In this dissertation, I analyse the impact of neoliberalism and 
the way it transforms the spatial experience of both urban and rural areas, and the 
effect it has on access to housing as market imperatives are generalized across Egypt. 
My intention is not to examine housing policy in a technical sense that treats housing 
as merely a logistical problem, but rather to situate the study of housing within the 
larger context of class struggle, state formation and capitalist· development in a way 
that emphasizes the socio-political dimension of the housing crisis. 
This analysis is informed by Marxist political economy. In particular, the 
dissertation draws on David Harvey's conception of 'accumulation by dispossession' 
and Wood's notion of 'market dependence' (Harvey 2003; Wood 2003). The former 
refers to the strategies of capital accumulation associated with the neoliberal phase of 
capitalist development, while the latter refers to the condition of dependence, by both 
producers and appropriators, on market imperatives for their social reproduction. As 
will become clearer in the next chapter, these two concepts are fundamentally related 
to one another, but represent different moments of capitalist development. 
Key Concepts 
Capitalism 
Capitalism constitutes a system of social property relations in which the organization 
of total social labour and the mobilization and distribution of natural resources are 
determined by the imperatives of profit maximization rather than determined by actual 
social needs of a society. 
While capitalist developed initially occurred in England, later models of capitalism 
did not necessarily follow the same path. As a result, we witness a divergence in the 
path of capitalist development in European and North American countries shaped by 
their specific historical and political contexts. Similarly, in the Global South, capitalist 
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development has occurred unevenly subjected to not only the local historical and 
political factors, but also subjected to the global capitalist economy's imperatives. 
Class 
Class can be conceived as a social relationship which has formed historically. Class 
comes about as a process, and is experienced as a relationship between groups of 
people who either control resources and means of production or who earn wages in 
order to survive. Rather than in an abstract sense, class has to be understood in its 
specific historical, social and political contexts. As societies undergo change in the 
process of transition to capitalism, class relations also undergo change. As E. P 
Thompson stated: "Class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences 
(inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between 
themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually 
opposed to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive 
relations into which men are born-or enter involuntarily" (1963: Preface). 
In short, class is experienced as individuals assume social roles. Demonstrating class 
requires a study of how particular individuals came to assume particular social roles, 
how institutions developed historically and what interests were pushed forward by the 
individuals and institutions. 
State 
State in its abstraction can be conceived of as an ensemble of institutions (coercive 
and extractive) representing the culmination of previous social struggles. What does 
the state do? The state exercises power over the territory under its borders, but the 
powers remain contested by rival groups of elites and ruling classes where 
institutional arrangements have not resulted in stable power sharing arrangements. 
The exercise of power by a ruling class or ruling elite is dependent on the 
administrative, legal and institutional capabilities of the state and the degree to which 
state has or has not gained legitimacy in the eyes of other social classes. 
21 
Capitalist State 
A capitalist state reproduces capitalist social relations by ensuring that short term 
interests of capitalists do not undermine the system. The capitalist state accomplishes 
this goal through maintaining a degree of relative autonomy from capitalists and their 
particularistic interests. The state relies on a set of sophisticated legal, coercive and 
bureaucratic apparatuses that are developed and perfected under various 
regimes/governments. This guarantees the continuation of the capitalist system and 
gives the state an image of permanence disregard of the various ruling parties that 
assume power. Although under capitalism the economic sphere appears to have 
assumed independence form the political sphere, the economic imperatives of 
capitalism continues to require the extra-economic powers of "regulation and 
coercion, to create and sustain the conditions of accumulation and maintain the system 
of capitalist property"(Wood 2002: 178 ). Indeed, more than any other system, 
capitalism requires "politically organized and legally defined stability, regularity and 
predictability in its social arrangements" (Ibid.). 
Political Accumulation versus Capitalist Accumulation 
Political accumulation takes place in non-capitalist or pre-capitalist societies where 
there exists a fusion of political and economic spheres. In other words, political 
accumulation requires the direct use of force by the state or ruling class. Capitalist 
accumulation in contrast does not require the use of naked force or violence. Rather 
coercion is masked through the institutional forms of exploitation and contractual 
nature of capital-labour relation that has emerged historically. As such, capitalist 
accumulation appears to be occurring in the realm of the market without the influence 
of political actors or ruling classes. However, the apparent separation of the economic 
from the political realm cannot always mask the political nature of exploitation and 
accumulation which is why the capitalist state continues to rely on coercive force of 
the police, courts and prisons. 
Neoliberalism 
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Neoliberalism is a specific phase in the development of capitalism, with its rise being 
a response to the crisis of profitability experienced by capital in the 1970s. 
Neoliberalism was a set of ideas and later policy proposals that attacked state 
regulations on capital, workers' rights and gains made in the post-WWII period. 
Neoliberal policies associated with the set of policy outcomes that were put in place in 
the US under Ronald Reagan and in the UK under Margaret Thatcher. Neoliberal 
policies were also imposed in Latin America and other parts of the Global South, with 
the Middle East being affected by these policies in the 1990s., In the latter case, 
Neoliberalism blamed the statist model for the structural weakness of the economies 
of the region and instead proposed economic liberalization, privatization of state 
enterprises and deregulation of capital. In short, neoliberalism paved the way for a 
greater role of the private sector in the economy while targeting the progressive gains 
made by workers and peasants in the post-WWII period. 
Accumulation by Dispossession 
This concept is specific to the historical context of the 1970s when, Harvey claims, 
the crisis of accumulation by capitalists was resolved through either reversing 
workers' post- WWII gains in the advanced capitalist countries or through finding 
new areas and sources of accumulation. The latter solution when extended to the 
Global South entailed a package of policies by the International Financial Institutions 
which paved the way for commodification of communal resources and abolition of 
customary forms of tenure. Inf act, the latter policies in the Glo;bal South formed the 
basis of accumulation of local ruling classes in the 1990s and this is the subject of 
discussion in this dissertation. 
'klarketDependence 
In the context of development or deepening of capitalist social relations, direct 
producers (i.e. peasants) lose non-market access to their means of livelihoods. In the 
absence of non-market means, direct producers become market dependent for their 
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basic means of survival. In the context of the post 1990 Egypt, we witness a process 
whereby workers lose access to guaranteed (protected from market imperatives) 
services, goods as well as benefits. The dismantling and privatization of state 
enterprises in combination with the dismantling of secure tenancies and attack on 
customary forms of tenure played an important part in rendering workers and peasants 
market dependent for their basic means of survival. 
Sources 
This dissertation relies on a range of evidence which includes official international 
and Egyptian state policy documents, interdisciplinary scholarly analysis of Egyptian 
political economy, and interviews and observations, which complement the 
documented evidence. 
My empirical data includes academic studies, official government reports, economic 
reports from national and international financial institutions and news articles 
collected from archives, libraries in Egypt (Centre d'Etudes et de Documentation 
Economiques et Juridiques, the library archives and Social Research Centre of the 
American University in Cairo) and France (the Institute of the Arab World in Paris). 
The aim of the qualitative research component was to gain an in-depth 
understanding of how workers and peasants experienced the process of change that 
was triggered by the liberalization of land and housing markets and the extent of this 
change across the country. This data was collected through unstructured interviews, 
which included purposive heterogeneous sampling of a wide variety of subjects in 
order to assess a wide range of reactions to the changes that had taken place since 
1991. The interviews were conducted over a period of four years (2005-08) in diverse 
geographical settings which included thirteen out of a total of twenty seven 
governorates. I carried out fifty six interviews with workers, peasants, landlords and 
policy makers. These interviews which are included in my case study Chapters Eight 
and Nine offer a window into how social agents experienced the changes in social 
relations that occurred as part of the strategy of accumulation by dispossession. The 
interviews also shed light on how the social agents, coming from different class 
backgrounds, interpreted the nature of the social change and how they viewed the role 
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of the state and how they reacted to policies that changed their social status and the 
extent of control they exercised over their lives and livelihoods. 
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the research that was carried out for this 
dissertation. First, conducting fieldwork was not immune from the intrusion of 
security forces and police that monitored access to villages across the country and on 
a few occasions prevented me from carrying out interviews and ~us my choice of 
villages sometimes were shaped by the ease with which I could gain access to my 
interview subject. Second, there is a lack of specific data on land ownership types and 
sizes. Given that this study is the study of contemporary struggles over land, it has 
been limited by the on-going legal changes by the state in land tenure, legal battles 
over lands seized involving private investors, farmers and the state, lack of disclosure 
of amount of land that changed hand between the state and private investors, and 
importantly lack of reliable information about the amount of land that was 
repossessed from peasants and small farmers by landlords. The only reliable, yet 
sporadic source of data for studies of land dispossession have been reports prepared 
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and as dispossession has been underway 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, such data is constantly outdated by recent 
developments on the ground. 
My data on land ownership structure and size therefore needs to be qualified. 
There are various categories of land ownership that are referred to in this dissertation, 
such as royal lands, state lands (public lands), endowment of waqf lands, private 
lands, foreign-owned lands and Agrarian Reform lands. I provide the distribution of 
registered lands which are recorded by the state. However, most of the land that falls 
under the category of state (public) lands and customary lands remain unregistered 
and therefore no reliable source for such information exists. In addition, most land for 
which records exist constitutes agricultural land. Desert lands which fell under 
customary tenure or state lan~s gained importance after they were being privatized in 
the 1990s and 2000s either for tourist development or mega-agricultural projects. 
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Thus, the contestation over various forms of land during Mubarak's rule left land 
tenure forms in a state of flux whereby it remained difficult to capture the exact 
amount of land under various tenure forms. However, what 'Vas possible to observe 
from the scattered pieces of evidence provided by the Egyptic;m media and non-
governmental organizations was the direction of change in access to land whereby 
customary forms of access to land and land that fell under state control were being 
subsumed by private property. Finally, I should mention that the data on the Egyptian 
military and their landholdings are not included, although I have discussed the role of 
the military and security forces in the process of dispossession. Under Mubarak's rule, 
information pertaining to the military was considered sensitive and categorized as part 
of national security. A fuller picture of the extent of the military's economic power 
may emerge in the coming years or decades. 
Structure 
The dissertation is divided into three parts and ten chapters. The chapters in Part One 
discuss approaches to the study of capitalist development in the Middle East. Chapter 
Two begins with a critical examination of Orientalist and modernization approaches 
to the Middle East, followed by a discussion of the alternatives presented by 
dependency and world systems theories. The final part of the chapter discusses the 
political economy literature within which I situate my own approach. This section 
offers a detailed discussion of the main concepts employed in this study and offers a 
theoretical framework that situates the current developments in property relations 
within the context of an expanding capitalist system. In Chapter Three, I discuss the 
neoliberal development model in the Middle East and in Egypt. This chapter 
examines the evolution of Egyptian development models from statism under Nasser to 
neoliberalism under Mubarak and assesses their impacts on property relations and 
housing. 
In Part Two, I trace the history of state formation, property regimes and 
housing from 1805 to 2010. These chapters discuss the evolution of housing policy in 
conjunction with changes in property relations and state formation. Chapter Four 
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includes an examination of the social struggles surrounding state formation, 
colonialism, and the various forms of property regimes that emerged in these periods. 
Chapter Five examines the period under Nasser, showing how the housing needs of 
peasants and workers became an important aspect of economic policy making 
resulting in land reform and rent control. Chapter Six examines the 1970s under 
Sadat, demonstrating how changes in property relations reflected the economic 
interests of the landed classes and the smaller merchants (the in.fitahi) and affected the 
nature of housing policy. 
Part Three focuses on the Mubarak period and the social and economic 
transformations that Egypt experienced under his rule. Chapter Seven discusses the 
shift to a market economy and the reconstitution of power relations through the 
implementation of new property laws and the strict enforcement of property rights, 
resulting in the coalescence of the landed class and a new fraction of the bourgeoisie. 
Chapters Eight and Nine demonstrate the ruling class coalition's attempts to 
dispossess workers and peasants as a strategy of accumulation. The case studies in 
these chapters provide a detailed look at the social struggles around access to housing 
as well as the class based nature of housing policy. In Part Four, the concluding 
Chapter Ten reiterates the close relationship between the shift to a 'free market' 
economy, the violent character of accumulation by dispossession and the insecurity 
and economic coercion associated with market dependence. It also emphasizes the 
role of the state in the reconfiguration of class relations, and concludes with a brief 
summary of the contribution of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2. Capitalism and Development in the Middle East 
Explanations of the subordinate position of Middle Eastern economies within the 
global economy and analysis of the social problems afflicting societies in the region 
have been deeply influenced by scholarly traditions of Orientalism and modernization 
theory. The absence of a tradition of political economy that critically assesses the 
integration of the region and the adverse effect of the expansion of the capitalist 
global economy on the region have reinforced the former traditions and their 
influence in Middle Eastern studies. This chapter discusses the various scholarly 
traditions that have over the course of the twentieth century and after shaped the 
contours of Middle East studies and consequently leading to an ordering/prioritizing 
of certain themes and research topics against others. In section one, I discuss how 
Orientalist influences shaped the development of the study of the Middle East. The 
following two sections deal with various postwar studies that attempted to explain the 
lack of economic development in the region. In particular, the contributioi;i of 
modernization, dependency theory and world systems theories will be assessed. 
Following this, I examine how recent studies in the political economy of the Middle 
East remain trapped by Orientalist characterizations of modernity and traditionalism. 
Next, I discuss a Marxian approach to the study of the Middle East. This approach 
situates the historical and contemporary developments in the region in the context of 
the expansion of a global capitalist market with its features of market dependence and 
competitive imperatives. In this section I introduce my main concepts borrowed from 
Harvey and Wood, accumulation by dispossession and market dependence, 
respectively. The concluding section characterizes the current phase of capitalist 
expansion in the region as a process of accumulation by dispossession: a conflict-
ridden process that has resulted in the generalization of market dependence and the 
reconfiguration of property relations in Egypt. 
Orientalism and the Middle East 
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In the 19th century, the study of the Middle East emerged out of what has been termed 
the Orientalist tradition of historiography. 'Orientalism' is a multi-faceted term, 
encompassing both a self-conscious scholarly tradition - associated with British and 
French 'Oriental' studies - as well as a term famously employed by Edward Said 
(1979: 2) to refer to a "style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between 'the Orient' and ... 'the Occident' ."18 In a similar vein, 
Thierry Hentsch (1992) argues that the 'Orient' was created as the 'other' against 
which a unified Western Civilization could be defined. A continuous 
'epistemological thread' of Orientalist discourse can be found in scholarship dating 
back as far as the Ancient Greece. In both cases, Orientalism 'essentializes' an 
Islamic identity by privileging the cultural and religious factors of Islam over the 
political, economic and social components in its explanation of Middle Eastern 
development. Indeed, as Maxime Rodinson (1987: 60) pointed out, it was in the 19th 
century that a conception of homo islamicus, a type of man essentially different from 
'Western man', emerged in scholarly discourse. 19 A further key point of 
differentiation relates to the dynamism of W estem society versus the stagnation of 
Middle Eastern societies that were "self-contained, isolated from external relations, 
frozen in an immobile dynamic and unchanging before their incorporation into the 
modem world system" (Farsoun and Hajjar 1990: 164). As a result of a perceived 
static nature of Eastern societies, change occurred only under the influence of external 
forces such as European colonialism. It is no surprise then that the rise of Orientalism 
coincided with the growth of European and American power over the Muslim world. 
Orientalists like Bernard Lewis explained these essential differences in terms 
of a differentiation between a rational, liberal West and a traditional, autocratic East. 
18 Said argued that Western scholars - particularly colonial officials and travel writers of the 19th 
century-had been complicit in the West's domination over the East by representing the Orient as an 
"irrational, weak, feminised 'Other"' cast in essentialist terms against a ''rational, strong, masculine 
West" (Said 1979). According to Said, this image of the East, and especially of the Middle East, was 
based on a series of false assumptions that reflected Western prejudices against the East, and Arabs and 
Muslims in particular. The truth, however, was that there was no Orient that accurately corresponded 
to the depiction put forward by Orientalists. 
19 Although trained in the French Orientalist tradition, Rodinson attempted to dismantle the classical 
Orientalist myths that Islam was hostile to trade and commerce (Rodinson 1977). Rodinson argued that 
Islam was not the reason behind the Muslim world's failure to embark on capitalism; rather, the 
Muslim world's socio-economic structures were organized in such a way so that trade, production and 
redistribution did not lead to capitalist development. Despite representing an important critique of 
Orientalism, Rodinson's work remained marginal to the social sciences in America and Great Britain. 
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In 'Communism and Islam', an essay published in International Affairs in 1953, he 
argued that Islamic political tradition has always been essentially autocratic in the 
sense that the sovereign was owed "complete and unwavering obedience as a religious 
duty imposed by Holy Law" (Lewis 1954: 8). Both Islam and communism, he 
argued, displayed a disregard for political liberty and human rights, and represented 
totalitarian doctrines that offered a sense of a mission to their followers. In a global 
context of anti-colonial revolt against the West, Muslims would embrace communist 
notions of collective action and selfless devotion to an ideal. Despite the overlapping 
similarities between Islam and communism, however, Lewis argued that Muslim piety 
would not tolerate communist atheism. 
This Orientalist tendency to explain the absolutist and repressive character of 
Arab governments by reference to a deferential or despotic Arab culture or Muslim 
religion meant that the complex nature of social relations and institutions of rule in 
Arab and Muslim societies were completely overlooked. In 'Islamic Concepts of 
Revolution' Lewis (1972) argued that while Muslim Arabs would resist impious 
governments, the "Western doctrine of the right to resist bad government [was] alien 
to Islamic thought" (1972: 33). There was a tendency, therefore, for Islam to foster 
tyranny and sanction subservience. In order to prove this, Lewis presented Islam as a 
"unitary civilization whose basic patterns were set a millennium or more ago and 
which continues to shape the beliefs and behaviours of Muslims everywhere even 
today" (Lockman 2004: 175). As Lockman (2004: 175) points out, Islam, for Lewis, 
"had always been, and remained a civilization whose essential characteristics and 
historical trajectory could be deduced from the texts of the 'classical' period and 
which did not, and cannot, really change. "20 
The emphasis on a despotic political culture prevalent in Eastern societies has 
a long history in Western political thought and gained a more 'scientific' grounding in 
a number of key sociological studies.21 In his famous text, Economy and Society 
20 Lewis's work oversimplifies the complex history of the Muslim world, its interaction with the West, 
and downplays the diverse nature of Muslim and Arab society, see: Ira M. Lapidus (1984; 2002). 
Lewis's work presents broad generalizations of Arabs, Muslims and Islam. As a result, he not only 
essentializes Islam, but presents it as a monolithic, ahistorical phenomenon, divorced from social 
struggles specific to the various political contexts of the region. Lewis effectively denies agency to 
Arab peoples as makers of their own history, thereby devaluing their struggles against colonialism. 
21 For a study of the orientalism embedded within Western political thought, see Springborg (1992). 
30 
(1978/1922) Max Weber wrote that Muslim societies ''were weak and backward 
because they lacked many of the key institutions which enabled Western societies to 
become wealthy and powerful" (Lockman 2004: 87). Key among these institutions 
was the development of private property rights which fostered the development of an 
entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and required the deve~opment of the rule of law. In 
contrast to Western Europe, the Muslim world was instead characterized by 
'sultanism', a system of domination by patrimonial states whose rulers were 
rapacious, arbitrary and despotic. The 'discretionary' basis of the patrimonial power 
of sultanism was rooted in traditionalism and therefore represented the antithesis of 
'rational' forms of rule (Weber 1978: 231-32).22 
Building on some of Marx's controversial writings on 'Asiatic' societies, as 
well as Weber's notion of an Eastern 'hydraulic-bureaucratic office-state', Karl A. 
Wittfogel (1959/1957) sought to ground the notion of 'Oriental Despotism' within a 
materialist exposition of the 'Asiatic Mode of Production' (AMP). According to the 
AMP, 'Asiatic' societies were based on 'hydrauli~ economies' that required extensive 
irrigation systems in order to produce a social surplus. This in turn required the 
development of a 'manager state' that possessed significant organizational capacity to 
ensure the provision of infrastructure and the allocation of labour needed to maintain 
the hydraulic economy. The growth of such a state facilitated its dominance over the 
various social classes and prevented the development of private property in land. In 
Europe, where the development of private property empowered specific social classes 
to restrict the arbitrary rule of monarchs and kings, no such development occurred 
under the AMP. Through the state, the despot retains an absolute or autocratic power 
over government, organizes the economy through control over a strong and large 
bureaucracy, and maintains total power over society by keeping a population under a 
unified system of domination. 23 
The AMP has been used by some Marxist scholars from the Middle East to 
explain the various stages of Egyptian development. Anouar Abdel Malek (1968) 
uses the concept to explain the development of unity, centralization, and hierarchy in 
22 See: Bryan Turner (1974). 
23 For a critical discussion of the Asiatic Mode of Production, see: Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst 
(1975). -
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virtually every domain of Egyptian society and economy. In contrast to European 
societies, the Egyptian ruling class maintained its power through control over the 
bureaucratic state, rather than relying on the accumulation of wealth through private 
property as the source of its power. Any weakness in the explanatory capacity of the 
AMP can be compensated for by a demonstration of how it is 'articulated' with other 
modes of production such as nomadism and mercantilism. 24 
Despite these qualifications, the AMP has come under: heavy criticism. Both 
Perry Anderson (1974) and Bryan S. Turner (1974; 1978) criticize it for being an 
underdeveloped concept that claims to 'explain' the wide range of societies as diverse 
as Imperial Rome, Tsarist Russia, Hopis Arizona, Sung China, Ottoman Turkey and 
Sumerian Mesopotamia, Inca Peru, Persia and India.25 Similarly, it has been 
criticized for its tendency to characterize Eastern societies as 'static' or 'stagnant' in 
terms of their social development. 26 While this is not the place to engage in a 
substantive debate about the AMP, the point is to highlight the ways in which it 
buttresses the notion of 'oriental despotism' that emerges out of the Orientalist 
tradition. In this sense, Orientalism has left a durable legacy in 20th century social 
science by creating an 'essentializing' paradigm for the study of the Middle East 
through which various disciplines and theoretical approaches interpreted 
developments in the region. 
Modernization Theory and the Middle East 
In contrast to the Orientalist tradition, modernization theory assumes a unilinear path 
of capitalist development that all states have the potential to follow. 27 This path of 
24 For an insightful discussion of Abdel Malek, see: Nazih N. Ayubi (1995b). 
25 See also A. L. Macfie (2000). Hamza Alavi's notion of 'over-developed state' is another variation of 
the state in the AMP or Tributary mode. The 'over-developed state' is similarly bureaucratic, with a 
strong military wing and relative autonomy vis-a-vis social forces (Alavi 1971). For a critique of the 
tributary mode and Amin's work, see: Terence J. Byres (1985). 
26 Various historical case studies of various Asian, African and even Latin American societies, have 
challenged this tendency. 
27 According to Lockman, "[m]odernization was a unilinear process in the sense that each 
contemporary society could be located somewhere along the fixed trajectory 9fhistorical development 
that led from tradition to authentic modernity. By definition, the advanced in~ustrial countries of North 
America and Western Europe, and a few others, were deemed to have already achieved modernity; 
straggling behind them at various points along the road to modernity were all the rest, all those 
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development takes the form of a shift from traditional agrarian society to a 'modem' 
industrial society, signifying a qualitative change from a 'simple' and less 
differentiated form of society to a more complex and differentiated urbanized society 
characterized by social stratification governed by occupational skills and the 
emergence of a middle class. The details of this transition were laid out in W.W. 
Rostow' s book titled The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(1990/1960). Such a transition would occur through the expansion of production for 
exchange, the institutionalization of private property, the creation of financial 
institutions, and the development of 'rational' institutions and democratic 
associations, all of which presumably existed in the West. 28 Whereas Orientalism 
emphasized the essential difference between East and West, and the inability of the 
former to become like the latter, modernization theory emphasizes the possibility-
indeed the inevitability- of convergence. In the words of Daniel Lerner (1958: 47), 
"what the [West] is ... the Middle East seeks to become." 
While on the surface, modernization theory appears to represent a break from 
Orientalism - given the latter's belief in the essential cultural differences between the 
East and West, and the former' s belief in the eventual socio-economic convergence of 
the Third World and the West - Orientalist influences remain dominant in its 
approach to the Middle East. In particular, modernization theorists focus on the 
"debilitating legacies of tradition" in the struggle to "achieve modernity" (Lockman, 
2004: 134). Traditional social mores and values are considered to be economically 
'irrational' and are perceived to be barriers to economic take-off. As Lockman (2004: 
139) points out, "both approaches can be seen as premised upon the drawing of sharp 
distinctions between 'us' (Westerners living as modem people in modem societies) 
and 'them' (non-Westerners, especially Muslims, traditional people living in 
tradition- bound societies), even if the adherents of modernization theory focused on 
the processes whereby 'they' would (or at least could) eventually become like 'us'." 
Modernization theorists tend to view the Middle East as trapped in a stage of 
societies (especially in the Third World) which were still in transition, still struggling to overcome 
There was only one possible path to becoming modem - that is, like the United States and Western 
Europe of the 1950s-and that was the destination ofall societies, unless they took a wrong turn during 
the transition and got stuck or side-tracked" (Lockman 2004: 134). 
28 For a provocative and insightful critique of modernization theory from the perspective of the history 
of European development, see: Sandra Halperin (1994). 
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traditionalism, where social structures remain static and irrational beliefs and values 
remain dominant. 29 The goal of modernization theory, therefore, is to find a way of 
introducing liberal and rationalist values that can overcome the influence of Islam. 30 
From the perspective of modernization theory, European colonialism 
facilitated - if not initiated - the modernization of the Middle East in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. For instance, Nadav Safran (1961) argued that Egypt's contact 
with Europe during the 19th century caused its political, economic and social systems 
to change. The problem, however, was that Egypt's Islamic culture, and the value 
system this produced, remained stagnant and antagonistic to modernization. Safran 
(1961: 3-4) concluded that the social conflicts of the first half of the 20th century thus 
could be understood as a result of a tension between the modernizing economic 
processes resulting from colonialism and the backward-looking influences of Islam. 
In a similar vein, Charles Issawi (1961) argued that Egypt underwent a shift from 
subsistence to export oriented economy in 1820 and it was not·until 1930 that the 
beginnings of a complex economy emerged thanks to a relative measure of political 
autonomy that was accorded to Egyptian political elite. Issawi identified the lack of 
economic growth in Egypt with the failure of Egyptian elites and foreign capitalist to 
invest in non-agricultural projects which could have led to a diversified economy.31 
Dependency, World Systems Theory and the Middle East 
The world systems and dependency theories challenged many of the key claims of 
modernization theory. In particular, they challenged modernization theory's belief 
that all societ~es will follow the same path of development. Both dependency and 
world systems theories apply critical political and economic approaches to the study 
of Latin American society in order to argue - in different ways - that global economic 
integration marginalizes the economies of newly integrated regions, relegating them 
to a subordinate position in the global economy. For both dependency and world 
29 See.: Bill and Leiden (1990: 65); Lisa Anderson (1990); Safran (1961). 
30 See.: Lerner (1958); L. Anderson (1990). 
31 Issawi (1998) held a positive view of western colonialism, and intervention in general, in the Middle 
East and in the rest of the world as he believed that through such encounters, advanced knowledge, 
technology and values from the west were transferred to less developed countries. 
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systems theorists, the point is to understand not only how relationships of economic 
inequality persist between states that are formally equal in sovereign terms, but how 
these relations of economic inequality create forms of what Andre Gunder Frank 
(1966) calls the 'development of underdevelopment' - a form of dependent 
development that enriches the core while marginalizing the periphery. As such, they 
concluded that social change in the Third World, or the lack thereof, has always been 
conditioned by external factors and relationships: in particular, the inequalities 
intrinsic to the world market resulting from the legacies of colonialism and 
imperialism. The economic generalizations of modernization theory were, therefore, 
insufficient to explain the nature of development in the Global South. 32 
According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1976), the historical roots of 
underdevelopment must be understood in the context of the development of a 
capitalist world economy beginning in the sixteenth century. The capitalist world 
economy developed around two fundamental dichotomies: the relationship between 
capitalists and workers within the capitalist core, and the unequal relationship 
between the core and periphery. Within the world systems, a hierarchy emerges 
between the core and periphery constituted by relations of 'unequal exchange' 
(Emmanuel 1972) where core countries supply high value added capital goods to the 
periphery in exchange for low value added primary commodities. In making this 
argument, world systems theorists and dependency theorists rejected modernization 
theory's claims that economic transactions with the capitalist core will help less 
developed countries establish the conditions of 'take-off' towru-ds economic 
modernization. Underdevelopment in the periphery, it was concluded, was the result 
of contact with the world capitalist economy, not a product of a persistent 
traditionalist culture. 
The most important application of world systems theory to the study of the 
Middle East was in the work of Samir Amin. In 'Underdevelopment and Dependence 
in Black Africa' (1977) and The Arab Nation (1978) Amin explained the patterns of 
underdevelopment in Africa and the Middle East by demonstrating how European 
capitalism subsumed the societies of the Middle East into a capitalist world market 
32 See: Andre Gunder Frank (1967) and Fernando H. Cardoso (1979). 
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through the process of colonialism (Amin 1977;1978).33 In contrast to modernization 
theory's claims, Amin pointed out that prior to the encroachment of European 
imperialism in the 19th century, the societies of the Middle East were in fact well 
developed commercial centres linked to the world systems. Amin employed the 
concept of the 'tributary mode of production' (TMP from here on) to explain the 
forms of surplus extraction in the Middle East. The TMP described all pre-capitalist 
social formations that were based on coercive surplus extraction by the state (Amin 
1993).34 In contrast to the widely held beliefthat Eastern societies were inherently 
backward, Amin argued that the societies comprised of the TMP experienced high 
levels of development in the forces of production. Despite these developments in the 
productive forces, surplus extraction was predominantly linked to trade and not to the 
exploitation of rural producers. Due to this dependence on trade, Amin argued that 
the fate of the Arab ruling class - the merchant-warrior class - was always tied to 
external relations, as opposed to domestic social forces (Amin 1977). 35 His emphasis 
on the urban character of Arab societies sought to challenge the characterization of a 
traditional Arab world depicted in the work of Orientalists and modernization 
theorists. The integration of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region into 
the capitalist world system was completed through the process of European 
colonialism, resulting in the 'development of underdevelopment' and the elimination 
of traditional social relations. 36 Capitalism thus came to the Middle East through the 
processes of European colonialism initiated by a 'semi-feudal and semi-capitalist' 
social class (Amin 1978: 28). This process of capitalist development led to a 
subsumption and subordination of pre-capitalist modes by the capitalist world system. 
Hence, economic growth was uneven and international specialization in the 
production of primary commodities perpetuated an unequal relationship in the global 
33 Also see: Amin (1976). Dependency Theory also influenced the works ofBaha Abu-Laban and 
Sharon M. Abu-Laban (1986) and Halim I. Barakat (1993). 
34 For Amin's original discussion of TMP, see: Amin (1976: 13-58). 
35 Also see: Lapidus (2002). 
36 However, having made this argument about the totalizing effect of colonialism (which Amin sees as 
agent. of capitalism in the Middle East), Amin makes a contradictory claim that capitalist expansion did 
not necessarily abolish or wipe out pre-capitalist modes. Indeed, more often .than not, it preserved pre-
capitalist forms/modes where it generated a cheap pool of labour. 
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economy, as African and Middle Eastern societies exported cheap raw materials to 
imperialist countries in return for high cost capital goods.37 
Amin' s contribution counters the claims of Orientalist and modernization 
approaches by presenting a history that makes the Middle East modem in the sense of 
being a highly urban, commercial society oriented _toward external trade prior to the 
influx of European colonialism in the late 19th century. However, paradoxically Amin 
reproduced some of the tropes of Orientalism and modernization theory. As we have 
seen, Amin argued that the TMP, characteristic of Middle Eastern societies prior to 
the development of capitalism in the 19th century, resulted in a relatively high degree 
of development of the forces of production. However, he further added, the TMP also 
led to the creation of a series of 'strong states' in the Middle East; These 'strong 
states', he argued, acted as an obstacle to the emergence of a bourgeoisie. Once 
again, the 'oriental despotism' theme of the Orientalist tradition emerges to act as a 
fetter on the modernization of the economy. This paradox is reflected in Amin's 
aphorism where he stated that Muhammad Ali, th~ 19th century ruler of Egypt failed 
to build a successful capitalist economy, not because he was "too Orientalist", but 
rather that he was not "Orientalist enough in his choices"(Amin 1985 cited in Ayubi 
1995: 101-03). 
While Amin offered an alternative explanation to those of Orientalism and 
modernization theory, his specific works examined here reflected a number of 
problems both in terms of his understanding of capitalism and his understanding of 
the Middle East, whereby historical specificity is sacrificed in the interest of 
theoretical abstraction. In the case of the Middle East, he did not sufficiently examine 
the historical development of the state or the struggles that shaped relations of surplus 
extraction and domination. Indeed, any discussion of the class nature of the state 
seems absent in his formulations. And finally, Amin's work privileged urban 
commercial relations at the expense of rural relations of production for the economic 
reproduction of Arab society. Given the numerical predominance of the peasantry, 
37 A more recent adaptation of Dependency Theory has been applied to the case of the Middle East by 
Raymond Hinnebusch (2003) who argues that the 19th century penetration of the Middle East by 
Western superior military power aQd technological expertise relegated the Middle East to a ~osition of 
a dependent in the capitalist world market. During the inter-imperialist rivalries of early 20 century, 
the region was carved into states by outside powers. The Middle East was thus incorporated into the 
world systems as exporter of primary commodities and became part of the periphery. 
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and given the overwhelming importance of agriculture to the subsistence needs of the 
majority of the population, this urban, commercial bias overstates the degree of 
'modem' economic development characteristic of the various states in the region. 
The critique of Amin aside, in general, dependency theory leaves little room 
for variations in national development as it places its focus on dependent development 
and imperialism within global exchange flows (Laclau 1971: 37-38). By making the 
key unit of analysis the world market, internal social forces have not received 
adequate attention in terms of the way that some forces form specific social property 
relations, production structure and states that become integrated into the world 
market. For instance, Wallerstein (1974: 406) argued that political struggles and 
ethno-national conflicts were important insofar as they were analysed in terms of their 
significance for the functioning of the world economy. Given these shortcomings, 
Portes outlined the task of sociology of development to be that of attaining a "close 
familiarity with the internal problems of 'peripheral' societies and the external 
constraints under which they must survive" (Portes 1977: 127). 
Heterodox Political Economy 
What I have considered as part of heterodox political economy includes an eclectic 
mix of neo-W eberian and rational choice propositions that date to the 1970s when 
studies of the Middle East became more firmly grounded in the historical 
development of the state. While these works take state institutions more seriously 
than previous studies, they too reproduced elements of orientalism and modernization 
theory by explaining the lack of economic development in the region as a result of a 
political culture that is considered to be "deeply entrenched" and difficult to change 
(Waterbury 1997). · Clement M. Henry and Robert Springborg (2001) for instance 
reproduce the trope of 'Oriental Despotism' through their characterization of the 
bureaucratic states of the Middle East as 'strong states' looming over a weak 'civil 
society'. Middle Eastern states are depicted as being too centralized, bureaucratic and 
powerful, thereby impeding the development of a free market economy. Henry and 
Springborg (2001) link the lack of development in the region not to socio-economic 
factors but to political factors that shape the response of the rulers in the region. They 
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identify the same factors that the IFis have identified as impediments to the region's 
development, namely an overgrown and bloated state sector, oil rents and 
authoritarian elites (2001: 6-8). While to some extent, this draws much needed 
attention to political institutions, it also reproduces the essentialist cultural stereotypes 
characteristic of the old orientalist approaches to the region. As an example of this, 
Springborg (2009: 8) recently argued that, "beset with political apathy and violence, 
the Arab world conspicuously lacks participatory political behaviour consonant with 
and supportive of democracy." 
Another problem stemming from the eclectic nature of the political economy 
literature relates to the way in which allegedly 'critical' approaches to political 
economy have tended to support neoliberal reforms. John Waterbury's and Alan 
Richards' (1990; 1996; 2008) survey of the political economy of the region reveals a 
problem that lies at the core of some of the more recent studies of political economy 
of the region, a problem that pertains to a relative lack of analytical rigour. 
Waterbury's (1978; 1983) earlier work was influenced by dependency theory and 
therefore paid some deference to the concept of class. The first edition (1990) of the 
collaboration with Richards was organized around the interplay of three concepts: 
state, class and economic development. The second and third editions of the book 
(1996; 2008) have excised class from the analysis and substituted it with the rather 
ambiguous concept of 'social actors'. This move away from class analysis to social 
actors is reminiscent of the civil society literature that proliferated in the 1990s and 
served as an often unwitting ally of the neoliberal agenda prescribed by IFis. Many of 
the scholars who fall under the category of eclectic political economy have embraced 
a neoliberal critique of the statist models in the region. 38 The alignment of scholarly 
work on the region with the interests of international financial institutions was 
reflected in a number of works of political economy produced during the 1990s and 
2000s.39 
38 Waterbury and Richards (2008) admitted that they uncritically accepted the wisdom of the 
Washington Consensus to which they dedicated a whole chapter in the second edition (1996) of their 
book. 
39 Some of the more prominent examples include: Bent Hansen (1991); Nemat Shafik (1997); Alan 
Richards (2001 ); Henry and Springborg (2001 ); Khalid Ikram (2006). 
39 
Roger Owen's work is an exception in the sense that, given his background in 
economic history, his approach is more historically oriented and rooted in archival 
evidence. Unlike other scholars who see states in the region as ossified structures, 
Owen's (1992) analysis shows a complex historical understanding of states and the 
contentious nature of power in the region. His recent work (2000) eschews the 
essentialist cultural categories of other scholars and has been at the forefront of a 
revisionist history of the region that attempts to challenge existing interpretations 
through new archival evidence from the region. 
Thus, there is still a need for an examination of the social relations of the 
region by looking at the changing nature of rule and domination in the context of 
globalization, and the new patterns of resistance and struggle that have shaped the 
contemporary histories of the region. Samih K. Farsoun and Lisa Hajjar (1990: 191) 
emphasize the need for development theories that are informed by empirical evidence. 
They write: 
Theory in isolation from empirical validation would 
produce flawed and acontextual theoreticism. Likewise, 
any development or modification of empirical 
categories devoid of theoretical guidance and 
structuring would produce sterile surveys with little 
relevance ... What is needed is an approach in which 
theory and method are coordinated to devise an 
analytical framework and a discourse to fit the Islamic 
Middle East. 
In a similar vein, Ilan Pappe (2005: 12) argues that any study of the Middle East 
needs to emphasize the importance of the interaction of social relationships between 
elites and non-elites, and between domestic and external forces: 
... the history of the Middle East should be written as 
much as a history of non-elites as of elite groups, a 
history of change but also of continuity and of external 
but also internal dynamics of development. It should 
make room not only for the narratives of the exploiters 
but also for those of the exploited, of the invaders but 
also for the invaded, and of the oppressor but also of the 
oppressed. 
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These calls for a critical reassessment of the Middle East, an assessment purged of 
Orientalist assumptions, forms the basis of the beginning of a more historically 
informed account of the nature of change in the Middle East in general, and Egypt in 
particular. 
Historical Materialism and the Political Economy of the Middle East 
In light of these critiques of the existing approaches to the study of development in 
the Middle East, this dissertation will present an historical materialist analysis of the 
changing pattern of social property relations in Egypt. As Bromley (1994: 34) argues, 
historical materialism offers a "working hypothesis and methodology which does not 
build culturally specific judgements into its explanatory concepts." The experience of 
modernity in the Islamic and Arab world can be grasped in terms of the "development 
and uneven consolidation of certain historically specific sets of social relations, as 
well as the distinct social forms, forces and struggles that these give rise to." Bromley 
proposes a set of guidelines for a fruitful study of state formation in the Middle East 
and North Africa. First, he suggests that a study of state formation must link the 
development of state apparatuses and institutions to the changing forms of social 
relations that underlie the material production of a society. Second, there is a need to 
situate the pattern of state formation within the larger context of expansion of the state 
system and capitalist world economy and examine the local responses to such global 
processes of change. Finally, state formation must be studied in a historical manner, 
which requires a study of social conflicts and the way these conflicts reproduce and 
transform older forms of dominant social relations. Keeping in mind the suggestions 
of Bromley, I bring in Harvey's concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' and 
Wood's notion of 'market dependence' in order to explain the process of integration 
of the Middle East into the capitalist world market. 
Capitalism is an inherently crises ridden mode of production. It is inherent in 
the logic of capital to engage in constant commodification of new spheres of life in 
capitalist centres and expand beyond existing geographical boundaries in order to 
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reproduce itself. For Harvey, the reason for this expansion is located in the crisis of 
over-accumulation, which requires a "spatio-temporal fix" (2003: 88). A spatio-
temporal fix refers to the profitable ways that surplus capital seeks in order to avoid 
devaluation. Since the 1970s, 'accumulation by dispossession' has emerged as the 
dominant spatio-temporal fix adopted by capital and becoming the main strategy for 
reproduction of capitalist social relations. Accumulation by dispossession refers to the 
manner in which assets - labour and resources - are released from communal 
regulation and into the sphere of the market whereby capital bring them into the 
circuit of value. Accumulation by dispossession can occur either as a way of 
resolving a crisis of over-accumulation in capitalist centres or it can be carried out by 
"determined entrepreneurs and developmental states" who want to "'join the system' 
and seek the benefits of capital accumulation directly" (Harvey 2003: 153). 
Marx's (1976: 874-75) use of the notion of 'so-called primitive accumulation' 
referred to a specific historical moment that initiated the rise of capitalism and paved 
the way for capital accumulation on an expanded scale.40 This 'pre-history' of 
capitalism was a violent process of accumulation through the enclosures of land, the 
commodification of resources and the transformation of non-market forms of use-
value into value. Consequently, direct producers were rendered market dependent as 
non-market access to means of production and social reproduction were removed. For 
Harvey, the concept of 'accumulation by dispossession' conveys a central strategy in 
the continual expansion of capitalism and therefore is not limited to the pre-history of 
capitalism. Given this ever present reality at the core of the capitalist system, Harvey 
proposed to substitute 'accumulation by dispossession' for Marx's earlier concept of 
'so-called primitive accumulation'. 
40 Marx (1976: 874-75) wrote: "So-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the 
historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as 'primitive' 
because it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the mode of production corriesponding to capital." 
However, in a later passage, Marx clarified that different countries experienced this process in different 
ways and at 'different historical epochs' allowing us room to argue that the cu,rrent process of 
'primitive accumulation' is linked to the global expansion of capitalism: "In the history of primitive 
accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in the course of 
its formation; but this is true above all for those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and 
forcibly tom from their means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour market as free, unprotected 
and rightless proletarians. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil 
is the basis of the whole process. The history of this expropriation assumes different aspects in 
different countries, and runs through its various phases in different orders of succession, and at 
different historical epochs" (1976: 876, added emphasis). 
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Since the 1970s, Harvey contends that the crisis of over-accumulation in the 
capitalist core has sparked a wave of accumulation by dispossession carried out 
through financialization, devaluation and the "opening up of new territories to 
capitalist development and to capitalis_t forms of market behaviour" (2003: 156). 
Notable instances of accumulation by dispossessi~n include the mass privatization of 
resources after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the opening up of China to 
global capital. Other forms of accumulation by dispossession are contained in the 
devaluation of assets carried out through structural adjustment programs (from here 
on referred to as SAPs) administered by the IMF. 
The notion of accumulation by dispossession can be supplemented by Wood's 
(1994; 2002; 2003) conception of market dependence and market imperatives.41 
Wood looks at two issues: first, the conditions that render direct producers and 
appropriators market dependent; and second, the compulsive nature of capitalist 
market imperatives. For Wood (2002: 55) capitalism is defined by the fact that 
appropriators and direct producers are dependent ~m the market for their means of 
subsistence. For the appropriating classes, this requires the elimination of 'extra-
economic' forms of surplus extraction which are "carried out by means of political, 
juridical, and military power." In pre-capitalist societies, extra-economic forms of 
surplus extraction are often exercised through the state itself - something that Brenner 
(1993: 652) refers to as 'politically constituted property'. For direct producers, 
market dependence requires the elimination of non-market access to the means of 
subsistence, be it in the form of land, labour or tools. 42 
41 Wood argues that Harvey's notion of accumulation by dispossession is more about accumulation of 
wealth for the purpose of reinvestment - in other words an opportunity - whereas to Wood 
accumulation by dispossession is fundamentally about the transformation of social property relations 
(Wood 2006: 23-24). 
42 Marx (1976: 874) declared private property as the historical outcome of conquests, enslavement, 
robbery, murder and, in short, forced. During the last third of the fifteenth century, "the great feudal 
lords, in their defiant opposition to the king and Parliament, created an incomparably larger proletariat 
by forcibly driving the peasantry from the land, to which the latter had the same feudal title as the lords 
themselves, and by usurpation of the common lands ... The dwellings of the peasants and the cottages of 
the labourers were razed to the ground or doomed to decay [in order to make way for the sheep walks]" 
(1976: 879). Primitive accumulation also entailed the expropriation of Church estates whereby "The 
estates of the church were to a larg~ extent given away to rapacious royal favourites, or sold at nominal 
price to speculating farmers and townsmen, who drove out the old established hereditary sub-tenants in 
great numbers, and threw their holdings together. The legally guaranteed property of the poorer folk in 
a part of the church's tithes was quietly confiscated" (1976: 881-82). 
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It is under conditions of market dependence that the market transforms from a 
realm of opportunity to a realm of compulsion. Wood (1994: 15) argues that the 
"distinctive and dominant characteristic of the capitalist market is not opportunity or 
choice but, on the contrary, compulsion." What this means is that, under capitalism, 
individuals are compelled to enter into social relations that are defined by the 
imperatives of competition, accumulation and profit maximization and increasing 
labour productivity in order to reproduce themselves: 
The specific precondition of capitalism is a 
transformation of social property relations that 
generates capitalist 'laws of motion': the imperatives of 
competition and profit-maximization, a compulsion to 
reinvest, and a systematic and relentless need to 
improve labour-productivity and develop the forces of 
production (Wood 2002: 36-37). 
Thus, in the absence of 'extra-economic' forms of surplus extraction available to 
appropriating classes (in this case, the capitalist class), and the elimination of non-
market access to the means of subsistence imposed on the direct producers, there is no 
simple 'exit' from the market. 
Wood's (1994: 16) account of the history of the market is a much needed 
corrective to mainstream accounts of capitalist development resulting from the 
removal of "age-old constraints" such as cultural and political 'fetters' on commercial 
practices. Such accounts imply that a pre-existing capitalist rationality is hindered by 
'traditionalist' forms of culture and morality; and it also implies that these traditional 
forms of behaviour are fundamentally 'irrational'. The removal of these fetters will 
result in the liberation of economic rationality and result in the creation of a capitalist 
market. While it is the case that in pre-capitalist societies markets were a 
"subordinate feature of economic life, dominated by other principles of economic 
behaviour" it is also the case that "these markets ... operated according to a logic quite 
distinct from that of the modem capitalist market" (1994: 21). Far from being 
'irrational', pre-capitalist markets were embedded in what Thompson (1971) called a 
'moral economy' of non-commodified conceptions of the just price that related to the 
material realities of communal life. For Wood (1994: 20), it is under capitalism that 
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"social relations are embedded in the economy"; and this entails the violent 
transformation of social property relations and political culture. 
Taken together, Harvey's and Wood's concepts illuminate the process of 
neoliberal reform in Egypt. While Harvey's notion of 'accumulation by 
dispossession' focuses on the accumulation strategies employed by the capitalist class 
that require the dispossession of direct producers, Wood's notions of 'market 
dependence' and 'market imperatives' illuminate the processes involved in creating a 
market dependent capitalist class in Egypt that is subjected to·the disciplinary 
imperatives of the market. The process of neoliberal reform in Egypt can be seen as a 
multi-faceted process of universalizing conditions of market dependence amongst 
both the newly constituted capitalist class and the direct producers (peasants and 
workers). In terms of the former, this entails a transformation of the Egyptian state 
into a capitalist state geared towards the enforcement of private property rights in a 
way that precludes its use as a form of 'politically constituted property' in its own 
right. In terms of the latter, this entails a process of separating them from the non-
market access to their means of subsistence through a process of 'accumulation by 
dispossession' - in this case, the commodification of land and housing. 
Accumulation by Dispossession under N eoliberalism 
The crisis of over-accumulation in the central capitalist economies in the 1970s 
provoked a global response by the U.S. state through its control of international 
financial institutions like the IMF. What became known as 'globalization' entails the 
internationalization of capital whereby finance is freed from institutional and spatial 
regulations and able to move freely and at unprecedented speed across the globe 
(Gamble 2009; Berberoglu 2003; 1987). The freedom gained by finance capital is 
often associated with a reorientation of state power away from Keynesian forms of 
fiscal policy and economic regulation towards monetarism and greater market 
regulation of economic production and commercialization of states. This phase of 
dominance of finance capital has become known as neoliberalism. 43 
43 The Washington Consensus was presented in 1989/90 as a background paper at a conference at the 
Institute of International Economics with the main goal of assessing the relevance of development 
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Neoliberalism as an ideological framework dates back to the 1930s and rests 
mainly on ideas expounded by Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises and Milton 
Friedman. As a political project it was not until after the crisis of over-accumulation 
of the 1970s that it emerged as a serious contender to Keynesianism. 44 Neoliberal 
ideas found their way into a policy framework under Margaret Thatcher in Britain and 
Ronald Reagan in the US in the early 1980s. Internationally, the IMF and the World 
Bank imposed neoliberal policies on countries in need of international credit in the 
1980s. By the early 1990s, neoliberal policies were grouped together into a more 
coherent international policy framework referred to as the Washington Consensus. 45 
The Washington Consensus contained two primary goals: first, to dismantle 
welfare states in the North and developmen~ states in the South; and, second, to 
generalize capitalist market relations on a global scale. These goals were laid out in 
policies that prescribed the eradication of the redistributive role of the state, the 
promotion of the private sector in all areas of society and the economy, and the 
creation of a citizenry independent of any economic reliance on the state. In the 
global South, these policies have entailed a process of 'disciplinary integration' 
culminating in the destruction of different 'value practices' and their subsumption by 
the 'capitalist value form' (De Angelis 2007: 80). The Washington Consensus 
discourages state intervention in the economy and prescribes the removal of the state 
from production in order to promote the forces of the free market. The Post-
W ashington Consensus, associated with Joseph Stiglitz, revised this particular role of 
the state by arguing that the state should "intervene to create the right kind of 
institutional setting within which markets can function" (Gamble 2009: 71 ). The latter 
policy was followed through in developing countries such as in Latin America and in 
the second half of the 1990s in the Middle East. Both incarnations of the Consensus 
represent different strategies of neoliberal development. 
economics as it had been practised in Latin America. The Consensus identified the developmental state 
and its policies as the reason for the economic crisis of the 1980s. To resolve the crisis, the Consensus 
proposed the following: fiscal discipline; reducing public expenditure; reform of the tax system; 
liberalization of interest rates and trade; privatization of state enterprises; deregulation in favour of 
private investment; and the protection of property rights. For the history of the neoliberal shift in 
economic policy in response to the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s, see: Harvey (2005), Gerard 
Dumenil and Dominique Levy (2004), and Andrew Gamble (2009). . 
44 For a history of neoliberal ideology, see: Rachel Turner (2008) and Philip Mirowski and Dieter 
Plehwe (2009). 
45 See: Gamble (2009); Wood (2003); and Harvey (2005). 
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The recent developments in the MENA region constitute an integral part of the 
expansion of capitalism as a global system. The rapid transformation of social 
relations in the region over the past two decades has been facilitated by the rise of a 
global neoliberal orthodoxy. While the coercive forces of the market are presented by 
neoliberal policy makers as liberating the potential of the market, critics have argued 
that, in reality, neoliberalism has involved "extensive and invasive interventions in 
every area of social life", in the sense that it has imposed "a specific form of social 
and economic regulation based on the prominence of finance, international elite 
integration, subordination of the poor in every country and universal compliance with 
US interests" (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005: 4). In short, the expansion of the 
neoliberal project is paramount to generalizing the imperatives of the capitalist market 
and, in the process, creating a new set of rules and laws that sanction the newly 
created power of capital. 
Indeed, the generalization of market dependence through the expansion of 
market imperatives is what characterizes the current phase of capitalist development 
in the MENA region where SAPs were modelled on neoliberal policies adopted 
earlier by Thatcher and Reagan. SAPs targeted government budgets by cutting 
spending, improving tax collection, reforms of the monetary system and the foreign 
exchange in order to reduce inflation, deregulation of the market and reduction of 
external trade barriers in order to encourage foreign private investment (Murden 
2002). A process of accumulation by dispossession has been underway in Egypt's 
countryside whereby neoliberal policies of privatization of land. facilitated the 
dispossession of thousands of peasants and small farmers. This process of 
accumulation by dispossession has entailed what Harvey (2003: 74) described as the 
"commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant 
populations, conversion of various forms of property rights .. .into exclusive private 
property rights, suppression of rights to the commons; commodification of labour 
power and the suppression of alternative, indigenous, forms of production and 
consumption." It is this regional process of 'accumulation by dispossession', with the 
intent of generalizing the relations of 'market dependence', that is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
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State and Class 
Defining the state as a universal entity is a difficult task as the state has evolved 
differently across space and time. As an analytical unit, the state emerged as a 
coercive apparatus that facilitated accumulation for particular ruling elite while also 
attempting to establish the legitimacy of rule by the elite. The degree to which a ruling 
elite succeed in accomplishing the delicate task of balancing accumulation and 
legitimacy determines the stability of the state. Max Weber in Politics as Vocation 
(1919) defined the state as an entity that has monopoly over the legitimate use of force 
within a territory. This definition refers to the modem nation state which coincides 
with the centralization of power and the diffusion of localized claims over power. 
Weber's definition of the state however, remains descriptive and leaves out the 
reasons for the rise of the state and the class dimension of the state, attributing to the 
state a form of objectivity with which it rules over citizens of a territory. 
Some scholars would object to such a characterization of the state. For 
instance, Roger Owen and Joel Migdal have argued that the state as a concept is based 
on the European experience of the rise of modem states and that it lacks sufficient 
explanatory power when used in the case of the Middle East. They argue that what is 
commonly understood by state conveys the specific set of historical struggles, 
economic development and social groups that were unique to Europe (Owen 2004; 
Midgal). Owen borrows Migdal's definition of state which Owen argues is "better 
tailored to analysis of non-European political entities than any of its competitors." 
According to Midgal, a state "'is an organization, composed of numerous agencies led 
and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability to 
make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of 
rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary 
to have its way"' (Owen 2004: 3). 
Emphasizing the European roots of the analytical concept 'state', Ayubi wrote: 
'state' is a phenomenon and a concept whose origins 
and precursors can be specified. Geographically and 
historically it is a European phenomenon that developed 
between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries. 
Juridically, it is premised on the idea of law as general, 
impersonal rules. Organizationally, it is associated with 
unity, centralization and functional differentiation (the 
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so-called 'legal-rational type' with its bureaucracy and 
public servants). And economically, its rise has 
generally accompanied the development of capitalism 
and the rise of the bourgeoisie, including the need for 
extending and controlling the market, and for spreading 
and standardising the process of commoditisation within 
it, so that it included human labour as well (1995:10-
11). -
I would propose that a Marxian definition of the state, without resorting to 
economic determinism, can illuminate the role of the state (both in the context of 
contemporary capitalism, but also in pre-capitalist class societies). 
While there is no clear discussion theory of State in Marx and Engels's works, 
there is one particular passage from the Communist Manifesto that has been widely 
referred to as a Marxist definition of the state: "The executive of the modem state is 
but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." The key 
word here is the 'modem state' whereby .Marx is clearly referring to the state in 
capitalist societies under his study. Transplanting this interpretation of Marxist 
understanding of the state to post-colonial societies implies that the state in the latter 
societies have developed sufficient level of bureaucratic capacities to secure the 
interests of the ruling classes. 
As Colin Leys pointed out, such an analysis· of the state which starts by 
analysing the superstructure (bureaucracy, military) and then moves on to see how 
these apparatuses serve the interests of ruling classes is a mistaken starting point. 
Rather, the analysis should begin by examining ruling class interests as they are being 
formed through class struggle and the ways in which the ruling classes manage to 
secure their interests through the state. This analysis conveys a dynamic and changing 
relationship between ruling classes and the state while situating the changes in this 
relationship within the broader context of class and social struggles. This analysis 
treats the state as an evolving entity rather than a static set of institutions frozen in 
time and immune from change. These suggestions of Leys force us to consider the 
class nature of the state and how the state transformed in response to the evolving 
ruling class interests as a result of inter and intra class struggles (See Leys 1976). 
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Marx's understanding of the state places ruling class interests at the centre of 
the state, especially the modem capitalist state that has played a central role in the 
development of capitalism. More specifically, in the context of contemporary 
capitalism, Marx viewed the state as a guarantor of the conditions conducive to the 
processes of capital accumulation. Depending on the vantage point one adopts, the 
state in a capitalist society could be seen either as an instrument of securing ruling 
class interests or as a set of "socioeconomic structures that establish both the limits 
and requirements of a community's political functions" (Oilman 2003: 110). In fact, 
the capitalist state performs both these roles. 
A discussion of Marxist theory of the state is useful in that it highlights the 
class nature of the state and reveals the true nature of the state as a social power and 
not as an abstract entity or organization that is an objective mediator over all social 
groups. It is precisely this class dimension of the state that makes it a contested 
sphere, both among ruling groups/classes and by oppressed groups. In other words, 
the state is directly involved in class struggle through introduction of laws and by 
legitimatizing the whole economic system, legal and ideologic'al institutions (Oilman 
2003: 138). This is what is unique about Marxist theory of the state that lacks in 
Weberian and other variants of institutionalist theories of the state. 
When speaking about the state in the Middle East, I am referring to the 
modem states that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and have taken 
shape in the course of twentieth and early twenty first centuries. Subsequent events 
such as the two World Wars and the collapse of British and French empires, the rise 
of American power and the Cold War shaped the political trajectory of states in the 
Middle East and North Africa. Domestically, attempts by nationalist, socialist and 
Islamist groups to leave their imprint on the new societies influenced the nature of the 
state and state policy in the modem period. Attempts at building coherent, centralized 
states by ruling elites faced numerous challenges. The outcome of colonial 
demarcation of state boundaries and the pre-existing tribal ties proved as major 
hindrances to consolidation of the state as a centralized legitimate power. Viewed as a 
foreign imposition, states were resisted not only by elites who were excluded from the 
state by the colonial powers but also by tribes that retained their cohesion despite the 
emergence of modem states (Hinnebusch 2003). While this was the case in the first 
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half of the twentieth century, post-colonial states embarked on reshaping these 
societies. 
The Egyptian state in the post-colonial period (1952 onwards) was devised in 
the image of a modem nation state, with a huge bureaucracy undertaking the task of 
national development. What was distinct about the Egyptian state in this period was 
that it was influenced heavily by ideals of Arab Socialism (anti-imperialism, anti-
Zionism, land redistribution through a progressive agrarian reform, an independent 
national economy and social justice) and thus the state did not act as an agent of 
ruling classes. In fact, the political forces that took control of the state stripped the 
former ruling elite from most of their political and economic privileges. To 
accomplish the tasks of national development, the post-colonial state established new 
allies among the workers and peasants. This period in the life of state as an instrument 
of radical progressive change however, was short. From 1970s onwards, the Egyptian 
state expanded its coercive apparatuses as well as the bureaucracy. However, the task 
of national development lagged behind contributing to a crisis of legitimacy of the 
state (O'Connor 1973). 
What explains the precarious nature of state's in the Middle East and other 
parts of the developing world? Ayubi (1995) contends that countries that achieved 
independence prior to the advent of a global capitalist economy, such as in Latin 
America and the Balkans witnessed the emergence and consolidation of a domestic 
bourgeoisie and states that were capable of promoting the interests of their 
bourgeoisies globally. In the places such as the Middle East and Africa where post-
colonial states developed after a capitalist global economy had been established, both 
the bourgeoisies and states remained weak and subordinate to other global actors that 
had experienced a head start. Consequently, bourgeoisies in the latter cases remained 
heavily dependent on their states. 
The interventionist role of the state was shunned after the collapse of East 
Bloc in the 1990s. Along with other states in the developing world, in the context of 
neoliberal globalization, the Egyptian state became the subject of experiment by the 
ideologues of the "free market." With a keen interest in promoting the role of the 
private sector in the economy, these proponents of the neoliberalism viewed the state 
as an obstacle. The decades of the 1990s and after, the Egyptian state was stripped of 
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its progressive elements as proponents of neoliberalism, both inside and outside of 
Egypt, began remaking the state so that it could facilitate capitalist accumulation in 
the context of deeper integration. In Egypt, after 1991 that we witness the 
consolidation of the power of a ruling class and the concomitant changes in the state 
reflecting this cohesion of the ruling class (discussed in Chapter Seven). Thus, an 
understanding of the state entails understanding ruling class interests in different 
historical periods and the challenges posed to such interests either by other factions of 
the ruling classes or by workers and peasants. 
Conclusion 
This chapter surveyed the literature that has interpreted the nature of development and 
the experience of modernity in the Middle East. More specifically, the chapter 
discussed the contributions and limits of Orientalism, modernization, world systems 
and dependency theories. The main concern of this chapter was to show the absence -
within these theories or their modified versions - of theoretical sophistication and 
historical grounding that could take account of the changing nature of social relations 
of rule, domination and surplus extraction within the context of an evolving and 
expanding capitalist system. 
In order to fill this gap, the chapter introduced two key concepts: accumulation 
by dispossession and market dependence. I argued that the introduction of market 
imperatives through the liberalization of economies in the MENA countries and in 
Egypt rendered workers and peasants market dependent. I argue that the social 
transformatio~s and struggles that shape the Middle East in the contemporary period 
can be best understood through an application of these concepts. In Chapter Three, I 
apply these concepts to a discussion of neoliberalism in the Middle East and in Egypt. 
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Chapter 3. Neoliberalism, Property and Housing in the Middle East 
This chapter provides an overview of capitalist development in the Middle East over 
the course of the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the neoliberal form of 
capitalism that has become dominant over the last two decades. Prior to neoliberalism, 
other factors such as colonialism and etatism left deep marks on the political and 
socio-economic outcomes in the region. However, there were variations of outcome 
given the natural endowments, social structures and political struggles of each country 
in the region. Nonetheless, in the 1980s, most countries in the region experienced 
socio-economic crisis which were resolved by embarking on a neoliberal model of 
development in the 1990s. The experiment with neoliberalism, although enriched the 
ruling class, it did not resolve the wide range of socio-economic problems that 
workers and peasants were suffering from. Indeed, the ruling class's formula for 
enrichment entailed a further impoverishment and disempowerment of workers and 
peasants. 
To elaborate these developments, the first section of the chapter summarizes 
developments in the political economy of the MENA region and Egypt in particular, 
from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire to the 1970s. The second section outlines 
the crisis of Middle East economies in general, and Egypt in particular, during the 
1980s. The third section provides an overview of the shift towards a neoliberal 
development model in the 1990s, the character and impact of reforms .and the new 
socio-economic forces that are driving the reform process. The fourth section 
discusses the larger social and political transformations that the development of 
neoliberalism in Egypt entails regarding the nature of the state and the character of 
social property relations. The final section provides a brief assessment of neoliberal 
reforms in Egypt, emphasising the persistence of corruption and economic crisis and 
the heightening of social conflict. 
Capitalist Development in the Middle East 
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The Middle East has been undergoing a radical social transformation in its recent 
history. In the words of Ilan Pappe (2005: 13): "The history of the Middle East is a 
contemporary historiography of a contemporary process." The twentieth century has 
witnessed three distinct historical periods during which social property relations have 
undergone significant changes: the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the division 
of its provinces by the British and French (1922-1952); the period of decolonization 
and the building, consolidation and crisis of statist models of development (1952-
1991); and the post-Cold War advance of the neoliberal model of development (1991 
to the present). In the case of Egypt, the period between 1922 and 1952 represented 
an initial period of formal independence from British colonial rule that did not signal 
a profound break with the patterns of development or the soci!al property relations 
dominant in the 19th century. The revolution of 1952 introduced a particular Arab 
socialist state-led development model - a form of ISi - under the presidency of Gamal 
Abdel Nasser (1952-1970) that decisively broke from the pattern of development of 
the previous period. In 1991, after a decade under the rule of Mubarak, Egypt 
underwent a shift to neoliberalism, which is characterized by a process of 
accumulation by dispossession in the attempt to generalize conditions of market 
dependence throughout society. In each of these distinct phases, power relations have 
been restructured in conjunction with the existing set of property relations. 
During the first phase, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the forging 
of modem Middle Eastern states under the influence of the colonial powers of Britain 
and France (Halliday 2005; Owen and Pamuk 1998; Bromley 1994). In the Arab 
world, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 gave Britain control over Iraq, Egypt, the 
Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Iran. France gained the Levant states while holding on 
to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. During this period, new ruling elites, such as the Al 
Saud family in Saudi Arabia, consolidated their power while other newly formed 
states, notably Iran, Turkey and Egypt, engaged in a period of extensive state 
building. While Egypt was granted formal independence from British colonial rule in 
1922, it remained tied to British imperial interests. Despite some agitation from 
nationalists, the urban economy was linked to the export of cottcm and failed to 
develop industries that could absorb the rural surplus labour. Throughout this period, 
Egyptian society was dominated by the ruling family and a small group of landed 
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families that owned most of the agricultural lands of the country while most peasants 
and small farmers lived in impoverished conditions. The dominance of the cotton 
producing fraction of the landed class and the cotton exporting bourgeoisie signified a 
general continuity with 19th century social property relations. 
World War II weakened the colonial powe~s of Europe and set in motion a 
wave of anti-colonial struggles across the Middle East. It was in this context that 
large-scale industrialization and domestic socio-economic projects of state formation 
took off. Two particular paths were pursued in the immediate post-war period. In 
republican states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria, progressive nationalism guided state 
policies. In these cases, the adoption of radical nationalism and Arab socialism 
resulted in a progressive redistribution of land and the implementation of policies in 
the interests of workers and peasants. As a result, this period witnessed the 
emergence of a new set of property relations that reflected a new balance of social 
forces. Egypt led the Arab world with the first nationalist revolution in 1952. 1 In 
general, the period under Nasser and the Free Offlcers- organized into the Arab 
Socialist Union (henceforth referred to as ASU) - witnessed a remarkable degree of 
change whereby the existing social relations of power were radically altered through 
national planning and a program ofland redistribution (Wahba 1994; Ansari 1986; 
Waterbury 1983; Cooper 1982; Hopwood 1982).2 
In the conservative monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Jordan and 
Morocco, elites continued to hold on to their power by reaching 'post-colonial' 
arrangements with the U.S. and their past rulers. The social property relations in 
these cases remained relatively unchanged during the first three decades of the post-
war period. In the region as a whole, a kind of 'social contract' between the states and 
citizens emerged that attempted to form nascent welfare states and advance 
industrialization. The outcome for the popular classes of the region was, on the 
1 While a military coup in Syria in 1949 brought to power a peasant based military government, the 
period between 1949 and 1954 was_ of great instability characterized by a series of coups and counter-
coups. This prevented the implementation of any coherent revolutionary program capable of 
transforming the social relations of Syrian society. 
2 Debates over the specific character of the Egyptian state under Nasser are discussed in Chapter Five. 
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whole, positive in the sense that economies grew at a remarkable pace enabling those 
states to invest in health care, education, housing and other public services. 3 
The progressive nationalist development projects were affected by regional 
factors such as the various wars with Israel, and international factors like the Cold 
War and American opposition to progressive nationalism. In Egypt, the un-doing of 
the Nasserist programs began in the 1970s as a result of Sadafs macro-economic 
'infitah' or 'open door' policy. The policies of infitah embodied in Law 4311974 were 
intended to attract foreign investment (specifically Arab capital). The implementation 
of infitah required the purging of pro-Nasserist elements from the state, bureaucracy, 
local governments and the ruling ASU led to the creation of a new party organization: 
the centrist National Democratic Party (NDP hencforth). It was under infitah that the 
landed class, in alliance with an emboldened mercantile bourgeoisie and through the 
newly formed NDP, began to regain their lost privileges and assert their power 
(Waterbury 1983; Cooper 1982). While policies ofinfitah were intended to increase 
flow of foreign investments to Egypt, the result remained less than impressive. The 
absence of necessary infrastructure to support an intensive industrialization program, 
transportation problems and unskilled labour forces were noted as some of the 
prominent factors that discouraged private investors (Ansari 1986). Workers and 
peasants in general did not benefit from infitah; however, one particular group that 
became known as the 'commercial agents' including actors from a wide range of 
social and political groups enjoyed the benefits of economic relaxation (Zaalouk 
1989; Au1as 1982; Cooper 1982; Waterbury 1983 ). The expansion of mercantil~ 
activities increased the social power of the commercial classes, which included 
technocrats, state officials, as well as skilled workers who worked in the Gulf States. 
Although new at leveraging their economic power, these groups struck alliances with 
each other in order to guarantee the reproduction of their wealth derived from finance 
and trade sectors (Ayubi 1991). 
In general, the policies of infitah encouraged private investment and did not 
support the social programs developed under Nasser, and increasingly distanced 
3 In the long term, this pattern of relationship resulted in populist authoritarianism whereby citizens 
were willing to give up a measure of their rights in return for services from the state (Yousef 2004 ). 
The downside was that it also resulted in lack of 'good governance' and inclieased corruption (Yousef 
2004; Vandewalle 2003; Anderson 1995). 
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workers from the state. In the second half of the 1970s, Sadat's support among 
workers continued to decline with rising levels of inflation and rising food prices. It 
was in this context that the food riots of 1977 took place forcing Sadat to reverse his 
initial plans for liberalizing food prices. 
Development and Neoliberalism in the Middle East and North Africa 
The statist development strategies of the postwar period became increasingly 
untenable by the early 1980s when oil prices declined sharply (Beblawi and Luciani 
1987).4 The impact of this decline was not only felt by oil producing states but also 
by countries that relied on remittances from oil, such as Egypt. However, the resource 
rich monarchies of the Gulf, despite being more integrated into the world market, 
managed to shield themselves from the forces of market imperatives and thus did not 
resort to neoliberal disciplines in the same way as other Middle Eastern states. 
Resource poor states such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Syria gradually adopted 
the neoliberal model of development. Unable to downsize the public sector or finance 
the associated costs of wages and subsidies, the majority of Middle Eastern states 
faced a growing debt crisis. The most pressing problems for these states included an 
inability to provide jobs in the public sector, maintain wage levels and curb inflation. 
Other socio-economic problems included rising levels of poverty, inadequate housing 
and mounting health problems. s 
Despite the fear of political disorder, governments of resource poor states such 
as Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt implemented neoliberal policies articulated 
through the Washington Consensus framework. 6 Subsidies were cut, public 
expenditures reduced and exchange rate regimes reformed. Public sector firms were 
privatized, trade was liberalized and financial institutions were deregulated. In Egypt, 
the cost of public services increased dramatically while subsidies on petrol, electricity 
and food were cut. In Algeria, austerity resulted in the privatization of agriculture, 
4 Ayubi (1993: 26) noted that the fiscal crisis of the MENA states was partly structural and partly 
conjunctural. 
5 Unemployment in the region averaged 15 per cent in the 1980s and early 1990s with fifty per cent of 
the unemployed between the age group 15-24 years (Yousef2004: 102). 
6 Niblock (1993) covers the divergent solutions initially adopted by countries such as Algeria and 
Syria. It is only after the 1990s that a consensus emerges in the region supporting the path to a 'free 
market' as the only viable path. 
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liberalization of the fmancial sector and reform of public sector firms by allowing 
them the freedom to make decisions on sales and investments. Tunisia implemented 
the most thorough set of reforms in the 1980s, offering capital incentives such as the 
full repatriation of profits and full tax exemptions. Other reforms included: 
liberalization of the fmancial sector, privatization of the public sector, creation of free 
export zones, liberalization of trade, creation of joint ventures with foreign capital, 
and liberalization of consumer prices. Yemen and Morocco implemented a series of 
similar reforms. Iraq and Syria implemented the most limited degree of reforms. 
Neither of the latter two countries was subjected to external pressures from the !Fis 
given their isolation from the global economy. 
Overall, the neoliberal reforms were adopted at a slow and uneven pace, 
leading to increased pressure by the IFis to accelerate the process by the beginning of 
the 1990s (Shafik 1997). The IFI' s increasingly pushed for the dismantling of statist 
policies that obstructed capital accumulation and deeper integration of the region into 
the global economy. An increasing number of 'obstacles' to liberalization were 
identified: 7 land reform; rent controls; regulations on land and the extraction and sale 
of resources; labour laws and other labour market 'rigidities' that protected workers; 
the presence of public sector credit institutions; 8 and the absence of clearly defined 
rights of private property. Along with the contested nature of reforms, these 
impediments discouraged investment in the region. Domestically, new laws were 
pushed through to further dismantle these obstacles. 9 Business leaders demanded a 
number of significant reforms: a liberalization of labour markets; infrastructure 
development through public-private partnership schemes; legal reforms to facilitate 
investment flows; economic diversification and investment in information and 
7 Assessments of the economic crisis in the region were predominantly done.by pro-'free market' 
intellectuals. Such scholars included: Safadi (2003); El-Said and Harrigan (2006); Srinivasan (2003); 
Richards 2001; El-Erian and Sheybani (1997); Gentzoglanis (2007). · 
8 Gentzoglanis (2004) argued that both state intervention in the financial markets and the absence of 
regulatory mechanisms discouraged private sector activity as investors were not given assurance. 
Consequently, financial integration did not reach its goals in Egypt as the financial market remained 
dom.¥iated by the four biggest state banks that also controlled more than half of the market activity 
(Gentzoglanis 2007). 
9 However, privatization remained a contentious issue both due to regimes' concern for social stability 
and due to pressures from workers to resist such policies (El Said and Harrigan 2006; Yousef2004; 
Abootalebi 1999). 
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communication technology; a broadening of the energy sector; and, finally, 
investment in workers through education and training. 
Left with few options, especially amongst the non-oil producing countries, the 
shift to a neoliberal model became the 'common sense' solution among the elite 
across the region, although the pace of reform remained a contested issue. By the end 
of the 1990s, the dominant framework became the neoliberal model prescribed by the 
international financial institutions. The debate, which previously focused on different 
models of development, was now narrowed down to neoliberalism: any 
disagreements over policy focused more on the pace than direction of policy from this 
point onwards. 
Neoliberalism in Egypt 
In Egypt, the neoliberal model of development would be gradually adopted under 
Mubarak. Three phases of neoliberalism can be identified. The first phase spans 
from the mid-1980s to 1990, and is characterized by reluctant reforms undertaken in 
the context of high levels of unemployment. While the period from 1991 to 2003 has 
been referred to as a "rapid transition to a market economy and global integration", 
there remained some disagreement amongst the ruling elite regarding the pace - but 
not direction - of the reforms (El Ghonemy 2003: 78-80). The period from 2004 up 
until 2010 represented the consolidation of neoliberal ideological influence and the 
rapid acceleration of the reform process. 
Let us examine Egyptian economy's shift towards neoliberalism. In the face of 
a deteriorating economy in the 1980s, Egypt was pressured by the United States' 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the IMF, as well as newly 
emerging domestic forces, to introduce free market reforms.10 By the end of the 
1980s, Egypt faced a serious decline in real income per head, a negative balance of 
trade, high levels of external debt - amounting to one and a half times GDP - and a 
huge fiscal deficit (El Ghonemy 2003: 7). Debt levels rose from $2 billion in the late 
10 Egypt had to pay back its military debt to the US, which amounted to $6 billion. 
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1960s to $21billionin1981.11 Average real GDP growth rates declined from 7.4 per 
cent a year in 1980-1985 to 4.6 per cent for 1985-1990 (Ikram 2006; Richards 2001). 
Debt-servicing obligations between 1984 and 1987 increased by an average of $1. 7 
billion a year, and total debt exceeded $40 billion by June of 1987, equivalent to 112 
per cent of GDP (Ikram 2006: 56). By 1990-91, the government was faced with a 
rising budget deficit (15.3 per cent of the GDP), high levels of debt and debt servicing 
obligations and an inflation rate of 14. 7 per cent. This economic crisis was 
exacerbated with the return of millions of Egyptian workers ftom the oil exporting 
countries after the first Gulf crisis. Reforms introduced midway through the decade 
were incoherent and lacked an overall strategy for structural adjustment. 12 The 
committee negotiating with the IMF was constituted of old 'statist' elites, such as 
Kemal El Ganzoury and Atef Ebeid, who remained skeptical of IMF demands for 
budget cuts. 13 However, the severity of the economic crisis led to the signing of 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment deals with the IMF and the World Bank in 
1991. 
The Economic Restructuring and Adjustment Program (ERSAP) was signed in 
1991, but was implemented in a series of three phases, ending in 2002. The program 
contained six components: a macro-economic stabilization program; privatization; 
price liberalization; trade liberalization; investment-friendly policies; and a social 
fund for creating labour intensive employment and the creation of micro-enterprises. 
In accordance with the program, the government introduced major cuts in general 
subsidies, introduced a new tax law, revived the stock exchange and liberalized land 
rents, removing Nasserist rent controls that had provided protection for tenants in 
rural and urban Egypt. ERSAP was also significant in that it resulted in over $20 
billion of debt reduction, which reduced interest payments, and tied future debt 
reduction to the implementation of economic reforms (lkram 2006; Richards 2001; 
Ayubi 1995b; Momani 2005). 
11 Throughout these chapters, I have used US dollars ($US) and Egyptian pounds (LE) as they appeared 
in the original sources. 
12 See: Kheir El-Din (2001); Momani (2005); Richards (1991, 2001); Ikram (2006); Bromley and Bush 
(1994). 
13 Reflecting the hesitance of the ruling elite and the Egyptian public towards IMF reforms, Mubarak 
famously described the IMF as "a quack doctor" (Hinnebusch 2001: 128). 
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A significant aspect of the reform program - which will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapters Eight and Nine -was the passing of a number of anti-tenant 
laws - Law 96/1992 and Law 411996 - which further shifted the balance of power in 
favour of landlords and developers while clawing back the gains that had been made 
by workers and peasants under Nasser. 14 Law 96/1_992 facilitated the privatization of 
Agrarian Reform lands and all other lands that fell under some form of customary 
tenure. Implemented in 1997, the law dismantled rent controls, abolished secure and 
inheritable leases. Rents were increased between 200 and 300 per cent, while short-
term contracts replaced the secure land titles gained under Nasser. Most peasants 
unable to pay the new rents or the high purchase prices left the land and either 
migrated to the cities or became day labourers. This was a violent process whereby 
the state used armed forces to evict peasants, demolish houses and imprison those 
who resisted evictions. ls The dispossession of agricultural land also meant the loss of 
housing and shelter for peasants, as most lived on the land they cultivated. 
Law 4/1996 was designed to facilitate the 9reation of a private urban housing 
market by abolishing rent controls. Previously, according to laws passed under 
Nasser, tenants could inherit their leases and pass them onto their children while 
enjoying the benefits of rent control. The outcome was the deregulation of rents in a 
housing market that had lacked an adequate stock of affordable housing for workers 
since the early 1980s. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult for younger 
Egyptians to find housing; and even those who have access to housing constantly fear 
the collapse of their buildings as they are often intentionally left to decay by 
slumlords.16 
These laws represent a form of' accumulation by dispossession' through 
which an increasing number of Egyptians have become market dependent. While 
under Nasser rent control and public housing helped workers gain access to housing 
outside of the market, the dismantling of these policies under Mubarak has created an 
urban housing market. In rural areas, housing problems have spiked as a result of the 
14 The rent control law increased the amount of land owned by the peasants during the twenty years of 
its application. Rent control was quite crucial for access to land for two-thirds of the farming 
Eopufation' s. . 
5 The Egyptian Land Centre for Human Rights (LCHR), a non-profit organization located in Cairo has 
documented most of the cases. 
16 See: Chapter Eight on urban housing for numerous examples of this trend. 
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privatization of agricultural land and the mass eviction of peasants and small farmers. 
At the core of land policy under Mubarak was an attempt to attack and dismantle all 
other forms of access to land while promoting the rights of private property. 
Privatization of agricultural land redistributed land back to pre-Nasser era owners and 
to regional Arab investors interested in establishing massive agri-business projects. 
Tenants are subjected to harsher terms of tenancy that allow landlords to increase 
rents and/or evict tenants due to the proliferation of short-term rental contracts. As a 
result, over a million peasants and small farmers lost access to land and housing in the 
second half of the 1990s (Saad 2002: 124). By 1997, the year the new tenancy law 
took effect, the Land Centre for Human Rights reported that the number of deaths, 
mass arrests, incidents of torture, and injury at the hands of the police responding to 
land disputes, had increased across Egypt (LCHR 1998). 
The signing of ERSAP represented a significant shift in the balance of forces 
in Egyptian society, in both socio-economic and ideological terms. Throughout this 
period, new domestic interests and powerful external actors had been pushing Egypt 
towards neoliberalism. 17 In the course of the 1980s, organizations such as the 
Egyptian Businessmen's Association, the American Egyptian :Businessmen's Council, 
and the American Chamber of Commerce began to assert themselves more forcefully 
in an attempt to influence the policy making process.18 The Chamber of Commerce 
(2007) praised the appointment of neoliberal economists and the implementation since 
1991 of policies of privatization and liberalization. These organizations represented 
the interests of landlords and other proponents of liberalization who had opposed 
Nasserist policies since the revolution. The context of economilc crisis was used to 
place the blame for the crisis on statist policies as a prelude to their dismantling. 
During this same period, the class beneficiaries of Sadat's infitah policy had 
transformed the NDP into a more effective instrument of ruling class interests. 
Through NDP the differences among various business interests were overcome 
through the development of the kind of tripartite relationships between the state, local 
private sector and foreign capital that had been established in Turkey and Latin 
17 From the mid-1970s, the IMF, World Bank and USA.ID placed pressure on Egypt to move away 
from the statist policies of Nasser. 
18 USA.ID had a strong role in promoting the role of these business organizations in the policy arena, 
see: Kandil (1994: 264-65). 
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America in the 1970s (Bianchi 1985: 159). The increasingly neoliberal character of 
the ruling party would be consolidated by the end of the 1990s as an increasing 
number of neoliberal economists and technocrats would come to dominate the party's 
policy committees. This dominance within the party would be translated into 
governmental power as the number of cabinet positions given to neoliberal minded 
MPs increased after 2000.19 
After 1991, this neoliberal bloc began reconstituting the state and using it to 
facilitate their accumulation strategies in a context of the rise of finance capital. A 
mutual recognition of interests allowed various factions of the ruling class to reach a 
consensus that materialized in the remaking of the Egyptian state and economy in the 
course of the 1990s. First, the Parliament and the Prime Minister gained more 
freedom in determining policy making and budgetary decisions. A series of special 
committees were formed through which members of parliament asserted their 
influence, signalling an increasingly independent role for the parliament in contrast to 
the pre-1991 period when decision making power was vested in the executive body of 
the state. A Presidential Decree No. 30/2005 transferred decision making power to the 
Prime Minister to approve investment projects. Another notable change was the 
elimination of ministries associated with the statist model of development, such as the 
Ministry of the Economy. The responsibilities associated with the ministry, such as 
fiscal and monetary policy, were transferred to the central bank (Law 88/2003). 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Investment was created in 2004 in order to improve the 
environment for private investment. Another notable change was the prominent role 
assumed by the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC). The SCC came to 
play a central role in settling disputes associated with liberalization and privatization-
particularly related to property- in the course of the 1990s. Finally, electoral reform 
represented a process by which ruling class interests began to resolve their differences 
19 The Policies Committee, a secretive and powerful organ of the ruling National Democratic Party was 
headed by Gamal Mubarak- son ofHosni Mubarak. He had the support ofn.eoliberal economists and 
policy makers such as Rasheed Ahmed Rasheed (then Minister of Foreign Trade), YoussefBoutros-
Ghali (then Minister of Finance), Mahmoud Mohiedin, (then Minister of Investment), and Ahmad 
Nazif (Prime Minister 2004-2011). Almost all of the businessmen in the legislature were members of 
the NDP (30 per cent of Parliament). The list of business cronies incorporated within the higher 
echelons ofNDP included figures such as Ahmed Ezz, appointed chairman of the NDP's secretariat 
for membership issues. Additionally, Ezz was chairman of Parliament's Budget and Planning 
Committee and a strong advocate of privatizing public services and phasing out state subsidies. 
63 
through formal, democratic institutions. This aimed to cleanse government ministries 
of such intra-class rivalries that were seen as impediments to the development of 
successful policies and accumulation strategies in an increasingly competitive global 
economic environment. 20 
Businessmen, who had merely 7 seats in the 1981 parliament, had secured 31 
seats by 1991, and more than doubled their seats, reaching 71, by 1997. This rise in 
their number was reflected in a louder voice for business interests that came to play an 
important role in policy making after 2000.21 As Kassem (2002) notes, prior to 2000, 
business organizations had to engage in informal networks in order to convey their 
concerns to individual ministers. In the 2000s, however, business interests were at the 
centre of policy making. An important think tank, the ECES, provided a forum for 
neoliberal ideas, as most of the cabinet ministers of this period were closely linked to 
the centre. Throughout the 1990s, the ECES opposed the slow pace of reform 
adopted by the government arguing that to resolve the crisis, a speedy pace was 
required. 22 
Support for neoliberal policies also had a strong international dimension. This 
support took the form of ideological justification and policy support provided by the 
IMF, the World Bank and USAID. The IMF had been pressuring Egyptian politicians 
for deeper public sector reforms for some time. Proponents of the private sector 
claimed that the Egyptian state had mismanaged public enterprises as they lacked the 
ability to respond to market indicators. The outcome was a bloated public sector that 
was inefficient in terms of service delivery and wasteful in terms of investments. 
Guaranteed employment and the scale of subsidies for public services and foodstuffs 
increased the burden on the state budget (World Bank 1989; USAID 1992). 
20 See El-Mikawy (1999), Sadowski (1991) and Springborg (2003) on the politics of consensus 
building among the elite in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They show the emergence of a consensus 
among the various powerful groups of the dominant class was crucial towards the construction of the 
neoliberal project. 
21 Business pressure created a business friendly environment in Egypt after 2006. According to the 
Doing Business Report (2009), whereas in 2006 starting a new business entailed 13 steps, 43 days and 
cost 63 per cent of gross national income (GNI), by 2009, it took only 6 steps, 7 days and cost 18.29 
per cent of GNI. 
22 Besides the ECES, another important organization - the Future Generation Foundation (FGF) -
helped revamp the image of the new Egyptian elite by promoting foreign languages, computer 
technology, skills and training for entrepreneurs and managers. FGF was sponsored by some of the 
major land and property and real estate developers such as Talaat Moustafa Group (TMG), AMIRAL 
Sokhna Port and the agribusiness sector represented by Farm Frites. 
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According to the IFis, privatizing public sector enterprises would lead to a more 
efficient distribution of resources based on market indicators, and result in an overall 
increase in economic growth (USAID 1992; World Bank 1992). Their demands 
included: 
(1) the share of the market within the Egyptian political 
economy must be radically increased by privatization of 
public assets and by the removal of inefficient public 
regulation, such that competition is the judge of 
efficiency; (2) the rates of domestic savings and 
investment need to rise to finance the growth warranted 
by the level of development and the increasing 
population; (3) an increased and stable flow of foreign 
exchange is called for both to service existing debts and 
to continue to pay for necessary imports; and ( 4) the 
public sector must be able to provide efficiently 
essential services (health and education) and civilian 
infrastructure, while containing the budget deficit 
through better cost recovery and new taxes (Bromley 
and Bush 1994: 204). 
In broad terms, the public sector had to radically reduce its share of the economy and 
withdraw from the provision of public goods, thereby making room for the private 
sector to expand. 23 
IMF economists such as Jeffrey Sachs also pushed for neoliberal reform. 
Sachs (1996) argued that IMF structural reforms were a necessary measure to abolish 
the remnants of Egypt's post-war state-led industrialization model, which he 
identified as the cause of Egypt's underdevelopment. To Sachs, Egypt's low growth 
levels were linked to its reluctance to implement structural reforms. 24 Sachs' (1996: 
46) main concern was to limit the role of the public sector in order to pave the way for 
23 Since 2000, unilateral policies based on IMF prescriptions were being adopted indicating the 
ideological success of proponents ofneoliberalism. The 2003/2004 Report of the CBE is testament to 
the close observance of policy demands of the IMF by the government. The ~eport states the further 
encouragement of the private sector through relaxation of bank credit as well' as a whole host of 
reforms that facilitated accumulation strategies of the private sector, especially in the tourism and land 
development sectors (CBE 2003/2004). 
24 A similar argument has been made by Ali Abootalebi (1999) about the whole MENA region's need 
to structurally adjust their economies. He argues that the failure to increase growth levels are directly 
linked to the absence of initiatives to alter radically the economies of the region in the context of a 
competitive global economy at the end of the twentieth century. 
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a stronger role for the private sector vis-a-vis the state, in the belief that the free 
market economy was "the only real choice" for Egypt. He declared that: 
Given the progress of Egypt's reforms to date, and the 
possibility of added reforms in the near future~ Egypt 
could well become one of the world's fastest growing 
countries in the next decade. To do less would 
jeopardize another generation to unnecessary poverty, 
unemployment, and instability (1996: 30).25 
Other economists linked to IFis also weighed in on the debate regarding neoliberal 
reform. The World Bank's resident economist in Egypt, Marcelo Guigale (1993) 
argued that structural reforms - entailing the removal of 'inefficiencies', such as 
subsidies for consumer goods, privatization of public corporations and liberalization 
of trade and finance - were unavoidable. The combination of these dominant forces 
in support of the liberalization constantly attacked the slow pace of reforms while 
arguing in favour of a faster pace for more radical reforms. These pressures 
eventually materialized into a series of deeper reforms in the period between 2004 and 
2010. 
In 2004, an aggressively neoliberal cabinet under Prime Minister Ahmed 
Naziftook power. This signalled a renewed commitment to neoliberal reforms after a 
period of stagnation in the late 1990s.26 Two significant institutional developments 
were implemented by the Nazif government. The first was the granting of greater 
autonomy to the Central Bank in determining fiscal and monetary policies. The 
second was the creation of the Ministry of Investment. Through this ministry, the 
N azif government accelerated the pace of the privatization and deregulation of public 
services (through Law 203) such as: transportation, health, and education.27 In this 
same period, the government introduced tax free zones, simplified its investment law 
25 Sachs (1996: 41) demonstrated his disdain for democratic process in the following passage of advice 
to the Egyptian government: "I am a strong believer that if you want to reform, just do it. Don't 
announce that you will do it over six years, because that will invite opposition; and you will get 
antibodies all around to stop the process, and reform will never happen." 
26 Assessing the reforms under various governments, the 2007 Arab World Competitiveness Report 
noted that Egyptian economic reform picked up pace in the mid-1990s and then slowed down until 
2004 due to disagreements among supporters and opponents of reform over the extent of privatization. 
27 In 2005, 172 state owned companies were still in place, but were marked for future privatization. 
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so that foreign investors could implement projects with ease and provided investors 
free land for development projects in Upper Egypt.28 
In the latter part of 2004, the Egyptian Junior Business Association (EJBA) 
published the National Business Agenda, 2005-2006 (NBA). The EJBA was formed 
in 1999 by a new generation of neo-liberal minde~ business men sponsored by the 
tourist and real estate industries. They represent a better organized and better 
educated business association that is more capable of influencing the policy making 
process. The main goal of the NBA was to achieve higher business standards by 
making the state more effective in facilitating business interests nationally, regionally 
and globally.29 The importance of the document resides in the fact that it presents a 
clear formulation of economic policy in the interest of the economic actors - like 
those in the tourist, construction and real estate sectors - who have come to dominate 
the state throughout the process of reform in the 1990s. These reforms were 
significant for reconstituting social property relations in a new phase of neoliberalism. 
The Neoliberal Transformation of Property and the State in Egypt 
An important aspect of neoliberal reform focused on the transformation of the state. 
Securing the absolute right of private property required a different kind of 
interventionist state that can legislate and act on behalf of capital. The state was to 
serve the role of an 'enabler' of capitalist relations by providing guarantees to capital 
mobility and facilitating the opening of various aspects of the economy to the private 
sector.3° Proponents of neoliberalism refer to this as 'governance': a process 
resulting in the increased transparency and accountability of the state in order to 
enhance their image as an attractive location for foreign investment. It is better 
28 These changes were introduced in the presence of Law No. 8/1997 for Investment Incentives and 
Guarantees, which guaranteed tax holidays that covered corporate profits and personal income and 
sales tax (between 5-20 years). 
29 The document is also important in that it identifies different economic sectors in terms of their 
contribution to GDP and the construction industry was at the top of the list in terms of its significance 
in the Egyptian economy (NBA 2005: 30). 
30 These reforms include freedom for firms to generate capital, access foreign exchange and repatriate 
profits without any difficulties. Thus, governments, through institutional reforms, must ensure that 
investors freely exploit a country's _resources, workers and environment without any obligations 
towards sustainable human development. Any regulations, whether taxation, or labour laws and other 
institutional impediments that slow the tum-over of capital, are seen as impediments (El-Erian and 
Sheybani 1997: 16, 24). -
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understood as a process of disciplining and transforming states that lack adequate 
capacities to facilitate the kinds of accumulation strategies necessary to function 
successfully in a capitalist world system (Greig et al. 2007; Craig and Porter 2006). 
As Chaudhry (1994: 3) points out, despite their interventionist character, states in the 
Global South often lack the administrative capacities to "regulate, define, and enforce 
property rights, dispense law"; and despite their allegedly strong appearance, their 
capacity to tax is "strictly circumscribed." In order to 'successfully make the 
'transition' to a market economy, these capacities become absolutely necessary."31 
The task of a peripheral capitalist state is twofold: first, it needs to overcome 
conflicts among elites and, second, it has to institutionalize "a culture of the market" 
(Chaudhry 1994: 7). This entails generalizing and legitimizing self-interest as the 
motivating factor behind economic activity. Thus, the final prerequisite entails the 
redefinition of legal rights of individuals, which would replace the pre-capitalist, 
communitarian notions of rights. This is not simply a technical process of creating 
new institutions and passing new laws. Rather, it entails struggles over land, resources 
and space. It involves local communities, workers, peasants and the unemployed and 
pitches their interests against more powerful and organized groups such as landlords 
and capitalists. As a result, this is perhaps the most important and most contentious 
aspect of the transition to a market economy. 
For proponents of market reform, capital accumulation requires the 
institutionalization of rights of private property. As De Soto (2001: 3 3) admits, states 
cannot effectively act on behalf of capital in the absence of formal property rights and 
proper legal institutions. However, markets do not spring forth 'ready-made' once the 
state is rolled back. In fact, the state becomes a necessary instrument for 
institutionalizing the social property relations necessary for the creation of capitalist 
markets. Creating capitalist social relations requires the abolition of "pre-capitalist 
forms of identification and behaviour, based on primordial ties built on 'non-rational' 
and in some cases explicitly communitarian notions ... because they introduce 
31 For Chaudhry (1993), the post-independence state has been preoccupied with the project of national 
integration and has thus not developed the capacities that are required for devefoping a capitalist 
market society. She argues that the initial phase of state formation in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and 
Saudi Arabia aimed at consolidating state power through political compromises among competing 
social groups. 
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uncertainty and economically irrational behavior into a system that cannot sustain 
them" (Chaudhry 1994: 7). In commenting on the economic policy of the 1980s, one 
commentator noted that Egypt's economic policy did little to transform Egyptian 
social property relations. Rather, to this commentator, Egyptian economic policies 
"[bore] a striking resemblance to household subsistence farming practices of the pre-
capitalist period. Both tend to reduce the pace of exchange in the domestic market 
and with the outside world. Both determine the volume and quality of production 
relative to domestic needs" (Harik 1998: 185). Even well-known proponents of 
neoliberal reforms such as De Soto have recognized the radical nature of changes that 
a shift in property relations will unleash. De Soto wrote that the creation of capitalist 
property relations is "nothing short of a revolutionary process" as it is not merely 
providing deeds of ownership, but rather a process of linking property and social 
relations together in a web of market interdependence, which to De Soto represented a 
positive step (De Soto 2001: 35). 
In Egypt in 2000, the De Soto estimated the absence of private property -
represented by unregistered land and housing assets - at US$241.2 billion, or 30 times 
the value of all shares on Egypt's Stock Exchange in 2000 (De Soto 2000: 254, 34). 
Based on a 1998 survey by ECES and the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (ILD), 
De Soto argued that the extent of informal rural and urban real estate value was close 
to US $240 billion, which constituted 64 per cent of total Egyptian real estate assets. 
Thus, close to 90 per cent of the population of Egypt "live[ d] and work[ ed] in 
informal dwellings and over 80 per cent of the rural population live[ d] on informal 
holdings" (De Soto 2001: 25). 32 
The inability of market forces to access this vast property, to De Soto rendered 
it as 'dead capital' and foreclosed any opportunity for financial markets to integrate 
that informal property into the market: 
Formalization creates the rights, obligations, and legal 
instruments that enable the owners to relate to 
government and private business. It provides the 
mechanisms whereby the most important assets of the 
informal sector, namely real estate and businesses, can 
32 De Soto's understanding of informality relates to an absence of officially recognized property deeds 
as well as unregistered property including land and housing, which remained shielded from the market. 
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be used to secure the provision of goods and services, 
especially credit and infrastructure. Formalization 
transforms its beneficiaries into individually 
accountable customers (De Soto 2001: 16). 
To proponents of neoliberalism, the establishment of private property rights remained 
central to the creation of a market in land and housing, which were regarded as pivotal 
to the formation of a financial sector. The method of establishing private property 
rights entailed the dismantling of other forms of rights to land and by extension to 
housing. Thus, agrarian reforms and secure tenure as well as rent control laws were 
dismantled in the course of the 1990s. Equally important, an attack was launched on 
customary tenure (wad el yad). For neoliberals, therefore, the goal was to establish 
the rights of private property by subsuming land and housing rights that fell under 
customary tenure, state lands, and Agrarian Reform lands. As will be discussed in 
Chapters Eight and Nine, the establishment of private property rights entailed a 
process of accumulation by dispossession with the backing of the state. 33 
The transformation of the state and of existing property relations entailed a 
corresponding transformation of the relationship between the state and its citizens. To 
neoliberals, Nasserist social policies signified "the triumph of clientelism in a new 
form and on a national scale" which created a citizenry that was 'dependent' upon the 
state (Harik 1998: 186-87). Clientelism used here referred to a set of benefits to 
workers and peasants that were put in place through populist laws under Nasser. 
These benefits included a reduced work day (7 hours in industry), a social ins~ance 
scheme, minimum wage increases, guaranteed employment for university and 
secondary school graduates within the state (bureaucracy and public sector), food 
subsidies, publicly provided education and health care and rent control (Kassem 
2002). It is argued that this 'clientelism' granted to the state a particular moral role 
vis-a-vis its citizens that impeded the development of capitalism. As Harik (1998: 
187) noted: "The collective character into which the client has been absorbed or 
integrated limits the retaliatory options open to the employer, whether government or 
private." Thus, Egyptians over time became suspicious of the private sector, 
33 By 2000, 92 per cent of the real estate assets of property holders were unregistered and without titles 
(Ikram 2006: 288). 
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believing that powerful private interests would "defraud the nation if left to its own 
exploitative means and selfish pursuits" (Harilc 1998: 191-92).34 Similarly, 
liberalization and privatization were seen as having the potential of leading to "chaos 
and injustice". Neoliberals associated this skepticism with a "culture of mass poverty 
that puts a premium on basic needs rather than on political or economic freedoms" 
(Beach and O'Driscoll 2003). A new 'social contract' therefore needed to be created 
based on a limited role for the state in the provision of goods and services, 
employment, and subsidies. Beach and O'Driscoll (2003) view liberalization as an 
"imperative" that will bring "democratic capitalism to the Arab world", arguing that it 
is "only because the control of the means of production is divided among many 
people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as 
individuals can decide what to do with ourselves" (2003: 27-28). 
This new found freedom, however, was only enjoyed by those who had the 
resources to succeed in the marketplace. For everyone else, thls posed potential 
problems for the legitimacy of the neoliberal state. As Bayat (2004: 79-80) noted: 
The historic shift from socialist and populist regimes to 
liberal economic policies, brought on by the World 
Bank's Structural Adjustment Program and other 
policies, has led to a considerable erosion of the social 
contract, collective responsibility, and former welfare-
state structures. Thus, millions of people in the global 
south who once depended on the state must now survive 
on their own. Among other things, deregulation of 
prices for housing, rent, and utilities has jeopardized 
many people's security of tenure, subjecting them to the 
risk of homelessness. A reduction of spending on social 
programs has meant shrinking access to decent 
education, health care, urban development, and 
government housing. And the gradual removal of 
subsidies on bread, bus fare, and petrol has radically 
affected the living standard of millions of vulnerable 
groups. In the meantime, in a drive for privatization, 
public sectors have either been sold off or 'refortned,' 
which in either case has caused massive layoffs Without 
a clear prospect of boosting the economy or creating 
other viable jobs. 
34 This perception was based on the outcome of infitah. 
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In contrast to neoliberal promises of democratization, however, the authoritarian 
nature of the state continued to play a crucial role in the consolidation of the 
neoliberal developmental model across the region. 35 
Corruption, Conflict and Crisis 
The path of neoliberal reform did not produce the results expected by its supporters. 
In contrast to increased transparency and accountability, neoliberal reforms opened up 
new opportunities for corruption amongst the Egyptian elite (El Ghonemy 2003; 
Radwan 2003; Ikram 2006; Arab Development Challenges Report 2011).36 Far from 
resolving the socio-economic problems of the country, neoliberalism exacerbated 
social inequalities and tensions and failed to result in greater democracy or economic 
growth. And far from fostering the development of 'democratic capitalism,' 
neoliberalism perpetuated authoritarianism and triggered an increase in social conflict 
across the country, culminating in the revolution of 2011. 
One observer describes the endemic corruption characteristic of economic 
liberalization as a "symbiosis between government regulators and speculative 
entrepreneurs" (Hirst 1999). Raymond Hinnebusch (2010) referred to the same 
phenomenon as 'crony capitalism'. As Mitchell (2002: 282) pointed out, neoliberal 
reforms "did not remove the state from the market"; rather, its "main impact was to 
concentrate public funds into different hands, and many fewer .. .It now subsidized 
financiers instead of factories, cement kilns instead of bakeries, speculators instead of 
schools." After the first decade of the reforms, it was widely acknowledged that the 
intended goals of the reforms in state administration clearly lagged behind. The 
bureaucracy continued to remain overstaffed, and the staff lack the skills needed to 
improve the quality of service delivery. The state's revenues suffered a decline as 
taxes were not effectively collected. Corruption and tax evasion by businessmen 
associated with the ruling NDP shaped public perception of the state and the 'free' 
market model altogether. By 2011, lack of transparency and accountability in 
35 The legitimacy of the state began eroding during this period leading up to the uprisings of 2011 
across the region. 
36 For a discussion of the rise of crony capitalism in Egypt and the region, see: Sadowski (1991); 
Richards (2001); and Hinnebusch (2010). 
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political and economic decision making process remained a daunting governance 
challenge (Arab Development Challenges Report 2011; European Neighbourhood 
Policy 2007). 37 
At a macro-economic level, neoliberal reforms did not lead to the outcomes 
predicted by its proponents. After a decade of ref<?rm, the Middle East remained "one 
of the least integrated regions in the global economy" suffering from low levels of 
trade and foreign direct investment even after liberalization (Yousef 2004: 106).38 
Between 1985 and 2000, the region - with the exception of the Gulf States - received 
slightly more than one per cent of all the flows to developing countries (Ibid). Since 
2000, most new jobs have been created in oil-producing countries while most non-oil 
producers saw unemployment rates rise (Arab Competitiveness Report 2007). In the 
case of Egypt, the positive economic indicators of the early 1990s -rising GDP, a 
declining inflation rate and a reduction of balance of payments - underwent a reversal 
by the latter half of the decade (El Ghonemy and Radwan 2003: 7). 39 As public 
investment levels declined, private investment leyels failed to fill the gap left behind. 
Between 1987 and 2000, levels of private investment remained largely unchanged in 
terms of its share of Gross Domestic Product at 15 per cent. 40 However, in 2003-4, 
private investment levels reached 4 7 per cent of total investment and by 2007-08, it 
was estimated at 65 per cent of total investments. Areas that attracted private 
investment prior to 2004 were mainly oil and gas sectors; since 2004, infrastructure 
projects, agriculture and construction secured a prominent place among sectors 
receiving private investment (African Development Bank 2009, Table 8). 
37 The 2012 issue of Doing Business Report demoted Egypt by two spots from 106 in 2005 to 110 in 
2012. This demotion was associated with a decline in the investor environment (e.g. taxation, 
protection of investors, enforcement of contracts, access to credit and ease of starting a new business) 
in Egypt. 
38 Trade barriers such as high tariffs, an overvalued exchange rate as well as lack of membership in 
international trade organizations had discouraged trade and institutional constraints on private sector 
activity had kept foreign direct investment levels limited to a few countries (only seven countries were 
members ofWTO in 2000 with three more added since). 
39 This reduction in the balance of payments was largely the result of the writing off of substantial 
amounts of Egypt's debt by foreign creditors in the early 1990s, not as a result ofneoliberal reforms. 
40 
"Private investment amounted to about 15 per cent of GDP in 1987; it was about the same in 2000. 
Public' investment on the other hanc:l, dropped quite sharply from over 12 per cent of GDP in 1987 to 6 
per cent in 1994; even by 2000 it had only recovered to just over 7 per cent ... Privatization was 
insufficient to call forth the investment expected from the private sector" (Ikram 2006: 82). Mitchell 
(2002: 282) argues that the levels of investment remained at 2.7 per cent between 1990-1997. 
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While the state lost a significant share of its revenue through tax breaks to 
capital and through the privatization of state enterprises, it had to find ways of 
financing the external debt and the interest accumulating on it. Debt servicing 
continues to absorb a large proportion of revenue. Egypt's public debt in 2011 stood 
at US $35 billion. Over the past decade, the country has paid around US $3 billion a 
year in debt services. Between 2000 and 2009, Egypt paid a total of US $24.6 billion 
in debt repayments while at the same time, its debt increased by 15 per cent (Walberg 
2011). 
Throughout the 1990s, numerous critics pointed out the failures of the 
neoliberal growth model in the MENA region in general, and in Egypt in particular. 
These scholars questioned the feasibility - and desirability - of the neoliberal model 
of development. Karshenas (2001: 60-69) argued that no evidence existed to suggest 
that trade liberalization was solving the problem of unemployment and poverty in the 
MENA. Rather than relying on new technology and innovation for new exports, 
MENA economies had relied on price competitiveness in traditional exports such as 
textiles. In the case of Egypt, Richards (2001: 18) noted that '~exports today are less 
labour-intensive than they were a decade ago", thereby providing no new sources of 
employment. 
The belief that the private sector would step in to fill in the gap left by the 
public sector also proved to be misguided. 41 The private sector included 2.5 million 
businesses of which 90 per cent fell under small or medium size businesses. 
Remaining small in size and restricted in their ability to access credit through official 
financial institutions, these businesses mostly relied on family members and hired 
very few workers (African Development Bank 2009). Consequently, unemployment 
levels remained high, reaching twenty per cent among youth, while rising levels of 
poverty continue to plague the country (Arab Development Challenges 2011).42 
According to the UN Human Development Report (2011 ), 25 per cent of college 
graduates could not find work while 22 per cent of the population lived below the 
41 A recent study of neoliberal experiment in twenty five countries in East Europe between 1990-2000 
has revealed that privatization programs hampered the ability of states leaving behind hollowed states 
without the needed capacity to promote development. See: Hamm et al., (2012). 
42 The unified labour Law 12/2003 made it easier for employers to hire and fire workers, shortened the 
length of paid annual holiday, shortened the length of paid and unpaid mateniity leave and finally 
linked pay increases, which were implemented automatically every year, to market profits. 
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national poverty line. In light of these figures, Egypt was ranked 113 th among states 
classified according to the 2011 Human Development Index. 
Since the implementation of ERSAP, social protests picked up pace despite 
the emergency laws and the heavy police presence. 43 Egyptian workers increasingly 
protested because they felt the pressures that a free market economy had imposed on 
formerly state-owned firms and factories. The imperatives to compete with private 
sector firms and stay alive unleashed a cycle of struggle. Workers were demanding 
living wages, although managers were attempting to keep up with the demands of 
profits and competition with private sector firms. In 2004, after Nazif government 
took over, there were 265 strike actions, seventy per cent of which happened in 
response to Nazif government's policies (Beinin 2012: 5). In 2006 alone, there were 
222 strikes and sit-ins; by 2007, the number exceeded 614 (Beinin 2009: 79).44 
Conclusion 
This chapter traced the development of capitalism in the Middle East arguing that 
throughout the 20th century and up to the current period the region is being 
transformed as a result of the expansion of capitalism. However, the responses of the 
elite in the region have differed depending on the availability of natural resources 
such as oil. Nonetheless, the post-WWII period witnessed a divergent path of 
development in the region reflected in Arab Socialist regimes in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, 
Libya and Algeria while monarchies and oil rich countries strived to preserve their 
rule through reaching post-War arrangements either with the US or with their former 
colonial rulers. This early experience of state formation shaped the responses of these 
states in the 1970s and after. Section two examined the convergence towards 
neoliberalism in the region. While almost all states adopted a degree of liberalization 
and market reform, the impact of these reforms fell unequally on populations of oil 
poor states, including monarchies such as Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan. 
43 At the very beginning ofreforms, Hans Lofgren (1993) warned about a need to reorder government 
spending priorities so that short-run social needs are not sacrificed in the hope of long term stability 
and growth. Among these pressing social needs, he identified education, health, public works and 
ffograms to retrain workers and reaching out to low-income groups 
In 2011, the government reported 335 labour actions (Beinin 2012: 16-17). 
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As discussed in section three, the adoption of neoliberalism in Egypt resulted 
in a transformation of social property relations and a new balance of social power in 
the country. Coupled with policies of liberalization, in the 1990s, the Egyptian state 
adopted regressive laws that dismantled rent controls and secure tenancies in urban 
and rural Egypt contributing to a further deterioration of the existing housing crisis .. 
The loss of agricultural land which rendered rural producers market dependent, 
created a rural housing problem that was directly linked to the state's strategies of 
accumulation by dispossession. The unprecedented upwards transfer of public 
resources resulted in outrage provoking a response in both urban and rural areas. Part 
II of this dissertation takes a step back into the modem history of Egypt and traces the 
relationship between state building, property relations and housing before returning to 
the contemporary changes that occurred under Mubarak. These historical chapters 
examine the consolidation of the power of landed classes from the early 19th century 
onwards. The nature of class formation not only determined economic development 
policies, but also shaped the way social property relations were articulated through ~ 
reorganization of access to livelihood and shelter. 
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Part II. The History of Egypt's Property Regimes, Class and 
Housing 
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Chapter 4. State Formation, Social Property Relations and Housing, 1805-
1952 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the consolidation of landed class power over the 
course of the 19th and first half of 20th centuries. The dominance of this particular 
class in Egyptian state and economy cannot be overlooked and remains central to 
understanding the nature of social property relations. The experience of colonialism 
reinforced the power of the landed classes by facilitating their integration into the 
British-led capitalist global economy. Class relations and social struggles over rural 
surplus were shaped by ruling class interests and by resistance from peasants and 
workers. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century under Muhammad Ali Pasha (in 
Turkish known as Mehmet Ali Pasha) (1805-1848), power relations in Egypt 
remained contested among various factions of the ruling elite leading to a protracted 
phase of state formation. State's role in housing provision remained marginal and 
where state intervention took place, it was motivated by the state and ruling elite's 
concern for security and control or maintaining a steady pool of labourers for state's 
infrastructural projects. In the absence of developed state capacities and in the context 
of a predominantly agrarian economy, workers' and peasants' housing needs were 
subordinated to the immediate needs of surplus appropriation. The second half of the 
century saw the consolidation of a landed class engaged in cotton production for 
export. Urban and rural developments were subordinated to ruling class interests in 
the context of an emerging export oriented economy. In rural areas, housing remained 
unchanged over the course of the century. In the cities, urban development was geared 
towards attracting foreign investment: the building of infrastructure, transport 
networks and luxury housing for foreign nationals and urban elites. In both cases, the 
housing needs of the working population remained neglected and the cities were 
characterized by a kind of dualism between undeveloped 'old quarters' and 
modernizing 'new quarters' catering to elites. This chapter examines these trends 
under Muhammad Ali and his son Ismail (1805-82), and then under the British rule 
until independence (1882-1952). 
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State Formation under Muhammad Ali and Ismail 1 
Muhammad Ali is considered the first state builder of modem Egypt who embarked 
on organizing the economy, implemented administrative reforms to facilitate state 
revenues and created a regular army between 1805 and 1848. These attempts at 
building the state and the economy were to ward off European encroachment and 
Ottoman influence in Egypt.2 Muhammad Ali's first act to consolidate his powerwas 
to massacre all 200 of the Mamluk Emirs in 1811 clearing the way for a new ruling 
elite. 
His economic development strategy included building industry and improving 
the agriculture sector. He built factories, revived canals for irrigation and 
transportation, and launched modem education in engineering and medicine with the 
help of foreign trained experts and built a strong army. 3 The cotton- dominated 
economy resulted in the expansion of port cities and transportation means. Soon 
afterwards, Muhammad Ali rapidly restrUctured Egypt's finances and administration. 
He created a centralized system of tax-collection and a professional state army, both 
of which had been fragmented under the Mamluk rule. 4 The confiscated estates of the 
Mamluks were redistributed to members of his family, urban merchants, village 
sheikhs and Bedouin chiefs as part of the consolid3:tion of his rule and the creation .of 
1 Muhammad Ali was an Albanian born officer of the Ottoman Empire who was sent to Egypt by the 
Ottoman ruler to reoccupy Egypt from the French in 1801. He was declared W ali and Governor of 
Egypt by the Ottoman ruler, but after arriving in Egypt, Muhammad Ali declared himself Khedive and 
ruler, a title that has been associated with him and was carried down by his dynasty. 
2 The British first attempted to occupy Egypt between 1801and1803 in response to France's 
encroaching power in Egypt. Later in 1807, the British attempted to overthrow Muhammad Ali by 
stationing 5000 troops in Alexandfia. At this point, Muhammad Ali's attempts for greater autonomy 
were seen as a threat by the Ottoman Port, whereas the British saw in him an ally of France. Later on, 
Britain managed to win over Muhammad Ali when France abandoned his troops in Syria. In the later 
years, British-Egyptian cooperation increased as British experts helped Muhammad Ali with his 
industrialization projects (Marlowe 1965; Lane, 1836). 
3 In 1816, the first textile factory was built in Cairo, followed by the first sugar refinery two years later. 
4 For different forms ofland tenure prior to Muhammad Ali in Egypt, see: Ziadeh (1978: 239-42). 
Two-thirds of the cultivated land w:as held under ushri tenure, which meant holders of such lands only 
paid half the taxes that were paid by the holders of the remaining one-third of the agricultural land. 
The ushri land was clearly a political compromise towards the local landholders by Muhammad Ali in 
return for assertion of his authority over Cairo. · 
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a new landed class. 5 In order to increase state revenues, Muhammad Ali began 
levying taxes on previously untaxed lands and launched a state project to rejuvenate 
agricultural lands that had been either abandoned or neglected due to damaged canals. 
This work was accomplished with the use of corvee labour, supplied by 355,000 
labourers out of a total population of three million in 1825 (Marlowe 1965: 54-55).6 
Attempts at building an integrated economy however did not materialize. 
There was an inherent contradiction at the heart of Muhammad Ali's policy of 
economic development. Given the scarcity of labour at the time and his reliance on 
agricultural surplus to materialize his industrial policy, Muhammad Ali was bound to 
face a serious problem as he diverted labour away from agricultural fields and towards 
his factories and public works projects. 
From the mid-century onwards, various Egyptian rulers made attempts to 
build the state capacity and establish its autonomy in areas of administration, finance 
and judiciary vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire and local power holders (Anderson 1968). 
Under the rule ofKhedive Ismail (1863-78), the 32-year old grandson of Muhammad 
Ali, rapid development occurred. Ismail' s goal was to create a modem state by 
replicating a European model of development. In order to expand the agricultural 
surplus, Ismail imported foreign experts to manage his agricultural farms. At the 
same time, he relied on corvee labour on his private estates (Mitchell 2002; Baer 
1968). Finally, to overcome budgetary limitations, he relied on foreign credit to 
modernize the agriculture sector and build the necessary infrastructure. Nonetheless, 
all of these attempts did not prevent him from facing what Lord Cromer called a 
'fiscal crisis of the state' that resulted in the colonial occupation of Egypt by the 
British (Mitchell 2002:66).7 To expand agricultural production, irrigation methods 
were developed and railways were introduced to transport cotton to the port cities as 
early as 1850s (Hourani 1991 ). 
5 Another important aspect of his diplomacy vis-a-vis his opponents was to engage in foreign military 
expeditions which benefited not only Muhammad Ali but also all his financiers who were his rivals. 
See Lawson 1999 for more on 19th century military expeditions in Syria, Sudan, Greece and Saudi 
Arabia under Muhammad Ali. 
6 Twelve thousand of the workers died due to hard labour and exhaustion (Marlowe 1965: 54-55). As a 
result, by the late 1820s, protest in rural and urban areas - particularly in state factories - was on the 
rise. 
7 Evelyn Baring, known as Lord Cromer served as the first British Controller General of Egypt (1878-
79) and the first Consul General of Egypt (1883-1907). His book Modern Egypt (1908) reveals the 
details of British policy under his terms of office in Egypt. 
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Ismail was influenced by one of his close friends, Ali Mubarak, a powerful 
state official educated in France. Mubarak believed that there was a need for a 
national project in order to transform 'an insular and tradition bound society' (Hunter 
1999).8 Keeping Mubarak's suggestions in mind, Ismail launched large scale 
infrastructural developments such as railways, canals, and telegraphs, supported by 
the expansion and intensification of agriculture. The transformation of the capital city 
and the adoption of modem infrastructure reflected Ismail' s desire to appear modem 
in the eyes of his European counterparts. 
Like the policies of his predecessors, Ismail's infrastructural projects diverted 
labour from agriculture, resulting in a radical decline in agricultural output. With 
agricultural revenues declining, Ismail sought support from the financial houses of 
Europe to fund his projects. Between 1862 and 1873, Egypt borrowed £68 million 
(Hourani 1991: 283).The building of the Suez Canal (1859-1869) had resulted in the 
accumulation of a foreign debt of LE 100 million principle and LE 5 million annual 
interest payments (Marlow 1965: 91-92).9 To raise funds for the repayment of this 
debt, Ismail implemented the Muqabala Law in 1872 which offered land to anyone 
who agreed to pay six years of taxes in advance. 10 In 1874, he made the Law 
8 Educated in France like the khedive, Mubarak argued that Egypt could compete with European states 
if she adopted European scientific methods in industry, trade, agriculture and the education system 
(Hunter 1999: 137-38). 
9 Interests in building the Suez Canal had been expressed by the French from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, but they were often blocked by British interests who felt their holdings in India 
would be threatened if the French controlled the Canal and secured a shorter :route to the east. 
However, the French under the convincing personality of de Lessep succeeded in convincing the 
Egyptian ruler Sa'id in proceeding with the building of the Canal. The task fell to the Compagnie 
Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez and the division of labour and capital contributions were as 
follows. The Egyptian government was expected to provide free labour for the complete construction 
of the Canal, whereas the burden of funding (in the amount of Fr. 200,000 000 or £8,000,000) was 
distributed three ways between the French company, the Egyptian ruler, and the third group included 
Britain, USA and Russia. The shares divided into 400,000 shares ofFr. 50,000 of which the French 
company took up 207, 111 shares, and 96,517 shares were given to the Egyptian ruler and the remaining 
85,506 were supposed to be picked up by Britain, USA and Russia. When the latter group refused to 
accept responsibility for the shares, the French company forced the Egyptian ruler to accept the 
remaining -shares leading to a total of 182, 023 shares. The newly created burden of funding the 
building of the Canal compounded the fiscal problems of the Egyptian ruler who begaa feeling the 
vulnerable financial position he was placed in because of the Canal. More importantly, Egyptian 
agriculture which was already suffering from a shortage of labour experienced another heavy blow by 
the demands for labour as was stipulated in the agreement between the French Company and the 
Egyptian ruler (Marlowe 1965: 65-67). 
10 Ismail's rule coincided with massive redistribution of sixty thousand acres of agricultural land to 
military men and royal family members. Ismail's personal landholdings increased by fifty thousand 
acres during the first year of his rule (Mitchell 2002: 54). 
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compulsory for all those who had access to land. Ismail also sold state lands to 
foreigners as an attempt to secure funds needed to pay off his creditors. 11 However, 
these efforts failed to raise the required amount of funds leading up to the formation 
of the Commission of Inquiry in 1876.12 The Commission's subsequent failure to 
secure the debts led to a European control of Egypt's finances in 1876 and six years_ 
later in 1882, the British occupation of Egypt.13 The Colonial administration began 
implementing some of the main proposals of the Commission in order to secure the 
foreign debts of Egypt. 
The financial recuperation plan of the European powers included confiscation 
of the royal lands, the closure of state monopolies and the end of slave and corvee 
labour, all intended to reduce the powers of the Egyptian ruler. 14 Ismail was forced 
to give up Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal to the British in what Abu Lughod (1971: 
113) called one of"the most fantastic financial coups of history", whereby Benjamin 
Disraeli, then Prime Minister of Britain purchased all of Egypt's shares in the Canal 
in return for only £4 million of Rothschild's money. 15 After Ismail's deposition in 
1879, a number ofroyal estates and palaces were repossessed by Egypt's foreign and 
domestic creditors with the help of the Mixed Courts (1875-76).16 In total, within a 
period of five years, fifty thousand acres of land were transferred to his creditors 
(Mitchell 2002: 73). 
In short, state building during the first decade of the nineteenth century made 
the Egyptian economy dependent on the growth and export of cotton. The desire to 
11 Various types of Islamic and customary lands from the Mamluk period were brought under the 
control of the state under Muhammed Ali and renamed as state lands belonging to the person of the 
ruler in the first decades of the 19th century. 
12 The Commission suggested the confiscation oflsmail's personal estates of 500,000 feddans and 
raising loans on the security of these estates in order to pay Egypt's debt, ended preferential tax rates or 
ushri lands and increased taxation on the landed classes (Marlowe 1965: 97-98; Ezzelarab 2004b: 567). 
In 1877, the total amount ofland-tax paid on Kharadji lands amounted to LE. 3, 143, 000 as against 
LE 333, 000 paid by the Ouchouri landowners" (Cromer 1908: 114). The Commissioner had proposed 
that taxes on ouchouri lands should be at once increased by LE 150, 000 a year (Cromer 1908: 115). 
13 For a justification of British occupation and then protectorate policies see: Cromer (1908); Cecil 
(1921); Marlow (1965); Carmen (1921); and Brunyate (1907). 
14 Ismail was first demoted to a constitutional monarch and later deposed and exiled by an Ottoman 
firman (royal order) and replaced by his son Taufiq in 1879. Negotiations between France and Britain 
led to the formation of an Egyptian cabinet comprising of an English Minister of Finance (Rivers 
Wilson), a French Minister of Public Works (de Blignieres) and other Egyptian ministers. 
15 By 1914, the value of the shares in the Suez Canal had reached £40 million (Blake 1966: 586). 
16 A single unified judicial system in Egypt did not come about until 1949. Prior to that, the Mixed 
Courts system remained in force, which placed native Egyptians in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis 
foreign nationals. · 
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diversify and modernize the economy further deepened the reliance on cotton and 
resulted in the colonization of Egypt. A state housing policy remained non-existent in 
this period. The next section explores changes in social property relations under the 
British colonial rule and assesses the impact of these changes on housing policy. 
Social Property Relations, 1805-82 
Drawing on Robert Brenner's concept of political accumulation laid out in his essay 
'The Agrarian Roots of European Capitalism' (1982), here I explain the strategies of 
accumulation in nineteenth century Egypt. Political accumulation as a strategy of 
surplus accumulation entailed surplus extraction through the application of extra-
economic compulsions such as force. This is due to the fact that direct producers 
remained in direct possession of their means of subsistence. Brenner's conception of 
political accumulation is rooted in the fact that direct producers (in this case, peasants) 
are in direct possession of their means of subsistence. Because they could provide for 
themselves outside of the market, accumulation entailed extra-economic forms of 
surplus extraction. It is the foundation upon which political accumulation rested. 
Thus, elites needed to tax, enslave, enserf, or conscript peasants; failing that, they 
needed to annex, conquer or extract tribute from alien communities. Parcellized 
sovereignty was a result of the prevalence of the strategy of political accumulation, 
because individual elites then tried to reinforce or expand their political and military 
powers as a means of reproducing themselves outside of the market. The rise of 
absolutism was a pre-capitalist attempt to resolve this problem, i.e. to end the 
fragmentation or parcellization of sovereignty. But it did so only by creating a pre-
capitalist state that competed with individual members of the pre-capitalist elite. It 
could either dominate them, or co-opt them (1982). 
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While Egypt did not experience feudalism characteristic of European cases, it 
did experience an economic crisis rooted in the decline of agriculture and the disarray 
of the ruling elite in the eighteenth century. The response to this agricultural crisis 
resulted in the emergence of an absolutist state dependent on strategies of political 
accumulation. This section seeks to answer two questions: Why did the ruling classes 
rely on forms of political accumulation and why did they persist over the century? 
Political accumulation was made possible in the early nineteenth century 
Egypt due to the availability of extensive amount of agricultural land, the possibility 
of waging wars to extract resources and the ability of Muhammed Ali to centralize 
power in his hands. Ali neutralized a system of parcellized sovereignty - a legacy of 
the Mamluk rule - by killing off Mamluk Beys and by co-opting village sheikhs. 
Second, he introduced a centralized system of taxation by placing tax responsibility 
on individual villages rather than on peasants or tenants. This replaced the old 
Mamluk iltizam system and ended the mediating role of the tax collectors/multazims. 
Finally, the modem state was created with the help of a new landed class composed of 
village sheikhs that replaced the Mamluks. Over the course of the 19th century, 
however, this newly created landed elite engaged in competition with the royal family 
and its landed bureaucracy for labour and a bigger share of rural surplus. 
When Muhammad Ali assumed power he aimed to increase state revenues by 
levying taxes on previously untaxed lands, besides launching a state project to 
rejuvenate agricultural lands that had been neglected due to damaged canals or had 
been simply abandoned (Loutfi el-Sayed 1968; Ziadeh 1978). He began centralizing 
state power and strengthening the territorial integrity of Egypt which had become 
fragmented under the Mamluks (Shaw 1968).17 He redistributed confiscated estates of 
the Mamluks and waqf lands to his new allies-the sheikhs and to peasants for 
cultivation. Peasants received between 5 and 8 hectares of land which they could 
transfer to their sons, although the final control of it remained with the state (El Araby 
2003). 
The ruling coalition that emerged as a result of Muhammad Ali's land 
redistribution policies consisted of state administrators, the leading import-export 
17 For the different forms of land tenure prior to Muhammad Ali in Egypt, see: Ziadeh (1978: 239-42). 
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merchants and towards the end of his rule, rich ulema and village sheikhs, large scale 
commercial estate holders who were either his family members or part of the larger 
Mediterranean merchants (Lawsonl 999; Sonbol 2000). This new coalition of ruling 
class, however, remained fragile as they internally competed over the agricultural 
surplus while the state and the merchants further c_ompeted over control of trade and 
prices. Direct producers in rural areas were subjected to various forms of taxes and 
exactions by local village sheikhs and state officials in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. This had transformed rural areas into a sphere of constant struggle over 
agricultural surplus. 
Peasant reaction to rising food prices in the context of increasing cultivation of 
cash crops for export, increased exploitation and taxation on the emerging large 
estates took various forms. The impact of increased production of cash crops for 
exports had reduced the amount of land available for growing staple crops such as 
com (durrah) and broad beans (ful) which caused a rise in food prices in Egypt. In 
response to the elite's policy of political accumul_ation, 'Brigandage' became "the 
primary form of collective political action by villagers attempting to ensure 
themselves some portion of the agricultural goods produced on or passing through 
their lands"(Lawson 1999: 122-23). Other forms ofresistance included family flight, 
theft from state storehouses and piracy along the Nile. In response to this rural protest, 
a proliferation of village jails alongside mosques and asylums began to appear in 
various provinces (Lawson 1999; Mitchell 2002; Baer 1968). 
Some poorer fellahin fled from where large landholdings began to appear 
instead of opting to become day labourers on small farms where they would not be 
subjected to the same degree of exploitation. The absence of heavy burdens of 
taxation on small landholders and the flow of labour towards them resulted in an 
increase in the independence of small holders. As a result, the levels of conflict 
between large estate holders and small holders rose as labour shortages continued to 
affect rural production levels on large estates. Other rural labourers attempted acts of 
sabotage, robbery, vandalism and pillage on the newly emerging estates (Lawson 
1999; Fahmy 1997). Revolts were not restricted to rural areas but also were common 
in urban centres where workers faced increasing unemployment and rising food prices 
caused by the export of cash crops in the Mediterranean region. Craft workers and 
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artisans contested and challenged the power of merchants who controlled prices of 
basic food items within the state factories (Lawson 1999).18 
In short, during the first half of the nineteenth century, rural Egypt had become 
"an arena in which several powerful forces engaged in growing competition for 
shrinking agricultural surpluses and the tax revenues derived from them" (Lawson 
1999: 128). The struggles over appropriation of the agricultural surplus only 
intensified in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Between 1858 and 1863, the economy became more deeply linked to the 
export of cotton as infrastructure and modernization projects required an increase in 
state revenues. To realize these goals, Law 1858 (also known as Said's Law)19 was 
introduced in order to expand agricultural production. 20 The Law rendered 
individuals, instead of villages, responsible for tax payments. Prior to the Law, very 
little land existed in the form of freehold tenure. 21 After the announcement of the 
Law, state lands were legally free to be offered for freehold tenure, albeit with many 
conditions attached (Jorgens 2000). Law 1858 not only recognized hereditary rights 
over agricultural land, it also extended the right to foreigners to purchase abandoned 
18 Muhammad Ali responded to the growing unrest by artisans by expanding his industrial sectors so as 
to absorb those in need of work. Thus he opened factories in various parts of Egypt, including one in 
Mahallah al-Kubra in the 1820. The factories were followed by others that specialized in linen, wood 
and silk works, dyeing plants and sugar refineries. Protective tariffs were implemented to stave-off the 
impact of European imports on these industries (Lawson 1999). 
19 Said Pasha, Muhammad Ali's son, served as the ruler of Egypt from 1854 to 1858. 
20 Law 1858 strictly dealt with state or miri land and arable lands while lands held as hiyaza athariyya 
or kharadji (subjected to were exempted from this Law. Hiyaza athariyya refers to "nrral producer's 
right to agricultural land, represented in a definite legal form to which the administration applied the 
term athar fulan (literally, 'so-and-so's trace or mark')" (Hakim 2002: 55). Miri land translated 
wrongly as state land by the British included crown land or land in the public domains, held through 
usufruct rights by cultivators was entrusted to the Muslim leader or Amir al-Muslimin. In return for 
right of possession or 'tassaruf the cultivator paid kharaj tax to the ruler. State-owned, taxable land 
was not inheritable as stipulated by the Sharia, nor was it mortgageable. However, after Said's Law of 
1858, anyone who possessed state-owned taxable land for five or more years and who was paying the 
required taxes could not have his land taken away from him. The state however could sell, rent or give 
unclaimed state lands to whomever it considered suitable and capable of using the land. At the same 
time, Sa'id only extended rights ofusufruct to cultivators and not outright oWl!lership. In fact, Sa'id's 
Law reaffirmed the Sharia Law by making state owned lands non-inheritable and non-mortgageable 
(Jorgens 2000: 93-97). 
21 Up until 1862, legal ownership of land was not institutionalized and all landremained ultimately the 
property of the state with use rights extended to lessees. After 1862, attempts were made to 
institutionalize the legal right of property owners in land (Ibrahim 1994). 
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and uncultivated lands, on the condition of cultivating them and paying the taxes that 
had fallen in arrears.22 
While the intended outcome of Law 1858 was to reduce the authority of 
village sheikhs vis-a-vis the state, and provide some protection for peasants, the 
opposite happened (Ghalwash 1998).23 Peasant indebtedness increased as landlords 
charged exorbitant rates of interest for the credit they extended to peasants. Attempts 
to build an army and develop industry proved counterproductive at the end because 
these efforts relied mainly on agricultural produce for funds and labour. In the case of 
the military, conscription drew labour away from agriculture, resulting in declining 
revenues. 24 Thus, the Law inadvertently increased the power of village notables over 
the peasantry and laid the groundwork for the eventual rise of a united and effective 
landed class in late nineteenth century which comprised of the royal family, state 
officials who held land (dhawat, or 'non-Egyptians'), village sheikhs and landlords 
known as local or provincial notables (or the ayan) who enjoyed preferential tax rates 
known as ushri.25 
Under Ismail's rule, which Abu Lughod (1971: 105) defined as "the last era of 
royal prerogative", an upward distribution of land occurred especially after the 
implementation ofMuqabala Law of 1870. This upward redistribution remained a 
tool to acquire the allegiance of the landed elite and local notables. Hunter (1999: 65) 
notes that, 
... the lands of peasant cultivators ... were confiscated on 
a very large scale. Entire villages were appropriated. 
Fifty-four villages along with 56,000 faddans were 
22 Writing about the impact of the Ottoman Law of 1858, Owen notes that the Law should not be seen 
as a fait accompli after it was announced. Instead, the application of the law was complicated by the 
difficult task of codifying rights at a period when the ruler attempted to award individuals a right to 
property, protect the interests of the peasants while also try to serve as the distributor of justice (Owen 
2000: xiv-xv). 
23 In 1861, the state forbade the assignment of empty lands to villagers. Instead such lands were 
auctioned and given to the highest bidder. This led to a concentration of land in fewer hands and rising 
levels of poverty among peasants. In situations where a peasant did not leave a male of appropriate age 
as heir, his land was auctioned and the wife received no land (Ghalwash 1998). 
24 The state, as well as the new urban-based landlords, found a remedy for the lack of labour by 
importing labourers from Europe and Sudan or resorting to corvee labour. 
25 Two thirds of land holders in Egypt constituted of local notables enjoyed us hri tax rates and thus 
paid half the taxes in contrast to kharadji land holders- constituted of foreigners and non-Muslims-
who were subjected to full tax rates. By the time oflsmail's rule, the ruling family was considered the 
biggest landowner, owning one-fifth ofall of the agricultural land of the country (916, 000 feddans). 
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confiscated in a single decree. Lands previously given 
in lieu of pensions were also resumed by the 
government, their holders compensated only if 
buildings had been constructed on them. 
While Muhammad Ali and his successors appeared to possess absolute power, in 
reality his powers of surplus extraction were constrained by local notables such as the 
village sheikhs and Bedouin leaders. 26 These provincial notables - or the ayan -
became increasingly powerful, both economically and politically, over the course of 
the nineteenth century and competed with the state for a portion of the peasant 
surplus.27 The provincial notables controlled a large area of agricultural land and 
enjoyed preferential tax rates (ushr) as opposed to kharadji tax, which was imposed 
on non-Egyptians and non-Muslims.28 
26 Despite establishing an 'absolutist state', Tucker argues that Muhammad Ali's rule continued to 
remain precarious due to lack of effective control over the country, which forced the ruler to resort to 
regular use of violence (1985: 30). In order to consolidate his territorial rule, increase state revenues, 
and keep the peace among the various competing factions of his fragile coalition, Muhaminad Ali 
launched a number of military expeditions to Sudan (1820), Syria (1831) and mainland Greece (1822) 
(Lawson 1999). 
27 For a Foucauldian interpretation of Muhammad Ali's rule and developments in 19th century Egypt 
see: Mitchell (2002); Toledano (1998); and Fahmy (1997). Mitchell explains the process of state 
formation in Egypt as the discovery of new ways by the elite to control the peasants through exclusion, 
surveillance and incarceration (2002: 74). Ehud Toledano (1998: 263) argues that the strength of the 
newly centralized state was based on the degree of its penetration of society through European-styled 
laws. To Toledano, Muhammad Ali's state was so strong that it shaped public discourse, the family, 
gender, the body, and the education system. He writes that, "these invisible means of control were 
inseparably attached to the explicit ones. Explicit, naked control would not have been possible without 
covert deployment of the defining and inculcating mechanisms of implicit control." Toledano 
illustrates how the strength of the state reduced the capacity of organized resistance by peasants and 
suggests that over time the reduction in peasant protests was a sign of increasing powers of the state in 
the course of the nineteenth century. According to Fahmy (1997), the state under Muhammad Ali had 
discovered a new way of implementing power, which is best understood as disciplining the peasantry 
by transforming them into 'disciplined, well-trained soldiers'. These Foucauldian interpretations do 
not sufficiently grasp the ways in which power was contested by various social forces including local 
landlords, sheikhs as well as peasants. Indeed, power was constantly constituted, reconstituted through 
negotiations, bargaining and contestations of various social actors including the ruler, local landlords 
and sheikhs as well as foreigners who were increasingly playing an important role in the Egyptian 
economy. As well, Rudolph Peters' (2002: 31-52) study of the prison system under Muhammad Ali 
poses a challenge to the way Foucauldians depicted power as absolute in this period. Peters pointed out 
that prisons were barely guarded, constructed in houses where escape became a routine occurrence. 
28 By the 1830s, provincial notables were made responsible for the tax trusts, which gave them the 
power to collect and transfer taxes to the central government, and provide corvee labour for 
infrastructure projects and military service. In 1842 holders of granted land received the freedom to 
mortgage, lend and sell their lands. By the late 1860s, the ayan would increase ,their power through the 
institution ofMajlis Shura al-Nuwwab or the Advisory Chamber of Deputies. In the next forty years, 
the ayan managed to expand their landed estates and occupy some of the senior provincial posts 
(Ezzelarab 2004a). 
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In the Ottoman Empire, a process of consolidation of land tenure forms 
reduced various types of Islamic and customary ('urfi) lands, which were brought 
under the state domain. By the end of the nineteenth century three forms of 
landholding had emerged: private property, waqf lands and state lands. Under 
Muhammad Ali and his sons, private ownership of land was extended from urban 
lands to agricultural land, motivated by the fiscal needs of the state for increased taxes 
(Ziadeh 1993). Agricultural land plots were given to farmers and peasants under the 
title of private property to ensure sustained tax revenues. 29 "Private ownership", 
writes Mitchell, "emerged not as a right won by individuals against the state but as 
part of a penalty imposed upon them as a means of paying government debts" (2002: 
67). 30 Highlighting this peculiar form of private property in nineteenth century, 
Robert Hunter points out how private property did not restrict the ruler's 'prescriptive 
right of confiscation and reallocation' (1973: 480). As a number of scholars (Owen 
2000; Islamoglu 2000; Mitchell 2002) have argued, relations of surplus extraction 
were negotiated within villages. So long as peasants cultivated their land and paid 
their taxes, they could not lose their land. In other words, exploitation had to be 
checked so that peasants could continue to produce and reproduce and thus guarantee 
future surplus. At the village level, customary rights determined the organization of 
production and level of surplus extraction (Owen 2000: xiii-xiv). 
Nonetheless, peasant exploitation remained an integral aspect of rule under 
Muhammad Ali and his dynasty as upward redistribution of land continued through 
various land laws.31 The landlords' ability to borrow at low interest rates from various 
29 In instances where land was extended as private property, these were lands that had been left out of 
cultivation or abandoned by peasants. Given a serious shortage of labour in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the increasing demand for agriculture surplus was not e~ily met by the available 
labour and thus in an attempt to increase surplus, land was offered to anyone who could guarantee tax 
payments to the state (ruler). 
30 Rules that dictated surplus distribution were often negotiated in violent ways. However, the 
subsistence needs of the cultivators were often acknowledged by village local authorities (Mitchell 
2002). 
31 Peasant resistance was often informed by notions of customary rights to land and property and took 
the form of (tax avoidance) flight from villages, self-maiming to avoid military service and corvee 
labour. During Muhammad Ali's Syrian Campaign, 60,000 conscripts went missing from his army and 
20,000 from his navy, most of whom probably went back to their lands to farm or escaped to Syria 
(Fahmy 1997: 258-59). Peasant families engaged in maiming their children in order to protect from 
army service. As cited in Lane, "In the time of my second visit to Egypt [183:3], there was seldom to 
be found, in any of the villages, an able bodied youth or young man who had not had one or more of his 
89 
financial houses increased their power over the indebted and cash-strapped 
peasantry.32 Unable to pay back their loans, peasants often had to abandon their land, 
which further expanded the landed property of the ayan. 33 By the 1860s, villagers 
were faced with high levels of debt as increased levels of taxation by the state and 
rural notables forced them to keep borrowing and into a perpetual cycle of 
indebtedness. By the 1870s, many villagers unable to repay their debts lost not only 
their lands, but also their cattle to tax collectors and usurers. This grim state of the 
peasantry was captured in the following excerpt in The Times from April 8, 1879: 
The people, deprived of their ordinary food, have 
striven to support themselves by eating green weeds, the 
refuse of sugar cane, and any garbage on which they 
could lay their hands ... Partly, this deterioration 
resulted from government pressure for taxes through the 
use of various coercive practices including the whip at a 
time when the ability to pay had already declined 
sharply by the impact of natural catastrophes, (unusual 
floods in 1878 followed by drought in 1879). The 
situation was particularly alarming in Upper Egypt, 
where the death toll in three towns only reportedly 
reached ten thousand (cited in Ezzelarab 2004a: 51-52). 
The expansion of cash crops in the mid-19th century, and the upward redistribution of 
agricultural land, radically reduced the supply of staple crops - thereby driving up 
their cost - and resulted in the creation of a large number of landless agricultural 
labourers. The condition of the workers deteriorated as the expansion of cotton 
production for export resulted in food scarcity. In order to discourage peasant flight 
and its adverse impact on agricultural revenues, in 1862 Ismail ordered a 
redistribution of lands that had been abandoned by peasants. He encouraged Bedouin 
Arabs and landless peasants to take over lands in the amount of two acres to 
households of five persons (Mitchell 2002: 67). 
teeth broken out (that he might not be able to bite a cartridge), or a finger cut off, or an eye pulled out 
or blinded, to prevent his being taken for a recruit" (Lane 1908: 201). 
32 The ayan borrowed at 9 per cent per annum from the banks while they charged the peasantry 
anywhere between 25-40 per cent for extending this credit (Ezzelarab 2004a: 37). 
33 By the end of the 19th century, the latter had gained sufficient power and established a united front 
against the Khedive and his family, who had lost a significant degree of their power under the British 
occupation. 
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Nonetheless, reflecting a fragile state and divided ruling class in nineteenth 
century, rules and laws were not always closely followed through. Instead, there 
appears to have existed a world of difference between the letter of the law and the 
actual practice of land ownership. Consequently, on Ottoman lands, property rights 
were constantly contested, negotiated and renegot~ated (lslamoglu 2000:18).34 
Mitchell reiterated Islamoglu' s point as follows: 
The network of claims, moreover, involved not just the 
land but a variety of processes and relations: grain as 
distinct from other crops, trees and their fruits, grazing 
rights, the supply of water, the maintenance of irrigation 
works, and so on. The claims were related to a wider 
discourse of justice and reciprocity reproduced in social 
practice. They were not fixed in an abstract code of law, 
but were guided by legal precedent and by prescriptions 
developed in response to actual circumstances and 
events (2002: 57). 
In other words, nineteenth century Egyptian society did not experience a system wide 
development of productive forces and therefore a new system of property relations 
based on market dependence did not emerge in this century. Rather than improve the 
productive forces, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the ruling elite 
increased their wealth by pursuing expansionist policies into other states (Syria, 
Arabia and Greece) and exacting tribute as well as by squeezing more from the 
Egyptian peasantry. As such the application of force remained instrumental in 
increasing the wealth of the ruling elites. 
Class relations in agriculture were based on three main set of actors: the state, 
landlords, and finally peasants/wage labourers/small scale subsistence farmers. As 
34 A number of recent works have -examined the non-capitalist aspects of property relations in the 
former Ottoman provinces including Egypt. These works include: Owen (2000); Islamoglu (2000); 
Jorgen (2000); Sait and Lim (2006). In the former Ottoman provinces, landholdings were governed by 
various legal systems (Ottoman, Islamic), but the goal was mainly to increase the revenue share of the 
state in order to make consolidation of the state possible. Variations resulted due to different land 
practices in different parts of the Ottoman Empire as Laws issued in by Ottoman ruler were adapted, 
changed and contested in specific contexts of Ottoman provinces. As Sait and Lim write: "various 
types of tenure that authorized lan~. use or rights to revenue 'did not correspond to an understanding of 
ownership', whether state or private, at least in the Western liberal sense of the word. The emphasis 
upon 'possession' and 'use of land', as opposed to ultimate ownership, remained and remains an 
enduring feature of land tenure in the Arab world" (Sait and Lim 2006: 64-65). 
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such, there is no evidence in Egypt of capitalist tenant farmers as had developed in the 
case of English agrarian capitalism. As Owen noted: 
The result was a system which ... stopped short of the 
re-organization of production along more capital 
intensive lines using a combination of wage labour and 
machines to allow a steady increase in agricultural 
productivity. As elsewhere in the non-European world, 
the actual production of cash crops remained in the 
hands of peasant agriculturalists and subject largely, to 
the limitations imposed by peasant techniques (1993: 
148). 
Given the absence of market compulsion, surplus extraction required extra economic 
compulsion which was exercised by the state and the landlords. 
Cultivable land was divided into two major categories: Royal Estates and 
Non-Royal Estates. Royal estates were further divided into Daira Saniya, Daira Khasa 
and the Domains. Daira Saniya included 51 estates each averaging around 10,000 
feddans, whereby the half located in Upper Egypt grew sugar and the other half 
located in Lower Egypt grew cotton. A major part of the Royal land fell under the 
Domains comprised the vast majority of Royal land, approximating 340,000 feddans, 
of which half was rented out to tenants. Daira Khasa comprised of 50,000 feddans, 
10,000 of which were farmed directly by their owners while the rest was rented out or 
used hired labour. 
The second major category of cultivated land was constituted of non-Royal 
estates. Although detailed information is not available about this category of land, by 
1880, there was ample evidence that cash rent on these lands remained the exception 
rather than the rule (Owen 1993: 145). Often landlords and tenants reached an 
agreement "in some proportion which related fairly directly to their own input in 
terms of labour and capital as well as who was to pay the tax." The daunting challenge 
for the landlords remained the issue of supervision which was "necessary to make 
sure that the land was properly worked and the crop properly shared" (Owen 1993: 
146). 
Another factor that prolonged political accumulation as an effective strategy of 
surplus extraction was due to a "lack of a well-developed market in agricultural 
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labour" in late 1800s (Owen 1993: 146). To compensate for this, landlords on non-
Royal estates organized agriculture around izbas, which relied on "service tenants, 
[and] peasants who agreed to provide a regular amount of work on the estate in 
exchange for the right to rent a small plot of land for their own use" (Owen 1993: 
146). To ensure regular access to labour, it made economic sense to landlords to 
house labourers within the izba in "mud dwellings grouped atiound the central store 
and the residence of the owner and of his nazir or overseer" (Owen 1993: 146). By 
1882, there were 5000 izbas scattered throughout the six lower provinces that grew 
cotton (Owen 1993: 146). Although izbas were marked by variations, in general, 
tenants who worked on izbas not only had a plot to cultivate their own food, they also 
had access to housing. Landlords ensured their power over their workers by placing 
themselves between the market and the peasant and thus had the ability to determine 
wages and the price of produce not to mention the ability to engage in debt bondage 
(Owen 1993: 14 7). 
Owen noted a number of defining characteristics of Egyptian agriculture in 
nineteenth century: first market compulsion was absent and thus there was no need for 
the cycle of specialization, accumulation and innovation associated with market 
compulsions under capitalism. Specialization in this period was strictly limited to the 
type of the cotton seed (Owen 1993: 145-47). The inability of the Egyptian ruling 
elite to overcome the agricultural crisis of the late mid-19th century led to the 
occupation of Egypt in 1882. 
In short, property relations in nineteenth century Egypt were 'politically constituted' 
and subject to political struggles between the ruler and his competitors as well as 
subject to peasant resistance. Surplus extraction occurred through 'extra-economic' 
means such as taxation by both the centralizing state and provincial notables. The 
existence of competing centres of power was reflected in the absence of a unified state 
with effective authority across Egypt. Thus, parts of Upper Egypt were not subjected 
to state control to any degree and village life in these parts continued uninterrupted 
and shielded from demands by the state for appropriation of the surplus. Surplus 
extraction occurred not in a sustained manner, but periodically through the use of 
army and raids on villages. 
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Housing Provision, 1805-1882 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, housing provision was mainly 
restricted to urban areas and shaped mainly by the ambitions of various rulers to 
overcome economic and security challenges to the state. Under Muhaminad Ali, the 
dominant role of cotton in the economy meant that port cities such as Alexandria 
experienced significant infrastructural development and replaced Cairo as the centre 
of economic power. Muhammad Ali viewed Cairo with suspicion and struggled to 
control it. Urban changes in Cairo were therefore primarily geared to the provision of 
security for the ruler and the circulation of goods and troops. Notable developments 
of this period included the building of factories, garrison towns and royal palaces on 
the outskirts of Cairo. Housing conditions of the peasantry, however, remained 
unchanged and workers' housing deteriorated as local traders lost to increased 
competition from Europe and the Mediterranean. 
Viewed as a threat to his rule, Mamluk-style large communal houses were 
ordered to be demolished by Muhammad Ali and were replaced by small family 
dwellings. He also demanded that old style windows made from wood lattices 
(mashrabiyya) be removed and replaced with glass. Following these changes, by 
184 7 Cairo and other major towns had their houses numbered under the supervision 
of artillery officers. Further, to avoid a surprise attack at the hands of his domestic 
rivals and to monitor the traffic in and out of Cairo, Muhammad Ali built palaces on 
the outskirts of the city. The palaces wete connected to Cairo through wide 
thoroughfares, the construction of which came at the expense of hundreds of houses 
that were on their path and had to be demolished. 
A different threat was posed by the regular outbreak of cholera and plagues 
which took the lives of thousands. The scarcity of labour in early 19th century was 
linked to high mortality rates caused by the plague in 1801 and spread of cholera in 
1831 (which killed 180,000) and an epidemic that killed 500,000 in 1835 (Tucker 
1985: 115). 35 The resulting scarcity of labour created a high demand for labour and 
35 Egypt's population was 4 million in 1800 and only reached 4.7 million by 1849, the year after 
Muhammad Ali died (Raymond 2001: 300). Mortality was quite high on public works' sites where 
400, 000 peasants were annually required to take part in public works. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the population of most towns remained around the 10,000 mark except for Cairo · 
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tough competition between landlords and the ruler. To maintain a steady supply of 
labour, and to reduce the impact of plagues and other diseases, Muhammad Ali 
engaged in projects of public sanitation, public works, whitewashing of houses, and 
widening of narrow streets which were dark and damp. It was under his rule that the 
public cemetery from the centre of Cairo was moved to the city's outskirts as a public 
health precaution.36 While Muhammad Ali was concerned with urban security, 
sanitation and transport, his rule remained limited in terms of radical urban and 
housing reforms. Tucker (1985: 104) notes that unsystematic state intervention in 
health, housing and food revealed the true limits of Muhammad Ali's power. Instead, 
much of the responsibility for the provision of these services rested on foreign 
investors, charitable institutions and communal organizations, or the individual 
household. 
Construction projects of considerable size and value were mainly carried out 
by foreign speculator in the first part of the nineteenth century. In the late 1849, 
housing and infrastructure attracted foreign investors leading to a building boom. This 
resulted in a sharp rise in land prices in Cairo and Alexandria while rents increased by 
500 per cent (Owen 1969: 85). In the same period, Egyptian rulers engaged in 
erecting buildings in major cities while French and English speculators took control of 
infrastructure provision (e.g. gas lighting) to residential towns inhabited by foreign 
elites (Owen 1969: 85-86). 
As a result, between 1825 and 183 5 elite housing benefited from burnt brick 
and cement with roofs strong enough to provide protection from rain; however, lower 
class housing remained mostly unplanned, situated in narrow alleys and on top of 
shops and generally lacking access to basic services such as waste disposal, sewerage 
etc. Workers' housing in the first part of the century was constituted of individual 
rooms in low-rise buildings, which were often shared by many individuals (Lane 
which had a total population of240,000 adding up to a total ·of2.5 to 3 million population for the 
country as a whole (Lane 1838). Of this total population of2.5 million, Lane estimated that 
Muhammad Ali had taken between 200,000-300,000 for his army and navy and for his industrial 
projects (1908: 23-24). 
36 In 1798, under the French colonial rule, burial in other parts of the city were prohibited; they were 
restricted to the Qarafa Cemetery with the intention of the making the city more sanitary. Other urban 
development works included filling of lowlands to curb spread of disease. 
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1836).37 Urban quarters in Cairo were controlled by guilds of trade and sheikhs and 
their agents who determined who to rent an apartment to and under what conditions. 
Guilds of trade continued to play an important part in the organization of workers' 
quarters and municipal services in the second half of the nineteenth century. Equally 
important, sheikhs of the quarters continued to play a crucial role in urban affairs 
(Raymond 2005; 2001).38 
Rural housing in this period was built by peasants from unbaked bricks and 
cemented together with mud. Commenting on the state of rural housing, Lane (1836: 
22) described most as simply 'hovels'. The quality of rural housing was inferior in 
comparison to elite housing in the larger urban areas. The roofs of the huts were 
"formed of palm-branches and palm-leaves, or of millet-stalks, etc., laid upon rafters 
of the trunk of the palm, and covered with a plaster of mud and chopped straw" (Lane 
1836: 22). In the absence of effective waste disposal, Lane noted that most of the 
villages were situated on top of mountains of rubbish, exposing the population to 
disease and inundation of the Nile. 
The growth of shanty towns during Muhammad Ali's rule was linked to the 
rise in repression towards the peasantry. Peasants who fled conscription or excessive 
taxation sought refuge on the periphery of urban centres such as Alexandria and 
Cairo. Informal shelters also developed around military garrisons whereby families of 
conscripts followed their men who served as their breadwinners. Throwghout the first 
half of the nineteenth century, thousands of peasant family members resided in shanty 
towns or informal, temporary settlements which were tolerated by the authorities 
(Tucker 1985: 135-36). 
From 1863 on, the urban housing landscape was impacted by the massive 
infrastructural and urban reform program of the emergent Egyptian state. Given the 
dominance of cotton exports in the economy, a national housing policy remained non-
existent. However, Egypt underwent a major phase of large-scale urban 
transformation under Ismail (1863-1879). Ismail sought a modem Cairo to symbolize 
a modem Egyptian state. He was inspired by Haussmann' s restructuring of Paris and 
37 I have relied on Edward Lane's statistics for early 19th century Egypt as he was the first scholar who 
systematically gathered information on various aspects of social life in Egypt, :including housing. 
38 In 1801, there were 278 corporations (along with their communities and sheikhs) of which 193 were 
in Cairo highlighting the importance of Cairo as the centre of urban trade (Raymond 2001: 295). 
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wanted to emulate that model in Cairo. Thus, in a very short span of time, he 
attempted to lay the foundations of what Owen described "an independent, European-
style state with its own modem railways and port facilities, its own industry, and its 
own magnificent capital city full of the long avenues, the parks, [and] large public 
buildings" (1969: 153). Three of the initial goals included: building a suburb to be 
named after Ismail; redeveloping Azbakiyya; and drafting a master plan for Cairo to 
prepare it for the opening of the Suez Canal in 1868. 
The completion of the Suez Canal, a crucial link to the East, was also 
considered a triumph of the modem state, an accomplishment that Ismail wanted to 
display properly to other states through a grandiose opening ceremony following the 
model of the Paris Exposition Universelle of 1867. While Old Cairo was left alone, 
the northern and western parts were modernized with the building of wide 
thoroughfares, palaces and grand houses. Ismail offered state lands free of charge for 
wealthy individuals in order to build villas and gardens and contribute to the 
beautification of Cairo. The prominent developm~nts in Cairo under his rule included 
the linking of Azbakiya to the Nile, the establishment of a system of avenues, the 
promotion of modem, luxury-style housing along the Nile, the Opera House, the 
Hippodrome, several theatres and a number of palaces. 
Between 1864 and 1865, planners and engineers working for the Ministry of 
Public Works undertook the task of implementing Ismail's vision for the urban spaces 
around the country. Wide thoroughfares and a system of avenues modelled after Paris 
were introduced in Cairo. Waste land areas around the city were filled and levelled 
while main streets were opened up through additional roads. By 1865, Cairo streets 
were lit up with gas lamps to facilitate movement at night while running water was 
extended to houses of the ruling elite. A drainage and waste disposal system was put 
in place while urban waste was transported for recycling in rural agricultural lands. In 
order to reduce the impact of plagues and disease, narrow streets were widened and 
damp areas were demolished. Ismail's desire to implement a new aesthetic to the city 
resulted in the creation of open public spaces and squares, the planting of trees, the 
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construction of drains, and regular cleaning. He also encouraged the building of 
mansions and Constantinopolitan in order to change the appearance of the city.39 
Khedive Ismail's housing policy was guided by his desire to transform his 
capital and other major cities in the image of a modem Europe as he considered Egypt 
not a part of Africa but part ofEurope.40 However, these chapges did not affect all 
parts of the big cities, leaving the old sections intact or with very little change. The 
outcome of his efforts was a dualism of old versus modem or western, whereby the 
old was comprised of dilapidated housing and the new was marked by western style 
modem housing for foreigners and the Egyptian elite. The new parts were the 
outcome of expansion into the western and northern parts of the old city. The new 
European parts were supplied by gas, water and transportation most of which was 
provided by foreign private investors. As for the old quarters, the linking of the new 
parts of the city to the old Islamic quarters through wide thoroughfares resulted in the 
demolition of houses while most parts of the Old City continued to be untouched by 
the authorities and thus were characterized by "leprous houses and poorly maintained 
streets" (Raymond 2001: 312-16).41 
The most controversial aspect of urban reform under Ismail was the 
destruction of four hundred large houses, three hundred small houses and an unknown 
number of shops, bakeries, mills, bath houses and mosques. This destruction was the 
price paid for the extension of a 2 kilometre long boulevard named after Muhammad 
Ali which cut diagonally through the Old City. 
In general, state intervention in rural housing in nineteenth century Egypt 
remained very limited. In a rare commentary on rural housing in this period, Mitchell 
(1988: xv) examined the case of 'model villages'. He argues that rural housing policy 
at this time intended to impose discipline and increase the power of the state over the 
population through the principle of "visibility and observation," thereby making 
39 Pollard (2005: 41) noted that by mid 1850s, "an allegedly Greek-style home, called the 
Constantinopolitan, had become popular with Mohammed Ali's family and the new elite classes. 
According to Ali Mubarak, the new elites started building the Constantinopolitan in order to imitate the 
royals. Mubarak himself lived in such a house." 
40 Khedive Ismail extended his modernization project to the education of the children of the elite 
through the adoption of European education methods and materials. 
41 Tucker (1985: 111-12) argue that the old parts of Cairo were not subjected to development plans due 
to the difficulties associated the complexity of property arrangements that shaped the old quarters. He 
interprets this as a demonstration of the limits on the powers of the state to restructure urban spaces. 
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Egyptians more "visible" to the police. This was part of a larger state-sanctioned 
project of order and discipline that extended from urban planning and architecture, to 
the construction of model villages and down to extension of military and educational 
discipline.42 According to Mitchell (1988: 14), model villages were created to control 
the bodies and movements of the peasants while the widening of thoroughfares aimed 
to expand the control of the state over the urban population. While some of the newly 
created large agricultural estates (izbahs) aimed to keep peasants within the village by 
providing housing for them, this in no way suggests that peasants did not welcome the 
offer of housing by some landlords. In fact, the degree to which model villages were 
common in the Egyptian countryside is unknown and Mitchell does not suggest 
otherwise. Indeed, model villages appear to have been an isolated experiment with 
very little impact over rural housing in general. As Tucker (1985) points out, there 
were variations in the nature of rural housing: at one end of the spectrum, tarahil or 
seasonal agricultural labourers provided their own housing; and at the other end, large 
estate owners provided housing for the peasants who decided to reside within the 
village. 
While it is indisputable that the consolidation of the Egyptian state meant 
establishing control over the population, the extent of state power exerted over the 
population in this period has been overstated (Tucker 1985; Hunter 1999). The degree 
of state power and its control over Egypt's territory and its rural population appears 
quite limited given the extent to which peasants constantly moved around the country 
(or even to places such as Syria) to avoid tax collectors (local and state) or 
conscription (Fahmy 1997). 
State Formation, British Rule and Independence, 1882-1952 
42 Mitchell's argument of the disciplinary nature of state policies in terms of organizing space is rooted 
in his understanding of the nature of the state in nineteenth century Egypt as a modem state that had the 
ability to mould society through education, military, and spatial organization. :He writes: "The politics 
of the modem state were modelled on this method of replacing a power concentrated in personal 
command, and always liable to diminish, with powers that were systematically and uniformly diffused. 
The diffusion of control required mechanisms that were measured rather than excessive and continuous 
rather than sporadic, working by invigilation and the management of space" (1'988: 174-75). 
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British colonial rule brought with it a wave of foreign investment geared towards 
cotton production. This investment, however, did little to transform the economy from 
a traditional, craft based economy to one based on modem forms of factory 
production. Rather, the bulk of foreign investment ended up in property development 
and speculation. The result was the creation of a property bubble that burst in 1907 .. 
The ensuing economic crisis highlighted the fragility of Egypt's export-dependence 
and, coupled with British attempts to curtail the exploitive powers of the landed class 
vis-a-vis the peasantry, provoked a surge of nationalism that culminated in 
independence in 1922. Independence brought with it an aborted attempt at import 
substitution industrialization in the 1930s. Throughout this period, the plight of the 
peasantry remained largely unchanged. The cotton export economy resulted in 
concentration of land and therefore landlessness among the peasantry. Housing 
provision for the elite and foreigners was facilitated through foreign investors and 
companies while the condition of housing for peasants and workers remained 
unchanged. This pattern of state intervention perpetuated the dualism that had beg~ 
to form under Ismail. 
Colonial economic policy was closely linked to cotton processing, export and 
transportation. To this end, the British undertook improvements of the agricultural 
system by introducing perennial irrigation, building the Aswan Low Dam, and 
repairing the canals system. They also unified the agricultural tax system by 
eliminating numerous taxes that were imposed on the peasantry by the Egyptian 
landlords while raising the rate of taxation on the landlords. Furthermore, in order to 
increase the revenue of the state, they handed out state lands to private investors for 
development. 43 
43 European railway companies obtained cheap land in the range of one Egyptian pound per acre and 
thus railway lines began springing around Cairo in the first decade of the 1900s. However, soon the 
value of urban land quadrupled due to urban developments and speculations. European land 
developing companies expressed interest in urban development in the same time period. Belgian and 
French firms received concessions for water and gas, which could have been in force from 50, 75, 80 
and 99 years (Abu Lughod 1971: 150). The only instance that an Egyptian company attempted to 
compete was in 1897. The Egyptian firm received a contract to build a railroad in al-Fayoum, but the 
results were devastating and the contract was transferred to an Anglo-Belgian firm. Abu Lughod points 
out that decisions taken in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century made Egypt 
dependent on foreign companies for her public services and utilities such as water and gas (1971: 151 ). 
It was not until after the 1952 revolution that Nasser's nationalizations in 1956 put an end to foreign 
control over public utilities. 
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The colonial presence in Egypt created confidence amongst investors to invest 
in public works and irrigation resulting in the building of the Aswan Dam and 
perennial irrigation in Upper Egypt (Abu Lughod 1971: 114). Other benefits that 
accrued to foreigners (French, British, and German) under the colonial rule included 
the control of trade. If in the late nineteenth century foreign investors targeted 
agricultural land, at the turn of the century they shifted their investments to urban 
land. It was hoped that urban land, especially in Cairo, would have higher returns 
under the British occupation. Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
speculative investment in urban property rapidly increased (Abu Lughod 1971 ). 
Between 1883 and 1892, two types of economic activities particularly 
attracted investments: cotton processing and exporting, and government public works 
projects. The attraction of public works projects can be gauged from the high level of 
foreign investments in Egyptian companies: "In 1897 the amount of foreign money 
(English, Belgian and French) invested in Egyptian companies was LE 11,912,000 ... 
Five years later this sum had increased to LE 24,642,000 out of LE 26,280,000" 
(Owen 1969: 281 ). From 1892 until 1902, foreign investors invested in cotton 
production with the hope of reaping big profits. Owen (1969: 281-85) points out that 
during the boom years of 1893 and 1907 foreign investment levels surged with most 
of the investments finding their way into land projects.44 How~ver, most of the 
investments were speculative in nature and further exacerbated the agricultural crisis. 
As Abu Lughod (1971: 152-53) writes: 
The paid up capital of companies operating in Egypt 
increased from some 7 million Egyptian pounds in 1892 
to over 26 million in 1902 and to 87 million by 1907, 
excluding the Suez Canal and the branches of European 
banks and companies. Almost all of this increase came 
from foreign sources ... Land and building societies were 
founded in increasing numbers between 1901 and 1907, 
44 In 1894, the Behera Company began a project of land reclamation. In 1896, three of the powerful 
banking houses in Alexandria-Suares Freres, J.L. Menasce, Figlio and Co., and J.M. Cataui et Cie., 
among their other projects, founded the Societe Fonciere d'Egypte to operate .an estate of 6, 250 
feddans in Giza Province purchased from State Domains. Owen notes that foreign capital that flowed 
into Egypt in 1897 amounted to LE 11,912, 000 and increased to LE 24,642, 600 by 1902 (Owen 1969: 
281 ). See also Cecil (1921) for various accounts ofland deals sought by English investors in Egypt 
after 1882. 
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each following approximately the same procedure: to 
buy, wait for an increase in values, and then sell. 
Generally, in the first part of the twentieth century, investments became more 
diversified. Besides land speculation, investors targeted banks and credit institutions, 
transport, and infrastructure, traditional industries of cotton-ginning and pressing, 
manufacture of cigarettes, sugar-refining and cotton mills. Rising cotton yields 
resulted not only in increased levels of investments, but also in dramatic land price 
increases during the first decade of the twentieth century. As Owen (1969: 282) 
notes: 
In seven years after 1900, 160 new companies were 
formed, representing a paid up capital of LE 
43,335,000. Of these, no less than 119, with a capital of 
LE 32,568,000, appeared between 1905 and 1907 ... 
Once again, a major proportion of investors' money was 
placed in concerns connected in some way with rural 
land. Mortgage companies were the most important 
recipients. In the ten years, 1896-1907, they accounted 
for 46 per cent of the increase in paid-up capital and 
debentures. 
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, foreign creditors played an 
important role in extending credit to large estate holders. Foreign investments in 1900 
came from three sources: French (LE 46,267,000), British (LE 30,250,000), and 
Belgian capital (LE 14,294,000) (lssawi 1961: 53). The result was a speculative 
bubble that inflated land values and went bust between 1907 and 1911.45 Similarly, 
agricultural development benefited land speculators and landlords while reducing the 
amount of land held by small farmers and peasants. Rural indebtedness increased 
between 1880 and 1914 as debts rose due to mortgages on land, property purchased 
on credit and loans extended to small cultivators.46 However, most of the debt was 
45 The spike in land prices is underlined by Abu Lughod (1971: 153) who writes that "land values 
increased from 2-15 milliemes per square meter before the 1890s to over 2,000 milliemes per square 
meter by about 1910." 
46 Botman (1991: 21-22) characterizes Egyptian agriculture during the first half of the twentieth century 
as "extremely backward" as peasants used simple tools and equipment. Landownership remained 
unequal with absentee landlords controlling large estates. She adds that "the landlord controlled the 
allocation of water, the system of drainage, and the schedule of crop rotations. Leases were generally 
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owed by relatively bigger landlords (owners of fifty feddans or more) to mortgage 
companies whereas peasant debts were owed to local usurers and landlords.47 In 1913 
a government commission estimated that peasants owed LE 12,123,189 to usurers, out 
of a total rural indebtedness of LE 44,000,000 (Owen 1969: 272-73). 
The modernization in cotton production su~ceeded in paying off Egypt's 
debts, however, the effect of these policies on Egyptian society was mixed. The 
economy outside of sectors linked to cotton production and export remained 
undeveloped. Despite the integration of the Egyptian cotton market into the British 
and European economies, domestic production methods remained traditional as the 
economy at the end of the nineteenth century contained a "tiny incipiently modem 
sector ... precariously superimposed upon the dominant traditional one" (Abu Lughod 
1969: 164).48 The modem sector remained small and foreign dominated; the rest of 
the economy was organized in what Abu Lughod (1969: 165-66) calls a pre-industrial 
economy, "in which the scale of firm was tiny, the division of labour organized by 
product rather than process, capitalization, mecha.¢zation and inventories all minimal 
and the relationship between client and producer, employer and employee direct, 
personalized even when fleeting, and encrusted by the generosities and cruelties of the 
non-cash nexus." By the time of independence (1922) a majority of urban workers 
were absorbed in industries of textile, dress making, wood, leather and metal making, 
which were organized on a small scale and used traditional methods of production. 49 
short-term, rarely exceeding two to three years. Landowners had little impetus to technologize their 
farms: labour was cheap, and peasants, who were historically skeptical of change, would likely have 
resisted innovation if it had been proposed." As Marlow (1965: 255) noted: "In 1913, 12,558 
landlords, each with more than 50 feddans, owned 2,420,558 feddans, or nearly half the cultivated area 
of Egypt, while 1,411,158 peasants, each owning less than 5 feddans, only owned 1,418,959 feddans 
between them." The intensification of agricultural productivity caused a decline in the quality of soil 
and perennial irrigation had devastating effects over rural health due to spread of bilharzia during the 
rest most part of the twentieth century. 
47 Peasants were both unable and unwilling to mortgage their lands as they wanted to act with caution 
and prevent the loss of their lands;-however, mortgage companies were also unwilling to provide small 
loans required by the peasants. 
48 In agriculture, little investment in terms of mechanization or modernization of production had 
occurred even in the early parts of the twentieth century (Beinin and Lockman 1987). 
49 Commenting on the structure of the employment in 1907 Egypt, Owen (1969: 294-95) wrote that 
"according to the 1907 census 376,341 people out of a total population of 11,287,359 were then 
engaged in what was classified as 'industry'. However, for statistical purposes the word was 
interpreted as widely as possible. It included, among other occupations, 45,500 hand-loom weavers 
and 10,622 railway workers. By comparison only a very few men were engaged in factory industry 
conducted on a European scale, that is in establishments which used sizeable quantities of capital and 
contained several hundred workers under one roof. Industrie-s in this sense were confined to cotton-
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The landed elite began opposing colonial rule, which they viewed as facilitator 
of foreign control over the Egyptian economy (industry, finance and commerce) 
(Beinin and Lockman 1987).50 The advent of World War I (WWI henceforth) 
exposed the economic vulnerability of reliance on agricultural exports and this 
prompted a rethinking of economic development among the Egyptian elite. This shift 
in their thinking was linked to their desire to remove privileges such as exemptions 
from various taxes enjoyed by the foreign elite. The next step for the Egyptian 
nationalists (concentrated in the landed classes) was to embark on an import-
substitution industrialization path in the 1920s. 5l Saad Zaghlul Pasha, the leaders of 
the nationalist movement was himself a big landlord. Just like Egypt's rulers in the 
19th century, the newly emerging elite were intent on emulating Europe in order to 
compete in the world market. One lesson that the Egyptian political and landed 
classes had learned from the events surrounding the demise ofKhedive Ismail and the 
occupation of Egypt by Britain was that a powerful banking sector was the linchpin of 
an independent and strong state. 
Up until the turn of the century, a mutual interest linked to cotton united the 
Egyptian landed elite with the British merchant and administrative elites. However, 
by the first decade of the twentieth century, the Egyptian landed class became 
concerned with the increasing influence of foreigners in the economy. The landed 
classes therefore mobilized workers and peasants against British rule in the context of 
increased "economic burdens imposed on Egypt to finance the British war effort" 
(Farah 1996: 23). This led to the popular revolt of 1919 and eventually to final 
recognition of Egyptian sovereignty by the British in 1923. 
The revolution of 1919 was an attempt to shift the balance of power from the 
foreign (mainly British) interests toward the Egyptian landed classes. Post-
ginning and pressing, the manufacture of cotton-seed oil and cakes, and the two cotton mills, as well as 
the production ofraw and refined sugar (which employed 15,000 men in 1907), the cigarette factors 
(3,000 men), and a number of small works making cement, bricks and other building materials, and 
food and drink products like alcohol, beer and bread." 
50 During the first two decades of the twentieth century, foreign companies continued to benefit from 
the system of Capitulations and the Mixed Courts, both of which guaranteed full freedom of action for 
foreign companies and without subjecting them to Egyptian laws (Mcllwraith 1911 ). Mixed Courts 
ceased to function in 1949. 
51 The Nationalists were constituted of landlords, professional lawyers and bureaucrats and thus the 
economic program for the first half of the century was determined by their interests in the presence of 
an occupying power - the British. 
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independence, the Egyptian landed elite ensured their dominance of the political 
sphere by restricting the Parliament to the propertied classes who controlled the 
cabinet and both houses of the Parliament (Ibrahim 1994: 24). The first Prime 
Minister Saad Zaghlul Pasha headed the first liberal party - the W afd Party. Having 
taken over the political apparatus of the state, the landed class next began identifying 
their economic goals. 52 They intended to assert more control over trade and thus the 
export of cotton, but also the general improvement of agricultural production and 
establishing financial independence (Hourani 1991 ). To accomplish these goals, the 
largest landowners alongside Egyptian cotton merchants pooled their wealth and 
formed the Bank of Misr (1920), the first major nationally-based financial institution 
in Egypt. 53 The Bank was followed by the establishment of the Egyptian Federation 
of Industry (EFI), and the Agricultural Syndicate, with the latter intent on finding 
ways to increase the price of cotton (Tignor 1984). 
These organizations received a major boost through state legislation that 
guaranteed a local market for domestic goods and products, provided subsidies for 
domestic industries and kept freight rates for transporting of their products low. In 
addition to these gains, Bank Misr facilitated the formation of shipping companies, 
ginning and cotton-exporting firms, and a conglomerate of textiles factories in the 
1930s thanks to the tariff reforms. The state began actively supporting the 
diversification of agricultural crops so as to move away from single crop (cotton) 
economy. Instead, a more viable agricultural policy of growing cereals and fruits was 
adopted by the agricultural syndicate. The state also became the main purchaser of 
cotton, as it had once before acted during Muhammad Ali. 
These successes in economic diversification through industry building came to 
a halt by 1930. Despite efforts to create an independent source of financing, the 
Egyptian elite remained politically divided and failed to articulate a viable economic 
program. Pointing out the political instability that characterized Egypt between 1923 
and 1950, Anderson (1968: 224) writes that "throughout this period [1923-1950] the 
average life of a Cabinet was less than one year, and there were general elections in 
52 Ismail Sidqi, who served as Egypt's Prime Minister in 1930-33, articulated the need for an industrial 
Eolicy in order to deal with unemployment and diversify the sources of wealth accumulation. 
3 For more on the Bank ofMisr and the context surrounding it, see Deeb (1977) and Tignor (1977b). 
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1924, 1925, 1926, 1929, 1931, 1936, 1938, 1942 and 1950. In addition, the king 
frequently acted in a very high-handed and arbitrary way." The focus of industrial 
development and all other projects of the state remained short-sighted, with no vision 
for the long-term development of the state and the crafting of mechanisms that would 
absorb different classes into the state. The ruling classes failed to strike an effective 
alliance to build the state and the economy. 
Nonetheless, divisions among the Egyptian elite did not hinder them from 
prospering through their relationships with foreign capital characterized by 
competition and collaboration (Tignor 1977a; 1977b). Indeed, foreign investors, 
technical experts and financiers proved instrumental for the development of 
agriculture and thus the generation of wealth for the Egyptian landed classes in this 
period. However, the newly-founded political power and independence through the 
Parliament tended to favour a competitive relationship by the Egyptian landed elite. 
The 'Egyptianization' of the economy between 1923 and 1952 resulted in a shift of 
power in favour of the Egyptian landed/industrial classes and away from foreign 
investors. Beside the Bank Misr Group, others such as the Ahmed Abboud Group, the 
Amin Y ehia Group, and the M. Farghaly Group, pressured the state to force foreign 
interests out of commercial and industrial sectors (Ibrahim 1994). Successive laws 
(especially Law 3 7 I 1951) passed by the Parliament facilitated the transfer of 
ownership of 12 per cent of cultivated land (about 600,000 feddans) from foreigners 
to Egyptian landed classes. 
The Egyptian landed elite continued to prosper during the Second World War. 
The demand generated for services and goods during the Second World War provided 
another opportunity for the Egyptian industrialists to increase their fortunes. 54 
Industrial development served the agricultural sector's needs (e.g., fertilizer and 
nitrate industries). Even some of the infrastructural changes that gave Cairo a face 
lift, were intended to facilitate the agricultural sector and other sectors of the economy 
linked to it. Thus, roads, bridges, railways, trolley lines, waste water systems and 
power grids were developed. Despite brief moments of increased demand for labour 
(during WWI and WWII), workers arid peasants' living standards deteriorated. The 
54 The purchasing power of the Allied troops represented 25 per cent of the Egyptian national income 
(Hopwood 1982: 18). 
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initial success of ISi was dependent on the control of labour as the Federation of 
Industries vehemently opposed all pro-labour legislation and the free association of 
workers. Similarly, while the size of estates of the landed classes kept increasing, 
more and more peasants lost their plots of land either due to high taxes imposed on 
them, or due to lack of access to state credit. However, with the end of the War, it 
became apparent that the situation of a major section of the population had not 
improved. Egypt's population had increased from 10 million in 1897 to 19 million in 
194 7 while housing and land conditions had failed to match the population growth. 
The inequalities in land ownership gap widened, forcing peasants to reside in 
substandard mud huts as their incomes restricted them from building good quality 
housing. The result of these pressures increasingly forced rural population to migrate 
towards the cities and coastal towns. 
Social Property Relations 
The two poles of conflict at the end of nineteenth century involved struggles between, 
on the one side, the Khedive (Ismail) and his allies which included the military and 
the ayan who had enjoyed preferential land taxes (ushri) up to this point. On the other 
side were the British who found support among non-Egyptian landed interests as well 
as state bureaucrats who were subjected to a higher rate of taxation (kharadji). After 
the military occupation of Egypt, under Cromer (1883-1907), the balance of power 
shifted in favour of the latter group who favoured the colonial administration's tax 
reform program. Consequently, the khedive was deposed and exiled and his allies lost 
most of their power in the coming years. This relationship that emerged out of this 
conflict continued until 1915. After the independence of 1923 onwards, the Egyptian 
landed interests managed to regain their lost glory once again. This section discusses 
the unfolding of these conflicts and the changing patterns of social property relations. 
Let us start by examining the processes through which the British colonial 
administration introduced a new balance of power among the elite. With the failure of 
the Commission of Inquiry, the colonial administration adopted the proposals of the 
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Commission. 55 First, the Administration stripped the ruling family of most of its 
landed estates and transferred these to local and foreign investors. 56 Foreign bankers 
took control of the estates of the Khedive and the ayan and then auctioned these 
estates in order to secure their loans. Next, in order to implement the proposed tax 
reforms, a Cadastral Survey was launched as a means to take account of over a 
million hectares of ushri lands in order to determine how much of the debt could be 
paid by the rich landlords who were mostly allies of the deposed ruler, Khedive 
Ismail. 57 Despite the massive amount of land that fell under ushri title, insufficient 
taxes were paid to the state as compared to kharadji landholders' contribution. 
Cromer (1908: 114) commented: 
At the time the Commission of Inquiry sat, 1,323,000 
acres ofland were held under Ouchouri, and 3,487,000 
acres under Kharadji tenure. In 1877, the total amount 
of land-tax paid on Kharadji lands amounted to LE 
3,143,000 as against LE 333,000 paid by the Ouchouri 
landowners. 
Finally, to implement their agricultural policies, top posts within the state 
administration were kept for foreign, mainly British nationals. The outcome of 
colonial policy led to the subordination of the domestic elite to the Colonial 
55 The Commissioner had proposed that taxes on ouchouri (also spelled as ushri) lands should be at 
once increased by LE 150,000 a year. Other proposals included unification of different forms of taxes 
in order to reduce the burden of local taxes on the peasantry so that more taxes could flow towards the 
administration. The various taxes included professional tax, poll-tax, octroi dues, the 'droits de voirie', 
the market dues, the weighing dues, the dues on stamping mats and tissues, the dues on the sale of 
cattle and other minor taxes (Cromer 1908: 115, 121-22). 
56 At the end of his reign, Ismail and his family held 916,000 acres or almost one fifth of all of the 
taxable agricultural land making him the largest landowner in the country (Mitchell 2002: 76). Among 
those who purchased these royal estates were Boulos Hanna and Ahmad Abbud, who later on would 
r,lay an important role in Egyptian economy 
7 It is true that at the end, peasants would be exploited in the process of tax collection, but the intention 
of the Commission was to discipline the elite of Egypt by taking away part of their revenues for the 
outstanding debt. From the accounts of Cromer (1908) it becomes clear that a colonial, paternalistic 
approach was adopted especially by the British who saw the Egyptian ruling class as backward and 
uninformed about how to balance their revenues and expenditures. Thus, the accumulated public debt 
was seen as an irresponsible behaviour by the ruler of Egypt who needed to learn about the art of 
government. As a solution to this problem, the British and the French proposed a parliament that could 
hold the ruler accountable and thus check his absolute rule, based on the histoFical experience of 
Britain and France. Of course, these experiments failed and Egypt was subjected to military occupation 
by 1882. 
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Administration and foreign investors. 58 Agricultural changes such as the unification of 
taxes shifted the balance of power in favour of the foreign elite as local landlords were 
subjected to increased taxation. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the relationship between peasants and 
landlords was deeply unequal: 
The typical arrangement was to employ the workers 
without payment or below subsistence wages on the 
labour-intensive cotton crop, which was grown on a 
three-year (sometimes two-year) rotation. On the land 
rotated out of cotton the workers grew food and fodder 
crops, each worker receiving a small plot to provide for 
the subsistence of his household and surrendering the 
rest of the crop to the owner. In some cases the workers 
rented rather than sharecropped their subsistence plots, 
but in either case the owner tended to retain control of 
irrigation and the choice of crops. Only the owners had 
a surplus to sell, so they alone had access to capital. The 
owners therefore provided the working capital for the 
subsistence plot. When workers were unable to repay 
this or other loans they were placed in debt bondage to 
the owner (Mitchell 2002: 72). 
The changes in land relations did not remove all forms of peasant protection as 
the colonial administration was aware that in order to increase rural revenues, a bare 
minimum of the producers' livelihoods had to be guaranteed.59 According to the laws 
of 1882, creditors could not seize "from small farmers their last five acres (feddans) of 
land, their essential farm tools, two draft animals, and their house" (Mitchell 2002: 
71-72).60 Even at the turn of the century, farm workers were given their own small 
plots, which they cultivated for their own subsistence, after giving the surplus to the 
landlord. Despite such means for provision of subsistence, small farmers and 
58 This first phase of change led to the first major nationalist revolt in Egypt; this became known as the 
Arabi Revolt of 1982. 
59 In a study of four villages in Lower Egypt, John Chalcraft (2005) found that peasants comprehended 
the nature of power rivalry between the colonial administration, the khedive and local power holders 
(sheikhs and umdas). With this knowledge, peasants often appealed to the more powerful faction of the 
afore-mentioned elite for justice. _ 
60 Given the on-going concern of the Colonial Administration with increasing agricultural surplus, this 
law was reintroduced under the title of 'Five Feddan Law of 1911' with the same goals (Hansen 1991: 
51). -
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peasants did not enjoy security of tenure and thus the failure to make regular rent 
payments often resulted in debt bondage. By 1914, small farmers who constituted 90 
per cent of all landowners owned only a quarter of the land wilth the remaining ten per 
cent of the large landowners controlling three quarters of the agricultural land 
(Hopwood 1982: 17-18). 
Waqflands also played an important role in providing an alternative option to 
peasants. One-eighth of the cultivable lands of Egypt and most of the land in Old 
Cairo fell under the waqf category and was managed by the Ministry of Endowment 
(also known as Ministry of Awqaf or Waqf). Waqfland holdings used for charitable 
purposes were exempt from land reforms throughout most of the nineteenth century 
and first half of the twentieth century (Abu Lughod 1971: 78-79). 61 
Nonetheless, peasants' condition under the British rule worsened as the burden 
of taxation increased as local landlords and colonial administrators competed for their 
surplus. Consequently, the main beneficiaries of colonial rule tended to be foreign 
nationals who gained large estates while being exempted from various taxes 
(agricultural land, urban land, personal and property taxes). European control over 
Egyptian lands doubled over the course of the 1880s constituting the main grievance 
of the local power holders against foreigners and finally leading to the revolution of 
1919 (Ezzelarab 2004a). 
In this period, most fertile lands were transferred to the state or the ruling class 
with the use of new systems of land registration as in Palestine, Jordan and Iraq.62 
Peasants either experienced a decline in their living standards as landholdings became 
subjected to increased taxes, or lost access to their traditional cultivation rights which 
had persisted until the 1880s. High levels of debt resulted in the loss of land as the 
izba system (large estates) spread and brought along a rise in private land leases. In 
the process of this rural transformation peasants became tenants, sharecroppers or day 
labourers. 
Peasants responded with violence in instances where they felt their commonly-
held land was sold off to foreigners. Tucker (1985: 12) cites one such example: "In 
61 Waqftenure form shielded a substantial portion of urban real estate as well as agricultural land, 
because such lands were unalienable and could not be pledged against a loan as collateral. 
62 However, in Egypt and parts of Syria, "a balance between production and population" continued to 
remain (Hourani 1991: 295). 
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1898, after the firm of John Lagonico bought an extensive piece of land in the 
province of al-Gharbiyyah over local protest, the company's workers became the 
object of systematic campaign of harassment waged by neighbouring peasants who 
prevented them from opening canals and even, at one point, launched a coordinated 
attack of 300 strong." There were indications of a rise in crime and in the number of 
prisoners under the colonial rule, corresponding with rising levels of rural poverty. 
Tucker (1985: 147) refers to the accounts in the Annual Reports of the Consul-
General: 
... between 1900 and 1905 for instance, the number of 
'crimes' or felonies, a category which included murder, 
robbery, destruction of crops, poisoning of cattle, arson, 
rape and indecent assault, rose from 1,290 to 3,011; by 
1913, 4,096 such crimes were recorded. While the 
number of such offenses relative to a population of 
some 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 remained modest, an 
upsurge in murder, robbery and especially the typically 
rural crime of arson is well documented. 63 
The authorities responded by building ten new prisons by the end of 1905. Following 
the proliferation of prisons, labour camps were established across provinces where 
convicts were used to dig canals and build roads. 
In the period leading up to WWI, landed estates mainly remained under the 
control of Egyptians however the economy in general was dominated by foreigners 
(including European companies and individual investors) (Beinin and Lockman 
1987). Land ownership structures continued to grow more unequal. Over 40 per cent 
of cultivated land was owned by large landowners (owning 50 feddans or more). Only 
20 per cent was controlled by smallholders who had 5 feddans or less. One fifth of the 
largest estates were controlled by foreigners. At the bottom were tenant farmers and 
day labourers who were landless (Hourani 1991: 289). 
As late as 1930, private property rights included the private ownership of 
villages, and landlord-peasant relationships were still essentially feudal. Village 
landlords were seen as 'the absolute master' who not only owned the tools, the land, 
63 Between 1885 and 1913, there were between 10,000 and 15,000 prisoners in Egyptian jails (Tucker 
1985: 160). 
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but also provided housing for labourers, albeit in return for a rent in kind (Mitchell 
2002: 68-70). Elgood (1927: 311) described the arbitrary nature ofland relations at 
the level of individual village in the 1920s in the following terms: "Round the Omda, 
the headman of the village, all rural life revolves: he can make the village a hell or a 
paradise for its inhabitants at his will." This reflected the uncertainty that was the 
defining feature of social property relations in rural Egypt in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. 
The period from the 193 Os to the 1940s witnessed a series of agrarian 
legislation that aimed to increase yields and bring unused agricultural land under 
cultivation. Land Law 1936 recognized customary land tenure on state lands so long 
as' the land was cultivated on a regular basis. 64 After five years, unused land became 
subjected to redistribution to anyone willing to cultivate it. The Egyptian Civil Code 
was another major piece of legislation that was enacted in 1949.65 The manner in 
which the Code sought to regulate land tenure proved controversial not only among 
the peasantry, but also among those who wanted to introduce modem European 
systems of tenure. On the one hand, the Code provided protection for peasants 
against landlord abuse; on the other hand, it extended the absolute power of the ruler 
to a vast portion of land in Egypt. Other agrarian laws resulted in a transfer of land 
from foreign land companies (e.g. Credit Foncier Egyptien) to Egyptian landed elite 
through the creation of Egyptian sources of financing. An e·stimated 600,000 feddans 
64 The Civil Code "gave people the right to own and to have a title for state 'public' lands if they held 
them, without any outside disputes or claims, for more than 15 years prior to 1936. In addition, other 
people who held, occupied and used a piece of state land without permission - even for less than 15 
years - could own it but over a further 15 years period. This right would be withdrawn if the land were 
not used in the first 5 years of this allowed period" (El Araby 2003: 434). 
65 According to the Egyptian Civil Code, " ... in the absence of an applicable law the Judge will base his 
decision on custom, and in the absence of custom, on principles of Muslim law" (Ziadeh 1978: 246). 
El Araby noted: "The Egyptian Civil Law considered the uncultivated and un-owned lands as state 
lands. Therefore, the state could sell, rent or give these unclaimed lands to whomever it considered 
suitable and capable of using this land ... All of these factors created six land tenure types. They were 
state owned land; endowed wakfland; free hold landlords; holders of mawat ('dead') or 'state' lands; 
renters; and unclassified and potential owners who did not have a clear title for their lands. The effect 
of these types of land tenure significantly influenced the process by which land was used, transferred, 
invaded, or transformed, and has affected potential informal land development in recent years" (2003: 
434-35). The Egyptian Code was influential in other places such as Syria, Iraq and Jordan where it 
revived old forms of land tenure such as miri, waqf and mulk (Sait and Lim 2006). 
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ofland were transferred to rich Egyptian landowners (Hourani 1991: 379; Ibrahim 
1994: 23).66 
By the 1940s, Egyptian society was gripped by a polarization of wealth and 
concentration of land ownership in the hands of a minority. While Slllbdivisions had 
reduced the share per family in land, the unequal landownership structure could not be 
overlooked. According to Sadowski (1991: 55): 
Fully 44 per cent of rural families were totally landless 
and had to work either on large estates or as milgrant 
labourers. Landless peasants faced three brutal options: 
to join the sharecroppers on a large plantation, to join 
the casual labourers who maintained the canals. and 
irrigation works, or starvation. For each member of the 
elite who owned fifty feddans or more, there were 
literally a hundred families who were completely 
landless. 
Land concentration in fewer and fewer hands reduced not only the number of 
small farmers but also the total number of big landlords. The latter shrunk further 
from 14,000 (owning two million feddans) at the turn of the century to 12,000 
(owning 2.6 million feddans) by 1950 (Ibrahim 1994: 22). This concentration ofland 
took place in the context of rising cotton prices and high rents. 
The crisis in land ownership grew grimmer during WWII as military demands 
for grain created further shortages of food for peasants. While a small number of 
commercial farmers profited from this shortage of grains, landlords in general began 
fearing the possibility of a social revolution.67 As the war came to an end in 1945, 
social tension levels continued to rise with the loss of employment for a large number 
of workers and reduced pay and benefits for state employees. A rising cost of living 
and increasing levels of rural and urban poverty gripped the Egyptian population in 
66 The centrality of agriculture to the Egyptian economy is reflected in the sector's share of value-added 
production in the whole economy. As O'Brien (1968: 163) observes: "As late as 1952 no less than 57 
per cent of the net value added by industry emanated from processing foodstuffs, ginnffig, pressing, 
spinning and weaving raw cotton, tanning leather, and the manufacture of fertilizers and implements 
utilized by farmers. Even at that date 39 per cent of total inputs of Egyptian industry represented raw 
materials purchased from local farmers." 
67 The ruling Wafd Party, keen to neutralize the rising anger among the peasantry, argued that rising 
poverty was not so much linked to ownership structures or absence of redistril\mtion, but to the terrible 
sanitary conditions that peasants lived under. This was the time when the first project for rural housing 
was launched (Fathy 1989; Mitchell 2002; Beinin 1998). 
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this period. Government inaction was compounded by an elite that was unwilling to 
share even a small fraction of their wealth with the rest of the' population. The 
Egyptian state proved to be a failure not only because it could not devise any social 
policy; but even if devised, it lacked the administrative support and structures that 
could put such a policy into practice. As Marlowe (1965: 377) observed: "more 
decisive than this technical inability was the unwillingness of the Egyptian ruling 
class to make any contribution either to the finances of the state or to the well-being 
of the people. Power was generally regarded as a means towards self-enrichment, 
self-aggrandisement, and as an opportunity for dispensing patronage among relatives, 
friends, supporters, and hangers-on." 
Housing Provision, 1882-1952 
The re-organization of space in Egypt under the British focused on canal development 
and infrastructure improvement to facilitate transportation of cotton to ports. Modem 
housing was developed for foreigners residing in major cities of Egypt and the 
Europeanized Egyptian elites. Workers and peasants continued to reside in self-built 
housing or in older parts of the urban centres where they could afford rents. The 
outcome of this preferential urban policy was a reproduction of spatial differentiation 
that had occurred under Ismail. Thus, two of the major urban centres-Cairo and 
Alexandria - continued to remain central under the colonial administration with 
infrastructural and housing changes mainly affecting these two cities. 
Following the precedent of Ismail' s urban development model, the British 
continued to build the northern and western parts of Cairo and the modem parts of 
other Egyptian cities. The increase in foreign population and their need for modem 
housing attracted European companies in housing construction in Cairo and 
Alexandria. Thus, private firms provided municipal services such as clean drinking 
water, gas and sanitary services. During the first decades of the twentieth century, 
large foreign contractors built modem housing in suburbs of Heliopolis, Maadi, 
Hadayeq-el-Qubba and Doqqi. These were mostly inhabited by foreign nationals. A 
growing demand for garden cities and resorts by foreigners was met by private foreign 
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firms such as the Belgian firm that developed Heliopolis as a suburb of Cairo by 
providing infrastructure and connecting it to Cairo by extending the metro. 
Heliopolis was established by Baron d'Empain of Belgium, who had also 
established the Cairo Electric and Heliopolis Oasis Company in 1906. The 6,000 
acres of land for the Heliopolis project was obtain~d at one Egyptian pound per acre 
from the colonial administration (Dobrowolska and Dobrowolski 2006:45). 
Heliopolis became the city of luxury and leisure with broad avenues, public spaces 
and finally a railway line connecting it to the rest of Cairo.68 The Belgian company, 
Heliopolis Oasis Company, planned several modem buildings and offered apartments 
on 15 year mortgages at very low interest rates. Heliopolis offered houses for 
purchase and rental apartments, but they were restricted to wealthy Egyptians and 
foreigners. 69 Other housing luxury housing projects followed suite of Heliopolis 
during the first decades of the twentieth century. Districts such as Zamalek, Ma'adi 
and Garden City in Cairo were designated areas for the rich who lived in privately 
owned villas. These cities demarcated a new divi~ion in the urban social fabric as 
they became associated with foreigners and thus colonial rule. 
Urban development and housing were affected by the system of capitulations 
that were introduced in the nineteenth century. Concessions offered to foreign 
nationals and foreign companies during the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
remained in effect even after political independence was achieved by Egypt. As a 
result, foreigners remained in control of municipal development and utilities. For 
instance, French and Belgian firms were responsible for the delivery of gas and 
transport. The absence of legal control and thus insulation from public pressure and 
accountability, determined the performance of foreign firms as they sought profit 
without consideration for service delivery. Capitulations remained in force until 1937 
which meant foreigners were exempted from taxation thus depriving municipalities 
from much needed taxes and subsequently resulting in stagnation of services. 
68 Heliopolis became the first of many desert cities that would be expanded under Sadat and Mubarak; 
however, whereas Heliopolis had sµcceeded in attracting the desired number ofresidences, the newer 
desert cities failed to do so. 
69 Foreign companies, such as the Anglo-Belgian Company offered housing for sale and rent in the 
1930s. · 
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Indeed, among Egypt's major cities, Cairo was the only one that failed to 
establish its own independent corporate identity until 1949. 10 As such, during the first 
decades of the century, the British and the French entrepreneurs delivered services 
and infrastructure in Cairo, while the Ministry of Finance and Public Works carried 
out a Project of 'beautification of Cairo' at a cost of LE 130,000 for the year 1926 
(Rizk 2001). Catering to popular neighbourhoods, the Project entailed paving streets, 
planting trees and creating green spaces. 71 
In general, housing conditions of the majority remained neglected, and 
enabled major epidemics and disease to strike twice during the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Outbreaks of measles and cholera hit Egypt in 1904 and 1909 
respectively. Plagues, which had been brought under control in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, returned under colonial rule. Lord Cromer admitted that 
sanitation, despite being in a "deplorable situation" was too costly for the colonial 
administration and thus not a priority (Tucker 1985: 116). Thus residents suffered 
from untreated drinking water contaminated by slaughterhouses and stagnant ponds 
which spread diseases. Public toilets were non-existent and there were no sewer 
treatment facilities leaving houses exposed to human waste. Mitchell (1988: 163-64) 
highlighted the deteriorating nature of housing of workers and new migrants in the 
following: 
As poverty, malnutrition and unemployment inc~eased, 
this 'Oriental' quarter and other backstreets where the 
poor found room to live became rapidly more cramped 
and more decrepit. 'The poorer classes are being more 
and more crowded into 'slums' of the worst type,' wrote 
the Egyptian Gazette in an editorial of February ]902. 
'No new houses are being built for their accommodation 
and the rising rent roll is constantly limiting the 
70 Alexandria acquired municipal status in 1890 long before Cairo and thus did not encounter the same 
degree of housing pressures or urban problems as Cairo. It was only in the 1970s and after that 
Alexandria developed major housing and urban infrastructure problems. This differential development 
of the two major urban centres is also reflected in the academic works which are heavily focused on 
Cairo. 
71 Investors acquired government land very cheaply and built with an eye towards future profits. Under 
these circumstances, the demand for land increased land prices and benefited speculators. Building 
permits issued in the years 1907 and 1908 were triple the number of those issu,ed in 1880s. Cairo's 
built-up area increased from some 1,000 hectares in 1882 to 16,331in1937. This also meant that a 
large number of workers were hired in the construction industry (21,744 in Cairo out of a total of 
94,989 in Egypt) (Raymond 2001: 322). 
116 
numbers that are still within their reach. Henc.e, in the 
byways, the backstreets of all quarters of the town, as 
well as in the suburbs, there is an ever enlarging number 
of houses in which families are packed together in 
numbers and under conditions that render these places 
the exact counterpart of the slums of Europe arid 
America.' 
After 1915 when Egypt was declared a British military base, many peasants were 
drawn into Cairo and other major cities in search of better wages. Although Cairo's 
population remained fewer than one million at the turn of the century, housing 
problems began to emerge in urban Egypt forcing migrants to settle in tombs or over-
crowded spaces in the older quarters of Cairo and Alexandria. During the first 
decades of the twentieth century, workers' housing conditions did not ameliorate 
much and instead due to demand generated during the war, housing shortages 
increased. To meet the pressing demands of wartime (WWI) economy, the 
government built two workers' housing projects but other residents predominantly 
resided in housing sprawls, cemeteries etc. 72 Taking advantage of the rising demand 
for housing in this period, landlords charged high levels of rent leading the 
government to fix the rents during the War. However, in 1925 threats of eviction by 
landlords forced the government of the Prime Minister Ahmad Ziwar Pasha to rescind 
rent controls (Rizk 2001 ). With the dismantling of rent controls, new arrivals from 
rural areas were forced to find shelter in tombs - Cities of the Dead. As Abu Lughod 
(1971: 174) noted: 
... the 'City of the Dead' ... increased its resident 
population from about 3,500 in 1907 to 7,444 by 1927. 
In the former year most residents in this zone were 
employed in the stone quarries nearby or as custodians 
of the tombs. In contrast, many of the newcomers who 
settled in the zone between 1917 and 1927 had little 
reason, except the housing shortage, to choose this 
location, for few of them had jobs that tied them to the 
'local resources' of the district. 
72 The only publicly constructed housing project was workers' city in Imbabah, with about 1000 
housing units. 
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However, to stop the trend of squatting in cemeteries, a government Decree in 1926 
prohibited anyone from staying in the cemeteries beyond the sunset (Rizk 2001). 
In the 1930s and after, scholars have attributed the rising level of urbanization 
to population growth, increasing parcellization of land and a widening gap in 
landownership (Botman 1991; Abu Lughod 1969; Issawi 1969). In 1917, Egypt's 
total population was 12,670,000 of which Cairo's share reached 790,000. Three 
decades later, in 1947, the country's population had reached 18,806,000 while Cairo's 
share standing at over 2,000,000 with the latter indicating an increased rate three 
times that of the country as a whole (Botman 1991: 21-22).73 In general, the 
provision of housing for workers and peasants in this period remained the 
responsibility of private individuals. Formal housing for workers only began to appear 
after WWII in southern Cairo and in Helwan. 
Prior to WWII, there is no indication of an acute housing problem despite 
housing shortages that occurred during episodes of rural-urban migration. One 
housing expert noted that before the 1940s, "in both the rural and urban areas there 
were enough houses to meet the demand" with rents not exceeding 10-25 per cent of 
income (Hanna 1985: 191). As was the case during WWI, in Cairo, the war-time 
economy had attracted many peasants in search of jobs. Rural-urban migration which 
had remained marginal until the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed a 
spike. It was in this period that workers and migrant peasants were exposed to harsh 
housing conditions as rent levels surpassed inflationary wages. The rental market had 
become saturated due to rising demand for rental apartments and a scarcity of 
construction material. In the absence of state housing policy, unplanned and random 
extensions began to appear in Imbabah, Mit Okba, Korn El-Gharb, and many others. 
Parts of Cairo such as Boulaq, Road El-Farag and South Cairo developed 
informal housing areas. The Eastern part of Cairo became the main hub of new rural 
migrants. The only regulation of urban development came through the Subdivision 
Law (52of1940) which set very high standards for building and public space and 
infrastructure. Tal<lng advantage of the rising demand for housing, landlords began 
exacting high rents from their tenants. 
73 Cairo's population between 1882 and 1937 increased by 250 per cent from 374,000 in 1882 to 
1,312,000 in 1937 (Raymond 2001: 319). 
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The rising demand for rental apartments combined with an unregulated rental 
market mainly controlled by foreign capital sparked a debate on rent control leading 
to rent control measures during in the 1940s.74 Jn June of 1941, the government issued 
Decree No. 151 which prevented landlords from increasing rents from what was 
stated initially in the contract or terminating rental contracts. All of these matters had 
been taken over the courts and, therefore, out of the hands of the landlords. In 1947, 
the government passed Bill 121/1947 to freeze rents at the value paid in April 1941. 
The law excluded houses built after January 1, 1944, which meant the newly 
constructed houses were let at much higher rent levels (until 1952 rent control laws 
were passed). 
In sum, the outcome of the colonial housing policy was a reproduction of the 
duality in space that began in the mid-19th century. Thus, new parts of Cairo and 
Alexandria were developed to serve the needs of foreigners, colonial administrators 
and local elites while the older quarters of cities were left untouched. The latter 
continued to attract new migrants and became overcrowded and with dilapidated 
infrastructure, lacking services such as clean drinking water or waste disposal. The 
new migrants tended to overcrowd on the edges of the desert or in old quarters of the 
city where new structures (e.g. rooftop and shacks) began to appear and dominate the 
landscape. The duality of space came to reflect the differences in wealth whereby the 
poor occupied the older quarters and the rich resided in the newer, more developed 
parts of the cities. 
During the first nationalist phase of ISi, housing conditions continued to 
deteriorate despite attempts by the government to regulate rents. Rising demographic 
trends and an unmet demand for housing compounded with fleeting employment 
opportunities provided the ingredients for a revolution that was to come. The 
combination of economic and social ills had created a polarized society. At the top of 
the socio-economic pyramid were the landed elite who dominated the industry and 
controlled the political structures of the state. Below them were the bureaucrats who 
felt marginalized because of foreigners and whose salaries could not cope with the 
rising cost of living. Similarly, Egyptian workers suffered as war-time employment 
74 From the 1930s on, private foreign firms began offering rental apartments (up to 1000 units) while 
smaller Egyptian builders offered smaller scale units for rent (Bayad 1979: 147, 231). 
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disappeared while peasants continued to suffer from a lack of land for subsistence and 
thus resorted to strikes and protests. 
By the early 1950s, calls for nationalization of the Suez Canal Company were 
echoed from the Egyptian Communist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. These 
calls for nationalization of foreign assets were tamed by the 'Egyptianization' of firms 
and companies. The Egyptianization of industry and agriculture did not weaken 
foreign power but rather strengthened a faction of the Egyptian elite enabling them to 
act as partner with those foreign powers. Thus, Egyptianization cannot be 
characterized as a process of nationalization which signifies the removal of the 
foreign powers over aspects of the economy. These grievances combined with the 
failed Anglo-Egyptian negotiations kindled the flames of nationalism and 
strengthened the power of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters. 7s The 
breaking point in British control over Egypt began in 1951 when serious fighting 
between Egyptian guerrillas and British troops broke out. The breakdown of order 
provided a power vacuum which was captured by the Free Officers who seized power 
in July 1952 and declared Egypt a republic. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the modem history of state formation in Egypt spanning the 
period between 1805 and 1952. The first section offered a discussion of the evolution 
of the state and the accompanying changes in social property relations reflected in 
75 Prior to 1945, the British motivations in Egypt were primarily shaped by the Empire's concerns to 
protect the Suez Canal - and thus its trade routes and imports from India - than by investments and 
profits from Egypt. The levels of English investments in Egypt in contrast to French capital in Egypt in 
this period remained low. As Tignor (1987: 482) writes: "French holdings in Egypt-private and 
corporate-were estimated at more than LE 200,000,000, nearly three-quarters of which were the value 
of shares and bonds of the Suez Canal Company held by French investors. The other major holdings 
were the Egyptian public debt (LE 14 million), the Credit Foncier Egyptien (tE 14 million). The Cairo 
Electric Railway and Oases Company (LE 2.4 million), and rural and urban property (LE 1.8 million). 
The most heavily capitalized French business (the Suez Canal Co. excepted), the Credit Foncier 
Egyptien, enjoyed the financial and political backing of such major French financial organizations as 
the Credit Foncier de France, the Societe Generale, and the Credit Loyannais.'' Nevertheless, British 
interests remained divided over the decolonization of Egypt and the establishment of a neo-colonial 
relationship. While economic interests favoured an official recognition of Egyptian autonomy which 
would facilitate the launch of a neo-colonial relationship between Egyptian elite and Britain interests, 
British military powers, under influence of conservative forces were not yet willing to let go of Egypt 
and of British legacy of colonialism. British businessmen feared that if some concessions are not 
made, the nationalist movement would bring to an end the profits that British firms reaped from Egypt. 
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land and housing prior to the arrival of the British. Property relations were shaped by 
various factors that catne into play such as customary rights to village organization of 
production and elite desire to increase their surplus. In the second section, I traced the 
socio-political and economic changes that occurred under the British rule. 
Furthermore, this section examined the changes ~ property relations that materialized 
under the British colonial administration which oversaw a reorganization of property 
relations by reducing the power of one particular faction of the Egyptian landed class 
while empowering European investors. 
This chapter demonstrated that the nature of accumulation did not radically 
change during the century and a half as cotton remained the main export crop. 
Political accumulation thus characterized not only Muhammad Ali's strategy of 
wealth appropriation but also what occurred under the British rule. Given the smaller 
population of Egypt prior to the 1950s, and the availability of land to exploit, the 
rulers of Egypt did not feel the need to enact a policy of mass dispossession. Lack of 
housing did not become a pressing issue until afte.r the 1950s when rural-urban 
migration picked up pace. A national housing policy as such did not exist in the 
periods under study in this chapter however the state did play a role in meeting the 
needs of the elite and foreign investors for housing. 
The next period in Egyptian history witnessed a social revolution that 
overturned the power relations that had dominated Egypt since 19th century. In 
Chapter Five, I exatnine the launch of the first Egyptian national housing policy as 
Egyptian society began a radical phase of transformation in social property relations 
motivated by the ideals of' Arab socialism'. 
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Chapter 5. Statism and Socialism under Nasser: Re-ordedng Property 
Relations 
The Revolution of 1952 brought about a reorganization of social power in Egypt. 
These transformations occurred through a number of specific phases under the Free 
Officers' rule. The first phase witnessed the adoption of a series of policies which 
aimed to marginalize the economic power of landlords and monopolists (Azim 1989). 
This task was complicated domestically by a prolonged investment strike by ruling 
class forces, and internationally by foreign intervention surrounding the Suez Crisis. 
By 1956, the revolution entered a more radical nationalist phase that resulted in the 
nationalization of key industries. By 1961, a more radical socialist phase was adopted 
with the development of the ASU. 
Throughout the Nasser period (June 23, 1956 - September 28, 1970), the 
revolutionary regime implemented a series of land reforms and rent control laws that 
sought to empower workers and peasants, and mobilize a basis of support against the 
domestic enemies of the regime. While these reforms had far-reaching implications on 
existing social relations in Egypt, the regime's inability to effectively build a long-
term political base, coupled with the devastating defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, 
left the regime vulnerable to attacks from conservative forces. This chapter examines 
the Nasserist regime's policies and their impact on re-ordering property relations. The 
first part examines economic development policies under Nasser. The second section 
examines the impact of Agrarian Reform on class formation and social property 
relations in the countryside. A third section provides a study of housing policies in 
relation to the regime's macro-economic policy of ISL The final section assesses the 
contradictions ofNasserism. 
Economic Development 
Prior to 1952, Egyptian society was marked by gross inequalities. The political and 
economic systems were dominated by an alliance of landowners and industrialists 
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who had benefited from British colonial rule. Industrialization remained limited in 
scope as only consumer goods industries linked to .the export sector, such as food 
processing and textiles production, had been developed. As a result, the industrial 
labour force remained small, receiving low wages and lacking basic labour rights. 
The landowners and industrialists expanded their share of wealth during World War 
II, either through monopoly pricing or through joint ventures with various European 
powers. However, no long-term vision for economic development, social justice or 
redistribution of wealth was conceived by the ruling class. 
As shown in Chapter Four, the period between 1945 and 1952 was a turbulent 
one as the gap between the rich and the poor increased, leaving many without the 
means to a decent livelihood. The continued presence of the British and the 
collaboration of the Egyptian elite with them mobilized public protest and anger 
calling for an anti-imperialist struggle. It was in this period that an organized faction 
with the military-the 'Free Officers' - came to power in a coup in 1952 with the 
intent of ridding Egypt of both the descendants of Muhammad Ali's dynasty as well 
as the lingering British political and military presence. 1 
By 1953, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) began planning for an 
initial three-year transitional phase. A six-point program was implemented with the 
aim of eradicating imperialism, abolishing feudalism, eliminating monopoly capital, 
establishing social justice, building a strong national army and establishing 
democracy. This program reflected their desire for modernizati<Im, social justice and 
state building, but it did not amount to a coherent blueprint for the development of 
policy.2 Their policies, therefore, were the result of trial and error and their goals were 
constantly being re-articulated. 
During this first phase of the development program (1952-56), an agrarian 
land reform was implemented with the hope of freeing up capital for industrial 
1 While Egypt was formally independent, Britain maintained a military presence in the country under 
the pretence of protecting foreign interests and foreign minorities as well as ensuring the protection of 
'imperial communications', i.e. the Suez Canal and defending Egypt against foreign aggression. 
2 While this program remained quite general, the Officers set out their vision of modernization and 
economic development in clearer terms focusing on agricultural development and the building of the 
High Aswan Dam. The following organizations were created to implement the industrial policy: the 
Permanent Council for Development and National Production (1952), the Industrial Bank (1952), the 
Permanent Council for Social Services (1953), the General Petroleum Authority (1954), and the High 
Dam Organization (1955). 
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development. The Officers, given their diverse ideological background, kept an open 
door to private sector's participation in the economy and demonstrated their good well 
by passing pro-investor laws. For instance, Law 120/1952 abolished the need for 51 
per cent Egyptian ownership of industrial enterprises while Law 156/1953, 
... allowed foreign enterprises during the first six years 
of an investment to repatriate profits annually up to the 
10 per cent of capital invested, and after that up to 20 
per cent annually. Not only that, but it also became 
legal for foreign capital to own 100 per cent of shares of 
new industries .... In case of project failures, other laws 
granted full fiscal exemptions to new industries and 
allowed foreign companies to re-export all of their 
capital after only one year of operation (Farah 2009: 32-
33). 
The Officers emphasized unity, order and hard work as their priority at this stage of 
development and declared labour's strike action illegal. 
Despite such incentives, private capital did not show any interest iti 
participating in the economic development program of the Free Officers, and engaged 
in a prolonged investment strike to cripple the new regime. As a result, private gross 
investment declined from LE 112 million in 1950 to just LE 39 million in 1956, with 
most of the investment occurring in unregulated sectors such as urban real estate and 
construction (Farah 2009: 33). 
The unwillingness of the private sector to respond to the regime's investment 
incentives forced the regime to launch a program of nationalization in 1956 in order to 
acquire the necessary capital for industrial investment. 3 The major challenge in this 
period was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. After the U.S. declined to aid the 
building of the High Aswan Dam, the regime decided to nationalize the Canal and use 
its revenues to support industrialization. This move was not welcomed by Britain and 
France who had controlled the Canal since the late nineteenth century. Israel, too, felt 
threatened that it might lose access to the Canal after its nationalization and joined 
France and Britain in what became known as the Suez War of 1956. Subsequently, 
3 Military Order No. 5/1956 led to sequestration of foreign firms in Egypt (Wahba 1994: 56). 
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the Soviet Union built the High Dam using Soviet equipment and technical skills. 
The Dam was inaugurated in May of 1964, but it officially opened in January of 1971. 
The shift to a socialist development model occurred in 1961. The model 
entailed the development of heavy industry and infrastructure supported by 
agricultural revenues and progressive social policies. The newly formed ASU was 
created to carry out the revolution. The ASU proved much more effective in 
organizing the Egyptian society than its predecessors, the Liberation Rally and the 
National Union. Membership of the ASU, which was open to all citizens except 
capitalists and landlords, had reached 5 million by 1954. The regime's goal was to use 
the ASU to establish cooperation among workers, the army, peasants and students 
(Hopwood 1982: 91). Under its direction, a series of radical reforms extended state 
control over the financial sector and various industries such as: banks, insurance 
companies, transport, heavy industry, textiles, sugar refineries, foodstuffs, public 
works, construction, hotels, department stores, cinemas, theatres, newspapers and 
publishing houses. Enterprises that were not covered by the nationalization law were 
forced to convert 50 per cent of their shares into public property while individuals 
were allowed shares of no more than LE 10,000. Egyptians earning income in excess 
of LE 10,000 were subjected to 90 per cent tax rates (Waterbury 1983: 225). 
A Five Year Plan (1960-65) was implemented that saw the public sector grow 
to account for 90 per cent of all non-agricultural domestic output, 45 per cent of 
domestic savings and 90 per cent of gross domestic capital formation (Farah 2009: 
35). The labour force grew from 6 million to 7.3 million workers over the course of 
the plan period (Farah 2009: 35). The socialist laws of 1961 extended many rights 
and benefits to workers. Unions were legalized, albeit with certain restrictions on 
their political activity, and granted collective bargaining rights. The ASU defended 
workers against unfair dismissals especially in nationalized industries. Workers 
began to enjoy a shorter working week, minimum wage, sick pay, holidays and social 
insurance. Workers were also able to sit on the boards of companies, participated in 
management decisions and profit-sharing schemes (Waterbury 1983). 
A number of external events, including the failed union of Syria and Egypt 
(1958-61), the Yemen War (1962-67), and the Arab Israeli War of 1967, negatively 
affected the course of the revolution. The most important factor was the defeat in the 
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1967 Arab-Israeli War. The war drained public sector investment and reduced 
subsidy levels, resulting in significant public sector retrenchment and a gradual move 
towards empowering the private sector. The state increasingly relied on private credit 
sources to support public sector activities related to investment, production and 
export, which resulted in rising inflation levels and depressed public consumption 
levels. 4 It also made Egypt dependent on politically unsympathetic foreign creditors 
such as the Gulf States. The economic crisis was intensified by the rapid growth of 
population and the rising demand for subsidized services and food. In industry, there 
was a large degree of idle capacity and overstock of industrial products in many firms. 
Prices were increased in order to reduce consumption levels and mineral exploration 
came to a halt after Israel occupied the Sinai region. While Nasser's regime did not 
cut public sector employment, the regime anticipated the hard times were ahead. As 
Time Magazine (August 4, 1967) reported Nasser conveyed these concerns to the 
public in the following terms at the time: 
'We must eliminate all privileges' ... [The post-War 
budget] imposed higher taxes on the middle and upper 
classes, raised workers' compulsory monthly savings by 
50 per cent, reduced overtime pay, cut the sugar ration 
by a third, and curtailed practically all major industrial 
programs. Only military expenditures were increased, 
by $140 million to an estimated $1 billion, exclusive of 
some of the hidden barter arrangements with the Soviet 
bloc. 
While the War of 1967 negatively affected the industrialization program, there were 
other issues that complicated achieving the goals of industrialization. Highlighting a 
lack of coordination between the various sectors of the economy, the Egyptian Prime 
Minister Ali Sabri (1960-65) stated: 
... when the First Five Year Plan was drawn 'there was 
no adequate scientific study of the inter-relationships 
between the different sectors of the national economy, 
nor of changes in these relationships following the 
4 On June 5th, within three hours, Israel succeeded in destroying at least 300 of Egypt's 430 combat 
aircrafts, many of which were still on the ground as pilots did not have time to take off. At the end of 
the 1967 War, eighty per cent of Egypt's military equipment was destroyed, 10,000 soldiers and 1,500 
officers killed, and 5,000 soldiers and 500 officers captured (Hopwood 1982: 74-76). 
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change of the rates of growth in the sectors. There was 
also no sufficient coordination on either the planning or 
the implementation level between the sectors of the 
national economy as a whole or between the projects 
included in each separate sector. . . [I]n spite of the 
extensive efforts made by the planners, they did suffer 
from a dearth of the basic data: capital-input ratios, 
propensities to save, consume, and ·import, income and 
price elasticities of demand and supply, technical 
coefficients etc. Thus 'our need for imported 
production requirements far exceeded what was 
estimated in the plan' [sic] (AI Barawy 1972: 304-05). 
Beside these administrative difficulties at the planning level, a set of domestic and 
external challenges complicated the building of a new state on the ashes of the old 
regime. The next section assesses the difficulty of re-ordering property relations and 
challenging the existing power relations. 
The Agrarian Land Reform Program 
The Agrarian Land Reform Program was launched in 1952 and progressed through 
two distinct phases. The first represented a nationalist phase of reform between 1952 
and 1961. The second beginning in 1961 represented a more radical, socialist phase 
of agrarian reform. The goal of the first phase was to break the power of the landed 
class and organize agriculture in a manner that would support industrialization. 
However, there was no plan to nationalize the agricultural sector. The justification for 
land reform came from a long history of exploitation in the Egyptian countryside. A 
small minority, including members of the royal family, owned millions offeddans 
whereas millions of peasants were either landless or had small plots that were 
insufficient for subsistence. -For instance, in 1945, ninety-four per cent oflandowners 
controlled a total arable area of 34 per cent whereas 0.02 per cent of landowners 
controlled 11 per cent of all arable lands (El Morshidy 1952: 378). By 1952, 20 per 
cent of the land was owned by 2,000 owners while 2 million peasants and small 
farmers owned 13 per cent of the land (Hopwood 1982: 125). Peasants were 
subjected to exorbitant rents without any protection by the state. Said (1972: 8-9) 
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pointed out that "some ninety great landowners had estates each worth more than two 
million pounds." 
The Ministry of Agrarian Reform was created to carry out the effective 
redistribution of land. There were three dimensions to Agrarian Reform. First, a 
·ceiling was introduced which limited landownership to 200 feddans in 1952, 100 
feddans in 1961, and finally, 50 feddans in 1969. 5 The second aspect of the reform 
program fixed the terms of land leases in an attempt to alleviate the exploitative 
landlord-tenant relationship. The third aspect involved organizing the redistributed 
lands through agricultural cooperatives. 
The state carried out the confiscation of the estates of the larger landowners 
and abolished private waqfs and hikr land titles in order to undermine the power of the 
religious authorities. Individuals, whose lands were confiscated, with the exception of 
the members of the Royal family, were offered indemnity, in the form of state bonds, 
redeemable in thirty years at 3 per cent interest. 6 The value of the indemnity was 
equivalent to ten times the land rent or seven times the basic land tax (Al Barawy 
1972: 73). 
By 1961, the second phase ofland reform, which Allain Roussillon (1998: 
344) called a "revolution within a revolution", began with a recognition of the failure 
of past land policies. In this phase, the stock of land for redistribution expanded 
through a number of measures. The first was the confiscation of foreigners' lands and 
the prohibition, through Law 15/1963 of foreign landownership of any kind. The 
second occurred through a sharp reduction in the maximum amount of land 
individuals and families could legally own. Other measures sought to alleviate the 
financial plight of smallholders. For example, Law 13 8/1964 required small farmers 
to pay only one quarter of the value of the land sold to them in 40 annual interest free 
instalments (Ziadeh 1978: 269-70). Additionally, this latter phase of land reform 
targeted land holders who had registered excess land (over 100 feddans) under their 
relatives or children's names (Roussillon 1998: 345). By 1969, an individual could 
own only a maximum of 50 feddans, whereas a family could have 100 feddans. 
5 According to Law 178/1952, no person was allowed more than 200 feddans of land ( 1 feddan = 
1.0368 acres). 
6 The total area ofland that was owned by the Royal family alone totalled 59,539 feddans (Al-Barawy 
1972: 73). 
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Excess land was taken over by the state for redistribution to landless and small 
holders. 
The second important aspect of the Agrarian Reform regulated the relationship 
between landlords and tenants. Agricultural workers gained the right to organize and 
defend themselves through trade unions, and agricultural rents. were fixed at seven 
times the basic land tax. In order to eliminate sub-letting, land was to be let only to a 
person who tilled it personally. Furthermore, peasants were provided with protection 
against the arbitrary powers of landlords by making leases span a period of no less 
than three years and required them to be in written form to avoid unfair takeover of 
peasant land by the landlords. In the case of share-cropping, the landlord could not 
take more than 50 per cent of the produce while all expenses had "to be apportioned 
equally between the sharecropper and the landlord." Law 17/1963 required landlords 
and tenants to "register their leases at the cooperative of their village for the purpose 
of ensuring security of the tenancy" (Ziadeh 1978: 270-71). In other words, the lessor 
shared both in the profit and in the loss as partners, while the lease could terminate on 
the death of the lessee. The Agrarian program and the rent controls that the Free 
Officers enacted was so influential in transforming social relation in Egypt leading 
one scholar of Egypt to call it "the only revolutionary aspect" of the Agrarian 
Program as seventy five per cent of cultivated land was affected by the rent control 
laws (Ansari 1986: 79). 
The third aspect of the Agrarian Reform was organizing peasants into 
agricultural cooperatives. The state redistributed land between 2-5 feddans amongst 
over 300,000 peasants (Fahmy 2002: 202). Thus between 1952 and 1970, thanks to 
Agrarian Reform, 817,500 feddans ofland were sold to about 342,000 landless 
peasants, which at the time represented about 9 per cent of all rural families (Ibrahim 
2003: 115). The redistributed land was to be paid for over thirty years while new land 
recipients had to join public sector agricultural co-operatives. Through 5000 
agricultural cooperatives, the state distributed agricultural inputs such as seeds, 
fertilizer, pesticides as well as fixed-rate credit. The marketing and transport of crops, 
especially cotton and sugar, also fell under the state's jurisdiction. After 1961, the 
regime aimed to achieve a greater balance between agriculture and industry. The state 
subsidized peasants by paying them higher prices than the level of international 
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markets. Prices were controlled on basic food stuffs in order to help workers. 
Sadowski (1991: 68-70) argues that whatever the Nasserist regime took out of the 
rural economy, it put as much back into it. 7 By 1970, there were 3 million members 
of the cooperatives (Sadowski 1991: 60).8 
While successful in its early stages, by mid 1960s, the cooperative system 
began to show signs of weakness as chances of abuse, misuse, corruption and 
mismanagement increased with the rising membership. The problems that marred the 
cooperative system ranged from the concentration of power in the board of directors 
and lack of peasant representation, to the lack of accountability which clearly 
endangered the viability of the cooperative system (Sadowski 1991; Ansari 1986). 
Furthermore, many of the cooperatives remained too small to constitute a viable 
economic unit that could bear the costs of production. In 1969, a remedy was 
proposed to make the cooperatives function more effectively and transparently by 
creating links among the cooperatives and increasing peasant participation at the level 
of board of directors. 
In addition to problems associated with the cooperative system, administrative 
weakness reduced the effectiveness of land redistribution. Out of 734,900 feddans of 
reclaimed lands, only 273,000 were redistributed by 1966 (Al Barawy 1972: 87). 
State control of crops was limited to cotton, rice, and wheat, while a whole range of 
fruits and vegetables were left outside of state control. This provided opportunities 
for enrichment amongst those farmers who did not join the cooperatives and sought 
instead to cater to export markets. As a result, the amount of land dedicated to the 
production of fruits and vegetables more than doubled in size from 94,000 feddans in 
1952 to 225,000 feddans in 1968 (Al Barawy 1972: 113). 
Housing Policy 
Under the Free Officers' the adoption of a national housing policy was at the centre of 
state policy for economic development and a re-organization of Egyptian society. To 
7 For a similar assessment, see: Said and Ahmed (1972: 77). The only source'of state revenue was 
cotton and rice. 
8 By 1967, there were 4,865 Agricultural Cooperative Societies, with a membership of2,724,677 and a 
total capital of LE 2,775,776 (Al Barawy 1972: 124). 
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carry out economic development in a balanced way through the integration of rural 
and urban sectors required envisioning a housing policy that would accommodate the 
migrants and rural workers in the major urban centres. 
In 1952, Egypt had a total urban population of 5 million. Two million lived in 
Cairo and over 1 million lived in Alexandria; the majority lived in dilapidated 
housing. Prior to the revolution, the only publicly subsidized housing was the 
Workers' Housing Project in lmbabah, which consisted of l,rno dwelling units (Abu 
Lughod 1971). The result had been over-crowding in existing residential areas where 
one room residences were occupied by four to ten family members. For most 
families, affordability was a major concern as their incomes barely covered the cost of 
basic necessities of life. Given the predominance of dilapidated housing and a lack of 
housing stock due to the absence of any housing policy prior to 1952, the Nasserist 
regime inherited a significant housing problem in which demand significantly 
outstripped supply. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, the demand for 
housing rose significantly, reaching near crisis proportions. 9 In order to resolve the 
growing housing crisis, the regime formulated a comprehensive housing policy that 
revolved around state provision of public housing and comprehensive rent control 
policies. 
In 1954 the regime established the Public Housing and Construction Company 
(PHCC) to construct housing units for low-income earners. This represented a 
modest state-led response to the problem that was reflective of the mild nationalism 
characteristic of the first phase of the revolution. As such, part of the work was 
contracted out to smaller private companies. The PHCC produced three housing 
types: subsidized units for low-income families, workers' units and condominiums for 
the professional classes sold for profit. The government launched the construction of 
low-cost high rises on the outskirts of Cairo. These projects were financed by the 
Development and Housing Company, a public sector company. As a result, in every 
city in the country, local governments erected blocks of flats according to a standard 
9 First, a wave of migration from rural areas to cities dramatically increased during the post-WIII 
period. This was partly a result of the urban employment created as a result of import substitution 
industrialization. Second, the War of 1967 created a demand for housing for the displaced population 
of the Sinai cities. 
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design of four stories with two flats on each level. These flats were leased to low-
income groups at a nominal rent ofLE2 or LE3 per month (Hanna 1985: 197). 
In 1956, a comprehensive policy paper commissioned by the government, 
called 'A Master Plan of Cairo', was published and marked a watershed in the 
regime's approach to the housing problem. 10 The Plan which was taken up as policy 
when the regime took a turn to the left in 1958, was part of the regime's industrial 
policy and emphasized a comprehensive approach to the provision of public housing 
for workers (Abu Lughod 1971: 230-31). Before 1956, workers' housing was limited 
and reflected the small scale of Egyptian industry. Workers' housing was mainly 
located near the Iron and Steel Mill Company in Helwan and Abo Zaabal in the north 
of Cairo for railway workers, Kafer El Dwar, and El Mahalia El Koubra for textile 
workers as well as in Aswan, Suez and Alexandria. The small size and the absence of 
an organized demand for workers' housing were the determining factors of the lack of 
supply of workers' housing prior to the revolution. As Abu Lughod (1971: 162) 
writes, "According to a survey of 1957, 55 per cent of the industrial labour force of 
Cairo was employed by the 87.5 per cent of all firms consisting of four or less 
persons! One and two-person businesses accounted for two-thirds of all industrial 
firms and employed almost one third of the industrial labour force of the city. The 
average size of a firm was only 3.6 workers." In accordance with the Plan six satellite 
industrial cities - containing public housing for workers - were proposed for 
construction around Cairo, as a part of the regime's macro-economic policy of ISi. 11 
As the nationalization of foreign private firms accelerated in 1961, the need for 
workers' housing became increasingly important. 
The Plan also emphasized the need for east-west housing expansion into the 
desert. The Free Officers' housing policy took this into consideration and launched a 
major housing project in Tellal Zeinhoum and Ain El Sira in 1957 and 1958. In 1959 
Nasser announced the construction of a new town near Heliopolis, to be carried out by 
the Nasr City Organization. By 1966 there were three similar companies: Nasr City, 
Heliopolis, and Maadi. Nasr City was to house civil servants and become the centre 
10 As part of the government's infrastructural development plan, 5.5 million square meters of Cairo's 
street system were paved between 1952 and 1958 (Abu Lughod 1971: 142, 160). 
11 Of the six cities, only one - Helwan - was built. 
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of government activity. Nonetheless, housing development continued to concentrate 
in the Delta region corresponding to the parallel growth of industry in this part of the 
country. Thus housing projects began in Shubra El Khaima. Low-income housing 
was constructed on the periphery of the cities while middle and upper income housing 
was allowed to be built in the centre of towns as was the case with Nasr City and 
Heliopolis. 
Other attempts to respond to housing needs included planned housing 
cooperatives. The Cooperative Housing projects were joint public-private schemes, 
although the final say remained with the government. To realize these projects, the 
state handed out large land plots of land at nominal prices to cooperatives. Finance 
was obtained through down payments from members in addition to loans from the 
public sector. Mainly well-to-do segments of the population such as engineers, 
lawyers, journalists, doctors and army officers benefited from participation in housing 
cooperatives. In fact, El-Muhandiseen City is evidence of the power of engineers' 
syndicate which built the City for its members an~ now is one of the upper class 
quarters of Cairo. One outcome of the cooperatives was the movement of middle 
income professionals from Cairo to the spacious outskirts of the govemorate. 
State provision of public housing increased after 1958 and on through the First 
Five Year Plan (1960-65) (See Table 5.1 below). 12 Between 1958 and 1960, an 
average of 56,000 dwelling units were built annually, making it a very active period 
in housing production (Hanna 1985: 192). Over the course of the First Five Year Plan 
(1960-65), three types of housing were produced by the state: low-income urban 
housing ( 45 ,000 units), middle income urban housing (22,600 units) and rural housing 
(500 units). The goal was to rehabilitate and develop shanty towns of Cairo and 
respond to the pressing housing need of workers. The availability of state lands 
allowed the regime of Nasser to engage in real estate development and provision of 
public housing for workers and the poor. 
Table 5.1 Countrywide Allocation of Housing 1960-65, First Five Year Plan 
12 The period between 1965 and 1970 saw an increasing reliance on private sector construction of 
housing units, which reflected the crisis phase of the revolution. Between 1965 and 1970, 56,000 
housing units were provided by the public sector, whereas 110,000 units were provided by the private 
sector (Feiler 1992: 301). · 
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Type of Housing No. of dwelling Annual rate of dwelling The cost of 
units units Housing 
Low-income urban 45,000 9,000 Est. LE 1,582,000 
housing 
Middle Income urban 22600 4500 Est. LE 1,800,000 
housing 
Rural Housing 500 100 Est. LE 100,000 
Source: Soliman (2004: 75). 
Rural housing was not in as short a supply as was the case with urban housing. 
A constant flow of rural to urban migration alleviated many of the problems of rural 
housing and ensured that the regime was more focused on the urban problem. Bayad 
(1979) and Hanna (1985) note that rural housing problems were resolved not by the 
state but by rural residents who relied on local materials and personal savings. The 
building code was restricted to urban areas and rural areas were left to rely on 
unwritten laws of tradition and no building permits were required outside of the city 
limits. Only 500 units were built in rural areas during 1960-65 by the government as 
part of its public housing schemes. 
Given the focus on industry in the 1960s, rural Egypt continued to experience 
low wages, a reality that shaped the nature of its housing. Peasants continued to rely 
on silt and palm leaves for building their houses. Bayad (1979) identifies four 
systems of housing in rural areas depending on the income level of the inhabitants: 
approved houses where village mayors lived; traditional houses for peasants with five 
feddans, or landless peasants whose family members worked as seasonal labourers; 
labour housing built by big landlords for wage labourers; and public housing. 
Housing was also built in the newly reclaimed areas provided by the state - often 
distributed to landless families - but their supply was very limited. 13 
Land for buildings was provided through subdivisions of agricultural land. 
Concentration within houses was common while vertical extensions were made 
impossible due to low quality of local building materials. Most of the houses were 
built on a self-help basis, and the structure, size and the materials of the houses 
reflected the income levels of the families. In terms of services and infrastructure, 
13 In some cases, housing was built on land confiscated from landlords as a result of the land reform 
program. 
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roads in rural areas were unpaved except the ones that connected to urban centres or 
those that passed through a number of villages. Water was supplied to the main 
villages and a few hamlets. Similarly, electricity was rare in rural Egypt until the 
1960s while sewerage system was left to the villagers to devise and look after. 
Various forms of rent control comprised the other main pillar of the Free 
Officers' housing policy. As with the provision of public housing, the regime's initial 
approach to the rental market was relatively modest. In conjunction with the reforms 
to rural tenancies implemented through the agrarian land reform program, legislation 
was passed that sought to transform the nature of urban tenandes. The first set of 
reforms introduced a series of rent reductions between 1952 and 1961 (see Appendix 
B). This was followed by a more assertive position implemented through a rent 
control law passed in 1962. Law 46/1962 resulted in the formation of public sector 
committees that determined rents based on construction and land costs. During the 
remainder of the 1960s, the government continued its policy of rent reduction and rent 
control as a measure of making housing affordable for workers and civil servants. In 
1965, rents were reduced 20-35 per cent depending on the age of the building. Law 
7 /1965 offered rent reductions to all urban dwellers except those living in houses built 
and let prior to January 1, 1944. By 1965, the Cairo govemorate had constructed 
15,000 low income housing units which were rented at a symbolic payment (Soliman 
2004: 48-49; Bayad 1979: 140). By 1968 rents reached a symbolic payment, for 
example, LE 1 per room in low income housing, and LE 2 in medium cost housing. 
All private housing became subject to rent control under the Nasserist regime. In 
essence, rent control was framed as a socio-economic right to secure residency for 
lower-income Egyptians. As a result of these laws, they obtained the right to transfer 
their contracts to their children with fixed rents. In this sense, Hanna (1985) and Hill 
(1998) characterize Nasserist rent control laws as a new form of a property right for 
workers and peasants. 
Most of the literature on housing places the blame for the lack of private sector 
investment in housing on the redistributive policies of the Nasserist period. In reality, 
public sector construction work went hand in hand with small private contractors, 
although the final product was considered a public sector project. The private sector 
continued to play an active, albeit informal, role in the housing sector until the 
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socialist phase beginning in the early 1960s. Prior to the 1970s, the private housing 
sector consisted of a few individual landlords, owner-occupiers and small 
development companies or small contractors. Infrastructure remained the sole 
responsibility of the government. Low and medium cost housing in general was 
financed by personal and family savings, as well as through loans from government 
institutions like the General Organization for Housing Cooperatives and the Bank of 
Housing. The private sector was involved in the housing sector in very complex ways 
providing either direct services in housing or taking on the role of subcontractor for 
public sector projects. 
Private real estate remained unaffected by the nationalization measures of 
1956. Given that the state did not regulate real estate in the first years of the 
revolution, the rich tended to pour their investments into housing and urban property 
with the hope of realizing profits which they could not get from the other sectors of 
the economy under the Free Officers. This provided incentives for owners of urban 
and rural land to invest their savings in land. As the economic crisis hit in the late 
1960s, the regime scaled back public investment in housing and increasingly turned to 
the private sector to fill the gap. However, private capital invested not in low-income 
housing but in furnished apartments (shaqaa mafroosha) for tourists and foreign 
nationals. Furnished apartments were exempt from rent controls, and could therefore 
bring in a profitable return to landlords. By the late 1960s, furnished flats for sale 
became dominant in the country a trend that shaped the pattern of housing 
development in the next decade. 
Two challenges complicated the regime's ability to resolve the housing 
problem. First, despite efforts by the regime, construction and building codes were 
either non-existent or remained underdeveloped. For instance, as late as 1965, Cairo 
"had only a building code and a law governing land subdivision. There was no 
housing code nor was there a general zoning ordinance, although in a few isolated 
quarters of the city, land use and architectural controls govern[ ed] development" (Abu 
Lughod 1971: 229). Second, as with the Agrarian Reform program, the lack of state 
admiajstrative capacity limited the government's ability to effectively implement and 
enforce its housing policy. Ministries acted independent of the central government 
policy and instead developed closer ties between various economic interests in 
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society. The Ministry of Tourism and Industry, for instance, engaged in private 
business deals with the economic sectors that had remained outside of government 
regulation. 
Between 1965 and 1970, the government came under increasing fiscal 
pressures that were intensified by the costs of war. As in other sectors of the 
economy, levels of public investment in housing dropped and the regime encouraged 
privately financed housing schemes, repairing and renovating existing urban housing 
while continuing its program of cooperative housing subsidies. Between 1952 and 
1970 public investment in housing declined from 32.5 per cent to 10.2 per cent 
(Bayad 1979: 24 7). This decline in levels of investment was indicated in the number 
of housing units constructed by the public sector. In the 1950s, the state produced 
56,000 housing units while during the First Five Year Plan the number declined to 
30,000. Between 1965 and 1970, less than a third of the numbers of the previous 
decade were produced (Harik 1998: 164). Another estimate indicates that the First 
Five Year Plan produced 38 housing uriits per thousand people while only 32 units per 
thousand people were produced between 1965 and 1970 (Soliman 2004: 75-76). 
Given the budget constraints, the government responded to housing needs by lowering 
standards for housing construction. After the 1967 War, displaced residents migrated 
to the Nile Valley where a housing shortage already existed. In order to respond to 
the needs of the displaced for housing, the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities 
launched the Nasser Project for Urgent Housing, most of which was built at low cost 
and with low quality materials. It was not too long before these units began to 
collapse. 
Towards the end of the 1960s, private construction firms and societies began 
to gain a strong foothold in the housing market. This move was facilitated by the 
decentralization of authority in the housing sector away from the central government 
and towards the local governorates during the 1960s. Many cooperative associations 
shifted their activities during this phase to large-scale developments and high-end 
housing. Rent-controlled buildings suffered from neglect and lack of maintenance by 
landlords. 
As public housing remained limited in scope, housing demand was met 
through the informal housing market. As a number of studies (Soliman 1988; Feiler 
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1992; Bayad 1979; Hanna 1985; Ibrahim 2003) have pointed out, public provision of 
housing fell far short of meeting the needs of a rising population. In the course of the 
1960s, population increased by six millions while housing production per one 
thousand of the population remained at 8.6 units (1960-65) and 9 .2 units (1965-70) 
(Feiler 1992: 301). By 1960, 3.5 million persons lived in the same amount of space 
where 2 million had lived in 194 7 (Abu Lughod 1971: 177). This density in housing 
only got worse as the decade of the 1960s proceeded. According to Abu Lughod 
(1971: 230): 
In a 1965 appraisal of the housing problem in Cairo it 
was estimated that by the target date of 1970, some 
40,000 new dwelling units would be required to take 
care of the population increase alone; another 30,000 
dwelling units were required to reduce the existing 
levels of occupancy density; furthermore, another 
70,000 dwelling units were needed to replace 
deteriorated or to be demolished units. 
With the public sector's inability to meet the projected housing demand, by the end of 
1960s the first informal areas began to appear as rural-urban mi:gration rates increased 
(Soliman 2004: 48-49).The informal sector continued to provide the bulk of housing 
reaching at 70,000 dwellings per year (Bayad 1979: 232). 
In a sense, informal housing was the predominant response to housing needs 
of newly migrated workers from rural areas. State factories had difficulty raising the 
capital necessary for the production of housing for their workers; as a result, workers 
resorted to living in squatter settlements. Left without any public support for housing, 
these workers began buying lots on agricultural land for housing through informal 
means. The expansion of informal housing led to an increase in the price of 
agricultural land on the periphery of urban centres as migrant workers continued to 
arrive in Cairo and other cities. In the course of the 1960s, the price of agricultural 
land for the purpose of housing development reached anywhere between LE4,000 to 
LE12,000 per feddan whereas agricultural land that was not in prime location for 
housing development was priced at LEl,000-2,000 per feddan (Bayad 1979: 179). In 
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urban centres informal housing growth placed undue pressure on public services, 
sewage system and transportation. 
The Contradictions of N asserism 
Nasser's formulation of progressive property rights was conceived in the broader 
framework of Arab Socialism which emphasized an end to exploitation, economic 
justice, and equal opportunities for all through a democratic dialogue among social 
forces - peasants, workers, soldiers, intellectuals and national capital. The rights 
enshrined in the constitution of 1956 included social and economic rights and made 
the state responsible for upholding such rights. Other rights included civil rights and 
personal freedom as well as freedom from exploitation. Economic activity was to be 
organized such that it benefited the general population and not the elite at the expense 
of the majority, and the natural resources of the country became the property of the 
state. 
These rights were strengthened and expanded in Al Mithaq al-Watany (the 
National Charter of May 1962), which had the goal of 'socialist transformation' in 
Egypt. Through the Charter, workers and peasants had their rights recognized by the 
state and had representation in all areas of government. They could occupy 50 per 
cent of the seats of the National Assembly and were guaranteed representation in 
village councils. Other concrete rights for workers included profit-sharing and 
participation in management decision-making. Workers were to receive 25 per cent 
of the annual total profits through different schemes including cash hand-outs, 
housing and social benefits. Nasser was also aware about the growing and 
unaccountable power of the bureaucracy and therefore warned about the emergence of 
a 'feudal bureaucracy' (Said and Ahmed 1972). 
Nasser and the Free Officers understood the challenges of introducing a 
radical transformation of social property relations. Rural Egypt was still in the grip of 
big landlords whose power had not been completely undermined by the land reforms 
of 1952. In the absence of a political force behind him, Nasser was forced to make 
comprormses. He laid out his ideas of socialism in Egypt illustrated in the following 
excerpt: 
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I have often said that our socialism is appropriate to our 
own circumstances. We do not copy the world's other 
social experiments; we study them without prejudice or 
chauvinism. But there are some basic differences 
between our socialism and Marxist-Leninist 
socialism ... We, on the contrary, do not believe that 
dictatorship should pass form one class to another. This 
will breed civil war. We are converting a state of 
reactionary 'bourgeois' dictatorship into one of the 
democracy of the whole people. Marxist-Leninism 
advocates the violent eradication of the exploiting class. 
We, on the other hand, solve our problems without 
bloodshed. We give to this class, or rather to its 
members as individuals, the opportunity of a decent and 
honourable life. Marxism-Leninism does not believe in 
private ownership. We distinguish between exploiting 
and non-exploiting private ownership. We are opposed 
only to the former but encourage the latter. Finally, 
Marxist Leninism stipulates the nationalization of 
agricultural land. Our socialism does not. Rather, it 
believes in private ownership of agricultural land within 
the framework of a co-operative system.' ... In this 
respect it is nearer to the Fabianism of 'democratic 
socialism' than to the Marxist-Leninist concept of 
violent revolution. Other similarities of approach 
between Western Fabianism and Arab Socialism in 
Egypt are their common belief in gradualism and the 
avoidance of violent clash between classes; and their 
view of the state as a social machine to be captured and 
used for the promotion of social welfare and social 
services, as the servant of the people rather than an 
instrument of domination (Nasser cited in Said and 
Ahmed 1972: 76-77). 
Nasser distinguished Arab Socialism from Marxist-Leninism by emphasizing a non-
violent transition to post-revolutionary Egypt. Arab Socialism assigned to the ruling 
class a role in industrialization, the maintenance of some form of 'progressive' private 
property, the organization of agriculture through cooperatives rather than through 
wholesale nationalization, and in limiting the role of the state to that of a provider of 
social welfare. Although private ownership was not eliminated altogether, it was 
assigned a subordinate role to the public sector. This was due to Nasser's beliefthat 
the state could serve as "the community's servant" and entrusted with protecting its 
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interests without any bias in favour of or against any class or group. In other words, 
the state could belong to the ''whole people and not any class" (Said and Ahmed 
1972: 69). Upholding the principles of Arab Socialism entailed creating a "socialist, 
cooperative and democratic society" through the ASU, which had established a social 
base in rural and urban areas (The National Charter of 1962). 
A number of scholars have argued that the revolution of 1952 marked the 
beginning of 'statism' or 'etatism' in Egypt' (Vitalis 1995; Cooper 1982; Wahba 
1994). Mourad Wahba (1994: 16) defines 'etatism' as a predominant role for the state 
in the economy. Statism, however, is a notoriously ambiguous concept. As a political 
project that prescribes a series of policies - as opposed to a theoretical concept 
describing the autonomy of the state - it lacks a precise definition and tends to 
incorporate competing, and often contradictory, political claims and ideologies, such 
as nationalism and socialism. The French notion of dirigisme, in which the state 
"compensated for the relatively weak role played by private entrepreneurs by 
developing a powerful capacity to intervene in the economy", is instructive in this 
case (Kesselman, et al., 1992: 153). The difference in the Egyptian case, of course, is 
that the Nasserist regime was unable to build up the kind of ad$nistrative capacity 
necessary to successfully implement a statist project over the longer term. Up to a 
point, both nationalists attempting to build 'state capitalism' and socialists attempting 
a transition towards socialism can collaborate on such a statist project. Statism, 
therefore, is fundamentally a contested phenomenon in which different social forces 
seek to use the state to implement different development projects. This was also true 
in the Egyptian case ofNasserism, where nationalists and socialists could collaborate 
on a project of anti-imperialism and import substitution industrialization. However, 
when it came to policies regarding broader issues of class politics and the 
redistribution of wealth, the contradictory tendencies within statism tended to become 
more prominent. Ultimately, any assessment of the nature of statism needs to take 
into account the class basis of the social forces driving forward and benefiting from 
statist policies and institutional arrangements. 14 This also was the case with Egypt. 
14 Vitalis (1995: 195) argues that the revolution of 1952 curtailed the power of the "local business 
oligarchy and its privileged position within the political economy." 
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The contested nature of statism is reflected in the lack of ideological unity 
characteristic of the Free Officers. One group believed that the technocratic and 
bureaucratic elite with the help of science and technology had the answer to Egypt's 
economic development; Socialism was seen as a practical solution to the problem of 
science and technology. A second group wanted the public sector to undertake the 
development of state capitalism through encouraging the private sector in the process 
of economic development. A third group believed in scientific socialism; although a 
small group, they believed in including the masses in the process of economic 
development. Associated with the traditional ruling classes, the fourth group 
supported the development of the private sector and wanted to distance Egypt from 
the East Bloc. As the revolution unfolded, it was impossible for them to reach an 
agreement on a grand strategy for economic development and the means to carry out 
such a program. 15 A series of recurring struggles among the Free Officers -
exacerbated after defeat by Israel in 1967 - led to the lack of a coherent policy and 
development strategy under Nasser. These divisions and conflicts within the Egypt~an 
state added to the challenges that Nasser had to overcome. 
The main architect of statism under Nasser was Aziz Sidqi who was assigned 
the Ministry of Industry. Under Sidqi, the state came to control various sectors of the 
economy ranging from "fertilizers, construction, heavy industry and petroleum to the 
private press." The railways had "never been privatized and were the real core of 
Egypt's contemporary state-owned enterprise sector" (Vitalis 1995: 207). While 
Wahba (1994) and others (Ibrahim 2003; Zaalouk 1989; Issawi 1963) argue that 
Nasser's economic policies were an extension of previous policies, Vitalis (1995: 
207-08) claims otherwise, arguing that, under Nasser and the Free Officers' rule, the 
state took on a very different role rather than simply continuing the policies of the 
previous regimes. Similarly, Waterbury (1983: 233) pointed out that for the first time 
in Egypt's history, it was through Nasser's industrialization policy that the state 
15 Sadowski captured the irreconcilable characteristics and ideologies of the Free Officers when he 
wrote that, "[the Free Officers] were an unusually diverse and cacophonous group, which included 
Marxists and Muslim fundamentalists, partisans of existing civilian parties and advocates of military 
rule, socialists and free traders, admirers of the West and violent anti-imperialists. Beyond their 
operational plan for the coup itself, the only thing they had found time to agree on was the need to free 
Egypt from the deadening monarchy of Farouq and the landowning elite that supported him" 
(Sadowski 1991: 55; Cf. Johnson 1973: 3). 
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"extended its regulatory and proprietary grip to vast areas of the economy."16 For over 
seventy years, private investors - Egyptian and foreign - had benefited from access to 
the state and public resources. The shift towards public sector control of resources 
and enterprises disadvantaged the private sector. Private investors were actively 
forced out of the economy by the Free Officers' regime betwe.en 1954 and 1956. The 
regime dismantled monopolies and, in 1955, amended the Company Law limiting 
"the number of firms for which individuals could serve as directors (six) or managing 
directors (two); at the same time it forced company directors to retire after reaching 
the age of sixty. The Decrees affected some 200 businessmen from families who had 
steered the economy for over two generations" (Vitalis 1995: 209). 
One of the aspects of the revolution that distinguished the socialists from the 
nationalists was a commitment to egalitarianism. This goal was promoted through the 
provision of public goods and services, and a number of other policies designed to 
redistribute the wealth of society. Such measures ~eluded: free education; health 
care; affordable housing, by way of rent controls and public housing projects; mass 
employment in the public sector; price and wage controls, and consumer goods 
subsidies. As mentioned above, workers benefited from a higher minimum wage, 
fewer work hours per week, paid holidays, compulsory social insurance, protection 
from illegal dismissal and ability to participate on the board of companies. 
The Agrarian Land Reform had a major impact on Egyptian society as more 
than 50 per cent of the population was engaged in the sector during Nasser's time. 
Rural inequality was radically changed as land ceilings reduced the number of large 
estates and land was redistributed to peasants and small farmers. As Bush (2002: 10) 
notes, the biggest impact of tenancy laws was on the largest and smallest landholders, 
with the latter securing rights to property: "Those with less than five feddans 
increased by 13 per cent and the land they owned increased by 7 4 per cent. The 
16 Waterbury, in his discussion of the nature of state and class in Egypt under Nasser, pointed out that 
"at no time in the modem history of Egypt has a capitalist class captured the state. Rather it has been 
the quasi-autonomous state and its manipulators -the Muhammad Ali dynasty, the British, or the 
military - that have broken up, reassembled, or created out of whole cloth existing and new class 
interests ... In Egypt ... in contrast to the experience of the capitalist West, no group has obtained an 
enduring grip on political power or on economic resources" (1983: 232-33). To Waterbury (1983: 260), 
Nasser's industrialization project, much less than a class project, reflected the desire of"a few among 
the top leadership" to change society through public policy supported by industrialization. 
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biggest estates of more than 200 feddans disappeared." The reform of agricultural 
credit cooperatives also played an important role in restoring the rights of peasants to 
land and thus livelihoods and secure dwellings. For the first time in Egypt's history, 
almost a million feddans of agricultural land was released for redistribution to the 
peasantry (Zaalouk 1989: 26). In short, Nasser's period was a unique period in 
Egyptian history in the sense that the rights of peasants and workers were not only 
recognized, but enshrined in the constitution. Despite opposition from conservative 
forces, Nasser and the Free Officers took big strides in changing the socio-economic 
and political landscape of Egypt. 
The revolution was, nonetheless, riven with problems and contradictions. One 
of the biggest obstacles to the revolutionary transformation of Egyptian society was 
the lack of state capacity to implement the necessary reforms. The state's reach was 
limited to the main urban centres. The state's control over cotton exporting 
companies, fertilizer and pesticide factories, and the gins and mills only gave it the 
power of taxation over certain economic activities. Regulating the agricultural sector, 
however, still remained out of reach. Sadowski (1991: 66-67) highlights this 
discrepancy between what the state willed and what it actually accomplished: "The 
effects of state policy were thus often quite different from their intended objectives. 
Nasser understood this problem well. As he once said, 'You imagine that we simply 
give orders and the country is run accordingly. You are greatly mistaken."' This 
weakness of the state was apparent in the way public sector contracts were handed out 
to the private sector. Similarly, a lack of accountability in the public sector allowed 
room for collaboration between public sector managers and the private sector. This 
resulted not only in a brain-drain, but also in illegal resource transfers from the public 
to the private sector and in the black market. Even in cities, various levels of 
government maintained their autonomy. As a result, policies designed in Cairo were 
often never implemented outside of the major urban areas. 
As a consequence of this lack of state capacity, the power of the big landlords 
persisted despite the fact that most revolutionary reforms were aimed at attacking 
their institutional and informal power. Landlords did not completely lose their power. 
Those who had their lands confiscated were given compensation in one form or 
another. They were also allowed to retain their deeds to the land, thereby enabling 
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them to easily reclaim their lands in the 1970s under Sadat. Other landlords were 
allowed to sell their land, enabling- as will be seen below-medium farmers to 
accumulate their land. 17 Reforms that were implemented between 1952 and 1969 did 
not affect the inheritance of landed property. The only individual landlords who were 
not given compensation for their confiscated property were those who belonged to the 
Royal family, under the pretence that they were collaborators with British 
imperialism. 
The persistence of landlord power subsequently exacerbated the state's 
administrative weakness, as landlords were able to co-opt local government 
authorities by bringing them into their circles of patronage. Thus, abuses of land 
reform were neither reported to the government and nor confronted at the village 
level. The weakness of state power to enforce policy at the village level was captured 
in the following example. In 1966, the village of Kamshish became the focal point of 
land reform violations when it was revealed that a landlord not only held hundreds of 
feddans, but had ordered the murder of an activist (Husain) who had tried to 
investigate Al-Fiqqi family's wealth and their circumvention of agrarian reforms. It 
was after this affair was captured by Cairo newspapers and magazines that the regime 
put together the Higher Committee for the Liquidation of Feudalism (HCLF). To the 
dismay of the regime, "The HCLF quickly determined that these violations were not 
confined to Kamshish but were common across Egypt. Ali Sabri, one of the officers 
on the committee, estimated that 'on average, each province had twenty to thirty 
families whose members either evaded the agrarian reforms, controlled the village 
administration and party organs, or exercised oppressive influence'" (Sadowski 1991: 
78-79). 18 
The weakness of the regime's administrative capacity and its lack of control 
over rural Egypt - particularly in Lower Egypt - coupled with the lingering power of 
the landlords provided the perfect environment for medium landowners to prosper. 
An unintended effect of the land reform policy was the emergence of a class of 
17 Some landlords found new outlets in the construction and real estate sectors. 
18 By July 26, 1967, barely a mon~ after the defeat in the war with Israel, Nasser's regime was forced 
to issue a de-sequestration law that returned properties that were sequestered by the HCLF. This meant 
that cases under HCLF investigation for sequestration declined from 334 to 25 and the amount of land 
for sequestration declined from 55,000 feddans to 3,100 feddans (Ansari 1986: 143). 
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medium size farmers who owned between 20-50 feddans ofland. By 1965, four years 
after Nasser's radical shift in economic policy and a new round of land confiscations, 
close to one-third of Egypt's cultivable land was controlled by 5.2 per cent of 
landowners (Ayubi 1991: 200). Close to 70,000 farmers owning more than 10 
feddans emerged as counter-part elite to the old landed elite in rural Egypt (Sadowski 
1991: 75). This group played an important part in controlling the rural economy and 
politics and thus shaped the outcome of state policies in most parts of Egypt. 19 
A number of factors facilitated the rise of medium size farmers. Medium 
farmers maintained their independence in crop production by remaining outside of the 
state cooperatives. They were free to shift their crop patterns to growing high value 
crops, vegetables and citrus fruits as well as raising livestock. Although they 
remained outside the agricultural cooperatives, these rich farmers benefited greatly 
indirectly from the public resources made available to the cooperatives through 
collaboration with corrupt local public officials. For instance, "10-20 per cent of the 
total value of fertilizer distributed through the cooperatives would end up being sold 
on the black market at mark-ups of 150 per cent (in Lower Egypt) to 300 per cent 
(Upper Egypt) over the subsidized price" (Sadowski 1991: 75). As a result, rich 
farmers increased the margin of their profits through their exploitation of the 
cooperative system (jam 'iyyat ta'awuniyya) as well as through methods of 
diversification and mechanization of agriculture. This newly emerging class, while 
benefitting from the revolution, had no loyalty to its goals, and would become an 
important base of conservative support for Sadat during the 1970s (Ansari 1986). 
These internal challenges and contradictions were exacerbated by economic 
crises. In the context of prolonged investment strikes by Egyptian capital, and the 
high cost of war in Yemen and Israel, economic growth failed to sustain the high 
levels of public spending that the progressive social policies of the revolution 
19 Pointing out the entrenchment of the power of landed elite in rural Egypt, Sadowski wrote: "Their 
members controlled 71 per cent of the seats on provincial councils and 55 per cent of district offices. 
They supplied the bulk of the 'umad, the village mayors. As Nasser built his new order in the 
countryside, they learned to dominate the cooperative councils as well ... Although the government 
determined how much water flowed through the irrigation canals into each province, the agrarian elite 
decided how much was actually directed to each village and farm. Perhaps most important, this elite 
softened-and sometimes frustrated-the application of the land reform" (1991: 78). 
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demanded. 20 Lack of economic growth, combined with a trade deficit resulting from 
ISi, and the withdrawal ofU. S. aid forced Egypt to turn to the conservative Gulf 
States for credit. Borrowing conditions set by the Gulf States included the removal of 
state controls over investors and guarantees against nationalization. After 1967, 
Nasser announced that he was ready to "denationalize certain enterprises and expand 
the opportunities for the private sector ... He authorized de-sequestration of some lands 
and enterprises (movie theatres, department stores), thus re-legitimizing private 
economic activity" (Sadowski 1991: 103). The defeat by Israel accelerated the crisis 
of the regime, as it emboldened conservative and Islamic forces in Egyptian society. 
At the same time, the regime began to lose the support of workers and peasants due to 
the corruption of state officials and the persistence of the power of the landed classes. 
Over time, these landed interests struck alliances with the right of centre elements 
among the Free Officers and thus began influencing state policy in their favour. The 
loss of support amongst workers and peasants was especially dramatic because the 
regime had effectively destroyed all independent progressive organisations that could 
help democratize the state and society. Paradoxically, Nasser was more successful in 
crushing the left and the communists than he was in uprooting the conservative landed 
classes in rural Egypt.21 As Johnson (1973: 3-4) argues: "Because the right-wing was 
never effectively neutralized, the pull in Egyptian politics was always towards the 
right. .. Nasser as an individual stood against the rightward pull - but he always stood 
as an individual and never as the representative of an organized left-wing with real 
political power." Thus, despite the commitment to democratization, the regime never 
successfully nurtured a democratic movement that would act as its political base, and 
the balance of class forces began to shift away from Nasserism towards the 
conservatism of the Sadat regime. 
20 The shortage of foreign exchange and insufficiency of domestic resources led to an imbalance in the 
economy while Nasser refused to sacrifice Egyptians by squeezing surplus out of them (Wahba 1994; 
Richards and Waterbury 1990). 
21 Nasser's decision to hang the leaders ofKafr al-Dawwar textile factory for demanding salary raises 
in 1952 left a dark spot in the memory of factory workers. In 1964, however, Nasser realized he did not 
have much support among the conservative forces that were gaining strength. In order to counter this, 
he released all communists from prison and invited them to help him with his program of Arab 
Socialism. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examined the revolutionary period under Nasser and assessed the 
subsequent social transformations that were realized as part of the Arab Socialist 
project. This period represented a unique period in the history of modem Egypt where 
the propertied classes for the first time faced a serious challenge from those who 
controlled the state. This period was also unprecedented in terms of state's relation to 
workers and peasants as workers and peasants' interests formed the core of state's 
policies. As a detailed analysis of statist policies demonstrated, the deep seated power 
of the landed classes remained entrenched even though they had lost their political 
power over the state. While some may argue that Nasserist regime was not decisive 
enough to push for more radical reforms, others remain convinced that top-down 
changes without a popular social base can only be temporary. As we tum to the next 
chapter, we will return to a discussion of how the landed classes secure their lost 
power, slowly but decisively in the coming decades. 
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Chapter 6. Liberalization under Anwar Sadat 
Anwar Sadat, who has been often described as "more rightist than most" of the Free 
Officers, became the President of Egypt in October 1970 and remained in power until 
his death in October 1981(Cooper1982: 66).1 His rule marked a significant shift 
away from the statism of Nasser as he opened the door for a larger role for the private 
sector in the economy. The infitah, or 'liberalization' of the Egyptian economy, was a 
response both to the economic crisis of the late 1960s as well as to the regional shift 
towards a free market. In an attempt to revive the Egyptian economy, Sadat passed 
laws that encouraged foreign investors to take a bigger role in the economy. 
Sadat's housing policy reflected the general direction of his economic policy. 
Part of Sadat's plan was to reduce the role of rent control in the housing market by 
promoting home ownership. Another aspect of his housing policy was to reduce over-
crowding in Egypt's two major urban centres, Alexandria and Cairo. To achieve both 
of these goals, he encouraged the private sector to build cities in the desert and launch 
economic projects that would attract labour to the new cities. The overall outcome of 
the Sadat regime's housing policy was a proliferation of luxury housing, a reduction 
in affordable housing, a radical rise in the price of urban land and an expansion of 
informal housing as an alternative by the poor. In this chapter, I examine the 
economic policies of Sadat and discuss the changes in property relations as a result of 
changes in the direction of the economy. Finally, I examine the housing policy in this 
period. 
The Economic Policy of Infitah 
1 Sadat cut ties with the Soviet Union and established closer ties with the U.S. In an attempt to express 
his support of the U.S and secure its financial help, as early as in 1971, Sadat began purging pro-Soviet 
members of the state and expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt. Cons~rvative 0il regimes such 
as Saudi Arabia rewarded Egypt shift of alliance in favour of the West by sending in aid, especially 
after the War of 1973. As Ansari (1986: 188) notes, "In addition to the military assistance program and 
other banking facilities, Arab aid amounted to $725 million in 1973, which then increased to $1, 264 
million in 1974. This sudden increase was spurred by the general Arab enthusiasm for Sadat's 
accomplishments during the October War. But this enthusiasm seemed to wane as Arab aid fell to 
$988 million in 1975 and declined even further to $625 million in 1976." 
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When Sadat took power, he announced a radical shift in the direction of the economy. 
While his policies marked a break from Nasserism, his policy of infitah, or 'opening' 
"was not in fact a strategy, if by 'strategy' is meant a coherent plan of action." Rather, 
it was "principally an opportunistic tactic intended to facilitate the inflow of Arab 
funds" (Ikram 2006: 20-21).2 Nonetheless, changes in the state and economy were 
significant as these initiated, intended or not, a transformation of Egyptian society that 
continues to this day. In September 1971, Sadat announced a program for the "re-
organization of the state", the essence of which was to rid the state ofNasserist 
policies and facilitate a larger role for the private sector in the economy (Cooper 
1982: 75). A number of important pieces of legislation preceded the inauguration of 
infitah proper. Law 65/1971 for foreign investment offered a five-year corporate tax 
grace period, allowed the establishment of free zones and joint ventures between the 
public and foreign private sectors. However, workers in public sector enterprises 
opposed Sadat's policies of economic liberalization throughout 1971and1972 which 
resulted in the failure of Law 65 to be implemented. 
In response to this opposition, Sadat began consolidating his power by purging 
state institutions ofNasserist elements and replacing them with more conservative 
appointees sympathetic to Sadat's economic policies. 3 The October War of 1973 with 
Israel bolstered Sadat's reputation - which was to re-establish Egypt's regional role as 
the leader of the Arabs, a role that had been tarnished after the defeat in the 1967 War 
- and provided the right political environment for him to introduce his policies of 
infitah. Hoping for a generous flow of Arab investment as a sign of gratitude for the 
War, Sadat opened up the economy to foreign private investments.4 
The infitah policy was presented in the October Paper in April of 1974 to the 
People's Assembly and the main argument was that in order for Egypt to achieve 
higher growth levels, there was a need to adopt an outward looking approach to 
2 Also, see: Waterbury (1983). 
3 Within a period of three months, he made 1,237 new political appointments notable among which 
were 25 new governors, 125 new secretaries and under-secretaries of the ASU :in the districts, 625 
members of the Popular Local Government, all of which guaranteed support for Sadat and his policies 
in the coming years (Cooper 1982: 77). 
4 As Waterbury pointed out, Arab investment was offered special privileges and was considered 
different from foreign investment in general. Arab investors were allowed to participate in real estate 
development as it was given the right to acquire urban real estate and housing (Waterbury 1983: 132). 
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economic development. 5 The core of the economic policy was a classic free market 
argument: foreign investment and technology combined with the cheap resources of 
Egypt - materials and labour - would result in economic development. With this 
guiding formula, Sadat implemented policies that aimed to revitalize the private sector 
and transform the role of the public sector. 6 
In his attempt to attract foreign and Arab investment, Sadat passed Law 43 in 
June 1974. Law 43 provided guarantees against nationalisation, confiscation and 
sequestration of capital and property. Under this law, investor guarantees and 
privileges included profit repatriation, tax exemptions from five to eight years and 
customs exemption for imports geared towards production. Priority was given to 
investors who were self-sufficient in foreign exchange, promoted Egyptian exports 
and imported advanced technology and management techniques. According to Law 
43, even if a public sector firm owned the majority share of equity of a joint venture, 
the project was considered as part of the private sector. In addition, no sector of the 
economy was protected from foreign private inve~tment as had been the case under 
Nasser. Economic sectors such as textiles, chemicals, minerals, and basic metals 
which were reserved for the public sector were now open to foreign investment. 
Two years after infitah, foreign and domestic private investment was 
concentrated in finance, services, tourism and real estate sectors, exposing the 
speculative nature of investment.7 By the end of 1976, only sixty-six projects had 
begun with a capital value of LE 36 million and 3,450 employees (Waterbury 1983: 
132). This lacklustre response of foreign investors was interpreted by the government 
as the result of rigid regulations on private sector activity prompting the government 
to replace Law 43 with Law 32/1977.8 . Law 32/1977 further reduced restrictions on 
profit repatriations, removed the requirements for firms' self- sufficiency in foreign 
5 Impressed by export-led economic growth model of East Asia (South Korea and Taiwan), and 
encouraged by the IBRD, Egyptian policy makers adopted the export growth model (Waterbury 1983: 
133; Wahba 1994: 175). 
6 The policy was supported by the IMF and agreements between the Fund and Egypt were signed in 
1974, 1976, 1978 and 1980. 
7 In general, Arab investment concentrated in real estate and tourism while non-Arab investors invested 
in petroleum, banking and pharmaceuticals. Tourism and services were two other areas beside finance 
and real estate magnets for foreign investors. 
8 Ansari (1986) mentions other reasons that kept foreign investments from rushing to Egypt in response 
to investment friendly laws of infitah. These he noted were absence of infrastructures necessary to 
support an intensive industrialization program, transportation problems, and unskilled labour force. 
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exchange and "made it possible for foreign investors to purchase foreign exchange 
with local currency, to sell products locally for foreign exchange, and to purchase 
hard currency in the 'parallel money market' that had first been set up to help the 
Egyptian private sector meet its foreign exchange needs" (Waterbury 1983: 133).9 
As incentives were extended to foreign investors, Egyptian investors 
demanded similar rights and tax incentives and they secured these rights through Law 
86/1974 (which was only made public in June of 1976). By 1975, the private sector 
had gained the right to import building materials duty free and housing projects were 
exempted from taxes for a period of five years. In 1978, construction and contracting 
firms were brought on par with foreign investors in the field of real estate 
development. Law 32/1977 extended the same benefits to Egyptian investors that 
foreign investors enjoyed. The only caveat was that unlike foreign investors, 
domestic investors still did not have guarantees against nationalization. 10 
The new approach altered the role of the public sector in a number of ways by 
privileging the private sector. While it was still considered as the primary sector and 
responsible for carrying out the development plan, its main role was to provide 
essential services to both Egyptian and foreign private investors. Infitah was intended 
to revitalize the public sector through competition with the private sector and by 
engaging in public-private partnerships with the foreign capital. 11 In practice this 
meant that the public sector was deprived of guaranteed public investments and was 
instead forced to perform in response to market imperatives and generate its own 
revenues. At the same time, Sadat had reduced democratic oversight in the public 
sector by dismantling public organizations (mu 'assasat 'amma) that functioned as 
public holding companies under Nasser. The mu' assassat were not simply 
bureaucratic apparatuses; they coordinated, planned and provided oversight for 
industrial activities. In effect, the state no longer made decisions regarding wages, 
profit distribution, credit or the organization of the public sector firms. These 
decisions were handed over to private firms. 
9 See: Wahba (1994: 190-91). 
10 See: Waterbury (1983) on how USAID and IBRD actively promoted private sector banking in Egypt 
by 1977. 
11 This direction was encouraged by USAID and the World Bank, who made such partnerships a 
condition for their aid and loan packages. 
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Access to foreign aid was conditioned on competitiveness, which led to a high 
degree of rivalry between government ministries and departments. As such, the 
private sector gained leverage in shaping the public sector. In this process, private 
investors' organizations organized themselves into a national association in order to 
more effectively represent the needs of business within the state. For instance, the 
Egyptian Businessmen's Association (Jam 'iyyat rijal al-a 'mal al-misriyyin), 
consisting of ex-ministers and officials, board members of major banks and public 
sector companies, was one such organization, which represented a wide array of 
interests including the 'state bourgeoisie', domestic private investors and international 
investors. 12 
The state bourgeoisie played an important role in linking the public sector to 
international capital by facilitating investments in consumer fields such as services, 
tourism, finance, trade and real estate. Another notable outcome of joint ventures 
with the private sector resulted in a transfer of assets from the public to the private 
sector. Public sector firms lacking foreign exchange often used their real estate as 
equity in these projects. Beside physical assets, public sector firms also lost skilled 
workers to the private sector through joint ventures given the absence of labour 
regulations and salary caps in the private sector under infitah. 
Despite plans for the privatization of public sector firms, infitah did not 
succeed in privatizing any noticeable firms as there was no demand in the private 
sector for tal<lng up public sector firms. Investors often opted for joint ventures and 
state subsidy policies for inputs such as energy and raw materials. While it avoided 
being privatized, the public sector no longer absorbed the large number of graduates 
that it had under Nasser. By the late 1970s, public sector enterprises were freed from 
the scope of Employment Guarantee Program and had greater flexibility in their 
hiring policy. The one area in which the government hired was the bureaucracy 
(excluding the public enterprise sector). Ayubi (1995b: 299) observes that: 
In 1975 the Egyptian public sector employed over 
868,000 people of whom about 573,000 worked in 170 
12 The term 'state bourgeoisie' refers to the heads of public sector companies who, under Sadat's 
reforms, were compelled to adopt profit-maximizing strategies in partnership with the private sector. 
See: Ayubi (1991). 
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industrial companies, about 266,000 in 160 service 
companies, and about 29,000 in agricultural 
companies ... At the beginning of the 1980s ... it 
employed 2,876,000 individuals in the central and local 
government as well as in the public sector. 
This was not merely a process of bureaucratic expansion in the interest of increasing 
the administrative capacities of the state, but an expansion of the state's coercive 
apparatus. 13 
Jnfitah freed up the private sector to engage in finance, heavy industry and 
foreign trade: areas of the economy that were heavily regulated under Nasser. Thus, 
by mid to late 1970s, a whole host of joint ventures had begun. The successful ones 
tended to be large projects that were joint ventures with foreign capital in textiles, 
food processing, chemicals and metallurgy. By 1977, a total of 693 joint ventures had 
been approved (Waterbury 1983: 172). 
However, not all private sector firms were winning. For instance, around 300 
textile and knitwear private sector firms that existed under Nasser and exported to the 
USSR were losing because of changes in diplomatic and trade relations with the 
USSR and the flooding of Egyptian market by cheap Asian goods (Waterbury 1983: 
172). The winners of infitah policy included three groups. The first group was 
characterized as 'crony capitalists' or 'compradors' engaged in the 'own-exchange 
system' which primarily catered to middle class demand for luxury goods. 14 This 
group was engaged in importing goods and acting as middlemen between foreign 
firms and the Egyptian government and utilizing their powerful social networks. 
Waterbury (1983) argues that this particular group of importers-who he refers to as 
13 According to Ayubi (1991: 268), "In only three years from 1977 to 1980/81, employment in the 
bureaucratic machine increased from 1,911,000 to 2,474,000, i.e. by 29.6 per cent or some 10 per cent 
per annum." It is important to note that bureaucratic expansion favoured the top levels of bureaucracy 
including defence, police and justice, in order to enhance the control powers of the central government. 
As for developmental projects including youth, education, agriculture and irrigation, and research 
suffered the most both in terms of resources and personnel. The coercive apparatus of the state 
experienced a 212.6 per cent expansion while insurance experienced 162.1 and commerce 142.1. 
Education, youth and research remained at 120.8 per cent (Ayubi 1991: 269-70). 
14 The own-exchange system was started in the early 1970s but then it was discontinued in 1973. The 
system was initiated to facilitate and expedite the import of raw materials for the private sector. 
However, the system facilitated the import of consumer luxury goods. Nonetheless, Sadat revived the 
system in March 1974 "in order to satisfy the needs of the masses" (Sadat cited in Wahba 1994: 191). 
See also: Waterbury (1983: 176-78). · 
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munfatihun - succeeded in consolidating their power thanks to infitah. The second 
group that benefited from public-private joint ventures consisted of contractors or 
muqawalun who contracted out their services to the state. This group's gains surged 
as the First Five Year Plan (1976-81) under Sadat was implemented. During this 
period, 40 per cent of all public investment, amounting to LE 700 million, went into 
construction projects. Of this, 80 per cent went to private construction firms 
(Waterbury 1983: 182). The rebuilding of the Canal Zone cities and the New Towns 
Project of Sadat opened up vast opportunities for contracting-out and sub-contracting 
to the private sector and the siphoning off of public sector materials into the black 
market. The individual who personified the construction sector and gained the most 
under Sadat was Ahmad Osman, the president of the Arab Contractors and Sadat's 
Minister of Housing and Reconstruction. His company employed 50,000 workers and 
his operations reached beyond Egypt. Under Nasser, Osman's domestic business was 
nationalized but he was free in his international operations. Later on under Sadat, 
Osman served as 'food security' adviser and promoted agri-business joint ventures 
such as the Pepsi Cola Citrus project in Ismailia (Waterbury 1983: 182-83). 
A third group that benefited from infitah included those who took advantage 
of relaxed urban rental laws and regulations. This group of investors included 
professionals, state officials as well as private sector investors. Landlords took 
advantage of relaxed rental regulations and collected huge amounts in 'key money' 
(khiliw rig!) and rent from their furnished apartments. 15 At the other end of the 
spectrum were property developers who by-passed building regulations and codes and 
became wealthy overnight. 
To make Egypt attractive for foreign investors, the regime also dismantled the 
Socialist labour laws that protected workers' wages and benefits. According to the 
October Paper of 1974, wages were to be determined according to the free market. In 
defense of his labour policy, Sadat argued that regulations limited the level of skills of 
workers and that competition would unleash high levels of productivity. The regime 
15 Hanna defines key money as "an illegal sum of money outside the rental contract paid to the 
landlord" and which is considered as the difference between market rents and controlled rents. 
Although it appeared in the 1940s, this practice was criminalized under Nasser keeping the sums for 
key money quite low. However in the 1970s key money became quite common and its levels increased 
dramatically reaching LE 100,000 to LE 300,000 for downtown area shops and business space of forty 
to eighty square meters (1985: 207-08). 
155 
believed that if workers had greater freedom of movement, they would contribute 
their remittances to the larger economy. To this end, Sadat's regime eliminated exit 
visas in 197 4 allowing workers to migrate to oil rich Arab countries. Indeed, 
increased remittances in the course of the 1970s played an important role in paying 
off the public external debt while increasing the level of public consumption of 
imports. 
While the regime managed to encourage outward migration of labour to the 
Arab oil States, infitah policies failed to absorb the remaining unemployed inside 
Egypt. 16 A rise in unemployment was linked to a shift towards labour saving 
technology in various sectors of the economy. By the end of 1978, there were only 
13,553 workers in 191 functioning projects. Even these numbers are suspect due to 
the "reclassification of public sector partners to joint ventures in the private sector" 
(Waterbury 1983: 143). Highlighting the failure of infitah to create employment, 
Ikram (2006: 215, 217) characterizes the decade of 1975-85 as the 'jobless growth' 
decade whereby high productivity levels in both the public and private sectors were 
linked to greater mechanization and a rising capital-labour ratio.of 10 per cent per 
year during 1970-81. Thus, the application of labour saving technology in almost all 
fields where international capital was involved reduced the demand for labour. 17 
Public sector workers involved in potential joint ventures expressed their 
opposition by using their unions to block them. Workers claimed that joint ventures 
with international capital would result in the liquidation of their factories and turn 
them into assembly plants for large international firms. Their fears were not out of 
place as these outcomes often followed. In general public sector workers were fearful 
of the loss of the gains made during the 1960s, such as the right to organize and the 
right to bargain for wages. Economic liberalization and the spread of private sector 
labour policies across meant that public sector workers were not immune from attacks 
on their wages, benefits and work conditions. As it happened, a fatwa (No. 882 of 
16 Aulas (1982: 14) notes that, "By the time of the 1976 census, 1.4 million Egyptians were counted as 
overseas, including 600,000 workers, or nearly five per cent of the active population." 
17 Ikram noted other studies that also confirmed the direct correlation between rising unemployment 
levels and the increasing application of capital intensive technologies. "As several studies - Fergany 
(1999), Radwan (1997), Karshenas (1994) -point out, the primary cause of unemployment in Egypt is 
deficient demand for labour, resulting largely from the capital-intensive character of economic growth 
during 1975-85" (Ikram 2006: 217). 
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1976) was issued stating that workers' representatives need not be elected by workers, 
but could instead be appointed by management. This soon became the practice in 
public sector banks, while spreading to other sectors of the economy. 
The economy experienced a noticeable measure of growth and expansion in 
the post infitah period. GDP growth averaged 9 per cent and per capita income 
increased an average of 6 per cent per year. However, these positive developments 
were less due to infitah and more linked to an inflow of resources from oil production 
and export, Suez Canal, remittances (US$5 billion a year by the end of the 1970s) and 
tourism (Rutherford 2008: 135; EIU 1989: 13). 18 El Ghonemy highlighted that the 
share of gross investment in GDP from 12.5 per cent in 1967-73-to 26 per cent during 
1975-83 was mainly public investment. The GDP share of domestic private 
investment stood at 4.6 per cent while that of foreign private investment reached 3 .4 
per cent, and mostly from oil companies (El Ghonemy 2003: 79). 
Other trends that became dominant under infitah included the rise of 
commercial activity and an increased involvement of various social classes in this 
field. 19 Commercial interests became dominant actors in the economy and investments 
(both domestic and foreign private) tended to gravitate towards commerce. 20 As on~ 
observer noted, "[b]etween May 1974 and August 1976, commercial capital rose from 
41 per cent of total Egyptian capital to 57 per cent. Of capital added in that 2.5 year 
period ... 64 per cent was commercial" (Cooper 1982: 109-10). The rise in 
18 After the 1973 war with Israel, Egypt had gained its oil fields in the Sinai Peninsula and soon after 
oil production resumed. At the same time, the relaxation of labour migration to the Gulf States led to a 
huge flow of remittances to Egypt. The value of remittances had increased from US$189 million in 
1974 to US$2,855 million in 1981. And finally, Egypt received grants and aid from conservative Arab 
states in return for its war with Israel. All of these flows contributed in lifting the budgetary constraints 
and in the short run and thus Sadat managed to avoid making any structural changes in the economy. 
19 The expansion of mercantile activities had increased the social power of the Egyptian commercial 
classes, which included not only technocrats, state officials, but also skilled workers who worked in the 
Gulf States (See: Cooper 1982, Table 7.3). Although new at their economic power, these groups struck 
alliances in order to guarantee thefr privileges. The power of this new 'upper class' was not derived 
from manufacturing but instead from finance and trade. An important vehicle for the promotion of the 
interests of this group was the ruling NDP created by Sadat. 
20 According to Zaalouk (1989), 'Commercial Agents' under infitah included military officers, large 
land-owning families, traditional trading and industrial bourgeois families, state sector technocrats, 
managers and senior civil servants, liberal professions such as accountants, lawyers, doctors, teachers, 
engineers as well as small scale merchants and domestic wholesale traders. This vast participation of 
various strata in infitah policy was also noted by Aulas (1982) who argues that all those who relied on 
non-governmental jobs tried to take advantage of deregulation under infitah, leaving the public sector 
workers, small peasants the urban unemployed and others on fixed incomes to suffer from inflation. 
For more on negative impact of infitah on workers and peasants, see: Waterbury (1983). 
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commercial activities was linked to relaxation on imports of technologies and 
equipment by the private sector. Tax incentives and repatriation policies too resulted 
in expanding the realm of commerce and banking. It appears that once implemented, 
the initial goals of infitah as being concerned with attracting technology and foreign 
capital were abandoned and instead a quantitative expansion of economic activity 
became the main goal (Cooper 1982). The foreign exchange gained through 
remittances was absorbed in purchase of luxury consumer goods or in real estate, cars 
and electronics. There was a boom in urban property development, construction, 
financial sector, food processing, textiles, services and tourism, and petroleum. 
Budget constraints resulted in cuts in education and health spending by the 
government. By 1980, education received half of its 1960 budget share while the 
health budget was cut by one third of its 1960 levels (El Ghonemy 2003: 79). The 
one area that government could not cut from was food subsidies which reached 10 per 
cent of the GDP (El Ghonemy 2003: 79). The outcome was a rising level of debt and 
trade deficit that constituted about 20 per cent of the GDP by 1975/76. The foreign 
debt was either equal to or exceeded the GDP. Debt service was equal to 10 per cent 
of the GDP (Cooper 1982: 106-07). Sadat's response to this escalating economic 
crisis was yet another generous gesture (Law 3 2/1977) towards the private sector 
(foreign and domestic) to pull the economy out of the crisis. However, in order to 
avoid an escalation of the social conflict and possible social disorder, he continued to 
borrow and support price subsidies, leading to a dramatic rise in Egyptian external 
debt (US$17bn in 1981) (Waterbury 1983: 411). 
Workers were aware of their potential losses and therefore as soon as Sadat 
began his project of de-Nasserization, they voiced their protest. In January of 1972, a 
mass protest by students and workers occurred. In January of 1975, workers of 
Helwan Steel Complex protested against the government's refusal to consider the 
demands of their union. Beinin noted that during 1975-76, real wages began to fall 
and protests followed. In March of 1975, a three day strike action was organized by 
the workers ofMisr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla al-Kubra, as a result 
of which workers won a wage increase from LE 9 to LE 15 a day for all public sector 
production workers in the country (Beinin 2009: 69-70). In August of 1975, 
Alexandria textile workers held a two-week long strike despite a ban on strike action. 
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The government took a punitive step in response to the strike and protests. In 
December of 1975, the government sequestered the funds of the General Union of the 
Egyptian Workers, the largest union in the country at the time. Waterbury (1983: 
229) summed up labour unrest and state violence under Sadat as follows: 
In 1972, Canal Zone refugees and private sector 
workers rioted in Shubra al-K.haima over working and 
living conditions. Mahalia al-Kubra in 1975 and 1976 
was the scene of bloody demonstrations by private 
sector textile workers demanding that their employer 
apply legislation on bonuses and minimum wages. On 
New Year's Day 1976, downtown Cairo was taken over 
by angry public sector workers unable to get to Helwan 
because of the electrified train line was not 
functioning ... Rioting broke out on January 20 up and 
down the Nile Valley, but especially in Cairo and 
Alexandria. Police precincts were besieged, the homes 
of officials ransacked, shops and nightclubs looted and 
burned. The police lost control of the situation, and 
army units, for the first time since 1952, had to be 
brought in to restore order. In Cairo alone seventy-
seven people were officially listed as killed. 
An important factor in labour unrest was the rising cost of living due to high levels of 
inflation during the 1970s. To stave off the wider effect of inflation, Sadat's regime 
implemented multiple increases in minimum wage levels and maintained subsidies on 
basic goods. The regime raised the minimum wage four times, exempted small 
farmers and low urban incomes from paying taxes and offered bonuses. Waterbury 
(1983: 228-29) notes that these giveaways did not succeed in arresting inflation or its 
impact on those with fixed incomes.21 The result was a series of protests and 
expressions of anger against the regime throughout the 1970s culminating in 20 
January 1977, bread riots and the death of hundreds. 
Social needs were left unmet and the level of discontent among the population 
was on the rise. This discontent was captured by the Islamists who openly criticized 
Sadat for failing to run the state and meet the needs of society. More importantly, 
Sadat and his regime were seen as nurturing a corrupt elite who had no ethos to serve 
21 Beinin (2009) argues that Sadat's wage increases and bonuses were in response to workers' 
mobilization and strike action. 
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society and their only goal was to accumulate wealth.22 According to the Egyptian 
Nadim Lachine, writing in 1977for the conservative and pro-infitah al-Ahram al-
lqtisadi, Sadat brought decadence, vulgar affluence and supported the growth of a 
nouveau riches class. The following excerpt by Lachine conveyed the concerns of 
many Egyptians about the impact of in.fitah on Egyptian society: 
Sadly, the majority of the Egyptian people have come to 
feel that they are unwelcome in the new consumer 
society. They live under a regime of 'economic 
apartheid,' a kind of economic discrimination that 
deprives the majority of the essentials of life while 
bestowing fantastic benefits and advantages upon a tiny 
segment of society. Whether this segment is that of the 
parasites and the individuals of the new class in Egypt, 
or from the Arab tourists who come to Egypt with an 
incredible buying power, they destroy Egyptian society 
and break its continuity (cited in Waterbury 1983: 230). 
lnfitah had sharpened class conflict and social tensions to the point that even its initial 
supporters no longer viewed it as a viable strategy of economic development. Instead, 
it came to be viewed as polarizing Egyptian society by widening social inequalities. 
Agricultural Policy 
The agricultural sector was radically reshaped under Sadat's regime. His policy 
intended to create a larger role for agri-business by promoting high value added cash 
crops for export, with the hope of increasing agricultural productivity levels and 
overall national revenues from the sector. In 1975, public investment in agriculture 
was reduced to 6 per cent of the total budget, down from 20 per cent in 1965 
22 A notable example of patronage policy and corruption was Osman Ahmed Osman who had 
accumulated most of his wealth through state contracts. Osman controlled the Arab Contractor's 
Company, a company that he personally owned prior to its nationalization under Nasser. Nonetheless, 
Osman became the CEO of the company, which received majority of Popular Development Programs 
(PDP). These contracts transferred the control of not only food security, but also land reclamations into 
the hands of Osman under Sadat. Given the high level of public funds' squandering, of 159 licensed 
PDP companies only 43 reached the production phase while the rest failed miserably. The state lost 
revenues and faced a serious economic crisis. The absence of accountability mechanisms within all 
levels of the state led to rising levels of corruption, something that the Islamists picked up on and 
united against in the late 1970s. As Sadowski (1991: 129) pointed out, Sadat was called the "'Pharaoh' 
who was of those who make corruption"' and therefore a legitimate target of assassination. 
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(Sadowski 1991: 71 ). Private investors were encouraged to fill the gap in land 
reclamation projects left by the public sector. To facilitate this, the regime passed 
laws that deregulated the land market, liberalized rents and gave landlords the 
freedom to determine the type of rents - cash or in kind-that they wanted tenants to 
pay. 
By the end of the 1970s, the agricultural sector appeared to be in decline. By 
1981 agricultural exports - as a percentage of total merchandise exports - were down 
to 13 per cent compared to 35 per cent in 1974. Food imports increased, resulting in 
an agricultural trade deficit of 9.3 per cent of the GDP in 1981 (Radwan and Lee 
1986: 150-53).23 The area ofland cultivated with non-traditional crops had increased 
while cotton cultivation had decreased. As a result, the government's role in the 
marketing and distribution of agricultural products also declined while the private 
sector's role in the sector expanded. 
The regime's taxation policy shifted the burden of taxation to land as opposed 
to taxation of incomes based on land productivity. This change served the interests of 
rich landlords who made significant gains by switching to capital intensive methods. 
In contrast, small farmers lost their lands as they could not compete with rich 
landlords or pay their land tax due to cutbacks in public sector support - primarily 
through the old cooperatives system. The Egyptian left viewed the regime's 
liberalization of agricultural sector as an attempt to radically change the social 
relations that had been established through the Agrarian Reforms of 1952. As Cooper 
(1982: 123-24) notes, the regime's incomes policy in agriculture, "was a conscious 
effort to alter the distribution of wealth and welfare in society - a redistribution which 
served upper-class interests." 
The outcome was a reversal of the Nasser-era gains by peasants and small 
farmers and a reassertion of the economic and political power of large landholders. 
The development of agri-business transferred arable land from small farmers to large 
commercial owners - both domestic and international - who shifted the pattern of 
agricultural production towards the export market and away from production for the 
domestic market. In contrast to Nasser, who redistributed land to peasants and small 
23 Agricultural trade balance was in a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP in 1974 (Radwan and Lee 1986: 
150-53). 
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farmers, Sadat redistributed reclaimed lands to private developers, public sector 
workers, agricultural engineers, university students, military families and veterans, all 
with the goal of strengthening his base of support. More importantly, the state 
provided guarantees to private property ownership by registering title deeds to 
redistributed lands. While some recipients received lease-hold deeds rather than :free-
hold deeds, the upshot was that there were no regulations on land beneficiaries as they 
were free to develop their plots as they saw fit. The loss of land in rural areas resulted 
in a mass exodus of rural migrants towards urban centres. Between 1972 and 1979, 
650,000 labourers left agriculture to find work in the cities (Roy 1991: 559-60). 
While some of these workers succeeded in moving to the Gulf States to work in the 
construction sector, most found jobs in the booming Egyptian construction sector.24 
State Power and the Restructuring Property Relations 
The policy infitah was biased in favour of the propertied classes. Even prior to 
infitah, the regime issued the desequestration Law 34/1971 that aimed to restore 
property to the urban and rural elite and establish a political base of support for his 
regime.25 While Nasser through his Land Reform policy expropriated the 
expropriators, Sadat carried out a strategy of accumulation by dispossession by 
targeting the gains that had been made by workers and peasants under Nasser. This 
specific character of Sadat's policy was evident in his policy of de-sequestration of 
lands that had been sequestered in the 1960s and before. As Ansari noted: 
"Sequestration, in the social dialectic of power, had different purposes. Under Nasser 
it was predominantly used to dispossess the wealthy classes although it was used 
against political opponents who were not necessarily wealthy. Under Sadat, 
sequestration became the means for suppressing political rivals, including the working 
class" (1986: 183-84). By changing the property relations, Sadat had two broader 
24 In examining the impact of remittances on village investment, Roy noted that most of the remittances 
went towards the purchase of a small plot for housing or for renting out. However, there was very little 
evidence that small farmers used remittances to shift towards capital intensive agriculture and farm 
mechanization (Roy 1991: 579). 
25 Ansari (1986) notes that Sadat's attempts to shore up support from conservatives within Egypt had a 
corollary in foreign policy of Egypt, whereby he sought support of conservative regimes like Saudi 
Arabia and other Gulf monarchies and the US while cutting off ties with the Soviet Union, the main 
trade partner of Egypt under Nasser. 
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goals in mind: to end the political isolation of the propertied class and to gain the trust 
of foreign and especially Arab investors. 
One of Sadat's main contributions to reshaping power relations was the 
extension of state power into parts of Egypt where the state previously did not have 
much control. This was accomplished through the NDP and the absorption of local 
elite into the governing structures of rural Egypt. 26 The Local Government Law 
passed in 197 5 was presented as a step towards decentralization and democratization. 
However, the Law strengthened the power of the central government and took away 
the power of local popular councils at the village level. This regressive step was 
accomplished by purging the ASU - which had granted peasants and workers 
representation at every level of the state - of radical elements while increasing the 
number of conservative representatives. By purging left-wing forces, Sadat not only 
gutted the ASU (leading to its abolition in 1978), he also increased the power of 
appointed officials at every level of the Egyptian state. The executive village 
councils, representing the central government and. appointed at the village level, were 
empowered to veto the power of the popular councils. This not only watered down 
representation of peasants and workers in decision making, it also increased the 
opportunity for corruption and collusion whereby local council members were bought 
off by the powerful local elite. 
The political networks created in rural Egypt ensured that a majority of the 
votes would be cast in favour of the NDP. These networks were maintained by 
rewarding loyal villages with government resources and withholding resources from 
rebellious villages where support for the NDP was low. Provincial govemors-
appointed by Sadat-tended to identify with the ruling party. The NDP also became 
an important vehicle through which businessmen, contractors, traders, speculators and 
rural magnates voiced their interests and determined policy outcomes under Sadat. 27 
26 Sadat dismantled the Arab Socialist Union and replaced it with the NDP (National Democratic 
Party), which from its conception until 2011 was the party of the ruling class and over time became 
more effective in organizing the various conservative and landed interests in Egyptian society. 
27 Sadat also lifted the 'Political Isolation Decrees' which prevented rural elite from participating in 
political life under Nasser. The ch~ge opened the door for rural elites into the political life of Egypt. 
They would come to form a strong interest group fighting against Nasserist policies. The extent of 
their power became evident in the 1980s and early 1990s when they succeeded in removing rent control 
through Law 96/1992. · 
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Indeed, the launch of infitah in 197 4 marked the beginning of a long process 
of consolidating and institutionalizing the rights of private property. In 1971 Sadat 
adopted a new Constitution which contained several articles establishing the sanctity 
of private property and limits of the state's power over it. Private property was 
offered protection from confiscation and sequestration by the state. In cases where 
private property was violated for the purpose of the public interest and in accordance 
with the law, the owners were fully compensated by the state (Articles No. 34 and 
35). The importance of these constitutional changes was that, while Nasser had 
allowed private property to exist so long as it did not subject anyone to exploitation, 
Sadat elevated the sanctity of private property over concerns about social justice. 
This institutionalization of private property rights came about mostly as a 
result of court rulings that assessed the constitutionality of laws passed under Nasser. 
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), which was ratified as an independent 
judiciary body in the 1971 Constitution (Article No. 174, Chapter V of the 
Constitution), played an active role in asserting the right of private property through 
the reversal of Nasserist policies. The outcome of SCC rulings empowered the 
propertied classes, whether in rural or urban Egypt, at the expense of peasants and · 
workers. In the following sections, I discuss the de-sequestration laws and tenancy 
reforms both of which played an important role in reversing the gains of the 
peasantry. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser's regime had sequestered property from 
wealthy individuals in order to fulfill the goals of the Revolution. Sequestered 
property was placed under the control of the state until a decision was reached 
regarding its return to its original owner, its redistribution to peasants and small 
farmers or its nationalization. Under Sadat, sequestration was criticized as unfair 
treatment by the state, and therefore, in the course of the 1970s, a number of laws 
were passed to either restore sequestered properties or compensate the past owners in 
kind or in cash. 28 As a result, de-sequestration marked the beginning of a long 
process of dismantling progressive policies - especially in rural Egypt, where small 
farmers and peasants were once again subjected to the exploitation of landlords. 
28 With a total offer of $10 million, Sadat also compensated Americans who had lost their property 
during the nationalizations of Nasser (Forte 1978: 276). 
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Sadat passed Law 49/1971 which called for the "removal of all obstacles to a speedy 
settlement of all outstanding claims" for the families who had lost their property to 
Nasser's sequestration laws (Hill 1998: 132). Accordingly, the value of sequestered 
property was to be determined "on the basis of 70 times the land tax or 160 times the 
rates imposed on urban property" (Ansari 1986: 179). Financial settlements 
equivalent to US$50,000 per person or $100,000 per family were announced. As 
early as 1971, 800 proprietors saw their land returned to them (Forte 1978: 276; 
Zaalouk 1989: 57). Estimates vary, but the properties of between four hundred to five 
thousand landlords were restored accounting for a grand total of 635,000 feddans 
(Tignor 1990: 462).29 
The final assertion of the right of private property came as a result of two 
different court rulings. The first ruling upheld the right of private property and 
accused Nasser of violating his own constitution through his policy of sequestration. 
Consequently, Nasser's Law 104/1964 - which resulted in appropriation of lands over 
the limits set by the regime - was rendered as unconstitutional by the Court. The 
Court emphasized that "the Constitution's call for 'social solidarity, self-sufficiency 
and just distribution which bridges the gaps of classes' does not allow the violation of 
other principles of the constitution such as protecting private property" which it 
argued Law 104/1964 allowed for (Hill 1998: 130-32). The second ruling in 1979 
nullified any legislation that limited the restoration of property. Ansari writes: "The 
opinion of the court was that such limitation was tantamount to confiscation" (1986: 
182-83). 
In effect, de-sequestration resulted in the dispossession of small farmers and 
peasants who had received small plots under Nasser. The case ofKamshish Village 
demonstrated the nature of social change from Nasser to Sadat. The ruling elite of 
Kamshish village - the Fiqqis - had their lands sequestered in 1961. The land was 
later distributed among 200 small farmers from a total of 576 in the village. Under 
29 In August 1974, 22,000 feddans including 5,000 feddans of orchards were to be returned to their 
original owners. In September of 197 4, another 1, 700 feddans including 700 feddans of orchards in 
Sharqiyya govemorate were returned to 86 owners. In total, 147,000 feddans were returned to their 
former owners, land that was redistributed among small farmers by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. 
The government paid compensation for 17 ,000 feddans of land which the Ministry had redistributed 
with full ownership rights to 7,500 families (Ansari 1986: 182-83). 
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Sadat the Fiqqis recovered their land and received further compensation for their 
'maltreatment' by the HCLF (Ansari 1986: 19-49). 
The second important change in property relations was the outcome of Sadat's 
attack on the Agrarian Reforms of 1952. In 1976, Sadat destroyed agricultural 
cooperatives and, by extension, peasant security in land. He transferred the resources 
and capital of the cooperatives into the Principal Bank for Development and 
Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) whose main office was located in Cairo. Once he had 
created this centralized credit agency for agriculture, he encouraged agribusiness to 
develop and reclaim land across Egypt. 
The regime of Sadat used the pretext of a lagging agricultural sector to 
dismantle the remaining Agrarian Reforms. In the second half of the 1970s, his 
regime imported as much as 40 per cent of Egypt's food requirements, 78 per cent of 
which was wheat. Critics ofNasserist rule linked the rising food imports and 
agricultural decline to the restrictions that had been placed on producers. It was 
argued that because of pro-tenant policies, landlords had no incentives to improve 
their lands. These critics called for a "balance between tenants and landlords" by 
reversing the agrarian reforms (Ansari 1986: 189). 
The ceiling on land ownership also came under criticism. Critics argued that 
caps on landownership prevented the establishment of large estates and the 
development of capital intensive agriculture. 30 Removing the limitations on 
landownership indeed facilitated the rise of large estates and the emergence of rich 
farmers who moved away from field crops - broad beans, lentils, peanuts, sesame, 
soya and potatoes - and invested in fruits and vegetables for export. The returns on 
export produce were substantively higher than for field crops. The area covering 
orchards expanded from 64,000 feddans in 1952 to 313,000 feddans in 1976; by 1977 
they became free of tax. The area dedicated for vegetable production had increased 
from 625,000 feddans in 1966 to 913,000 feddans in 1976 (Ansari 1986: 190). 
By 1979, the agricultural sector had undergone radical changes as a result of 
Sadat's assault on small farmers. Rents had increased by as much as 100 per cent. In 
30 Ansari (1986) argues that contrary to the claims by critics of agrarian reform, even under Nasser, it 
was the small producers of field crops bore the brunt of agricultural restrictions as they relied on the 
state for inputs and for prices of their produce. Rich farmers had elected to stay out of agricultural 
cooperatives and were thus not affected by prices or restrictions placed by the state. 
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July 1975, Law 65 increased rents at seven times the land tax while landlords gained 
the right to evict tenants who failed to pay rents within a specified period of time 
(Ansari 1986: 191-92).31 These changes in tenancy relations affected 1.5 million 
peasants and an area of 2.5 million feddans, or around 43 per cent of the cultivated 
land (Ansari 1986: 192).32 
In short, the restructuring of property relations led to the rise of a class of rich 
farmers who enjoyed guarantees against nationalization and sequestration of their 
properties. Rich farmers eventually succeeded in dominating yillage popular councils 
after Sadat changed the definition of a peasant to anyone owning less than fifty 
feddans (Sadowski 1991: 81). 
Housing Policy 
In the context of infitah, Sadat's housing policy was subordinated to the goals of 
attracting foreign investment and tourism. 33 To realize these goals, he enacted laws 
that facilitated the role of the private sector in the housing market, dismantled 
Nasserist rent control laws and reduced public investment in housing by subjecting 
the public housing sector to competition with the private sector and encouraging the 
construction of units for sale. 
The Egyptian housing market had experienced a hiatus due to the costs of the 
1967 War. Housing shortages were worsened after the 1973 Sinai War which 
displaced the residents of the Suez cities. Housing and infrastructure in Cairo came 
under heavy pressure because of the flow of rural migrants on the one hand, and the 
relocation of Suez residents on the other. In formulating his housing policy, Sadat 
outlined his goals of reducing the burden of over-crowded cities; such as Alexandria 
and Cairo, and eradicating slums by relocating people to New Towns and rebuilding 
the destroyed cities in Suez. New Towns, which will be discussed in detail below, 
31 The rent increases only affected rural rents according to Law 65/1975. 
32 The next major change in rural land relations with a comparable impact on tenants would happen as a 
result of Law 96/1992 under Hosni Mubarak, see Chapters Eight and Nine of this dissertation. 
33 Housing was a preferred area of investment not only for Arab investors, but also for Egyptian 
migrant workers who earned high wages in the Gulf State. Workers' remittances reached over $1.5 
billion by the late 1970s and most of it was invested in the housing market (Roy 1991: 560-61 ). 
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were Sadat's policy to direct/guide investment for production and to solve the housing 
problem. 
The success in rebuilding the Suez Canal Cities provided a blue print for the 
further development of desert cities which would be linked to economic development. 
The private sector participated in rebuilding the Suez Canal region because of the 
potential economic gains from the region. Free zones were established to offer 
investors cheap land and labour. A new Ministry for Development and 
Reconstruction was established with the task of ensuring freedom of action for the 
private sector. Rent control laws were lifted while concessions on profit repatriation 
were offered to investors. Most investment came from Arab investors in the Gulf 
States. Sanctioned by the state and with investment ceilings reaching LE 500 million, 
the private sector engaged in building housing for profit by implementing new cost-
saving methods and prefabricated technologies. 34 Outside of the Suez area, private 
investors were free to build housing units for profit. This resulted in a hike in the 
number of luxury units, which were sought by Arab tourists, businessmen and foreign 
nationals. 
In the post 1974 period, housing development became a joint initiative 
between the public and private sectors. Joint ventures would involve a number of 
agencies such as Ministry of Development and New Communities (formerly the 
Ministry ofHousing)35, the Gene.ral Organization ofEl-Awqaf, Cairo Govemorate, 
Giza Govemorate, The Arab Contractors Co., Nasr City Co., for Housing and 
Development, The Civil Egyptian Insurance Co., Misr Bank, Cairo Bank, Nasser 
Bank, and Alexandria Bank. Between 1970-71 and 1980-81, the private sector added 
34 During 197 5-77, the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction headed by Osman Ahmed Osman, 
imported ten large prefabricated concrete panel systems from the West. The prefabricated systems had 
a huge impact on the construction sector which was affiliated with the M. 0. H. R. at that time. As 
Egyptian skilled labour was absorbed in the Gulf States after infitah, the construction sector faced a 
shortage of skilled labour. The import of prefabricated systems aimed to help the construction sector 
deal with the labour shortage, save capital and resources. Under Sadat, the two basic materials - steel 
and cement - were produced exclusively by public sector companies. In the eourse of the 1970s, the 
construction industry boomed due to oil price increases and demand for luxury housing and office 
space by Arab investors. To respond to this demand, new state owned construction companies were 
created. At the same time, the private sector was encouraged to invest in the construction sector. See: 
Moavenzadeh and Selim (1984). 
35 There was no designated ministry assigned with the task of housing, but instead the responsibility 
was divided up among various ministries (Ministry of Housing and Construction, Ministry of Planning 
and other ministries), each competing for influence at the local level and for access to public resources. 
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406,228 housing units while the public sector added a total of 162,140, of which 
114,23 7 were added by local govemorates and 4 7 ,903 by the Ministry of 
Reconstruction. The Ministry of Reconstruction started adding housing units after 
197 5, mainly in the war tom Suez region. 
Table 6.1 Production of Formal Housing in Egypt, 1960-83 
Period Public Private Total Growth of Annual Housing Unit 
Units Units Population Completion (per thousand 
(million) population) 
1960-64 61,000 79,000 140,000 3.274 8.6 
1965-70 56,000 110,000 166,000 3.000 9.2 
1971-76 40,000 86,000 127,000 2.961 7.2 
1977-83 150,000 619,309 769,309 .9.428 11.7 
Total 307,000 894,309 1,201,309 18.663 36.7 
Sources: Feiler (1992: 301); Soliman (1988: 68). 
Table 6.2 Regional Housing Production and Population Increase, 1966-76 
Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Total increase 
Population increase 45.86% 35.74% 6,580,322 
Housing Production 35.21% 28.31% 1,488,712 
Source: Bayad (1979: 96). 
Cairo took centre stage in Sadat's housing policies both because of the rising 
levels of population due to rural-urban migration (and the subsequent growth of slums 
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this caused), but also because of the rising value of land which served as a magnet to 
private investors. Cairo had become an attractive destination for rural workers since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, but pace of rural-urban migration had 
increased dramatically after the revolution. Along with an early phase of 
infrastructure development in the 19th century, Cairo's other pull factors included the 
considerable size of its urban market, the availability of services and the proximity to 
other enterprises that supplied inputs or consumed the products of other industries. In 
1952, Cairo had 3 7 per cent of the country's industrial labour force; by 1966, it had 
increased to 44 per cent (Bayad 1979: 90). The solution for the rising population was 
the New Towns, which were part of the Entrance Master Plan for Greater Cairo's 
expansion adopted in 1976 (Bayad 1979: 91).36 A total of $11.5 million was to be 
spent on the production of 300,000 housing units by 1980 (Antoniou 1978: 49). 
Rural migrants continued to arrive in urban centres leading to increased 
demand for housing and services. According to a study conducted by the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Egypt (1995), Sadat intended to increase national income, 
improve the living standards of the population, and ease the pressure on crowded 
cities. A two-pronged approach was launched to accomplish these goal-s. The first 
was the Free Zones Investment System and the second was the New Communities. 
Another factor behind the policy of the New Towns was the fear that unplanned urban 
informal housing would encroach onto limited fertile agricultural land and increase 
pressure on existing services and infrastructure. It was hoped private investors would 
move their operations to the New Cities in the desert and create 'pull factors' for 
population from the big cities such as Cairo and Alexandria. 
In 1979, Law 59 established the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA 
henceforth) to carry out the development of the New Cities/New Communities. The 
New Communities included first generation cities with a population of one million 
and second generation cities with half a million population. 37 According to the Law, 
36 One area of government focus was infrastructure development in Cairo. In 1977, a study was 
commissioned by the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction for sewerage work for Greater Cairo 
until the year 2000. Large districts of Cairo at the time lacked sanitary disposal of waste or treatment 
plants for sewerage. 
37 First generation cities were Tenth of Ramadan, Sixth of October, Fifteenth of May, New Bourg El 
Arab, New Salehiya, New Damietta and El Sadat and second generation cities included Al Shorouk, El 
Obour, El Amal and others. 
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the New Communities were not to be located on arable land and received first priority 
in getting industrial permission. While the private sector was to build the New Cities, 
the government would provide infrastructure and public buildings. Land in the New 
Communities was offered cheaply for investors, with prices ranging between LE 71 
per square meter in Fifteenth of May City and LE 15 per square meter in New 
Nubaria (ACCE 1995: 15). The housing units were subsidized and buyers were 
promised tax reductions. 
Despite a large amount of public investment and land being allocated to the 
development of desert cities or New Cities, future assessments of the New Cities' 
policy indicated that the New Cities closest to Cairo had prospered due to their 
proximity to services and infrastructure of Cairo while those furthest from the capital 
had not done so well. While tax incentives and provision of infrastructure by the 
public sector made some New Cities attractive to businesses, inadequate services, lack 
of amenities and unaffordable housing discouraged workers from settling there. 38 
Most workers who worked in the new towns, found it more affordable to commute 
from Cairo. Ill-devised and bad planning meant that the New Cities remained as 
ghost-towns until the 1990s when middle class commuters flocked to them to avoid 
Cairo's overcrowding, noise and pollution. 
The housing market had always remained a preferred area for investment by a 
broad group of individuals, both Egyptian and non-Egyptian.39 The housing market 
became an even more attractive field for investment under Sadat due to the 
liberalization of this sector.40 A major example of beneficiaries of Sadat's housing 
policy was Osman A. Osman, the director of Arab Contractors and Egypt's Housing 
and Reconstruction Minister under Sadat. As Waterbury (1983: 182) points out, 
"Contracting and subcontracting in construction provided limitless possibilities in 
38 Given that the targeted workers, who were supposed to reside in the New Towns, could not afford 
the new apartments, the size of the apartments were reduced from 600 square meters to 120 square 
meters by 1982 in an effort to attract low in-come earners (Chatterji 1990: 501). 
39 Among others, the housing cooperatives benefited from infitah housing polieies. By the mid-1970s 
there were almost 1,000 cooperatives whose members had acquired urban land for speculative purposes 
(Bayad 1979: 187). 
40 Public sector investment in reconstruction and housing ranged from LE 391millionin1974 to LE 
654 million in 1975. Between 1976 and 1981, public sector budget for reconstruction reached LE 700 
million or 40 per cent of the public budget for the period. Of this total, 80 per cent was handed over to 
the private sector through contracts to build the satellite cities in the desert, build the ports and rebuild 
the Canal Zone cities (Waterbury 1983: 182). 
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kickbacks, and the siphoning off of building materials into the black market." 
Osman's Arab Contractors employed 50,000 workers and its annual business was 
worth LE 200 million both inside and outside of Egypt. Osman had total control over 
the vast budget for the reconstruction of the Suez Canal Cities controlling millions of 
dollars of funds that flowed from Arab States (Waterbury 1983: 182).41 
Land developers also took advantage of the free market in land, making 
millions either through fraud or by violating building and construction codes with 
disastrous outcomes for tenants. 42 On Christmas Eve of 197 4, an eleven storey 
building in Doqqi, just outside of the centre of Cairo City collapsed, killing the owner 
and his two family members. Investigations into the collapse showed that the 
contractor had received a permit for building a six storey building and the collapsed 
building had no steel reinforcement bars. Waterbury (1983: 183-85) indicated that 
such practices were "typical of the private sector building entrepreneurs."43 
By the late 1970s, the left' s prediction regarding Sadat's housing policy 
seemed to have come true. The left believed that Sadat's infitah was an ill-conceived 
policy without sufficient planning to guide private investment. The outcome of 
infitah indeed indicated failed planning by the state that resulted in the breakdown of 
social order. Policies of infitah were seen as promoting greed without any regard for 
the poor or the workers who relied on fixed incomes. Indeed class polarization 
41 Under Nasser, Osman's domestic businesses were nationalized but he was allowed to carry on with 
his foreign businesses. Under Sadat, he continued to control Arab Contractors, a public sector 
company yet directed by Osman and with very little accountability. In the last days of Sadat, Osman 
continued to influence land related policies. He was the principal presidential advisor on food security 
which allowed him to promote agro-industrial ventures like the Pepsi Cola citrus project near Ismailia. 
However, Waterbury (1983: 183) notes that "the scale of [Osman's] operations are not typical of the 
private construction sector as a whole." 
42 Hanna (1985: 209) explains why such violations were possible in the housing sector: "With the 
Infitah slogans appeared to 'break the bureaucratic routine' with the aim of 'facilitating the road for the 
private sector to solve the housing problem.' Under these mottos, the grip of the technical staffs of the 
local housing authorities decreased or ceased. Many buildings were now put up without an official 
permit for the .drawings or check to see that they fulfill the bylaws of town plaµning regarding space, 
height, natural light to each room, and such things ... The critical issue is that the execution of the work 
is carried out under the responsibility of the owner without the control of local authorities or any 
impartial body." 
43 Another example of a land developer trying to make a quick buck from the Egyptian housing market 
was Canadian Peter Munk. In 1975, Munk's Southern Pacific Properties (SPP), registered in Hong 
Kong had established a joint venture in Egypt by investing $500,000 while the Egyptian public sector 
had contributed 10,000 acres of land near the pyramids as its share of equity. By 1977, Munk had 
made $4 million for simply selling off public sector lots without improving the land. The deal came 
under investigation and by 1978 Sadat annulled it. 
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increased under Sadat, squeezing out the middle class, leaving only a class of rich and 
a mass of poor. The left argued that: 
Arab investment in above middle housing and urban 
development will affect the wages of construction 
workers. It will absorb building materials, from which 
we already suffer a lack, in those projects at the expense 
of regular, or economic and popular housing projects. 
In addition to that, the land found in excellent areas will 
be owned by Arab investors (Cooper 1982: 105). 
Workers' low wages could not keep pace with the high rents in the newly built 
housing units since most of the new units were in the middle-income or luxury 
category. Resources from the public sector supported joint venture projects which 
engaged in for-profit housing production, not to serve the needs of workers. Finally, 
the flow of Arab investment had inflated land prices in Cairo. 
Under Nasser, urban residents enjoyed rent control. In the 1970s, however, 
rent control laws and renters' rights came under attack from the state and the 
landlords. To support the private sector and private housing, the government began 
dismantling rent control legislation by increasing rents and allowing landlords more 
rights against their tenants. 
The rent laws passed under Sadat recognized the rights of owners over those 
of renters. Through Laws 49/1977 and its amendment through Law 136/1981, 
attempts were made to attack rent control and limit tenancy rights. Law 49/1977 fixed 
rents on the basis of 197 4 land values, while adding an annual increase of 7 per cent. 
Law 136/1981 extended the power oflandlords by introducing 'equilibrium' into the 
tenant/landlord relationship, as it was claimed that Nasserist laws were too anti-
landlord. The Law required tenants who had constructed new multi-unit buildings to 
offer a unit for the same low rent and with the same tenancy rights for the owner of 
their unit in the new building or vacate the unit. The impact of Law 136/1981 
however was partial as it only applied to those renters who had the financial 
capabilities of erecting new buildings and not the majority of renters who were on 
low, fixed incomes. 
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In order to encourage private investment in the housing sector, all new 
buildings were exempted from rent control while existing rent control was to be 
gradually phased out. Luxury housing, a main focus of Arab and domestic investors, 
continued to be exempted from rent control laws. Other categories of housing that 
were exempted from rent control included furnished apartments, units rented to 
foreigners and units sold as condominiums. The outcome of these trends made the 
housing market even more unstable as housing prices and rents spiralled out of 
control. 
A second front of attack on rent control came from the landlords whose 
buildings fell under rent control category. Violations of rent control under Nasser 
occurred but these were insignificant compared to the common practice of key money 
which had proliferated under Sadat. In the 1970s, landlords launched an indirect 
battle against rent control legislation by neglecting their legal responsibility for 
maintenance and repairs which often resulted in the collapse of buildings. They 
preferred to pay fines instead of respecting the housing laws. Disregarding landlords' 
actions, residents undertook repairs of the buildings they resided in and after their 
death, their flats passed on to their children at the same low rents. It was in this 
context that landlords began exploiting tenants with the use of key money. While 
landlords could not increase the rents, they would ask new tenants for a huge sum 
which sometimes exceeded the cost of the flat itself. The key money was then 
divided between the old tenant who would renounce his contract and the landlord 
giving the landlord a fresh start with a new tenant. By 1974, when per capita incomes 
were at about LE 180 annually, key money for an average unit could reach into the 
thousands LE, and commercial leases enabled landlords to extort hundreds of 
thousands of pounds in key money from tenants (Waterbury 1983: 183-85).44 
With the possibility of high returns on property, landlords found ways to re-
possess rent-controlled buildings. They tried to circumvent rent control by building 
on top of rent-controlled buildings and houses, often leading to the collapse of the 
foundation. These developments occurred because of lax government policy as well 
44 In this context, land prices sky rocketed making housing ever more inaccessible for workers. Ayubi 
(1991: 74-75) notes that on one square meter ofland on the Nile Corniche cost LE 400 in January of 
1976 and by January 1978 it had jumped to LE 1,500, an increase of270 per cent in just two years. 
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as demand by entrepreneurs and rich Arabs for furnished flats or office space since 
the beginning of infitah. Often the older, rent-controlled flat could fetch LE 20 
pounds in rent, whereas office space or furnished flats built on top of the old flats 
could bring in LE 2000 (Hanna 1985: 210). 
Sadat continued to partially maintain Nasserist rent control laws despite 
increasing the actual rent levels on low income housing. He addressed the continuing 
shortage for low income housing by regulating the construction sector and stipulating 
a minimum number of low income housing to be built nationally. Of the total housing 
built, 55 per cent had to be economy housing, 37 per cent middle class range and 8 per 
cent luxury. However, the private sector succeeded in exploiting loopholes such as 
the absence of taxation on vacant land to amass land and drive the price of land to 
unprecedented levels (Harik 1998: 160). Egyptian landlords with big plots ofland 
also demanded the right to expand the luxury housing market. As a result, the 
proliferation of luxury housing was coupled with a rising cost of construction 
materials and rising interest rates, the latter as a r~sult of the demand of investors. In 
the meantime, interest rates had risen from 8 per cent to 20 per cent resulting in rising 
rents for tenants (Hanna 1985: 199-200). 
The outcome of housing market liberalization was a rapid increase in land 
prices over a short period of time. Hanna (1985: 199) notes that, "the price per square 
meter, which was LE 60 up to 1973, became LE 1000 in 1976 for the more desirable 
areas overlooking the Nile." Price increases not only accelerated year by year, but 
"from month to month" (Bayad 1979: 171 ). The overall impact of Sadat's housing 
policy was a rising cost of housing and rent and consequently a rise in class 
inequalities. By the late seventies, the housing market was such that customers could 
not find affordable rentals while developers and landlords could not find customers 
who could afford luxury housing, resulting in frozen value as thousands of apartments 
and villas remained vacant (Harik 1998). By the late 1970s there was an urban 
housing shortage of 35 per cent and rural shortage of 25 per cent (Feiler 1992: 297-
98). According to one estimate, in order to end urban housing shortage, there was a 
need for 320,000-350,000 new housing units annually to accommodate the rising 
population and new families in need of shelter (Bayad 1979: 233). 
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As the formal housing market failed to meet housing demands of the workers, 
informal housing experienced a rapid expansion in the 1970s. The urban population 
tripled since 1952, reaching 40 million by 1978, and Cairo became one of the most 
crowded cities in the developing world with two thousand inhabitants per square 
kilometre. Housing production did not keep up with this increase (Ansari 1986: 211-
12). The existing housing stock was deteriorating in the absence of maintenance by 
landlords. In the 1970s, 33 per cent of the housing stock dated from before 1952 and 
possibly half were more than 50 years old. By 1975, the Ministry of Housing and 
Reconstruction estimated that 300,000 housing units in Cairo were obsolete while the 
popular housing built in the 1950s was in a dilapidated condition (Bayad 1979: 99, 
135). 
Consequently, as public investment in housing declined, formal housing 
production levels dropped and informal housing became the dominant form of 
housing. At the same time, due to infitah policies, wages either stagnated or declined 
which affected workers' ability to rent houses. Bayad estimated that in 1976, 76 per 
cent of the population could not afford formal housing prices (1979: 175). At the 
same time, private investment in housing was channelled towards the building of 
luxury housing. The outcome was that in the absence of public investment in 
affordable housing, the only venue for low income earners was the informal housing 
market. Informal housing on agricultural land expanded while thousands made the 
Cities of the Dead their home. Under these circumstances, many people were forced 
to rent in the informal housing market. Between 1966 and 1976, formal housing 
numbers stood at 27 ,000 in urban areas and 6,000 in rural areas. In contrast, informal 
housing numbered at 40,000-60,000 units in urban areas and 50,000-70,000 in rural 
areas per year (Bayad 1979: 99). 
The source of financing for informal housing either was personal savings, or 
increasingly in the 1970s, workers' remittances from the Gulf States. These 
remittances found their way into informal urban housing as a secure source of 
investment. In a way, the remittances relieved the housing problem of Egyptian 
workers' families who were new migrants in urban centres and lived in overcrowded 
conditions. A construction frenzy followed by 197 4 as new buildings were going up 
with different levels of extensions being added leading to absorption of rural 
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peripheries by urbanization. Notwithstanding the increase in the level of housing 
stock, eighty per cent of the new housing units in Cairo during the 1970s were 
considered as informal (Soliman 2004: 50). 
While a Master Plan for Cairo had been completed in 1970, the government 
did not have the ability or the will to implement the Plan. Consequently, by the late 
1970s, informal housing continued to develop on the northern and western peripheries 
of Cairo on subdivided agricultural lots where land was still affordable. Informal 
settlements eventually extended into the desert land and around cities (El-Batron 
2004). USAID encouraged self-help programs to maintain and restore informal 
housing; the government of Sadat refused to adopt such a policy as it meant legalizing 
the informal housing. Similarly, building codes were applied only to formal urban 
buildings while 70 per cent of informal urban buildings were built according to 
traditional codes similar to rural areas by late 1970s. Slums also existed in the 
medieval quarters of towns or in villages that were in the process of urban expansion. 
In rural areas, informal housing was built on subdivided agricultural land and 
was financed through personal savings or interest free loans from relatives. 
Construction materials were often basic such as silt and palm leaves and occasionally 
red brick. The informal housing market functioned without official building codes, 
but applied traditional standards to housing safety. The state often interfered by 
providing infrastructure after the buildings had been erected. The main reason for 
state intervention had been a concern to slow down or completely stop the 
encroachment on agricultural land by residential buildings. 
In contrast to urban areas, housing development in small towns and villages 
did not attract a noticeable level of either formal private or public investment. Instead 
of the central government, local govemorates were made responsible for housing 
development and regional planning. In 1973, a presidential Decree had established 
the Agency for the Reconstruction and Development of the Egyptian Village 
(ARD EV) with the intent of promoting home ownership. Seventeen villages in 
various govemorates were selected as part of this experiment whereby the government 
would build houses corresponding to the socio-economic conditions of a family - or 
in other words, cutting costs by relying on cheap local labour and raw materials. The 
state assumed 20 per cent of the cost while the beneficiaries were expected to make an 
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initial 20 per cent payment. The remaining 60 per cent was to be paid over twenty 
years in interest free instalments (Ayubi 1991: 215). The state also provided basic 
infrastructure as well as sanitation facilities. While this seemed like an idea that could 
have positive outcomes, by the end of the 1970s, ARD EV had deteriorated. Rural 
housing continued to be built on private sub-divided agricul~al land. It was not o~y 
the rural inhabitants who sub-divided agricultural land: the state was equally engaged 
in sub-dividing it and selling it to private developers. 
It should be noted that the demand for housing in rural Egypt was not as 
pressing as it was in major urban centres due to a rapid pace of rural-urban migration 
especially in the 1970s. Ansari (1986: 212) noted that the population of rural areas 
declined from 81 per cent in 1960 to 56 per cent in 1976. While some of these new 
migrants succeeded in going to the Gulf States for construction work, a large number 
of them found employment in the domestic construction sector. Many migrants, 
however, could not find adequate housing and often had to live in slum conditions, 
cemeteries or overcrowded run-down housing. These deteriorating living conditions 
became the source of anger of many rural immigrants. Al-Zawiyya al-Hamra, for 
example, was previously a waqf property of forty feddans that had been turned into 
state property under Nasser in order to house the newly arrived migrants from rural 
areas. In 1979, the government decided to relocate the residents from the slums of 
Eshash al-Torgoman and Arab al-Mohammadi to al-Zawiyya al-Hamra, which was 
already overcrowded. Sadat commented on the relocation decision in the following 
excerpt which appeared in Mayo, the NDP's official newspaper: 
Listen, for thirty years, from before the 23 July 
, revolution to this day, we have been facing a big 
problem called the problem ofEshah al-Torgoman and 
the Arab al-Mohammadi in the centre of Cairo. It is a 
major problem and it gives a very bad picture of the 
people's standard of living. I have summoned you to 
tell you that the time has come to solve this problem 
immediately. I will no longer allow the continuation of 
this problem ... Al-Kafrawi acted immediately. He 
chose al-Zawiya al-Hamra and decided to move the , 
inhabitants ofEshash al-Torgoman and Arab al-
Mohammadi there. Last year I went to al-Zawiya al-
Hamra, toured the area, entered some houses and talked 
178 
to their owners. I was really pleased to see happiness in 
the faces of the new residents. They had left their 
shacks and now lived in healthy houses in an area that 
was rebuilt in accordance with the modem system 
(Sadat cited in Ansari 1986: 226). 
Sadat could not have been more out of touch with the mood of the relocated residents 
of the slum. The decision to destroy the slums was intended to recover high value land 
in the centre of the business district in Cairo in order to build luxury hotels and tourist 
centres and residents were fully aware ofthis. The evacuation of 5,000 families (up to 
30,000 individuals) was done using state security forces. Living conditions in al-
Zawiyya al-Hamra were "appalling" according to a sociologist who had visited the 
area after the relocation of slum residents (Ansari 1986: 225-26). In June 1981, al-
Zawiyya al-Hamra was the scene of ugly sectarian clashes and communal riots and 
was the breeding ground of extremist Islamist elements - Tanzim al-Jihad - that 
assassinated Sadat in October of the same year. The clashes in ial-Zawiyya al-Hamra 
were not only due to lack of sufficient living space; it was also the result of citizens' 
frustration with the rising cost of living due to inflation and government policies that 
only served the interest of investors. 
Conclusion 
Critics of Sadat's policies charged that infitah was an ill-conceived policy that was 
going to result in deindustrialization, a rise in financial activity, tourism and luxury 
housing construction, a loss of skilled labour to Arab oil countries and the private 
sector while the public sector would be drained from essential investment. By the end 
of 1977, these predictions had come true. The state's taxation policy resulted in a 
decline in public revenues while the rich enjoyed un-taxed profits and un-taxed 
incomes. The government increasingly relied on borrowing to support its subsidies' 
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program and social services.45 Contrary to the logic of infitah and the free market, 
public expenditure did not decline after infitah, but rather increased from 48. 7 per cent 
in 1976 to 62.9 per cent in 1981-82. The recipients, however, were not workers and 
peasants. Instead, most of the expenditure was directed in the areas of law and order 
(military), which grew from LE 91.5 million in 1976 to LE 241 million in 1980-
81(Ayubi 1995b: 300-01). 
The agricultural sector had failed to meet the basic needs of Egyptians forcing 
Sadat to maintain food subsidies through borrowing and heavy imports, all of which 
not only increased the external debt, but also failed to prevent mass protests and revolt 
by ordinary Egyptians. 46 In general, Egyptian society experienced a decline in 
agricultural sector, a rise in urban overcrowding and decay with a growing working 
class left to fend for itself. The losers under infitah were disproportionately the small 
peasants, public sector workers, and the urban unemployed. lnfitah had in effect 
reordered social property relations by increasing the economic divide. This was 
perhaps very obvious in the area of housing where the construction industry received 
a major boost. While the regime of Sadat did not reverse Nasserist housing policy in 
its entirety, his policies of favouring the private sector resulted fill the rise of a luxury 
housing market. Under these circumstances, informal housing became the main 
avenue for rural-urban migrants and increasingly for residents of major urban centres. 
As one commentator observed that the "highly charged" and class nature of infitah 
could no longer be masked by its supporters who unfairly benefited from it; and he 
noted that at its heart, infitah was a "highly political" policy and "it was only a matter 
of time before it became consciously recognized as such" (Cooper 1982: 124). 
The chapters in the next section examine the response of the Egyptian state to 
the economic crisis and the unfolding of economic liberalization as a strategy of 
development during the 1990s and 2000s. 
45 Egypt's external "debt increased on an average of28 percent per year under Sadat, compared to 13 
£ercent over the previous ten years" (Aulas 1982: 8). 
6 The biggest bill for the public sector was linked to the cost of subsidies on seven basic commodities: 
wheat, flour, sugar, rice, cooking oil, tea and butane gas. These cost the state over $2.9 billion in 1981 
(Aulas 1982: 9). 
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Chapter 7. Neoliberalism and the Mubarak Regime 
In the context of declining oil prices and the credit crunch of the mid-1980s, and with 
over two million of its workers in the Gulf States, the impact of the oil shocks on the 
Egyptian state was severe as much of its revenues were linked to the regional oil 
economies. In the face of a deteriorating economy, the Mubarak regime, pressured by 
USAID and the IMF, as well as by an emerging domestic ruling class, introduced 
'free market' reforms. The decades of the 1990 and 2000 witnessed the emergence of 
a coherent set of class interests that coalesced around real estate and agriculture and 
who used the state effectively to further their interests. It is in the period that we 
witness capitalist accumulation strategy based on dispossession of workers and 
peasants take off. This chapter examines the project of neoliberalism, the process of 
its implementation (ideological justification, institutional reforms and policies) and 
the political, economic and social outcomes in Egypt. The first section provides an 
overview of the 1980s crisis and how that crisis provided the backdrop to the "free 
market" reforms of the 1990s. The second section examines the beginning of the 
neoliberal era from the launch of ERSAP in 1991 to the economic downturn in the 
late 1990s. A final section discusses the consolidation of neoliberal reforms and ruling 
class power under the premiership of Ahmad Nazif from 2004 onwards. 
The Crisis of the 1980s 
The 1980s constituted a decade of political and economic crisis in Egypt. The 
assassination of Sadat in 1981 foisted the Presidency onto Hosni Mubarak and 
changed the political context of reform away from liberalization and towards a 
security clampdown against the rise of Islamic extremism. The bread riots, combined 
with the economic failures of infitah, the rise of 'conspicuous consumption' and 
corruption amongst the 'infitahyoun', sparked a popular backlash against the reform 
process. The re-introduction of the Emergency Law1 enabled the regime to repress 
the Muslim Brotherhood and to confiscate its property and its assets. Within this 
1 The Emergency Law was first introduced in 1967 in the context of the war with Israel. Sadat repealed 
it in 1980, but it was reinstated in 1981 under Mubarak. 
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political context, the reform movement which supported the infitah was largely 
derailed until the late 1980s. 
By mid-decade, Egypt faced a serious decline in real income per head, a 
negative balance of trade, a huge fiscal deficit, high levels of external debt, rising 
from US$2 billion in 1960 to US$22 billion in 1981, amounting to one and a half 
times the GDP (Niblock 1993: 35). The extent of the economic crisis was conveyed in 
the following passage: 
... [T]he world oil glut and terrorism which affected the 
tourism industry ... drastically reduced Egypt's foreign 
currency income. Depressed oil prices cost Egypt about 
$1.2 billion in revenue [in 1986], and remittances from 
expatriate Egyptian oil workers also dropped. Income 
from tourism fell about 40 percent after a spate of 
terrorist acts in the region in 1985 (Baligh 1986). 2 
Egypt's foreign debt had reached $36 billion in 1986 and official estimates indicated 
that it would cost US$3 billion in annual interest payments over the next three years. 
In light of these circumstances, the Egyptian government began negotiations for a $1 
billion standby credit with the IMF in order to deal with the balance of payments 
deficit. 3 Debt-servicing obligations between 1984 and 1987 had increased by an 
average of $1.7 billion a year, and total debt exceeded US$40 billion by June of 1987 
(Ikram 2006: 56). By 1989, Egypt's debt service obligations consumed forty per cent 
of its foreign exchange revenues (Bromley and Bush 1994: 202). 
Table 7.1 External Debt (Short and Long Term), 1981-1991 
Year Short and Long Term Debt Services ($ US 
External Debt ($ US billions) 
billions) 
1981 22.077 0.2 
1986 39.896 11.4 
1988 46.146 10.8 
2 The decline in oil prices from US$41 a barrel in 1980 to $8 in 1986 had negative implications for 
Egypt's sources ofrevenue -remittances, oil exports, Suez Canal fees and tourism (Farah 2009: 40, 
80). 
3 The government was also negotiating $800 million with the World Bank to fund development 
programs (Baligh 1986). 
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I 1991 I 32.630 2.7 
Source: Ikram (2006: 149). 
Faced with rising unemployment, decreasing wages, an expanding imports bill and a 
rising levels of debt repayment within an inflationary context, the government began 
serious negotiations with the IMF.4 Atef Sedki (1986-1996) was appointed as Prime· 
Minister in the midst of economic crisis and was assigned with the task of resolving 
the crisis. An economist by training however educated in France, Sedki responded to 
the economic crisis through a technocrat' s lens. He oversaw the negotiations with the 
major financial institutions and was instrumental in the ERSAP deal. 
The tWo main concerns of the IFis were to stabilize Egypt's macroeconomic 
indicators and to implement a program of structural reforms that would fully liberalize 
the Egyptian economy. The IMF demanded cutting the budget deficit (23 per cent of 
the GDP by 1986) by cutting expenditures on subsidies and devaluing the exchange 
rate and increasing interest rates to encourage savings (Ikram 2006: 58-59). 
Throughout its negotiations with the IMF, political stability remained the 
government's top priority contributing to a slow pace of implementation of IMF-
proposed reforms. However, by the end of the 1980s, the IMF succeeded in achieving 
some of its goals, such as a reduction in subsidies and price increases on basic 
commodities, and further pushed Egypt down the path of liberalization. 5 Some of the 
notable reforms implemented by the government prior to 1990 included: the adoption 
of Investment Law 230/1989; the beginnings of the privatization of public sector 
enterprises; the liberalization of the financial sector; and setting the stage for the 
liberalization of the agricultural sector. 
Mubarak's Investment Law 230/1989 built on Laws 43/1974 and 32/1977 
passed during Sadat's tenure. It allowed foreign companies' full rights of ownership, 
4 The number of Egyptian workers in the Gulf fell from approximately three million in the early 1980s 
to less than one million by 1987 reflecting a radical decline in remittances (Rutherford 2008: 136). 
The government was also responsible for providing jobs for most of the university graduates and 
majority of the female workers, a factor that placed further constraints on the fiscal capacity of the 
state. 
5 Niblock (1993: 44) notes that the Egyptian government was concerned that too many reforms over a 
short period would destabilize the country and result in social upheaval. Despite these concerns, 
various demands of the IMF, such as price increases on energy and basic commodities, were 
implemented. The main demand that the government resisted was that of exchange rate unification and 
devaluation. Most of this resistance came from within the NDP. 
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facilitated the transfer of state land to the private sector, allowed the transfer of net 
profits abroad and provided guarantees against expropriation and/or sequestration of 
property or accumulated assets. Businesses benefited from tax holidays ranging from 
five to fifteen years, foreign employees were exempt from paying taxes, and profits 
were exempt from general income tax. This new Investment Law also opened up the 
following sectors for private investors: land reclamation, the cultivation of fallow and 
desert lands, tourism, housing and construction related activities. Desert reclamation 
and cultivation projects enjoyed a fifty-year lease on the land used for such projects. 
Finally, foreign capital no longer had to engage in joint ventures with Egyptian 
capital. 
Despite the high productivity levels of public sector firms, the crisis of the 
1980s provided the ideological justification for the privatization of the public sector 
by ascendant social forces. 6 Although actual privatization had to wait until after the 
signing of ERSAP in 1991, the government had to prepare a preliminary list of 
potential enterprises that could be privatized. The list offered by the government 
included hotels, small scale state industries and food processing. But it "was made 
clear that there was no intention of privatizing large industrial units" that "were 
deemed to be of strategic importance", such as the Kafr al Dawar and Mahalla al-
Kubra textile plants, the Helwan iron and steel complex, or the Kima fertiliser plant 
(Niblock 1993: 44). The privatization of the public sector was to be implemented in 
the context of Public Sector Company Law 203/1991, the main goal of which was to 
expose public sector firms to market imperatives, thereby forcing them to operate as 
private firms. The implication was that public sector enterprises which had enjoyed 
credit from public sector commercial banks were now forced to find their own sources 
of credit in the market. 7 
Another important area of reform was banking and financial services. In the 
1970s, Sadat's liberalization had led to the emergence of informal financial 
6 Ayubi (1995b: 343) points out that, despite cutbacks in public investment, the public sector continued 
to perform effectively well into the 1980s: "In 1984/85, eighty-three profitable companies showed a 
combined profit of LE 268 million, while thirty-four remaining companies showed a combined loss of 
LE 142 million, for a net profit of LE 126 million." 
7 While Egypt's agreement with the IMF was concluded in 1998, Egypt continues to receive expertise 
and technical advice from the Fund. This is obvious from the large number ofEgyptian.;.bom IMF 
economists and technocrats who either work in the Egyptian government or set the agenda of research 
centres and universities in Egypt. 
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institutions, known as the Islamic Money Management Companies (IMMCs)-
' sharikat tawzif al-amwal al-islamiyya'. Popular among small depositors and workers 
from the Gulf States, these Islamic investment companies amassed billions of pounds 
of savings, which were invested in various domestic and international markets. 8 By 
December 1986, 190 registered and 90 non-registered IMMCs existed. While the 
majority remained small, some grew to amass deposits of over US$10 billion with a 
client base of up to 500,000 (Zubaida 1990: 153-54). The IMMCs offered 25 per 
cent dividends, which were considered a form of profit sharing rather than interest 
(Sadowski 1991: 229-30).9 This starved the major banks of savings at a time when 
the Egyptian state subsidized most of its imports through borrowing in a global 
environment of tight credit. IMM Cs therefore posed a threat to the interests of both 
public and private banks. 
The onset of IMF negotiations in the late 1980s put pressure on the state to 
reign in the IMMCs while increasing the power of the major financial institutions in 
the country. The official banks had formed their own powerful lobby in the late 
1970s and put pressure on the government to eliminate the IMMCs. 10 Between 1985 
and 1988, the government and the major banks launched a successful attack that 
brought down most of the IMM Cs. Thus, by the second half of the 1980s, through 
financial restrictions and banking regulations, the government orchestrated the 
collapse of the IMM Cs and numerous other informal moneychangers and financial 
outlets. With the introduction of anti-IMMC legislation in April 1988 (Law 
146/1988), numerous members of the IMM Cs were arrested, their operations shut 
down and their deposits - which stood at millions of US dollars - were transferred 
8 Sadowski (1991: 223) notes that the while official estimates ofremittances stood at US$4 billion, 
others have argued that remittances reached anywhere between US$12 billion and US$18 billion, 
which means a huge amount of savings was accessible by the informal economy which was represented 
by the IMMCs. 
9 Another reason the IMMCs remained popular was due to their voluntary support for charity 
institutions and their provision of social services. As public investment in social services shrunk 
throughout the 1980s, Islamic charitable associations stepped in to fill the gap. Their services included 
"schools, trade-skill centers, day-care programs, and health care centers and hQspitals" (Sullivan 1990: 
329-30). Clearly this marked a crisis of legitimacy of the state that threatened the ruling elite especially 
those close to the NDP. 
10 The list included "Uthman Ahmad Uthman, the richest man in the country and founder of the Suez 
Canal Bank; Mustafa Khalil, one of the founders of the National Democratic party and former prime 
minister; Ali Nagm, former director of Central Bank; and Fu'ad Sultan, long-time director of the Misr 
Iran Bank, later minister of tourism and architect of the government's privatization drive" (Sadowski 
1991: 235). 
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into the official banks. As a consequence, the amount that the official banks 
processed on a daily basis increased dramatically from US$200,000 to US$10 million 
(Sadowski 1991: 237). 
With their competitors destroyed the official banks emerged as the winners; by 
1990, they had established a monopoly over the financial system at the expense of the 
IMMCs. Once the banks emerged successful in their battle with the IMMCs, they 
started looking at ways to maximize their profits. The banks began charging the 
government hefty fees for their services while providing inefficient and costly 
services for the public in general. This marked the beginning of a larger process of 
banking reform that would pick up pace after 2004 under the bank privatization 
program. 
Another sector that became the target of liberalization was agriculture where 
USAID, IMF and landed interests united to put an end to Nasserist agrarian reforms. 
Having a major lobby group within the ruling NDP, the landed interests found an ally 
in Yussef Wali, the Minister of Agriculture, who believed that the liberalization of 
agriculture would benefit the economy as a whole. 11 However, the Ministry of 
Agricultural remained divided on the issue of reform, as lower echelon bureaucrats 
and project directors opposed Wali's proposals. The radical reform of the agricultural 
sector had to wait until the passing of Law 96/1992. 
In spite of these sectoral reforms, it became.apparent that the economic crisis, 
characterized by declining growth, an annual inflation.rate of over 14 per cent, a 
balance of payments deficit, an unsustainable external debt of US$ 45 billion (1989), 
debt service payments (US $11 billion), and depleting foreign exchange reserves left 
the government with few options. The Egyptian state thus arrived at an agreement 
with the IMF for loans (Ikram 2006: 149). 
11 In the course of the 1980s, USAID had established closer ties with various ministers and encouraged 
them to support economic liberalization and YussefWali was one such example. It is here that we can 
distinguish between those who supported IMF recommendations for a rapid reform of the system -
namely the landlords and the official banks - and those who preferred a gradual transformation of the 
economy, namely the bureaucrats and project directors. Sullivan (1990: 321) notes that, "Various 
undersecretaries have large farms, are beef producers, or have stakes in the various fertilizer and seed 
companies. Given the low and unchanging salaries for government employees, the vast majority of 
these workers, including high-level officials, must have another source of income." Law 92/1996 was 
the outcome of these struggles. 
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The Rise ofNeoliberalism: 1991-99 
By late 1989, the Egyptian state continued to experience fiscal constraints due to its 
limited revenues and the rising costs of sustaining the public sector. The IMF 
proposed a series of substantial policy changes and institutional reforms that aimed at 
reducing the role of the public sector and expanding the role of the private sector. It 
was hoped that these reforms would stabilize the Egyptian economy and thus restore 
the confidence of Egypt's creditors. While Egyptian officials agreed with many of the 
reforms, they objected to the fast pace of IMF reforms. Egyptians remained skeptical 
of IMF demands for budget cuts and only a handful of the new generation of officials 
expressed agreement with the IMF; a large number of officials - even the liberals -
were hesitant in accepting IMF demands. As the Cold War came to an end, sections 
of Egypt's ruling class became more closely integrated into the global economy and+ 
a fragile consensus around liberalization was established at the elite level. 
The move towards neoliberal reforms signified a shift in the composition of 
the ruling class. During the 1990s, a globally oriented faction of the Egyptian 
propertied class organized themselves and became increasingly active in policy 
circles. Supported by the IMF and the World Bank, this elite sought to integrate 
Egypt more deeply into the global economy. They identified three areas that needed to 
change in order for a free market economy to succeed in the country. First, they 
demanded a transformation of the interventionist and redistributive role of the 
Nasserist state; the new neoliberal state was to be a 'facilitator' of economic growth. 
Next, it was argued that the rule of law was needed in order for the private sector to 
feel secure in its investments in the country. This entailed significant administrative 
reforms: an overhaul of cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, a simplification of 
exchange rates and taxation, and increased institutional support for the private sector 
in the economy. Finally, ensuring guarantees for property rights were identified as a 
crucial element for a successful shift to a "free market" economy. Achieving such 
guarantees entailed a dismantling of previous laws that shielded land and public 
resources from market forces. 
In 1991, the government agreed to an IMF Standby Agreement which resulted 
in the signing of the Economic Restructuring and Structural Adjustment Program 
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(ERSAP henceforth). ERSAP contained six components: macro-economic 
stabilization, privatization, price liberalization, trade liberalization, investment-
friendly policies, and a Social Fund for Development intended to create labour 
intensive employment and reduce the overall impact of public sector privatization and 
job losses. The adoption of the program represented a significant shift in the Egyptian 
economic policy. Richards (2001: 25) pointed out that the 1990s was no longer 
'business as usual', as for the first time the Egyptian government was under pressure 
to carve out a place for itself in the global economy and thus a new domestic 
accumulation strategy was launched setting the legal context for the reform of land, 
finance and banking sectors. The government began liberalizing prices, interest rates 
and trade, reducing public spending and introducing new taxes while freezing wages. 
It implemented major cuts in general subsidies, introduced a new tax law, revived the 
stock exchange system and liberalized land rents. A significant aspect of the reform 
program was the passing of Law 96/1992 which liberalized the agricultural sector and 
marked the beginning of a systematic process of accumulation by dispossession in 
rural Egypt. 
With disagreements amongst members of the ruling NDP over the pace and 
direction of economic change, the reform process remained slow in the first half of the 
1990s. Subsidies were left intact in order to protect jobs and cushion the effects of 
low wages and a high cost of living. At the same time, the government resisted trade 
reform, arguing that it would hurt small firms. By the mid-1990s, the IMF's 
assessment of the implementation of ERSAP attacked the government's piecemeal 
approach to reform. This period was marked by conflicts amongst members of the 
NDP who wanted to protect public sector enterprises and those who wanted to speed 
up the process of privatizing them. The latter included the older son of Mubarak, 
Gamal Mubarak and his western educated, IMF and World Bank associated friends 
who played an important role in ensuring the adoption of a neoliberal economic 
model. 12 
12 A prime example of this IMF linked elite is YousefBoutros-Ghali. Boutros-Gali was a member of 
staff at the IMF in the 1980s and then IMF-resident Representative in Egypt. While at the IMF, he 
worked on the Latin American Debt Crisis. He was appointed governor of CBE between 1986-1993 
and was a key negotiator of the IMF standby agreement of 1991. In 2004, he served as Minister of 
Finance until his conviction - in absentia - on corruption charges in 2011 after the fall of the Mubarak 
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The Egyptian government entered a number of international treaties that 
bound Egypt to the neoliberal model of development. Thus, in 1994, Egypt signed the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT henceforth) 
and joined the newly formed World Trade Organization (WTO henceforth). 
Membership of the WTO signified a serious commitment on Egypt's part towards 
structural adjustment. During this same period of time, Egypt signed the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS henceforth) accord which 
bound Egypt to international. rules to protect property rights. Egypt also joined the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP henceforth) which required institutional and 
policy reforms to fulfill the terms of EMP membership. In accordance with the terms 
of these agreements, the government increased consumption taxes, electricity tariffs 
for select groups, and raised the price of gasoline and fuel. It also abolished 
guaranteed employment to university graduates and reduced the number of subsidized 
goods, something that began under Sadat, but did not happen in full until the 1990s. 
Reforms in the second half of the 1990s reflected these deep divisions. On the 
one hand, some of the reforms facilitated the push towards privatization and 
deregulation of the economy; other reforms however, impeded or in some 
circumstances reversed the changes that had already been implemented. This divisive 
phase was particularly evident under Prime Minister Kamal El Ganzouri (January 
1996-0ctober 1999).13 Pressured by Egypt's pre-existing international agreements 
and pro-free market members of the NDP within the government, Ganzouri's 
government passed 36 new laws intended to promote foreign investment and 
economic liberalization. These laws encouraged 'Build-Operate-Transfer' (BOT) 
projects, foreign owned banks and real estate as well as the promotion of exports. 
During his first year in office, Ganzouri' s cabinet passed Law 4/1996 which ended 
rent controls and rendered urban tenants market dependent. The Law aimed to expand 
a private housing market which favoured landlords and private investors. 
In a positive gesture towards investors, the government introduced Investment 
Law 8/1997 in the hope of encouraging a larger inflow of foreign investments. The 
regime. In 2008, he sat on the IMF's policy setting committee. Another notable individual linked to the 
World Bank was Mahmoud Mohieldin, who launched the Ministry of Investment in Egypt after 2000. 
13 Prior to his term as Prime Minister, Ganzouri served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Planning under the government led by economist Atef Sedki (1986-96). 
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Law equalized the treatment of domestic and foreign investors, created a five year tax 
holiday for some sectors, extended complete foreign ownership of loeal projects, and 
reduced the number of regulations on foreign investment. The Law also provided 
permanent exemption from taxes, duties and customs in 'free zones'. Although the 
idea of Free Trade and Industrial Zones were launched by Sadat, the comprehensive 
set of incentives offered to the private sector in the 1990s qualitatively set apart the 
Free Trade Zones of Mubarak from those of the 1970s. Investors in the zones were 
offered full exemptions from corporate tax throughout the life of the project as well as 
cheap or free land to start their projects. 14 Other incentives ranged from land 
reclamation in the desert, to industry and mining, air transportation and tourism.15 
Key beneficiaries of these reforms were the construction, real estate and tourism 
industries. The passing of Law 96/1992 had made state lands easily obtainable by 
private investors through various ministries under questionable terms and at extremely 
low prices (US$1 per square meter). 16 Under this system, over 40 million square 
kilometres of land was sold to the private sector in 21 tourist zones across the country 
between 1991 and 1995 (Moore 1997: 129). As a result, development projects for 
tourism flourished. For instance, in 1995, the Egyptian Company for Tourist Resorts 
was launched in order to develop the coast of the Red Sea. Another major tourist 
development by El Montaza for Tourism and Investment Company which covered 
3,360 hectares and cost LE4 billion was being developed in the North coast (Moore 
1997). The Amer Group was engaged in tourism development in the North Coast in 
and around Alexandria in an attempt to transform it along the lines of Sharm el 
Sheikh tourist resort. 
14 By 1996, 1,814 factories employing 192,000 people were active in these cities and there were plans 
for 1,175 more factories in the future (Moore 1997: 156). It should be noted that in competing with 
places such as Israel, which attracted most of the FDI in the region due to skilled nature of its work 
force, Egypt had regionally positioned itself as a source of low wages and lax labour laws and 
regulations. Multinational corporations in Egypt still remained limited in the number of jobs they 
created. For instance Heinz, 3M, Suzuki and General Motors combined had 485 factories employing a 
total of 63,000 workers, which was dismal given the millions of workers who are unemployed or 
underemployed (Moore 1997: 155-57). 
15 The total revenues of the state were radically reduced due to introduction of this law. The 
government's expenditures on research and development remained at the dismal 0.2 per cent compared 
to 0.7 per cent in Turkey (Said Aly 1994: 188). But this was overshadowed by the larger reality of 
radically reduced public investment levels for the public sector since the mid-1'980s. 
16 These include the Ministry of Defense, the Egyptian State Railways, the Ministry of Housing and 
New Communities, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, the Ministry of Religious 
Endowments (awqaaf), and public insurance companies. 
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A key private investment project was the Southern Valley 'Toshka' Project -
inaugurated in January 1997. Toshka, once fully operational, was expected to resolve 
the problems of food scarcity and urban overcrowding. It was intended to create an 
alternate delta parallel to the Nile Valley and with the capacity to settle six million 
people while providing 800,000 to 2.2 million feddans of land for cultivation. The 
infrastructure for the project was provided by the government while investment came 
from a Saudi Prince Talal who purchased 100,000 feddans at LE99 per feddan (EIU 
1997/98: 50).17 
Despite the launch of these projects in the 1990s, the Ganzouri government 
came under criticism by proponents of a faster pace of reform within the NDP. 
Among this group, Ganzouri was seen as an old technocrat who continued to revive 
the statist model through unacceptable means. 18 Ganzouri was also accused by the 
NDP leadership of bailing out loss making state-owned enterprises during 1997/98 in 
the amount of LE 5.5 billion without the advice of the Ministry of Finance or even the 
cabinet. His cancellation of the Egyptian National Railway Authority's debt of LE 1.4 
billion also came under officials' criticism (Essam El Din 2000). To boost the GDP 
levels, the Ganzouri government relied on mega projects such as Toshka, the Gulf of 
Suez, East of Port Said, North Sinai, Aswan and second Cairo underground line that 
were intended to create the needed jobs, reduce inflation and keep the budget deficit at 
one per cent. However, Ganzouri was criticized by his pro-free market opponents for 
engaging in costly projects. He was seen as influencing Central Bank decisions 
according to the needs of state sector enterprises, wages and prices. He was especially 
vehemently opposed by Garn.al Mubarak and other neoliberal ministers in his cabinet 
and in the Shura Council. 
These intra-NDP conflicts notwithstanding, in the 1990s legislation was 
developed to facilitate the development of banking, capital markets and private 
insurance companies. Since its nationalization, the insurance sector remained part of 
the public sector. It was only in 1998 that legislation allowed the privatization of 
public sector insurance companies and enabled the transfer of ownership of these 
17 In May 2011, the Egyptian government annulled the deal with Prince Talal, taking back 75,000 
feddans ofland. 
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18 He supported state enterprises and on a number of occasions bailed out state enterprises by bypassing 
parliamentary procedures and directly seeking funds from public sector banks. 
companies to foreigners. All of these changes required a seismic shift in the legal 
system (which had maintained its fundamental character since Nasser's rule). 
The reform process began to slow down in the late 1990s in the context of an 
economic downturn and an upsurge in popular unrest. Given the low levels of 
productive private sector investment, the increasingly export-oriented economy was 
not as dynamic as proponents of the neo-liberal model had hoped. While in 1998, the 
IMF was praising the reform process as a 'remarkable success story', macro-
economic indicators told a different story, and in fact, Egypt was on the verge of an 
economic downturn. By 1998, manufacturing goods accounted for only 15 per cent 
of total exports, while energy exports accounted for double that figure. At the same 
time, Egyptian imports far outpaced exports: Egyptian merchandise exports 
amounted US$3.2 billion while imports from the U.S. amounted to US$16.5 billion, 
comprised mainly of food imports and small machine parts (Kheir El-Din 2001). 
Ganzouri's term in office was cut short in October of 1999. Despite a spate of 
free market policies, his government retained certain populist policies, a result of 
which granted him the nickname, 'minister of the poor'. This reputation was due to a 
decline in poverty rates, which had decreased from 25 per cent to 21 per cent under 
him (Abdel Razek 2011). Other pro-poor policies included the continuation of 
subsidies, education and public sector salaries were increased to keep up with 
inflation; however, the latter decision was contestec;l at the Shura Council which 
supported freezing wages. 19 During the three years of his first term as PM, Ganzouri 
maintained control over various committees in the cabinet. Public sectors continued to 
be created at the rate of 150,000 per year although public sector enterprises that were 
slated for privatization lost workers. He was left untainted by corruption which had 
involved various high profile members of the NDP, such as YousefBoutros-Ghali. 
Ganzouri was critical of the privatization program, as he saw it as enriching 
individuals close to the regime. 
Despite all of the incentives provided by the government during the 1990s, an 
assessment of the performance of the private sector indicates lacklustre outcomes. 
Rutherford (2008: 204) notes that, over the course of the first half of the 1990s, 
19 Ganzouri balanced the budget by bringing down the deficit, kept inflation at 3.6 per cent and guarded 
the exchange rate (US $1 =LE 3 .4 7 in the late 1990s) (Abdel Razek 2011 ). 
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"private-sector investment stayed virtually unchanged - it reached only 15. 7 per cent 
of GDP by 1997 ... The government had cut its total investment in the economy from 
12 per cent of GDP in 1987 to 6 per cent in 1994 - in nominal terms - this was a 
decline ofroughly 5.6 billion LE." 
Figure 7.1 Investment Levels, 1991-2001 
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Given the government's own predictions that levels of private sector 
investment would reach 45 per cent of GDP by 1997, this represented a significant 
shortcoming. On top of this, much of the FD I that was coming into the country took 
the form of portfolio investment in capital markets rather than productive investment 
in manufacturing. It therefore remained unreliable as a potential .source for long-term 
economic development and job creation. As well, most of the capital invested came 
from wealthy Egyptian expats who had left Egypt in the 1960s rather than foreign 
investors. This clearly demonstrated a lack of trust among foreign investors. 
Nonetheless, the support from Egyptian capital at home and abroad seemed to be 
sufficient enough at this point to continue the push towards liberalization forward. 
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Portfolio investment in real estate and property had created a property bubble 
throughout the mid-1990s that burst in 1999, affecting both the real estate and 
construction sectors. The construction industry experienced an unprecedented crisis 
of realization linked to the speculative building frenzy in the luxury housing market 
that took off in the earlier part of the decade. 2° Close to LE22 billion belonging to 
public sector banks were trapped by these bad debts. By 1997 private sector debts 
had reached LE 95.2 billion, and by 1999 they accounted for 60.9 per cent of total 
domestic debt (Wahish 2000).21 According to the Egyptian Federation of 
Construction and Building Contractors, among 28,000 contractors, almost 50 per cent 
of work stopped and most companies cancelled their registration. 22 
The effect of the crisis on the construction industry can be seen in the example 
of Arab Contractors, a construction firm that played a major part in the construction of 
a number of major national projects, such as the Aswan High Dam, the Cairo 
underground, the foreign ministry building, the Ahmed Hamdi twmel below the Suez 
Canal and Cairo's network of fly-overs. In 1998, the Company's turnover reached 
LES billion linked to infrastructure and other government projects (Moore 1997: 93). 
The company employed almost 70,000 people and its work volume in 1997-1998 was 
LE 4.7 billion (Farah 1999). By 1999, the company's portfolio spanned more than 30 
countries, including Algeria, Bosnia, Kazakhstan, Libya, Poland, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. In 2000, after twenty years of accumulating debts, 
the company faced a major financial crisis. The state owed LE3.5 billion to the 
company and the company owed loans to banks which incurred the company annual 
interest charges of LE480 million (Farah 1999). Private projects such as Dreamland 
and Beverly Hills had also come to a halt as the market for luxury housing became too 
saturated. Indeed, gated communities and vacant luxury villas came to symbolize the 
post 2000 financial crisis in Egypt. The depreciation of speculative investments 
affected both public banks and private developers. 
20 See: The Egyptian Junior Business Association, 'Report on Nation Business Agenda, 2005-2006,': 
http://ejb.org.eg/publication/Englishversion.pdf (accessed January 18, 2008). 
21 In 1996, the industry made a short term rebound due to the privatization of the Heliopolis Housing 
and Urbanization Company. 
22 Businesstodayegypt, No. 1448. Bigger companies like Orascom conglomerate did not feel the 
pressure of the crisis to the same extent since they produced their own construction materials and thus 
did not rely on the market for materials. 
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Despite its promises to reduce unemployment, privatization did not produce 
sufficient jobs to absorb the new entrants into the labour market. During the 1990s, 
close to 180,000 workers were laid off in the areas of financial services and 
administration alone, while government estimates suggest that up to 300,000 workers 
were laid off in public enterprises (Khattab 1999).23 Between 1990 and 1996, total 
public sector employment dropped from 1.2 million to 950,000 (El-Ehwany and 
Metwally 2001: 5-7). During the same period, the labour market expanded as 
500,000 new job seekers entered the market (Richards 2001: 24). The private sector's 
reliance on capital-intensive techniques in manufacturing and agriculture meant that it 
failed to absorb much of the surplus labour reserves. Between 1986 and 1996, private 
sector employment growth remained extremely low, at 3.2 per cent; and the jobs 
created tended to be based on insecure, short-term contracts (El-Ehwany and 
Metwally 2001).24 At the same time, the government neglected to establish re-
training facilities for workers who were laid-off. By 2000, unemployment was hitting 
15-29 year olds the hardest, and the unofficial unemployment rate topped 25-30 per. 
cent (Farah 2009: 45). Unemployment was also higher in rural Egypt than it was in 
urban Egypt due to the massive privatization of land. 25 The commodification of land 
through Law 96 of 1992 led to the immisseration of the peasantry and tenant farmers. 
23 The laid off employees were offered the option of buying shares in the privatized companies. There 
was also a possibility of accepting early retirement in return for a termination of bonus of between 
LE15-35000 depending on the number of years of employment. Close to 60,000 workers accepted 
early employment while 5 out of72 companies were sold to their employees (Khattab 1999). 
24 Government employment between 1976-86 stood at 3.6 per cent and from 1986-96 remained at 6.5 
per cent. The relative employment share of the government in comparison to the private and informal 
sectors was 17.7·per cent in 1976 and 28 per cent in 1996. Within the government sector, most 
employment was generated in social services, which reached 20 per cent in 1970 and 25 per cent 
between 1987/8-1996/97 (El Ehwany and Metwally 2001: 6). Other problems with the private sector 
included its gender bias. The private non-agriculture sector mainly employed male workers and thus 
the female workers laid off in the process of privatization were discriminated against. Ikram (2006) 
underlines four factors that explain the prejudice of the private sector towards female workers in Egypt. 
First, the absence of labour intensive industries makes the hiring of unskilled female labourers 
unprofitable. Second, Egyptian labour laws are seen as constricting the ability of employers who 
would be required to pay generous maternity leave and childcare alongside other benefits. Third, 
women are seen as lacking commitment to their jobs and thus they make for unreliable and 
undisciplined workers. Finally, existing social norms prevent a flexible labour market for women and 
thus casual labour and self-employment are not feasible in Egyptian society. 
25 Unemployment in Egypt has multiple dimensions. In urban Egypt, unemployed is concentrated 
among 15-29 year olds, most of whom are recent university graduates. In the rural areas, rising 
unemployment mostly affects women (Ikram 2006: 246). 
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Market based rents determined who could keep their plots of land resulting in the loss 
of land by over a million small farmers (Bush 2002). 
As both the private sector and the government failed to meet the needs of the 
labour market, the informal economy continued to absorb most of the workers. The 
informal economy is comprised of small to medium sized family businesses 
employing less than 10 workers in labour intensive forms of manufacturing (Algan 
2003: 171-2).26 Between 1984 and 1991, it is estimated that 24 per cent of the non-
agricultural workforce was employed in the informal sector (lkram 2006: 240). By 
2003, this number increased to approximately 40-45 per cent of the non-agricultural 
workforce (AHDR 2009), and 60 per cent of the total workforce in 2006 (Millennium 
Development Goals Report 2010). 
While privatization failed to increase employment, what it did increase was 
corruption. Rather than increase efficiency, transparency or accountability, 
privatization intensified corruption, and increased the market power of the few at the 
expense of the many. Richards (2001) and Sadowski (1991) characterize the 
relationship between the state and the private sector in Egypt during the 1990s as 
'cronyism', whereby powerful interests in the state and economy unite to maximize 
their share of resources through control of the market. For instance, Richards (2001: 
24-25) writes, "A symbiosis between government regulators and speculative 
entrepreneurs has developed; 'insider trading' is rampant, particularly in the 
construction sector, where public land may be sold very cheaply to a friend who then 
resells it at its market value." One high profile case of corruption includes Ahmed 
Ezz, the iron and steel tycoon who, as the Chairman of the Budget Committee and the 
NDP's Secretary for Organizational Affairs, allegedly blocked the passage of anti-
trust laws in 2008 that could have damaged his monopolistic hold on the iron and 
steel markets. Farah (2009: 81) elaborates on the nature of privatization: 
26 While the informal economy remains the dominant employer, the problem that economists have 
pointed out is the inability of the state to measure and regulate the flows that are generated in this 
sector. More importantly, most of the activities of the informal economy are self-financed and thus 
remain outside the sphere of influence of powerful financial actors. "According to CAPMAS statistics, 
96 per cent [of activities in the informal sector] are mostly self-financed small enterprises, while only 
0.7 per cent rely on loans" (Algan 2003: 172). See Sadowski (1991) about the role of the informal 
economy in the 1980s in Egypt. 
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Privatization .. .led to collusion between state 
bureaucrats and businessmen for the sale of public 
sector enterprises at prices much lower than the 
market.. .Most companies were sold to investors through 
loans provided by state banks. In some instances, 
investors bought state-companies with loans backed by 
false guarantees and retained ownership of the 
companies even after they defaulted on the loans. 
The overall outcome of the reform process was an aggregate upward transfer 
of wealth in Egyptian society as the burden of economic reforms fell unevenly on the 
poor and the unemployed. Between 1980-1997, the "share of the population living in 
poverty in urban Egypt increased from 18.2 to 22.5 per cent, and the share of the 
population living in poverty in rural Egypt rose from 16.1 to 23.3 per cent" (Adams 
Jr. 2000: 262). In absolute terms, the number of poor increased from 27.8 million in 
1996 to 32.7 million in 2000 (El Ghonemy 2003: 5). Economic restructuring 
introduced a trend towards mergers and monopolies, flexible labour laws and the 
erosion of family owned businesses, which were seen as obstacles for launching 
economies of scale. 
In this context, a wave of industrial unrest broke out in the late 1990s, 
challenging the legitimacy of the neoliberal model and slowing down the process of 
reform. These strikes can be traced back to the mid-1990s as the impact of neoliberal 
reforms was beginning to set in. For example, 7,000 workers at the Kafr al-Dawwar 
Spinning and Weaving Company were locked out by state security forces in 
September 1994. Tensions between workers and security forces escalated resulting in 
a violent confrontation leading to the death of 4 workers, the wounding of 120 and the 
arrest of 90 more. Strikes continued throughout the mid-1990s as privatization 
accelerated the pace of layoffs. In 1998, major strikes began to break out at the Misr 
Helwan Spinning and Weaving factory after the dismissal of 2,800 workers. From 
1998 to 2004, there were over 1,000 workers' collective actions. The upsurge in 
industrial action would signify a trend that would only intensify as privatizations 
accelerated after 2004, and to which we will return in the next section. 
In rural Egypt, peasants faced attacks by landlords and the state security forces 
that forced peasants to leave their land and houses after land Law 96/1992 took effect 
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in 1997. Tenancy agreements were increasingly short-term and rents were left to the 
market; as a result rents increased 15-17 times in comparison to their pre-1985 values. 
In 1999 and 2000, average rents per feddan ranged between LE 1000 and LE2000 
leading to a loss of land by small farmers. 
From Crisis to Consolidation and back to Crisis, 2000-2011 
The initial response to the crisis of 1999 was to slow down the reform process. 
Despite adopting Law 203 in 1991, the government did not privatize the number of 
firms that were slated for privatization, and by 1998, 113 of 314· enterprises were only 
partially privatized (Adams Jr. 2000: 269). The privatization of insurance companies 
had not yet begun, a unified law on investments had not been implemented, the cotton 
industry continued to remain under public sector control, and finally, civil service 
reform and bank privatizations were put on hold. However, the appointment of Atef 
Ebeid (1999-2004), as Prime Minister signalled the success of pro-free market 
members of the NDP.27 Prior to his post, Ebeid had served as Minister of Public 
Business Sector under Ganzouri and had played a key role in implementing the 
privatization program as well as the ERSAP program. He was instrumental in 
preparing public sector enterprises for privatization, negotiating with the IMF and 
streamlining the procedures for private sector enterprise. 
Despite the crisis in 2000, old alliances between state officials and business 
people were reconstituted and the neoliberal model was salvaged. The crisis was 
resolved through further privatization of public sector companies which picked up 
pace after 2000 and especially after 2004. A report prepared by the USAID indicated 
134 majority privatization and 61 partial privatization cases between 1991 and 2003, 
worth over LE billion 12 of public sector enterprises linked to textile, construction 
and agriculture (USAID 2003: 25-27). Under Law 203, privatization plans for the 
public sector portion of public-private joint ventures in food, metallurgical, transport, 
chemical, trade and textiles were under way in 2003-2004 (USAID 2003). 
27 Atef Ebeid was an economist and after his term as PM he headed the Arab International Bank (an 
investment bank) between 2005-1 f. While Ganzouri kept tight control over 17 high level councils and 
associations, under Ebeid's term, these committees were accorded freedom of decision, signalling a 
scaling down of Prime Ministerial powers. -
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During Ebeid' s term of office, the Ministry of Economy was dismantled in 
2001 and the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE from here onwards) was granted autonomy 
from ministerial oversight. This resulted in the transfer of monetary policy to the CBE 
and shielding it from political contestation. As discussed in previous chapters, the 
Egyptian banking sector had been nationalized under Nasser resulting in the creation 
of four public sector banks (National Bank ofEgypt-NBE from here onward-
Banque Misr, Banque du Caire and Bank of Alexandria). Prior to the 1990s, the CBE 
had acted as an administrator in the banking sector under the umbrella of the 
government. Under Sadat, infitah resulted in allowing joint venture banks with 51 per 
cent public sector ownership. By the 1980s, the public sector banks were engulfed 
with non-performing loans extended to public sector enterprises. After eliminating the 
IMMCs in the late 1980s, Mubarak's regime liberalized the banking system. This 
entailed offering services to foreign investors and allowing banks to set their own 
interest rates. 
As part of the financial sector reform under terms of ERSAP, the reform of the 
banking sector picked up pace after 2000.28 The goal of reform was to reduce the role 
of public sector banks and increase the role of the private sector in banking. To 
achieve this, public sector banks were restructured and their shares in joint venture 
banks were reduced. By the end of 2000, the share of public sector banks was above 
20 per cent in 8 out of a total of 23 joint venture banks. In 2000, public sector banks 
were mandated to divest their shares injoint venture banks keeping their maximum 
share at 20 per cent (El Shazly 2001 ). The government also announced its plans to 
privatize four public sector commercial banks. Deregulation in the banking sector 
allowed the entry of private sector banks into the Egyptian market and foreign 
partners were allowed majority shares in joint venture banks. The reforms increased 
the private sector's access to credit in Egypt whereby the total share of domestic 
credit provided to the private sector by the banking sector increased from 29 per cent 
in 1990 to 54 per cent in 2003 (Roll 2010: 353). 
28 In 1993, fifteen small regional banks were merged into a single institution -the National Bank for 
Development. In 1999, two specialized real estate banks, Credit Foricier Egyptien and Arab Land Bank, 
merged into Egyptian Arab Real Estate Bank. 
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However, the overall reform of the financial sector lagged behind: more than 
half of the 35 joint venture banks continued to remain majority owned by the public 
sector and none of the four public sector banks had been privatized by 2003 (Roll 
2010). To accelerate the reform of the sector, in July 2003 the government announced 
a new banking law which aimed to consolidate the industry by reducing the number of 
banks, privatizing the remaining public -owned joint venture banks and the public 
sector banks while giving the CBE greater supervisory role in the financial sector. As 
a gesture of his support for promoting private investors, Ebeid facilitated the 
development of the construction and tourism industries in conjunction with Gulf 
capital through privatization of state controlled hotel and tourism sectors (Andersen 
2004). However, despite his policy statements and unwavering support for opening up 
the Egyptian economy, Ebeid's record of policy achievement remained dismal. Ebeid 
came under criticism by various members of the government including some of the 
neoliberal minded members who thought he was promising too much and not showing 
much in return. He was also criticized for failed promises of job creation in the private 
sector (Essam El Din 2003). Deeper financial sector liberalization had to wait until 
after Ebeid's departure in 2004. 
By 2004, under the leadership of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, a united front 
had been formed in directing economic policy. 29 Nazif appointed reformist 
technocrats with business backgrounds and an ideological orientation in favour of a 
free market economy in order to carry out his 'New Economic Initiative' agenda.30 
The renewed commitment to neoliberal reforms was elaborated in a document titled, 
'Egypt ... Crossing Path to Modernization' (2005) (NBE 2005: 81-86). The central 
concern of government policy laid out in this document was to establish public-
29 The 2003/2004 Report of the CBE is testament to the close observance of policy demands of the IMF 
by the government of Egypt. The report documents the further encouragement of the private sector 
through relaxation of bank credit as well as a whole host of reforms that facilitated accumulation 
strategies of the private sector, especially in the tourism and land development sectors (CBE 
2003/2004). 
30 It is important to note that the latter part of2004 also coincided with the publication of the National 
Business Agenda (NBA) 2005-2006 by the Egyptian Junior Business Association. The NBA 
represented a clear formulation of economic policy in the interest of economic actors who had come to 
dominate the state. The main goal of the NBA was to achieve higher business standards and make the 
state more effective in facilitating business interests nationally, regionally and globally. The document 
is also important in that it identifies different economic sectors in terms of theit contribution to 
Egyptian GDP and the construction industry finds itself at the top of the list in terms of its significance 
in the Egyptian economy (EJBA 2005: 30). 
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private joint ventures sectors in order to respond to the increasing demand for jobs, 
and to "restructure the banking sector, amend customs tariffs, reduce taxes and boost 
investments" (NBE 2005: 97). 
Within the reformed ND P, businessmen replaced bureaucrats and engineers 
who had traditionally led the public sector. Businessmen and entrepreneurs doubled 
their seats in the parliament in the 2000 elections. Almost all of the businessmen in 
the legislature were members of the NDP (30 per cent of seats in the parliament). 
This was in line with the state's new development strategy, which relied on the 
private sector. The Policies Committee, a secretive and powerful organ of the ruling 
National Democratic Party was headed by Gamal Mubarak ,who consulted neoliberal 
minded economists and experts such as Rashid Ahmed Rashid, Boutros-Ghali (a long 
time Minister of the Economy and eventually Minister of Finance under Nazif), and 
Mohieldin, the Minister of Investment.31 A reformed ruling party became the channel 
for these neoliberal forces. During the 1990s, business interests had established 
institutional support by joining the ruling NDP, dominating media outlets, and 
influencing intellectual forums. Electoral politics in Egypt was transformed as 
millions were spent on campaigns by various businessmen. Between 1990 and 1995, 
eight businessmen were in the Parliament; in 1995-2000, their number had increased 
to 37; and between 2000 and 2005 their number more than doubled to 84. By 2005 
parliamentary elections, 150 seats were occupied by businessmen, including some of 
the crucial positions such as chairs of the Parliamentary Committees (El-Din 2008b). 
Businessmen were well represented in the Legislative Councils, the People's 
Assembly and the Shura Councils. This marked a radical shift from the time when 
bureaucrats and experts had dominated various state apparatuses from the post-WWII 
period up until the early 1990s. 32 
The ECES became the forum where supporters of neoliberal reforms gathered 
in the post 2004 period. Beside Gamal Mubarak, economists like Mohamed 
31 Menza's piece appeared in the Economic and Business History Research Centre (EBHRC) which 
was created in 2004 in light of the dramatic changes in the state and the economy. Farah (2009: 82) 
notes: · "These ministers were handed portfolios corresponding to their sphere of expertise, so, for 
example, the Minister of Transportation owns a car company in the private sector and the Minister of 
Health comes from one of the most prestigious private hospitals in Egypt." 
32 Businessmen-turned-politicians facilitated the sale of public sector enterprises that fell within their 
portfolio. For instance, Salah Hasaballah, the Minister of Housing and Public Utilities (1994-95), 
played an instrumental role in selling public sector hotels at below market value to the private sector. · 
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Mohieldin who was a senior economist at the ECES became the chairman of the 
NDP's economic committee and later Minister of Investment. Mohieldin became the 
"link between private sector, ruling party and government" (Roll 2010: 365). His 
portfolio included investment policy, management of state-owned assets and financial 
services such as insurance and mortgage finance. He was later appointed as Egypt's 
representative at the World Bank and held top posts at the African Development Bank 
and Islamic Development Bank. Together with Boutros Ghali, the Minister of 
Finance, Moheildin oversaw this next phase of financial reforms. Other important 
adjustments that facilitated the reform process included stacking boardrooms of public 
and private financial institutions with supporters of Gamal Mubarak and his vision of 
reform (Roll 2010). 
Members of the N azif government included one of the two Mansour and 
Maghraby Investment Development (MMID henceforth) owners, Ahmed El-
Maghraby (Minister of Tourism and later Minister of Housing), Rashid Mohammed 
Rashid (Minister of Industry) and the second MMID owner, Mohamed Mansour 
(Minister of Transport). All three ministers played an important role in the reforms 
that boosted the financial profile of EFG-Hermes which "profited to a great extent 
from the revitalization of economic reforms of 2004 ... At the end of 2005, the 
investment bank's share price was nearly 20 times higher than it had been in mid-
2004. Respectively, the value of shares controlled by MMID increased from LE 44 m 
to more than LE 669 m, despite a reduction of MMID shares during this period" (Roll 
2010: 361). These mechanisms of financial sector reform played a crucial role in the 
concentration of capital in the hands of powerful political and economic elite. 
The government that took power in 2004 included an emboldened 'business 
community', wedded to neoliberal orthodoxy, who were frustrated by the slow pace 
of the reform process. To redress their concerns, a second phase of more vigorous 
financial sector reform was launched in 2004. Crucial in this phase of reform was the 
role of Mubarak's son Gamal - a London banker - who personified the convergence 
of interests between the emerging faction of neoliberal minded businessmen and the 
NDP. Gamal was appointed to the NDP's governing body in 2000 and quickly 
moved up the ladder to become influential in reforming the party. He was appointed 
the chair of Policies Secretariat which gave him the power to reform the regime 
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through the ruling party. He was influential in the creation of the ECES, a neoliberal 
think tank whose members later filled the cabinet under N azif. In fact, he facilitated 
collaboration and cooperation among the major business associations such as 
American Chamber of Commerce (AM CHAM), the Egyptian Businessmen's 
Association (EBA), the NDP and the ECES, which proved crucial in pushing through 
serious reforms in the course of the 2000s. 
More importantly, Gamal was instrumental in reforming the NDP through a 
'peaceful coup' in order to make more room for business voices.33 The reform of the 
NDP was launched under the banner of a 'New Thinking' which was articulated by 
neoliberal ideologues from within the ECES during the 1990s. This 'new thinking' 
proposed the application of the free market principles in every aspect of the economy 
and society.34 The reformed NDP became a strong supporter of the privatization of 
public sector firms, and formerly strategic sectors of the economy, such as the 
pharmaceutical sector, utilities, health and education. Other targets included 
rationalizing subsidies and replacing them with job training programs, liberalizing and 
facilitating trade by providing the necessary infrastructure. Most of these proposals 
found their way into the main policy documents produced by the NDP under the Nazif 
government. 
Figure 7 .2 Investment Levels, 2002-08 
33 An example is Dr. Badraway (Hossam), the owner and manager of Nile Badraway, one of Cairo's 
biggest and best equipped private hospitals. Badraway was appointed chairman of the NDP's business 
secretariat. He was also chairman of parliament's Education Committee and a proponent of 
privatization of the health sector. Other business members at the top of the NDP include Ahmed Ezz, 
appointed as the chairman of the NDP's secretariat for membership issues, and chairman of 
parliament's budget and planning committee. Ezz was also a strong supporter of phasing out state 
subsidies and privatizing public services (Essam El Din 2002). Other business actors that were 
involved at the level of decision making in the NDP included Rashid Ahmed Rashid who was Minister 
of Industry and also sat on the board of Unilever. Ahmed El Maghraby, Minister of Tourism, was an 
executive of French tourism giant Accor. 
34 The drive for competitiveness masked corruption by redefming embezzlement under the guise of 
entrepreneurial initiative and the 'free market'. This marked the beginning of a new form of patronage 
that was masked in the language of the market economy. 
204 
250000.0 -.------------------Investment 
1150000.0 -+-------------~--rn!!---41&-
~ 
·e 
: 100000.0 -+------------tk"'t-----
_, 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Source: Ministry of State for Economic Development. 
• Government Sector 
I Economic Authorities 
~ Public Companies 
• Private Sector 
~Total 
Other services offered to capital included a reduction of the costs of 
transactions and a shortening of the time required to issue licenses. Tax reductions -
both corporate and individual - were implemented as further incentives for investors. 
The government further absolved itself of providing services or controlling 
production, leaving both fields to the private sector. To do all this, the Nazif 
government established a new Ministry of Investment with the goal of facilitating 
investment in Egypt. The Ministry played a crucial role in privatizing public sector 
firms and deregulating public services such as transport, health, and education and 
opening these sectors to private interests. A further goal was to turn Egypt into an 
exporter of services rather than goods, thus serving as a contracting agency for global 
firms and corporations. 35 With this goal in mind, the government aimed to enhance 
the competitiveness of the workforce through skills training and education. 36 
35 Despite a long series of legislatfon to promote an export-oriented economy and increase employment, 
by 2002, Egyptian exports remained at 16.2 per cent of GDP, down from 27 per cent of GDP in 1982 
(NBE 2003). The agricultural sector is said to have succeeded in increasing its exports in the period 
between 2001-03, targeting markets in the EU and Asia. In terms of manufactured goods, this is 
clearly a failure of the government's policy to promote exports through the establishment of free trade 
zones and incentives offered to the private sector. This shift to an emphasis on services may signify 
recognition of this failure, and represents a change in the nature of the interests of the dominant fraction 
of the capitalist class in Egypt. 
36 According to the NBE, the Egyptian labour force's low productivity levels relative to other states in 
the region (although unit labour costs remain very low) reduces the competiveness of Egyptian 
business (NBE 2005: 15). · 
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With an economic policy aimed at attracting foreign investment, the 
government adopted the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law 13/2004, which 
treated foreign and Egyptian investors as equal. Other reforms included cuts in 
customs tariffs, the removal of imposed restrictions on imports and the opening up of 
new areas for investment such as infrastructure projects (railroads and 
telecommunications), real estate and utilities. The General Authority for Investment 
and Free Zones (GAFI) shortened the time required to start up a new company 'to 
seven days. Other institutional reforms in the interest of encouraging private sector 
activity in the economy included: establishing a commercial court to resolve business 
disputes more quickly; promulgating an anti-trust law; and adopting a competition 
law aimed at preventing monopolies and unfair takeovers as public sector firms were 
being privatized. Thus, Law 3/2005 on the Protection of Competition and Prevention 
of Monopolistic Practices was adopted. The government also simplified registration 
of property to make the real estate market appealing to investors. Finally, the reform 
of the bureaucracy extended benefits to the private sector either through the creation 
of parallel institutions that sped up business procedures or by cutting the 'red tape' of 
existing institutions. Other reforms included legislative reforms and administrative 
reforms with the goal of cutting costs and speeding up business transactions. 
Financial sector reforms picked up pace in 2004. The Ministry of Investment 
was assigned the task of accelerating the privatization process which had stalled in the 
latter part of the 1990s. Within an initial ten year period lasting between 1993 and 
2003, 197 state owned enterprises had been privatized. By the time Naziftook power, 
there still remained 172 state owned enterprises. Privatization of the latter became the 
central plank ofNazifs economic development policy. Thus, under Nazifs 
government enterprises that had previously remained outside the purview of 
privatization, such as Telecom Egypt and the Bank of Alexandria, were put on the 
block to be privatized. 37 During the first two years of his term in office (July 2004 
and March 2006), 80 companies were sold off (Farah 2009: 45-50).38 As Rutherford 
(2008: 223-24) indicated: 
37 At least five public sector tourism companies and seven housing companies were privatized (USAID 
2003). 
38 The four state owned insurance companies were next on the block slated for privatization. Three out 
of four of these companies controlled 75 per cent of all investment in the insmance sector, most of 
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In the year prior to N azif assuming power [2003], Egypt 
privatized nine firms with a total value of $17 .5 million. 
In 2005-2006, the state sold fifty-nine firms worth $2.6 
billion. It also announced plans to sell another forty-
five firms, as well as its share of an additional fifty-
eight joint ventures. The list of firms on the block 
included some of the state's most prosperous 
enterprises. 
This wave of privatization was intended to raise revenues needed to pay off part of the 
domestic debt accumulated in the speculative building frenzy of the latter half of the 
1990s. Farah (2009: 50) bluntly stated that: "The program under the Nazif 
government, while accelerating the process of privatization, [was] in essence 
subsidizing the private sector at the expense of the nation as a whole." 
The construction, real estate and tourism industries all had strong ties to the 
emerging neoliberal faction within the NDP. A primary example was Tarek Talat 
Mustafa, of the Talat Mustafa Group (TMG henceforth), who played an important 
role in the NDP's Policies Committee. Over the course of the 1990s, TMG 
landholdings had expanded to 50 million square metres, and by 2008, its profits had 
reached LE875 million. TMG was responsible for the development of resorts and 
hotels under the Four Seasons management group. The company's board of directors 
included former CBE experts as well as members of the Bin Laden family of Saudi 
Arabia. 
Not surprisingly, one of the main beneficiaries of privatization was the 
construction industry. In 1999, the Beni Suef Cement Company was privatized. By 
2003, 68 per cent of local cement production was dominated by the private sector and 
private sector control of the construction industry in general increased by 30 per cent 
(AMCHAM 2003). During the same period, an additional 198 construction 
companies were established with a total investment of LE 659.5 million (Cairo 
Investment Forum 2007).39 According to the Oxford Business Group (OBG) 2010 
which included real estate assets in areas where the value of land had soared. The government hoped 
that by privatizing these companies they would attract investors to the market. See: Abdel Razek (2005: 
25-31). 
39 In 2000-2001, the construction sector employed 1.5 million workers and contributed 4.7 per cent 
(LE16.56 bn) to the GDP (AMCHAM 2003). In 2000, the sector ranked 36th in the global construction 
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report, the construction industry grew while economic growth declined. On the Cairo 
Stock Exchange, the top three sectors of the economy included financial services (137 
companies), construction and public works (123 companies), and construction 
materials (52), cement (12); housing (98) companies, followed by commerce (90) 
(Vignal and Denis 2006: 108). 
Other primary beneficiaries included the real estate and tourism sectors. After 
2000, a number of major luxury property developers from the Gulf entered the 
Egyptian real estate market. The prospects of cheap land and flexible labour laws 
with an unrestricted international market for potential luxury home buyers, a number 
of major projects were launched. For instance, an important Dubai company, 
DAMAC Properties, one of Middle East's largest luxury property developers, made 
its debut in the Egyptian market in 2006, with a deal to develop a 320 million square 
metre tourism project in Gamsha Bay, 60 kilometres north ofHurghada. As the 
Damac' s website stated, the residences built in Gamsha Bay represented: 'luxury that 
is out of this world'. 40 The company also developed Park A venue in 6th of October . 
City in order to cater to upper class tourists. Another Gulf luxury real estate 
developer, Emmar Properties entered the Egyptian market through its subsidiary 
Emmar Misr, and launched six projects.41 The company's investment in Egypt was 
estimated at LE 43.3 billion (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005). In Cairo, it was 
engaged in building a residential area on Moqattam Hills, where apartments sold at 
LE 4,500 per square metre. 42 The eight villages planned to be built were not open to 
the public and are sold by invitation to a select citizenry. In the southwest of Cairo, 
Emmar Misr planned to build Cairo Gate, Egypt's largest mall, across from Smart 
Village where the company planned to develop 300,000 square metres into office park 
space for the workers and commuters of Smart Village. The company has 3. 78 
million square metre plot of land in the suburbs ofNew Cairo near the American 
market, with a value of$12.71 l billion. In 2001-02, the sector's investment levels reached LE 41.2 
billion, representing 48.2 per cent of the country's total investment. The sector's growth levels of 8.3 
per cent were higher than the general economic growth of 7.4 per cent in this period. The forecasted 
investment levels during 2002-07 amounted to LE 257 billion (AMCHAM 2003). 
4
° For DAMAC homepage, see: www.damacproperties.com 
41 Emmar Misr was established as a joint venture with the state Al Nasr Housing and Development 
Company (EIU 2005: 32-33). 
42 The project on Moqattam Hill has been at the centre of controversy due to landslides caused by the 
construction of villas that resulted in death of slum dwellers at the foot of the Hill. See chapter on 
urban housing for more on this controversy. 
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University's new campus. On the Mediterranean coast, Emmar Misr has plans for 
hotels, office parks and malls close to Bibliotheca Alexandria. In the North Coast, in 
Sidi Abdel Rahman, the company has 6.2 million square metres of land intended to 
build luxury residences, hotels and shopping malls (Neumann 2009). 
According to GAFI, investment in tourism projects increased by 90 per cent 
between 2004-06 reaching LE 8.4 billion of which 40 per cent was foreign (GAFI 
2007). 
Figure 7.3 Foreign Direct Investment, 1991-2008 
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Source: International Monetary Fund. 
Between 2005 and 2007, the number of newly established companies in 
tourism reached 142 and tourism revenues reached LE 7.6 billion in 2006 (Cairo 
Investment Forum 2007). New tourism projects along the Mediterranean and the Red 
Sea were launched by various private sector developers with the goal of increasing 
visitors to 20 million by 2015, from 8 million in 2006, which would double tourism 
revenues to US$12 billion. 
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Banking sector reform was launched after the adoption of Law 88/2003. 43 
While attempts were made to reform the banking sector in the late 1980s, its 
privatization was not on the table. After ERSAP, a number of significant mergers and 
acquisitions took place and by 2004 the banking system comprised 63 banks, with a 
total asset value of LE 63 3 .4 billion almost half of which belonged to the four public 
sector banks, total deposits of LE 461. 7 billion of which over half were in the public 
commercial banks and total loans accounting for LE 296.2 billion, half of which was 
extended by the public commercial banks (NBE 2005: 28-30; EIU 2002: 46).44 The 
main clause of Law 88/2003 stipulated that "the issued and fully paid capital of a bank 
shall not fall below LE 500 [millions]" (NBE 2005: 31), preparing the grounds for 
mergers and acquisitions, although the main goal was to transfer the assets, deposits 
and loans of public banks to private or joint sector banks. Thus, during 2004, the sale 
or privatization of public sector banks or their equity shares took place, reducing the 
number of public commercial banks to two. The struggle for acquisitions by the 
private and joint banks continued relentlessly during 2005 in an attempt to expand 
their share of the Egyptian market (NBE 2005: 42). 
Financial sector reforms resulted in the entry of foreign financial institutions 
into the Egyptian economy and a growth in capital market. Thus, by 2008, the number 
of banks had been reduced from 62 in 2003 to 39, and foreign ownership in the sector 
increased with private sector controlling around 15 of the Egyptian banks (See Table 
7.2). However, soon it was realized that foreign financial institutions only extended 
loans to large scale enterprises leaving out smaller enterprises. This realization forced 
the government to backtrack from their plans to privatize the public sector banks in 
43 In 1961 Nasser nationalized the banks, and the financial sector remained partly regulated until the 
late 1980s (EIU 1989/90: 12). Agricultural banks provided subsidized credit to agricultural producers 
and interest rates remained fixed. Under Sadat, liberalization of the banking system led to the 
emergence of private banks, numbering 97 by 1984 with a total deposit of$20 billion. Despite the 
emergence of private banks, the four largest banks - NBE, Banque du Caire, Bank of Alexandria and 
Bank Misr - remained state owned and together they controlled the bulk of bank assets in 1985. While 
the large public banks benefited from having the state as their main customer, the smaller private banks 
specialized in short-term loans, which did not have a cap on interest rates. 
44 The 63 banks included 28 commercial banks ( 4 public banks and 24 private and joint stock banks), 
11 investment and merchant banks, 19 branches of foreign banks, 3 specialized banks, and 2 banks not 
registered with the CBE (NBE 2005: 29-30). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country 
Profile (2002: 46-7), Egypt continued to remain a predominantly cash economy, although credit usage 
had begun to grow. The banking sector suffered due to a high percentage of"poorly-performing" loans 
not just extended to the public sector, but also to powerful individuals. Non-performing loans stood at 
around LE 50 billion in 2002. 
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order to meet the needs of smaller businesses. What was significant about the growth 
of capital market and entry of foreign financial institutions was the transfer of 
ownership rights to outside of Egypt and thus protection for investors against 
expropriation (Roll 2010: 366). The expansion of capital market had also directly 
reduced the power of the state over the financial sector implying that capital flight 
could occur at the whims of investors. This further created pressures on the 
government to accommodate the needs of investors within government policies in 
order to avoid potential future capital flight. 
Table 7.2 The Banking Sector in Egypt, 1980-2010 
Types of Banks 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Public Commercial Banks 4 4 4 5 
Private Commercial Banks 15 40 24 27 
Private Business and Investment 7 11 11 0 
Banks 
Off-shore Business & Investment 22 22 20 7 
Banks 
Specialized Banks 4 4 3 0 
Total 52 81 62 39 
Source: Kapadia (2011: 32). 
Beside the dominance of large scale private sector banks, the Egyptian market 
also witnessed the rise of large scale private companies in sectors such as construction 
and real estate. Although in 2008, market capitalization in relation to GDP was 60 per 
cent higher than it had been five years previous, this rise was associated with a 
smalfor number of private sector companies which stood at 3 80 in contrast to 978 five 
years ago (Roll 2010: 355). Among some of the main beneficiaries of credit from the 
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banking sector were large scale capitalists in real estate and construction. According 
to an Egyptian banking sector analyst, Salwa El-Antari, 343 clients received 42 per 
cent of the overall credit facilities allocated to the private sector, while 28 clients 
among these secured 13 per cent of the overall credit (cited in Roll 2010: 356). 
Similarly, records of the Banque du Caire indicate that in the first half of the 2000s, 
"46 businessmen held nearly 74 per cent of the bank's loan portfolio" (Roll 2010: 
356). The steel magnate, Ahmed Ezz was a major beneficiary of bank credit in the 
1990s and after. In the 1990s, Ezz was heavily indebted to the public sector banks. 
After the reform of the banking sector in the post 2000 period, Ezz continued to enjoy 
easy access to large scale credit facilities. It is ironic that the banking reform of the 
2000 was initiated to deal with the non-performing loans of the public sector banks. 45 
Yet, the reforms further facilitated large scale private sector's access to credit in the 
2000s. According to Roll (2010: 358): "Between 2004 and 2008, companies 
controlled by Ahmed Ezz (Al-Ezz Steel Rebars), the Kham.is-family (Oriental 
Weavers), Naguib Sawiris (Orascom Telecom) and the El-Sewedy family (El Sewedy 
Cables) increased their long-term debt remarkably." 
Table 7.3 Top Beneficiaries of Credit Facilities, 2004-09, LEm 
Company 2004 2008 Per cent 
change 
Al-Ezz Steel Rebars 969 2,636 172 
Oriental Weavers 229 625 173 
Orascom Telecom 5, 174 28,794 457 
El-Sewedy Cables 17 755 4,435 
Source: Roll (2010: 359). 
In the post banking reform period, closer ties between the Egyptian real estate 
sector and the private banking sector was exemplified in the merger of the French 
45 In 2004, the Central Bank established a non-performing loan unit. An examination of more than 5000 
loan default cases indicated that 250 of the default cases exceeded LE 50 million (Roll 2010: 357). 
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bank, Credit Agricole and the MMID in 2006 (Roll 2010: 359). With the 
establishment of Credit Agricole Egypt, the Bank expanded its activities in the field of 
mortgage financing to support the business interests of El Mansour and El Maghraby 
families in the real estate and construction sectors. The relationship between the 
private sector and government officials demonstrated a new era in the formation of 
'networks of privilege' (Heydemann 2004) between the private sector, government 
officials, bureaucrats and capitalists. Another example will demonstrate this 
relationship further. In 2001, MMID had become an important shareholder in EFG-
Hermes, the Egyptian investment bank. In 2004, Rashid Mohammed Rashid joined 
the two families becoming a major shareholder in EFG-Hermes. 
The outcome of economic reform in Egypt was measured by the yard stick of 
growth rate, which had remained positive during most of the 1990s, plunging in 2000 
and picking up again in 2002. As one observant scholar noted: "Both the Egyptian 
government and the international financial institutions had a vested interest in 
painting the Egyptian economy as a success story rather than the 'basket case' for 
which evidence has accumulated." What the growth rates meant to hide, showed "its 
ugly face through the twin afflictions of unemployment and poverty" (Fergany 2002: 
212). Beside the rising levels of poverty, as the following graphs indicate, Egyptian 
society experienced a consistent rise in debt and rents in the face of positive growth 
rates. 
Figure 7.4 Economic Growth Levels, 1991-2010 
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Figure 7.5 Net Domestic Public Debt, 1991-2009 
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Figure 7.6 Rents, 1991-2008 
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These stark realities could not have been overlooked by the Egyptian workers 
and the poor. Thus, beginning in the mid-l 990s, policies of privatization and labour 
market reforms faced serious resistance from workers who feared the loss of work 
benefits, resulting in strike action and protests. The basic minimum wage remained at 
LE 35 a month since 1984 while the cost of living reached LE 108.50 a month by 
2008 (Beinin 2010: 14). The minimum wage was subsidized with numerous 
allowances, bonuses, incentives and profit shares. However, these wage subsidies 
came under attack as the process of reform picked up pace. The official rate of 
unemployment climbed from 8 per cent in the 1990s to 12 per cent in 2002-03, 
declined to 9 per cent in 2008 but increased again at the outbreak of global financial 
crisis. Most Egyptian analysts believe that the actual unemployment rate was much 
higher, possibly double the rate reported here (Beinin 2010). Workers' reactions to the 
policies of the Nazif government expediting the process of privatization of public 
sector enterprises were fierce. 47 From 2004 to 2006, there were well over 700 labour 
actions, and in 2007 alone 550 were reported (Rutherford 2008: 227). As Farah 
(2009: 46) records: "During 2006 and 2007, a continuous series of demonstrations 
46 No data for 2007. 
47 More than a quarter of the public and private sector strikes that broke out between 1998 and 2004 
occurred in 2004, the year when Nazif government accelerated the pace of privatization of public sector 
enterprises (Beinin, 2009: 77). 
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and sit-ins forced the government to bargain with industrial workers and state 
employees about wages, which had not increased since the mid-1990s." Estimates 
indicate that "over 1. 7 million workers engaged in more than 1,900 strikes and other 
forms of protests from 2004 to 2008" (Beinin 2010: 14). Beginning in the textile and 
clothing sector, the strikes spread to include building materials, transport, food 
processing, oil workers and workers from other sectors of the economy. During the 
first half of 2009 alone, there were estimates of close to 500 workers' actions (Beinin 
2010: 18). 
The increased frequency of strikes was not the only significant development in 
this period. The organizational form taken by workers' protests was increasingly 
taking new and diverse forms. As privatization picked up pace after 2004, workers 
began organizing themselves outside of the official trade union movement. The 
Egyptian Federation of the Trade Unions (EFTU) began to lose its legitimacy as 
workers increasingly viewed it as an arm of the state (Hussein 2005: 19-21). The 
EFTU had been integrated with the state through a corporatist arrangement since the 
1960s. The Federation continued to negotiate between government and workers 
without facing much scrutiny from workers until the late 1980s, at which point it 
increasingly faced opposition from its own members. In the late 1980s, the official 
trade unions agreed to sign the Joint Manifesto of Labourers and Businessmen, 
thereby consenting to a program of privatization without the knowledge and consent 
of workers. In the context of accelerating privatization, the main demands of workers 
included the preservation of public sector jobs, largely due to their secure nature. 
Without an official channel to negotiate their demands, workers had nowhere to go 
but to take to the streets. For the first time since the 1950s, workers began to protest 
against the EFTU. In the meantime, collusion between the managers of public sector 
firms and the EFTU led Egyptian industrial workers to seek autonomy from the union. 
Thus, in 1990 labour lawyer and political activist, Youssef Darwish established the 
Centre for Trade Union and Workers' Services (CTUWS). The CTUWS was indeed 
the first step towards establishing an independent trade union that could genuinely 
represent the interests of the workers and defend their rights. 
The labour protests of 2006 onward marked a crucial departure as these were 
in response to the privatization of public sector firms which had kept wages low and 
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dismantled workers' benefits. In 2008, the security forces targeted the CTUWS and its 
members leading to mass arrests. Three years later, in 2011, workers succeeded in 
establishing an independent umbrella trade union, the Egyptian Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), with a membership of 1.4 million belonging to 
72 individual unions (Alexander 2012). 
Figure 7.7 Unemployment Levels, 1991-2008 
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As a result of privatization in the agriculture sector discussed in Chapter Nine, 
the rural population deeply resented the government and its local representatives in 
various govemorates. The Bedouin of the Sinai region experienced a rapid decline in 
their living standards and high rates of unemployment as their land was taken by the 
government for tourist development projects. In the absence of an adequate policy to 
deal with the dislocation experienced by the Bedouin and the failure of the tourist 
industry to provide jobs for them, the locals have had to resort to violence to express 
their anger. Between 2004 and 2006, three bombings in the Sinai Peninsula targeted 
48 No data available for 1996. 
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tourists, killing 181 people (EIU 2006: 15).49 With the loss of livelihoods, rural 
populations have been fighting back against the government and the landlords. 
Despite sporadic protests, the peasantry have been faced with severe challenges to 
self-organization, because under Mubarak the formation of independent unions in 
rural areas was banned (King 2010: 100). Under such circumstances, rural Egyptians 
have expressed their anger in ways that were possible in order to convey their 
frustration and anger against the government. Thus, they targeted tourists on 
numerous occasions during the 1990s, the early phase of accumulation by 
dispossession in the countryside. Since its implementation in 11991, ERSAP has gone 
hand in hand with repression in rural areas and urban Egypt. 
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the shift to a neoliberal model of development since 1991. 
This shift allowed for the consolidation of power of a new rulit\g class that adopted 
capitalist strategy of accumulation. Taking advantage of the ide,ological global 
· environment in favour of 'free market' policies, the emerging mling class transformed 
the Egyptian state in order to secure their interests. In a sense, this period also marks 
an important phase of state formation whereby intra-elite struggles were resolved 
through legal, constitutional and economic changes that recreated the Egyptian state. 
The chapter demonstrated that various economic crises under Mubarak paved 
the way for deeper reforms along the 'free market' path. These reforms constituted a 
political project and a new model of development - the neoliberal model pushed by 
the international financial institutions and the capitalist groups who had become 
integrated into the NPD apparatus, particularly in the policy planning branch. As a 
result, the public sector's role in the economy was radically undermined while the 
private sector assumed a bigger role in the economy. However, the rise of the private 
sector, through privatization, did not offer a solution to the social and economic 
49 The government easily dismissed the economic roots of these violent actions of the Bedouin, linking 
the bombings to Al-Qaeda (Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). Since the fall 0fMubarak in 2011, 
Sinai Bedouin have been demanding their rights to their land and resources in ,the Sinai. Over the 
course of2011-12, there have been serious clashes between the government and Bedouins without any 
solution in sight. 
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problems that millions of Egyptians faced. Rather, the shift to neoliberalism 
intensified the arbitrary and unchecked power of the state and capitalist groups while 
reducing the space for democratic politics. A stark aspect of the neoliberal phase was 
the increase in the powers of the state reorganized and deployed to facilitate surplus 
extraction and capital accumulation in the interest of landlords, developers and 
capitalists. In turn, this meant squeezing peasants, small producers and workers by 
reducing state supports and regulation and increasing market-dependence for 
livelihoods. These radical socio-economic changes were challenged by workers 
through strikes, protests and struggles to form independent unions. The unfolding of 
the strategies of accumulation by dispossession is discussed in more detail in the next 
two chapters which examine the transformation of social relations in urban and rural 
Egypt through a case study of housing changes. 
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Chapter 8. Workers, Property Rights and Housing 
With the emergence of a new ruling class coalition under Mubarak's rule, workers 
experienced a radical transformation in their social and economic power. The gains 
secured under the Nasserist rule were dismantled in the course of the last two decades 
of rule of Mubarak regime. This represented a new set of class relations whereby 
workers' interests were subordinated to interests of capitalist entrepreneurs. To 
demonstrate this changing class relation and the unfolding of a new set of social 
property relations, this chapter examines the changes in property rights that affected 
workers' access to means of social reproduction, i.e. right to housing. The 
liberalization of the housing market through the introduction of Law 4/1996 
constituted part of a larger project to reshape social property relations by transferring 
wealth and resources into the hands of a few powerful elite while dispossessing a 
large number of workers and unemployed. In effect, the strategy of accumulation by 
dispossession generalized market dependence among workers by subjecting them to 
market imperatives in order to acquire the basic necessities of their lives. 
Prior to a discussion of Mubarak's housing policy, I discuss Mubarak's land 
policy in order to contextualize the emergence of housing policy since the 1990s. 
Following this, I lay out a chronology of housing policy under Mubarak. In part two, 
I discuss Law 4/1996 and the ways in which the Law facilitated an expansion of a 
liberalized housing market while creating opportunities for private investors. In part 
three, I discuss the persistence of informal housing as the only avenue for a majority 
of workers in the context of a liberalized economy. The final section discusses how 
the changes in housing policy mirror a related set of changes in social property 
relations and the consolidation of power by a ruling class who pursued strategies of 
accumulation by dispossession. Here, I discuss the contestation over property rights as 
holders of customary tenure were threatened by the imposition of private property 
rights as the only recognized form of property rights by the state. 
Mubarak's Land Policy 
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Real estate has been considered one of the main channels for private investment in 
Egyptian cities and new urban communities, both for the purpose of job creation and 
for housing. Under Sadat, the New Urban Communities Program launched in 1974 
aimed to create independent communities in order to reduce the congestion of major 
urban centres as well as protect agricultural land along the city limits. To facilitate this 
plan, Sadat created NUCA in 1979 to which the government allocated free public land 
including a 5 kilometer protection barrier between cities and agricultural land. Land 
allocation was subject to Law 59/1979, which mandated NUCA to plan, establish and 
manage" new urban communities in coordination with GOPP and other government 
agencies. NUCA could enter into direct contracts with persons, firms, banks, 
international and national organizations and could give concessions for infrastructure 
and real-estate development projects in the New Urban Communities (World Bank 
2006b: 54). To encourage industrial investments in the New Urban Communities, 
Law 59/1979 offered the following incentives for investors: exemptions from 
customs' fee and other related duties, tax-free, interest free loans and credit, tax free 
profits for ten years starting from the date of production (World Bank 2006b: 54).1 
Since Sadat, attempts to redistribute population and encourage economic 
development across the country guided the state's land policy. Sadat's government 
had launched the New Urban Communities (or New Cities) in the desert in an attempt 
to direct economic development and housing production with the help of the private 
sector. For a decade, his policies continued under Mubarak. However, in the 1990s 
with the free market economic development model, the Egyptian state revisited its 
land and housing policies as land increasingly took centre stage in the new economic 
model. Public lands began to play an important role in Egypt's economic 
development as they were targeted for various economic sectors: industrial 
development, tourism, real estate and agribusiness (See Table 7.1). Here I examine 
the allocation of public lands for tourism and real estate development. 
Prior to 1991, the only organized tourism sector that relied on receiving 
public/state lands was managed by NUCA, through allocation of land to professional 
1 By 2006, there were 20 new cities and urban communities, but Mubarak had planned an additional 44 
new urban communities in the coming year (World Bank 2006b: 55). 
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cooperatives who built holiday villas along the coast for their members. 2 In the 1990s, 
the tourism sector gained greater access to public/state lands through administrative 
reforms that cut complex bureaucratic procedures and eased land transfer to the 
private sector. A crucial step in this direction was the Presidential Decree No. 
374/1991 which established the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) as an 
economic authority with juridical personality, affiliated to the Ministry of Tourism. 
TDA' s mandate included developing tourism areas within the framework of the new 
national policy. Among its other powers, TDA was authorized ;to manage and dispose 
public (desert) land for tourism development (World Bank 2006b: 36). In 1992, 
Presidential Decree No. 445 transferred most undeveloped public desert land along 
the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea and Aqaba Gulf, lands which were formerly 
controlled by the govemorates and by NUCA. The Decree effectively extended 
TDA' s control over 578 million square meter (from here on sqm) of land, over which 
other ministries have no jurisdiction (World Bank 2006b: 37-38).3 To carry out its 
mission, TDA set up 13 branches across the couney to facilitate land allocation to the 
private sector. 4 TDA's intent was to dispose of all land under its jurisdiction, 
irrespective of the location at the fixed price of US $1 per sqm, signalling a frenzy in 
land development (World Bank 2006b: 43). 
Land development strategies by the state up until 2004 were designed to de-
centre economic activity across the country especially in areas that were in need of 
jobs. This was also a way of distributing the population away from the major urban 
centres. Thus, the state promoted New Cities and encouraged investments in Upper 
Egypt such as the Toshka Project. The private sector was not attracted by the rigidities 
of pre-determined land use policy by the state and wanted to have freedom to choose 
the location of their economic activities. The issue of concern for proponents of the 
free market model was the role of the state and its regulations on public lands. As the 
state's role in guiding economic development was curtailed, the state's role in making 
public lands available to the private sector came under increased scrutiny by 
2 A Prime Minister Decree 540/1980 had transferred control over the entire coastal areas along 
Mediterranean to NUCA, amounting to millions offeddans of public/state lands (World Bank 2006b: 
35) 
3 Any future lands that TDA would acquire would have to be cleared by the MOMDP. 
4 TDA was authorized to issue construction permits (World Bank 2006b). 
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international financial institutions. A number of studies carried out by the World Bank 
and USAID recommended that the state should no longer designate geographic 
locations for private investors (USAID 2007; World Bank 2006b; 2008). Investors 
were keen to access serviced land in existing cities, but faced bureaucratic and legal 
challenges by the state. Under the Nazif government, steps were taken to ease 
allocation of Public/State lands, initially by reducing prices and second by cutting 
down bureaucratic procedures. Serviced land prices in New Cities, which ranged 
between LE 140-600 per sqm ( 1999-2004) depending on the location, were thus 
reduced to LE95 by September 2004(World Bank 2006b: 7). The second step was to 
reduce institutional obstacles that guided the allocation of Public/State lands, which 
had been controlled by various ministries and authorities making it difficult for 
investors to easily access such lands. The World Bank recommended that land 
allocation should be guided by a demand-driven policy as opposed to a supply driven 
policy (World Bank 2006b; 2008). 
To operationalize these changes and reduce the role of the state, a new entity-
the General Authority for Industrial Development (GAID henceforth)-was created 
by Presidential Decree (No. 350/2005). Acting as an economic authority withjudicial 
personality, GAID was "to consolidate control over all existing industrial estates in 
Egypt, in both new communities and Govemorates, and oversee the development, 
management and operation of these zones and any new planned zone" (World Bank 
2006b: 2). Having established an industrial land bank, GAID aimed to reduce red tape 
and long bureaucratic procedures that investors were subjected to before they could 
access public/state land. 
These administrative reforms, however, did not reduce various forms of 
conflict over public lands. Conflicts involved various ministries, for example the 
Ministry of Defence and Military Production (MOMDP henceforth), as well as 
various govemorates who felt they no longer had power over govemorate lands for 
the purpose of economic development. A case in point was the govemorate of the Red 
Sea where desert land was cleared by the MOMDP for tourism development, but the 
govemorate resisted allowing access to land developers (World Bank 2006b: 38). 
Furthermore, the creation of entities such as TDA did not bring transparency to land 
allocation procedures. Instead, public/state lands were given out to members of the 
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political and economic elite either at no charge or at below the market prices (World 
Bank 2006b: 35). 
Beyond resulting in conflict, TDA's decision to hand out land to investors to 
the latter's choice of location resulted in a sprawl in tourism developments whereby 
unplanned developments came to define places such as Hurghada where the coastal 
spots are overcrowded while the rest of the city was ignored by developers (World 
Bank 2006b ). Equally important, TDA' s plans to generate revenues from land sales 
were shattered as a wave of investors defaulted on their payments and left a landscape 
of half developed monstrosities in prime coastal areas. The acquisition of cheap or 
free land often also led to speculation whereby developers waited for a chance to 
make a quick profit without undertaking any serious development projects (World 
Bank 2006b: 44). The failure of private developers to hold their end of the bargain 
and thus fulfill the terms of their contract led to the cancellation of 71 projects and 
repossession of a total land area of22.5 million sqm (World Bank 2006b: 45). 
Table 8.1 Public/State Land Use and Allocation for Private Investment Projects5 
Categories of Land Use Legal and Administrative Regulations 
Public Free Zones (FZs) Since the 1970s, around ten Public Free Zones have been 
established across the country, on public lands transferred by 
Presidential Decree to GAFI. 6 GAFI has been empowered by 
Law to plan, service, promote and manag~ the FZ in question and 
to be the only interfacing entity with the investor seeking to 
locate there. By 2006, 865 hectares (ha) had been allocated to 
these Zones. Investors were expected to make a 25% down-
payment and pay the rest in annual instalments over a 3 year 
period (without interest), at the end of which they would have 
5 Public/State lands were designated for projects linked to real estate development, towism and agri-
business, which are discussed in more detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
6 Ameriya, Alexandria (1353 feddans, unoccupied area 18 per cent); Nasr City, Cairo (170 feddans, 
unoccupied area 0 per cent ); Port Said (172 feddans, unoccupied area 0 per cent ); Ismailia (first phase 
of 100 feddans, out ofa total of 800 feddans, unoccupied area 38 per cent); Suez (two areas totalling 77 
feddans, unoccupied area 53 per cent); Damietta (190 feddans); Media Production City, 6TH of 
October City (714 feddans); Shebin El-Korn, Menofiya (first phase 20 feddans located within Misr 
Shebin El-Korn Spinning and Weaving Co Property), under establishment; Qeft, Qena (216 feddans), 
under establishment; East Port Said Port (8,429 feddans) under establishment (World Bank 2006b). 
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freehold ownership. To lease land in FZs, investors only have to 
deal with GAFI. 
Industrial Zones Located in New Cities/Urban Communities, operated by NUCA. 
The total planned land area in existing Urban Communities was 
16,648 ha, of which 11,806 ha were distributed by 2006. A total 
of 6,840 industrial projects were licensed and obtained land, but 
only 1,848 (27%) projects were operating. Land prices in several 
New Cities were reduced in 2004 to attract more investment. 
Planned Industrial Zones Also called Inland Industrial Zones, these are located in existing 
cities. In the 1990s and 2000s, the state through Presidential 
Decree No. 158/2001 offered free land to investors in Upper 
Egyptian cities. By 2006, 22,84 7 ha were assigned for inland 
industrial zones. A total of 2, 304 industrial projects received 
licenses and obtained lands. The total reported number of jobs 
was 60,161. 
Special Economic Zones SEZs were regulated through Law 83/2002 and managed by 
(SEZs) independent SEZ authority. Law 83 offered investors tariff 
exemption on imports, 10% tax on profits, 5% tax on salaries and 
wages, exemption from sales tax, stamp duties and State 
development duties. Land was allocated through long term leases 
(50 years renewable). SEZs are considered bureaucracy free 
zones as investors only deal with the SEZ Authority, which is in 
charge of land allocation, issuing of building permits and other 
approvals and permissions that may be needed. 
Investment Law No. 8/1997 offered unlimited land on freehold 
basis to foreign investors mainly along the coast ltine (Suez, 
Alexandria and the Red Sea). 
Source: World Bank (2006b ). 
Housing Policy Under Mubarak, 1981-2010 
Housing prob~ems under Mubarak's rule ranged from a lack of adequate housing and 
the growth of dilapidated public housing, an increasing reliance on informal housing 
by the migrants and the poor, and the loss of agricultural land due to increasing 
urbanization on agricultural lands. These problems were left unresolved in the 1980s 
as the state continued to construct new cities as a policy of distributing the population 
across the country. Significant changes in urban housing policy occurred after 1991 
as the land and housing markets were liberalized. 
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At the outset of his rule, Mubarak carried on the National Housing Policy 
(NHP) established under Sadat in 1979.7 According to the NHP, 3.6 million units 
were to be built between 1979 and 2000, both to fill the shortage of housing and to 
replace old and dilapidated buildings. Many who could not afford land or materials 
formed the numerous slums in and around Cairo and Alexandria. In Cairo alone, 
there was an estimated need for the construction of an additional 56,000 units 
annually to keep pace with the rising population in order to provide home for the 
homeless and to replace the dilapidated public housing (Feiler 1992: 297-98). 
According to the 1986 census, there were 1.8 million vacant houses across 
Egypt (NBE 1995) while at the same time 1.3 million people were deemed without 
adequate housing. Lack of housing had forced many to resort to informal housing but 
the government feared that expansion of informal housing in the unplanned manner 
that was taking place would endanger agricultural land at the outskirts of govemorates 
and urban centres. To deal with the problem of housing, Mubarak's government did 
not propose any new ideas in the 1980s but expanded upon Sadat's policy ofNew 
Urban Communities or the New Towns/Cities. 8 
The New Cities (New Towns) 
The New Cities/Towns/Communities project - carried out by NUCA - played a 
central role in Mubarak's housing policy. The idea of developing new towns and 
cities which started in the 1970s with Sadat's 'New Communities' project, remained 
at the core of Mubarak's policies for economic development and population 
relocation. Between 1977 and 1999, a series of laws established 17 new cities. 9 The 
1983 Master Plan for Greater Cairo Region aimed to add 10 industrial cities, each 
with a population capacity of250,000 inhabitants (Sutton and Fahmy 2001: 137-38). 
7 Sadat's rent control Law 49of1977 remained in force throughout the 1980s with a few minor 
amendments through Law 36/1981 (Global Property Guide 2006). 
8 I use New Towns and New Cities to refer to the same phenomenon. 
9 First Generation Cities include: 10th of Ramadan; 15th of May; 6th of October; Sadat; New Borg El 
Arab; New Salhiya; and New Damietta. Second Generation Cities include: Bader; Obour; New Ban 
Sweif; New Minya-New Nubaryia; and Sheikh Zaied. Third Generation Cities include: Shrouk; New 
Cairo; New Assuit; New Tiba; New Sohag; New Aswan; New Kena; New Fayoum; New Akhmeim. 
Law 4/1996 also affected rents in new towns and given that they were mostly built in the 1990s and 
after, almost all rentals were subjected to the new rent control law. 
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The New Cities were to serve three main goals: absorb excess population from 
crowded cities by offering affordable housing while protecting agricultural land from 
the effects of urbanization; launch industrial projects; and create jobs. 
As centres for industrial activity, new cities became a favourite destination for 
Gulf capital, which benefited from state subsidies for energy and infrastructure, cheap 
- and sometimes free - land, cheap labour, and various other incentives that came 
with the reform of the investment laws throughout Mubarak's rule. By 1990, the 
government had allocated 10 million square metres of land for the New Towns (Feiler 
1992: 308). Most investment (89 per cent) was attracted by the first generation new 
cities, like Tenth of Ramadan City, Sadat City, Sixth of October City and Bourg el 
Arab City, which were strategically located close to major urban centres like Cairo 
and Alexandria (AMCHAM 1995: 12, 26). But the problem of housing was not 
resolved by the New Cities for a variety of reasons which is discussed below. 
After the signing of the ERSAP in 1991, housing policy was integrated into a 
more coherent macro-economic policy of liberalization, privatization, and 
financialization. In this context, Mubarak's housing policy adopted two approaches 
to resolve the crisis. 1° First, it envisioned urban expansion and the creation of new 
cities in the desert through the private sector to absorb an increasingly urban 
population. 11 This, it was believed, would also resolve the problems of unemployment 
and overcrowding in Egypt's largest cities. 12 Secondly, a program to upgrade slums 
was adopted to tackle the problem of informal housing. The latter was to be carried 
out by the private sector and non-governmental organizations, with the state's 
participation remaining minimal. Both approaches aimed to deepen the integration of 
the housing market into the financial sector as rent control laws were dismantled and 
private mortgages were promoted. 
10 The government's housing program in 1993 aimed to construct 300,000 units per year, with the state 
building forty per cent of and the private sector constructing the remaining sixty per cent (Soliman 
2004: 81-82). 
11 As part of this project, 17 new cities were planned across the country that would bring the number of 
new cities in the country to 23. 
12 In 1996, Egypt's population had reached 59.277 million, of which 29,760 lived in urban areas and 
32,240 lived in rural areas (Soliman 2004: 53). While Egypt grew ten-fold in the last century and a 
half, Cairo grew thirty fold within the same period (Soliman 2004: 41). The Greater Cairo Region 
continued to suffer from lack of adequate housing and a heavy reliance on informal settlements by half 
of its population. 
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By the mid- l 990s, with a new generation of real estate developers coming on 
the scene and with tourism and land development securing an important role in 
economic development of Egypt, the New Cities' development became the mainstay 
of the private sector. In the context of economic liberalization and the state's need to 
attract more investment to land projects, private investors began demanding 
increasing levels of incentives. 1n the context of a neoliberal economic model, the 
persisting problem of housing was re-articulated. It was argued that too many vacant 
housing existed both in the formal and informal housing sectors, yet there were too 
many people who were in need of housing. The question posed was how to make 
these housing available to those in need of them. One set of so[utions began by 
criticizing Nasserist era rent control and regulations as discouraging factors for 
landlords and investors. The proposed solution was two pronged: first, the state 
should implement a regulatory framework alongside with incentives to owners of 
apartments and developers while also enhancing the security of property rights to land 
and real estate by ensuring speedy court-administ~red eviction procedures in case of 
breach of contract terms; Second, it was suggested to increase the role of the private 
sector in housing supply by removing obstacles such as rent control as well as making 
serviced land available to private developers (USAID 2007: vii). 
The private sector's demands were duly met by the government who 
introduced a range of incentives including de-centralization of power towards 
govemorates in disposal of state/public lands, changing the role of NU CA and 
creating new entities that would transfer land to private investors, strengthening 
private property rights through the courts, constitutional reforms that removed 
references to socialism and dismantled protections for tenants and finally introducing 
investment laws that offered cheap or free land to private developers. Thus, Prime 
Ministerial Decree No. 2903/1995 authorized govemorates to dispose of public land 
for real estate development leading to a boom in the sector in GCR (World Bank 
2006b ). The Decree essentially de-centred the power to dispose of public lands away 
from NUCA and towards the govemorates which could from now on deal with private 
investors independent ofNUCA. Beginning in the late 1970s and increasingly so 
during the 1980s and the 1990s, the private sector assumed a larger role in housing 
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development. 13 Even public-private joint ventures gave decision-making powers to 
the private sector, which responded to demands from the high end of the housing 
market. As Table 8.1 demonstrates, throughout the 1980s, the private sector became 
the dominant provider of housing, both in terms of the percentage of investment and 
in terms of the number of units built. 
Table 8.2 Number of Housing Built, 1982-2002 
Contribution By Units Per cent 
Sector 
Public Sector 1,203,900 28 
Private Sector 3,107,337 72 
Total 4,311,237 100 
Source: El Batran (2004: Table 1). 
The reform ofNUCA constituted altogether a decisive shift in the role of 
public sector entities, reflecting the increased role of the private sector in housing. So 
far, NUCA had facilitated the government's centralized, supply-driven approach to 
public/state land redistribution. In the 1990s, private investors and critics ofNUCA 
had argued that NUCA's land redistribution policy was guided more by political 
interests than by a clear vision of urban development (World Bank 2006b ). The 
reform of NUCA was intended to remove the layers of complex and unclear land 
allocation procedures. The underlying goal of these reforms intended to reduce 
NUCA' s role as an arm of public sector in the planning and distribution of resources. 
To implement these changes, NUCA was partnered with the private sector. As such, a 
Prime Minister Decree 1056/2003 established the Holding Company for Urban 
Communities, which was also made responsible for various New Cities' authorities. 
13 According to figures provided by Soliman (1989: 34), the public sector produced 61,000 units 
between 1960 and 1964, and 56,000 in the period 1965-70: "It is estimated that the government 
invested around LE 599 million in the period 1968-73 and LE 682.4 million in the following five years. 
Despite the increase of invested capital in the last period, the percentage of GDP devoted to housing 
has decreased from 5.1 per cent in 1968 to 2.4 per cent in 1979" (Soliman 1989: 36). The level of 
production dropped under Sadat as only 40,000 units were produced in the period 1971-76, although 
the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a spike in production levels as the number of units reached 150,000. 
The substantial increase at the end of the 1970s can be explained by the launch of the NHP in 1979 that 
aimed to meet housing shortages until the year 2000. 
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"By Law, the Holding Company replace[d]. .. all current agencies of new urban 
communities in terms of assets and liabilities, primarily to the National Investment 
Bank. The holding company [was made] ... in charge of all NUCA implementation, 
supervision and management responsibilities related to the new urban communities' 
development" (World Bank 2006b: 64). However in practice, these changes in the 
role of NUCA were not easy to implement. NUCA continued to play a role in the 
distribution ofland through "direct sale (Takhsis), lease (Haq lntifaa), or public-
private partnership agreements, and to public entities through transfer of assets (Naql 
Ossoul)" (World Bank 2006b: 60). 
Nonetheless, NUCA's role in the provision of affordable housing was 
reconfigured as the private sector gained a more central role in housing provision. As 
such, NUCA was partnered with the private sector in Public Private Partnership (PPP 
henceforth) schemes for affordable housing initially in the New Towns, but eventually 
in other parts of the country. The PPP scheme was based on the offering of free 
serviced land with infrastructure to the private sector by NUCA in the New Urban 
Communities. Once a project was completed, a small percentage (7-10 per cent) of the 
units from a block was recaptured by NUCA in exchange for the free land and 
infrastructure it had extended to the private sector. These units were offered to low-
income groups financed by small down-payment and low annual interest (5-6 per 
cent) soft loans with a 40 year repayment period (World Bank 2006b: 60). 
As the state withdrew from building housing, it began encouraging the private 
sector by offering incentives (free land initially with infrastructure and later without) 
and removing disincentives (rent control) from the housing market. The formula for 
housing under the "free market" rules became the PPP scheme. The state through its 
housing policy was engaged in facilitating accumulation by dispossession as private 
investors were given thousands of hectares of free public/state land in return for a 
small number of units for low income groups. 
Once NUCA began to face financial problems that prevented it from offering 
serviced-land to the private sector, the PPP scheme over time became more deeply 
entrenched as part of the private sector's housing scheme. In the 2000s, NUCA 
engaged in land-for-equity-swap partnerships with the private sector and PPP schemes 
were linked to private mortgages to be developed under Nazif s government. 
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However, private mortgages and PPP schemes were not the only ways of promoting a 
private housing market. 
The shift to a private sector led housing market entailed a number of policy 
changes. First, the state dismantled rent control and other pro-tenant measures such as 
inheritable leases (Law 4/1996). Next, the state actively began promoting home 
ownership over rental housing by activating a private housing mortgage finance 
schemes. This approach to the housing crisis required significant reforms to the 
existing property regime. Changes to regulations governing investment needed to be 
implemented in order to encourage investment in the development of new urban 
communities. Incentives for private sector were introduced through a series of 
investment laws. For instance, investment Law 230/1989 was introduced to boost 
foreign and domestic investment in the new communities in the areas of land 
reclamation, tourism, housing, real estate development, and services for oil 
production. Through Law 230, private sector companies gained the right to own land 
and enjoy tax exemptions of varying degrees depending on the nature of activity 
companies were engaged in. 14 Other incentives ranged from land reclamation in the 
desert, to industry and mining, air transportation and tourism. 
Having liberalized the rules governing foreign and domestic investment, the 
government implemented a series of laws that offered land for development either at 
low prices, or for free. Law 143/1981 had already allowed the sale of state lands in 
the desert to private domestic investors for the purpose of new towns/cities; in 1994 
the Ministry of Housing sold massive plots in the desert to 320 real estate and 
construction investors for the purpose of the development of new communities. 15 
Law 230/1996 repealed Law 56/1988 which had, among other things, prohibited 
foreign ownership of land. In 1997, the government introduced Investment Law 
8/1997 in the hope of encouraging a larger flow of foreign investment to Egypt. The 
law equalized the treatment of domestic and foreign investors, created a sliding scale 
14 Although the idea of Free Trade and Industrial Zones were launched by Sadat, the comprehensive set 
of incentives offered to the private sector in the 1990s qualitatively set apart the Free Trade Zones of 
Mubarak from those of the 1970s. Investors in free zones were offered full ex~mptions from corporate 
tax throughout the life of the project as well as cheap or free land to start their:projects. 
15 As a result the construction of luxury housing far outpaced the existing demand with a total of six 
hundred thousand luxury residences. The number of middle class in Greater Cairo reaches 315,000 
families, less than half the number of luxury units built over the course of the 1990s (Denis 2006: 52-
53). 
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tax holiday (ranging from 5, 10, and 20 years) that covered corporate profits, as well 
as personal, income and sales tax, depending on the location of the project. It 
extended complete foreign ownership of local projects, and reduced the number of 
regulations on foreign investment. The law also provided permanent exemption from 
taxes, duties and customs in 'free-zones'. Other incentives included "reduced import 
duties, guarantee against nationalization or confiscation and the right to acquire and 
own land and real estates" (GOE 2005: 25). 
The most important legi.slation that liberalized the housing market was Law 4 
of 1996 (amended as Law 13 7 /2006), which aimed mainly to dismantle secure 
tenancies and rent regulations associated with Nasserism. The Law was introduced on 
the pre-text of opening up the rental market and meeting the demand for much-needed 
affordable housing. Two thirds of the urban population lived in rental housing and 
therefore any changes to rent control laws were bound to have widespread impact. 16 
Law 4/1996 was designed to facilitate the creation of a private urban housing market, 
a pre-requisite for which was bringing- to an end inheritable rental leases. The 
outcome of Law 4 was the proliferation of short-term contracts, renewable annually 
and thus subject to market based rent increases. 17 The Law also ended the legal 
process required to secure eviction thus speeding up evictions in favour of landlords. 18 
Combined with the investment laws of the late 1980s and early 1990s, Law 
4/1996 led to a flurry of activity in the housing sector. According to the Global 
Property Guide of 2006, no other law was more effective in reviving the private 
housing market than Law 4/1996 which empowered landlords against tenants. 19 The 
targeted beneficiaries of the Law were those with market power, including the 5-7 per 
16 It was this consideration that forced the government to restrict the impact of the law on new 
buildings and on contracts that ended in 1996, while the remaining portion of the rental contracts would 
be gradually phased out. See McCall (1988: 276). 
17 Previously, under laws passed during the time of Nasser, tenants could inherit their leases and pass 
them onto their children while enjoying the benefits of rent control. Under the new law, tenancies were 
no longer heritable and were subjected to market rates. Article 14 of the law stipulated immediate rent 
increases on the basis of the year of the construction of the building. Rents increased by l 0 per cent for 
units completed before 1January1944, by 3 per cent for flats in buildings completed between 9 
September and 1977 and December 1996. Rents on all units are to increase annually by 10 per cent for 
five consecutive years, after which the market is supposed to take over. 
18 Prior to the passing of Law 4, tenants had to be evicted through court proceedings; the new law, 
however, empowered the landlord to enforce the payment of rent and secure an eviction merely through 
the use of an enforcement agent, such as the police. 
19 The government's justification for adopting the law was that it would revitalize the housing market 
through a supply and demand mechanisms. 
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cent of ultra-rich Egyptians or Europeans who took advantage of the exchange rate 
and purchased holiday homes on Egypt's coasts. Despite government claims to the 
contrary, "evictees [did] not receive compensation, [alternative] housing or any other 
form of assistance" (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 2006: 21). Under the 
Occupants Union Bill prepared by the Ministry of Housing, landlord gained further 
powers that entailed not only eviction of tenants, but also the seizure of his/her 
personal belongings in the event that the tenant refused to pay for the costs of 
maintenance and repair of the rental unit as demanded by the landlord. 
In the 2000s, the New Towns/Cities remained an important aspect of housing 
policy. However, the terms of negotiation between the state and the private land 
developers who carried out the New Towns projects were revised. Having reformed 
the investment law, the government launched a twenty year plan with the main goal of 
expanding Egypt's inhabited area from the 4 or 5 per cent to 25 per cent of the total 
area of the country. The government offered developed land for individual and urban 
developers in new cities and settlements outside Cairo, such as Al-Sherouq, Al-
Obour, and 6 October City. All these developments affected the land market 
mechanisms within the Greater Cairo Region. With their newly gained powers in the 
context of a liberalized economy, private land developers and investors demanded 
policy changes to strengthen a privatized housing market - demands which formed 
the cornerstone ofNazifs government from 2004 onwards. 
Under the Nazif government, a privatized housing market and associated 
private mortgage schemes were viewed as integral to strengthening the financial 
markets. To this end, with support from the USAID and the World Bank, his 
government developed private mortgage finance schemes. In May 2008, under 
Nazifs second term as Prime Minister, the World Bank submitted a Housing Policy 
Reform Framework to the Egyptian government (World Bank 2008). Earlier in 
February 2008, the USAID had launched a housing survey for the Ministry of 
Investment in an effort to gather information on the housing market (USAID 2008). 
These organizations were also instrumental in building the capacity of mortgage 
institutions as well as launching the registration of property in urban and rural Egypt. 
With these changes undertaken, government housing delivery after 2004 was 
no longer restricted to the construction of new housing units, but also included 
233 
making existing housing, i.e. vacant housing available on the·market as well as 
encouraging private investors to expand the rental housing market. 
. The New Towns (Cities): An Assessment 
Despite high levels of public investment, the New Towns did not fulfill the goals of 
population relocation due to the high cost of housing and the lack of necessary public 
services. For instance, in the Tenth of Ramadan City, where a large number of 
industries were located, 70 per cent of the workers rented their flats through their 
companies. However, given the low wage levels and high cost of housing, housing 
continued to be inaccessible to most workers (AMCHAM 1995: 36; Vignal and 
Denis 2006: 116-17).20 By 1994, most of them remained woefully under-populated: 
on average, the New Towns contained only 8.3 per cent (448,850 residents) of their 
expected population (Yousry and Atta 1997: 144). By 2008, the New Towns were 
still marred by the inability to provide adequate and affordable housing for low 
income groups. Even the World Bank criticized the government's desert development 
strategy and the New Towns project arguing that the government instead should shift 
its attention to existing cities and housing project (World Bank 2008). 
The problem with private sector dominance of the housing market was that it 
privileged the construction of high-end luxury homes over the provision of affordable 
housing for workers, keeping such housing out of reach of low wage earner. For 
instance, a unit in 6th of October required an initial deposit of LE 4,000, followed by 
monthly payments of LE 1,000 for a period of three years. Then, a monthly payment 
LE 115 would be expected for a period of thirty years. Beside the issue of the cost, 
there was no thought given to the long- term provision of employment for the 
residents expected to move to the New Cities. Employers in the industrial zones in 
the New Towns tended to close shop once the ten year tax-free period was over and 
20 Employers tend to buy flats from the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) and then rent them out 
to their workers charging them market rents (AMCHAM 1995: 36). 
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laid off their entire workforce in order to start new projects that could qualify them for 
another ten years of tax relief. Often investors attracted to the New Towns purchased 
land purely for speculative reasons and did not develop it in accordance with the 
government's plans.21 Finally, the provision of services in the New Cities was non-
existent, and even after services were provided it was done through the private sector 
and at exorbitant prices that were beyond the reach of poor and low income groups 
(ECHR 2002; LCHR 2004; Fahmy and Sutton 2008: 284-94).22 
Far from resolving Egypt's housing problems, the neoliberal solution of 
liberalizing urban rental and property markets exacerbated the problem through the 
creation of a segmented housing market that reflected the on-going trends of class 
polarization initiated by Sadat's infitah. At the high end of the housing market, there 
was an expansion of Gated Communities catering to upper middle class consumers 
and wealthy domestic and foreign investors. At the low end of the housing market, 
there was a prolonged neglect of affordable housing for workers and a subsequent 
proliferation of informal housing. These two categories of housing are examined 
next. 
The Gated Communities: a Metamorphosis of the New Towns 
While the New Towns failed to serve as an effective housing policy tool for the state, 
it succeeded in consolidating a class-based housing policy as gated communities 
flourished on public/state land allocated to private developers. Gated communities 
sprang up after the introduction of ERSAP and were designed to allow the rich to 
escape the overcrowded and dilapidated cities. These private communities provided a 
green, clean, noise-free environment with the same standards as elite residences in 
North America and Europe. In other words: ''No factories, no pollution, no 
problems" (Mitchell 2002: 273). The construction of private communities explicitly 
21 Many such cases were known in the Sinai govemorates leading to disenchantment of locals against 
the g~vernment and private developers. 
22 A 2008 World Bank report re report titled 'Towards an Urban Sector Strategy' port titled 'Towards 
an Urban Sector Strategy' criticized the New Towns strategy of the government arguing that it had 
come at the expense of existing cities where urban planning was completely overlooked adding to the 
chaotic urban sprawl (World Bank 2008). 
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geared toward the rich was justified by the head of NU CA as the "right" of the rich 
"as citizens to live in nice places .... [He added] [i]gnoring their needs means 
marginalizing them just because they are rich" (Mahmoud El-Sarnagawi, head of the 
NUCA cited in Shahine 2000). 
The proliferation of Gated Communities occurred in the framework of the 
New Cities where absence of regulations on private developers resulted in the 
expansion of luxury housing. In a 1995 report, the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Egypt (AMCHAM) proposed that the private sector "should be an effective and 
important partner with the government in building the New Cities." The report 
further recommended that the government "should only provide the basic 
infrastructure" (AMCHAM 1995: 55). Taking these recommendations to heart, the 
government sold vast tracts of state land to real estate developers who planned private 
cities for the rich with the support of public sector banks (Fahmy and Sutton 2008: 
285; Mitchell 1999). With the abolition of rent controls, and with a new investment 
law in place, the prospect of building private communities for the rich proved to be 
too good an opportunity for the private sector to turn down. From the mid- l 990s 
onward, Egypt witnessed the beginnings of the construction of a number of private 
communities such as: Al Rihab; Misr El Aseelia; New Cairo; Mena Garden City; 
Dream Land; Utopia; and Beverly Hills. 
The main preoccupation of private developers for these Gated Communities 
was the building of luxury housing. Catering to an elite seeking refuge from Egypt's 
overcrowded urban centres, the size of properties ranged from 120 to 800 square 
metres and were often priced between LEI million to LE3 million. To appeal to the 
consumption tastes of the elite, the communities were often equipped with golf 
courses, lush green spaces, amusement parks, and shopping malls. Security, hospitals 
and clinics, private schools and private universities (such as the new campus of the 
American University of Cairo) were provided through the private sector, which were 
desired by the rich who took pride in using private services. Geographically, these 
private communities were protected from Cairo by suburban ring roads and were 
accessible only by private means of transportation. 
This trend of building villas and luxury housing was not shielded from the 
eventual burst of the property market bubble in 2000. By 2003, only 60,000 luxury 
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housing units were built out of a projected 600,000 (Fahmy and Sutton 2008: 285). 
However, the crisis in the luxury real estate market did not lead to any significant shift 
in policy. Rather, it led to a further increase in pressure from the private sector on the 
government to develop a private mortgage scheme that could create a steady supply of 
customers for the developers. 
Politically, Gated Communities encapsulated a process of accumulation by 
dispossession through the rapid expropriation of public land, the enclosure of space 
and the privatization of resources such as water, all in the interest of elite consumption 
and capitalist profitability. In light of this, these Gated Communities resulted in a 
"duality of peripheral informalization, on the one hand, and planned exclusive 
suburbanization, on the other," that was a "stark manifestation of urban polarization 
and social cleavage in Egyptian society" (Bayat and Denis 1998: 16-17).23 Shielded 
from the majority in their gated residences, the elite continued their policies of 
"oligopolistic liberalization, without redistribution, while protecting themselves from 
the ill effects of its pollution and its risks" (Denis 2006: 49-50). In this sense, Gated 
Communities captured the essence of neoliberalism as a form of social exclusion that 
privileges a new Western life-style for the few over access to affordable housing and 
quality public services for the many. If the Gated Communities represented one side 
of the coin, the other side was the expansion of informal housing, which is discussed 
in the next section. 
Affordable Housing Through Public Private Partnership (PPP) Schemes 
Under Mubar~' s rule, the public sector's share in housing investment declined 
significantly, corresponding to a radical decline in production of affordable housing 
over the course of the 1980s and 1990s: between 1986 and 1990, 52,600 units were 
built; between 1991and1995, 32,500 units were built; and between 1996 and 2001, 
only 30,000 units were built (El-Wardany 2011).24 As the public sector withdrew its 
23 Gated Communities represented the "rehabilitation of the spirit and the city of royalty and colonial 
investors before ... the Egyptian Revolution" (Denis 2006: 56). 
24 Public sector investment levels between 1985-95 reached LE 17 billion while public sector's share 
remained at LE 1.6 billion (NBE 1995). This private sector's share of production of housing reflected 
this rise in its investment share. During the first two Five Year Plans (1982-87, 1987-92), out of a total 
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role from a direct producer of affordable housing and investor for workers housing, 
the state adopted a PPP scheme with the private sector. The state's role in the 
provision of low income housing through PPP scheme was two pronged: first, it 
allocated state/public land coupled with infrastructure for low income housing 
projects to be developed by the private sector; second, it developed a private mortgage 
system that would enable the poor to enter the housing market through the private 
sector banking system.25 To make these aspects of the policy succeed, the state 
moved to adopt relevant laws and annulled past laws that posed obstacles in the 
creation of a housing mortgage system. 
Disregarding the failure of the New Cities' formula for affordable housing, 
Mubarak's regime implemented two further projects. The 'Mubarak Youth Housing 
Project' was launched in the 1990s and aimed to build 70,000 units, between 1996 
and 2000, in 15 new cities across the country with a total cost of LE 2. 7 billion. The 
state subsidized 40 per cent from the sale of high income residential areas and 
dwellings in new cities and resorts. Ownership was encouraged by offering credit to 
be repaid in 40 years at 5 per cent interest rate. 26 After the completion of this project, 
the state intended to replicate it across the country as a way of providing housing for 
low income earners. A second project, 'The Future Housing Project', was launched in 
the late 1990s by Mubarak's wife. This project also aimed to build 70,000 units at a 
total cost of LE 2.1 billion, excluding the cost of land. The private sector raised half 
of the funds while the state covered the other half. These units were offered on credit 
extended by the state, payable over 40 years at 5 per cent interest rate. This project 
estimated 2.4 million housing units, public sector's share stood at 120,000 while the remaining portion 
was contributed by the private sector. However, these levels of investment were reflecting the 
economic crisis that Egypt experienced in the 1980s. In the 1990s, with the liberalization of the land 
market, there was a spike in housing production (World Bank 2008). 
25 However, as a survey by USAID (2007: 42) indicated, very few of those in need of housing were 
aware of such official housing programs for low income groups and even less were aware of 
mortgages. Critics have argued that projects labelled as affordable housing serve more of a 
propagandistic purpose to boost the popularity of the ruling party than a real solution to housing for the 
poor. Indeed, most of the housing built under this category has been acquired through bribes by 
individuals as a worthy investment and kept vacant (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003: 219). 
26 According to Egypt's State Information Service, the government's contribution in the 2000s towards 
low mcome housing took the form of the extension of soft loans in the amount of LE 625 million, each 
for LE 15,000, to be repaid in instalments over 40 years at 6 per cent interest rate (Egypt State 
Information Service 2005). 
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was also to be replicated across the new cities as part of a process of population 
transfer from overcrowded urban centres. 
Rather than increase public sector investment in affordable housing, however, 
the Mubarak regime engaged in a new mortgage-backed private sector housing 
strategy. New 'affordable' housing projects were to be driven by the creation of a 
private sector backed market in mortgages for low income earners. The attack on rent 
controls served as a means for promoting home ownership amongst the poor. In the 
2000s, the state began to promote affordable housing provision through the 
privatization of financial services. 
The reality was that despite these plans, a majority of the affordable housing 
constructed between 1997 and 2004 continued to be by the informal sector as both the 
state and the private sector played a very limited role in the provision of low income 
housing. As mortgages were slow to pick up, the private sector continued to find 
luxury housing, tourist accommodation and villas as the natural destination for their 
investments. Thus, luxury housing in the new cities and urban communities remained 
attractive targets for real estate developers and financiers given the incentives that the 
state offered them under various investment laws. 27 
In 2005, the government launched the NHP with an estimated budget of LE 
25 billion to build 85,000 housing units annually for low income youth. The project 
was to end in 2011. To realize the NHP, the government sold state land at cheap 
prices to Orascom Development Holding and Nasr City Housing on the condition that 
they would produce low income housing. The private sector would build the housing. 
The housing units were distributed through a lottery whereby those in need of housing 
would fill out applications and enter a draw. However, there were other conditions 
that excluded the very poor and privileged only those with a stable monthly income as 
valid candidates for such housing: "Eligible applicants should be between the ages of 
20 and 50 with a monthly income of a minimum LE 640 and a maximum LE 1,000. 
They were required to pay LE 5,000 with their application in order to reserve the unit 
and LE 160 in monthly instalments over 20 years, subject to 7.5 per cent annual 
increase" (Elyan 2008). However, when the project was completed, it fell far from 
27 The government's NHP 2005-11 aimed to build 500,000 units over that period, without any 
specification of the category in which the housing would fall.See: (Hassanein and Sherif2011). 
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meeting the criteria of affordability. Not only were the flats small and unsuitable for 
ordinary families, but the prices of the flats -ranging from LE 500,000 to LE 1.5 
million-were beyond the means of the majority (El-Wardani 201 lb). 
Being unable to afford what the private housing market offered, a majority of 
the workers were forced to live with their families well into their adult lives. A 
journalist, Mr. Aheb who worked in Cairo lived in an informal housing area with his 
wife and daughter. However, he had planned to eventually move into his family home 
along with his parents, and his unmarried brother. The house was being built in 
stages, one storey at a time (Joya 2005). Even though the size of flats offered by the 
private sector shrank, the high cost kept such flats out of reach of urban workers. 
Table 8.3 Distribution of Urban Housing Built, 1987-97 
Sector Units Built Percentage Share 
Public sector 718,30_0 27.6 
Private Sector 706,500 27.2 
Informal Sector 1,175,200 45.2 
Total 2,600,000 100 
Source: USAID (2007: 128). 
The Failure of PPP and the Persistence of Informal Housing 
As the failures of the New Cities made increasingly evident, the problem of affordable 
housing was not being resolved as the majority of private sector housing construction 
was tailored towards the middle class, to rather disastrous effect (World Bank 2008). 
The obvious alternative for workers was the informal housing market. 
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Informal housing has long been considered a problem in Egypt. 28 Informal 
areas first appeared in the 60s and expanded in the 70s and in the late 1970s, 
uncontrolled urban expansion in the Nile Delta region's agricultural land became a 
major issue for the government. Informal housing was seen as a problem primarily 
because of the threat it posed to agricultural and not because of lack of urban planning 
or inadequate housing for those who resided in them. Government measure, vis-a-vis 
informal housing, not primarily motivated by resolving the lack of affordable housing, 
but instead aimed to restrict their expansion onto agricultural land (World Bank 
2008). 29 But the concentration of population in informal settlements over the decades 
also posed a political challenge for the government who feared the radicalization of 
residents of informal settlements by the Islamist opposition groups. 
Some estimates suggested that from the mid-1980s onwards, three-quarters of 
the population of Greater Cairo lived in informal settlements, covering two thirds of 
the land area and accounting for 85 per cent of dwellings (Mitchell 2002: 287-88; 
Feiler 1992: 300-1). Even the conservative estimates of the Egyptian government put 
the residents of informal communities at 12.6 million in 1993 (LCHR 2004: 92-
109). 30 In 1992, the population of urban informal settlements in the country was 
estimated at 8.2 million or over 38.6 per cent of the total urban population, residing in 
707 informal areas across the country's major urban centres, including Cairo and 
Alexandria (Soliman 2004: 86).31 In 2001, an estimated 1,105 squatter and informal 
settlements were reported in Egypt providing housing for 15. 7 million inhabitants. 
However, according to the 2006 Census, only in the Greater Cairo Region, 60 per cent 
of the population lived in informal areas accounting for 10 million inhabitants, 
28 A study by the Land Centre for Human Rights indicated that the number of buildings without any 
sanitary drainage or adequate clean water in Cairo reached 77,122 buildings (LCHR 2004: 92-109). As 
a result, such areas suffer from a high rate of disease due to lack of clean water and proper sanitation. 
29 Informal housing had consumed over one million feddans of agricultural land over the course of 4-5 
decades (USAID 2007: 1 ). The USAID (2007) study for affordable housing in Egypt was requested by 
the Minister of Housing, Utilities and Urban Development with the aim of formulating a national 
housing policy for affordable housing. 
30 According to Naglaa Arafa, an analyst at the Unite4 Nations, Egypt is home to 1,221 urban slum 
areas, housing between 12 and 15 million of the country's approximately 75-million citizens (Mail & 
Guardian 2006). 
31 Cairo has the largest number of informal areas, as it has 79 informal areas compared to 60 in 
Qalyubeyya, 49 in Assiut, 46 in Beni Swif, and 40 areas in Alexandria (Soliman 1996: 187; Mitchell 
2002: 287). 
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indicating that across all of Egypt a larger percentage of the population lived in 
informal housing (World Bank 2008: 11). 
These staggering numbers alerted some experts - who viewed informality as 
hindrance to other economic activities -to propose a way out of informality. 
Formalizing the informal housing market which was a subsequent proposal promoting 
a liberal housing market which was put forward by the Peruvian economist Hernando 
de Soto. De Soto argued that 92 per cent of all urban housing fell under the category 
of informal preventing such capital from becoming the lynchpin of a strong financial 
sector (De Soto 2000: 30).32 De Soto (2001) framed his ideas by equating informality 
of urban dwellings with the lack of legal protection for informal dwellings. He 
proposed registration and titling of informal residential property as a first step towards 
the enjoyment of benefits of a free market. Formalization, de Soto argued, would 
enable property holders to use their newly registered property or mortgaged property 
as collateral against loans from banks, which would further contribute towards other 
forms of economic activities. Once formalized, investors would gain access to an 
estimated US$195.2 billion 'masked' in informal housing (De Soto 2001: 29). 
Formalization, it is argued, would make housing a secure venue of investment 
not only for home owners but also for the financial system (Moustafa 2003). 
According to de Soto, 90 per cent of urban housing and 80 per cent of rural housing 
were considered informal as they lacked clear titles (De Soto 2001: 25). One 
implication of informal housing was that residents could not use their property as 
collateral against credit and loans from the banks and thus their economic activity is 
radically limited. 33 Liberalizing the housing market and formalizing the informal 
sector could bring US$240 billion to the market in the form of registered property 
(Rutherford 2008: 216-17).34 However, property could only be turned into collateral, 
32 De Soto's main argument was that such informal assets if kept out of the formal property market 
would not become the means of development to those who sit on such assets. The majority of poor of 
informal communities, de Soto argued, would begin to experience the trickle-down effect of capitalism 
only after "the firm foundations of a formal property are in place"(2000: 222). 
33 De Soto (2000: 5-6). 
34 While de Soto argued for titling as a mechanism for reviving the housing market and boosting the 
economy, others argued for the very creation of private property as the solution to the problem of 
poverty in the Arab world. Thus, Beach and O'Driscoll, Jr. (2003: 27-8) argue that the absence of 
clearly demarcated property rights and thus, the absence of economic freedom led to the slow pace of 
growth and development in the MENA region. They emphasize the role of institutions - the 
Constitution, private property, rule of law and economic freedom - in creating the right conditions for a 
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and from collateral into credit, if rules and powers were arranged to enable creditors 
to seize the property of debtors who defaulted. These considerations were at the core 
of changes that the government introduced in the 2000s. 
The government responded to these proposals by liberalizing the housing 
market and adopting policies and laws that would increase the role of the private 
sector in the housing market and deepen the links between the housing sector and the 
financial sector. It did not, however, go so far as to adopt de Soto's suggestions 
regarding the formalization of informal housing. Thus, while reforms were 
implemented that sought to establish an urban housing and real estate market through 
the provision of private mortgages, these mortgages were not aimed at the informal 
housing sector (hence the continued reliance of the state on demolition as a policy of 
dealing with congested informal neighbourhoods). 
Very little has been known about the sources of financing for inf onnal 
housing. What has been known is that informal housing has been steadily built up 
over a long period of time pending on the availability of funds either from personal. 
savings or loans from relatives or from local credit groups (gamiias). The informal 
source of financing did not mean informal property was not exchangeable. In reality, 
informal housing could be rented, sold or inherited through legal means and on the 
basis of ourfi contracts. 35 
Within the category of informal housing, there exists a hierarchy. While some 
civil servants and rural farming families over time manage to acquire their own 
housing, others - especially those migrating to cities - have no means of acquiring 
such housing. The latter category thus ended up on roof tops or in tomb housing. 
According to Soliman (1996: 187), there were over 200,000 people in Alexandria who 
lived on rooftops on a regular basis, while Cairo's rooftop population reached 1.5 
million. 
democratic market economy. They argue that: "Bringing democratic capitalism to the Arab world is 
not a dream but an imperative. F.A. Hayek wrote eloquently of how private property protects the 
poorest of the poor: The system of private property is the most important guarantee of freedom, not 
only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not. It is only because the control 
of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that nobody has 
complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves." 
35 Ourfi contracts are simple contracts drawn between two parties and witnessed by two persons. They 
are backed by Sharia as well as the Civil Code. However, the Ministry of Justice does not accept them 
as proof to register property (USAID 2007: 130). · 
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Tomb housing, while existing for some time, was never as prevalent as it 
became in the recent decades. Ignored by municipal authorities, residents of tomb 
cities developed their own basic infrastructure and provided their own basic services. 
Cemetery housing could be found across Egypt, but the most prominent ones are 
located in the major cities of Cairo and Alexandria. El-Arafa, or the 'City of the 
Dead', founded in the seventh century, became the destination of choice for migrants 
who came to Cairo in the 1950s and since then it has become the residence of over a 
million inhabitants. Over the course of the centuries, the cemetery has turned into a 
genuine city with cafes, shops, post offices and medical centres. 36 Official attempts to 
relocate residents of the City of the Dead to outer areas of the Cairo govemorate failed 
given that no adequate housing had been planned to meet the needs of these residents. 
These areas have continued to remain outside of state jurisdiction and the 
residents tend to deal directly with the relatives of the dead whose tomb they use as 
residence. The distance from the state is further reinforced by the precarious labour 
market through which residents reproduce themselves. Residents of Sayeda Ayesha 
and Tarb Al Ghafeer, two slum areas at the foot of the Moqattam Hills in Cairo, for 
instance, relied on informal work such as selling flowers or fruits on carts. They 
complained about the lack of services, such as clean, running water, electricity, 
garbage collection, sewage, health clinics, and schools. While they resided in tomb 
houses and did not pay rent, they still relied on the mercy of the relatives of the dead 
who decided who they wanted to keep and who to evict (Joya 2007). The absence of 
rent was the main factor in Naama Mohamed's choice to live in her tomb house. At 50 
years of age, Naama, originally from Suhag, had lived in her house for twenty five 
years. She initially lived with her husband's family in another poor neighborhood and 
then moved into the present grave house. Her husband, 70, worked in silk making 
trade and she had seven kids. The son-in- law worked as painter-apprentice 
(mahaara). Her children did not get schooling. The families said they did not pay rent 
and as long as they looked after the graves regularly and properly, they could stay in 
36 According to the Cairo 2050 Master Plan, the government will replace the el-Arafa cemetery with 
gardens and parks, creating a green lung in the middle of the city. To realize these plans, graves and 
monuments spread over 17,000 acres of land will need to be relocated to Helwan and Sixth of October 
cities. The contentious issue surrounding this Plan is the fate of the living residents of el-Arafa 
cemetery. 
244 
their residence. They said they got electricity for a bulb-light from one of the bigger 
graves; often times, they said they would steal a line so they could have some light in 
the house. But they had to fetch their water from far distances (Joya 2007). 
A hesitant interviewee, Mona Abdel Hamid from Giza, Cairo lived in her 
tomb housing with her two children and her husband, a painter apprentice. She had 
moved into this tomb house without the knowledge of the relatives of the dead and 
was fearful would be evicted if found out. Another interviewee, Hoda, originally 
from the govemorate of al-Sharqiyya, had come to Tarb al Ghafeer (Moqattam Hills, 
Cairo) thirty years ago. Her husband was a grave keeper (torab ). She had two kids. 
When asked if she would consider moving into the new cities, she said she had filled 
out an application four years ago and that since then she had not heard anything. She 
expressed her grievance about the New Cities' Housing project saying that only those 
with political connections got housing although there was more than enough to be 
distributed to those living in insecure and informal housing like her and her 
neighbours. All the families I interviewed in the City of the Dead had similar 
problems including lack of clean drinking water, electricity, schools and access to 
amenities, such as pharmacies, clinics and grocers. They expressed concerns about 
housing, financial problems and the failure of the government to respond to their 
needs (Joya 2007). 
Beside financial insecurity and fear of evictions, health challenges due to the 
physical environment of decomposing tombs remain a daunting challenge for 
residents. In one of the tomb houses, I spoke with an old woman who invited me 
inside her house. The house contained two compartments used as rooms. There was a 
tiny space for kitchen and a washroom with a hole for toilette, a feature that all the 
houses I visited had in common. Damp and lacking any sunshine, the house was 
infested with mosquitos covering the bodies of the young children playing around the 
tomb (Joya 2007). 
Residents of tomb housing benefit from the absence of rents but suffer from 
low quality housing, health hazards and lack of services. However, not all informal 
areas resemble one another, each shaped by a whole host of factors (e.g. proximity 
from the centre of Cairo, availability of services, flow of funds through remittances 
among others). Therefore, assigning the label of informality to settlements can carry 
245 
serious implications for the right of residents of such settlements. First, it could 
exclude them from accessing services and public funding for upgrading their living 
spaces. Secondly, the title of informality could take away the communal rights of 
people who have built their homes and their livelihoods in a particular settlement, 
which is often on state/public land. 37 Lastly, and linked to the previous point, the 
label of informality can leave such settlements prone to demolition and forced 
evictions by the government as part of their slum upgrading initiatives. 
To residents of informal settlements, the government's plan of urban renewal 
represented a process of dispossession, eviction and forced relocation. For example, 
in 1992, a national plan was established for the upgrading of informal settlements in 
which 434 informal settlements (out of a total of 904) were chosen for the first phase 
(El Batran 2004: 6). This strategy continued over the course of the next decade, and 
by 2004 the government had issued 112,000 demolition orders (Fathy 2004).38 The 
informal settlement in Hekr Abu Domma, in Cairo along the eastern bank of the Nile, 
was demolished by the government in 2001, with _residents being compensated by the 
state in the amount of LE 15,000-45,000 per family. The land on which the 
settlement was built however was worth much more than this with each square metre 
averaging approximately LE 50,000. 39 With the low levels of compensation given to 
its residents, it was very likely that they would end up in another informal settlement. 
Other residents ended up in places that were already crowded or were far from 
amenities and services. For example, in the case of the clearing ofUmm Al-
Masryeen, residents were "sent to a remote area in 6th of October City - the 
somewhat misnamed Hope City" where "new homes had not been provided with 
37 Informal settlements are fraught with conflicts over property rights with the residents claiming 
ownership over their housing while the state attempting to claim the land as state land. Attempts by the 
state to claim such informal lands in the urban areas began with Decree No. 506/1984 whereby 
municipalities were given the right to clear out informal settlements in parts of Cairo and Alexandria. 
However, these attempts were faced with strong resistance by the residents who claimed property rights 
over their housing (Soliman 2004: 109). According to the Vice-Chairman of General Organization for 
Physical Planning (GOPP) at the Ministry of Housing, informal settlements or slums could include 
illegal building on agricultural land, people living tombs, desert settlements and rooftop housing (Daily 
Star Egypt 2006 ). 
38 Since the application of Law 96/1992 that dispossessed many small farmers and peasants, a new 
wave of rural-urban migration began in the late 1990s. These new migrants often found it hard to find 
housing and if their informal settlements were destroyed they were told to return to the places that were 
indicated on their ID cards. 
39 Residents indicated that buildings and schools were also demolished due to the high value of the 
~d -
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utilities" and "lacked telephone lines, electricity or water" (Fathy 2004). Still others 
are evicted and relocated to distant, desert locations. For example, in 2001, a Prime 
Ministerial Decree ordered the demolition of the whole area of Hekr Abu Domma, 
labelling it susceptible to collapse (Ministry of Local Development 2001; Ministry of 
Investment 2011 b: 30). Alternative housing was offered in the new desert city of Al 
Nahda. Even those who accepted compensation had to live in tents for months and 
await the receipt of the compensation, which was not guaranteed. The ultimate irony 
was the demolition of an informal settlement - and the forced eviction of its residents 
resulting in their subsequent homelessness - with the intent to build affordable 
housing units on the cleared site was part of Mubarak's Youth Housing Scheme. In 
this case, five hundred families in Tosson, Alexandria, who had settled in 1998, were 
forcibly removed in 2008. The police used tear gas, dogs, and brute force. For ten 
years, the state had turned a blind eye to the illegality of the housing and even 
provided electricity, water and other services. Residents claimed that they had 
invested most of their savings in their housing and were left with nothing after the 
demolition of their homes. 
These attempts at clearing slums and informal housing cannot be understood 
outside of the context of the government's larger strategy of neoliberal economic 
reform and development and, in particular, the attempt to create a market in urban 
housing and urban property. Despite recommendations by USAID to substitute the 
policy of slum clearance with a scheme of 'formalization' by which slum dwellers 
will be 'empowered' to buy their own home through some form of financing 
initiatives,40 the government accelerated the process of dispossession through 
demolition as a means of attracting foreign investment to develop urban real estate. 
Thus, slum upgrading schemes transferred prime urban real estate to private investors 
and radically increased the price of land, making it impossible for informal housing 
residents to even contemplate purchasing their former informal dwellings. 
40 Given that the proliferation of informal housing has remained the dominant means of meeting the 
housing needs of ordinary Egyptians, USAID has been encouraging the formalization of the informal 
housing sector through the promotion of home ownership schemes and the creation of mortgages. This 
scheme is supported by de Soto (2003) who argues that creating a legal property system by absorbing 
illegal or informal property would "unblock trillions of dollars in 'dead capital"' (Clift 2003: 10, 
interview with de Soto). Thus, USAID has discouraged the continued demolition of slums in favour of 
promoting their upgrading by offering tenants the chance to buy their homes in order to encourage 
renovations and improvements. 
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Slum upgrading through evictions and demolitions constituted an important 
policy of the government, the latter motivated by two factors: potential windfall from 
sale of informal lands especially settlements in the heart of Cairo; next, in line with 
promotion of tourism, the state attempted to present a 'clean' and 'orderly' image of 
Egypt to western tourists by moving informal areas to outskirts of major urban 
centres.41 As a result of this policy, on November 27, 2005, "the Minister of State for 
Local Development, Abdel Raheem Shehata, unveiled his Ministry's plans to convert 
informal housing quarters, in seven different govemorates [Giza, Gharbiya, South 
Sinai, Port Said, Suez, Sohag, Aswan], into land for new investment projects - these 
plans were to be executed starting December 2005" (Charbel 2005). A major project 
dependent on slum removal was the 'Cairo 2050 Master Plan' which was launched in 
2007 with the goal of making Greater Cairo a "cleaner, greener and better" place 
through the upgrading of slums (Madbouly 2006, 2009; El Maghraby 2009). The Plan 
intended to redistribute the population of informal settlements, create 50,000 feddans 
of green space, move industry to the outskirts of the GCR, and improve public 
transportation by adding 15 new metro lines and two new railway stations. These 
goals are intended to transform Cairo into a 'world-class city'. According to 
Elsheshtawy (2011) such urban visions were not unique to Egypt, but were part of 
regional attempts to make the urban spaces more liveable and more inclusive. 
The exorbitant cost of this urban renewal, however, became apparent when it 
was revealed that whole cemeteries (including City of the Dead) would be uprooted in 
order to make room for green space, while slums and informal settlements in the Old 
and Islamic parts of Cairo and from the vicinity of the Giza pyramids would be 
demolished in order to create an open air museum. In July, 2007, 
Al Wayly district began demolishing 21 buildings in 
Abasseya square to kick-start the construction of 
Cairo's third underground metro line, amid the stifled 
objections of angry residents. Before that the council 
had cut off electricity and water from all the buildings, 
where shop owners and some residents objected to not 
receiving what they consider to be 'satisfactory 
compensation.' They claimed that the government 
41 Similarly, affluent groups in Egypt view informal residents and their occupation of such land as 
temporary, expecting them to eventually leave such areas, allowing landlords and developers to make 
profitable use of such lands. 
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devalued the land, offering merely LE 2,000 per square 
meter (Carr 2007). 
Keeping on track with its plan for a private sector-led urban renewal, the 
government carried out forced evictions in informal housing areas such as Qal' at Al-
Kabsh in Cairo's district of Zainhum, Old Cairo's district of the potters, Ayn Helwan, 
Al Marj as well as many others. 42 The security forces regularly used tear gas and 
imprisoned residents who resisted evictions. 43 The evictions resulted in loss of 
housing as well as jobs for those who had to seek housing in alternative informal 
neighbourhood. 
Table 8.4 Forced Evictions and House Demolitions after the Adoption of Law 
4/1996 
1997 Demolition of Fawakir (ceramics workshops) in old Cairo. 
June 1998 Demolition of seven buildings in Ain Helwan, Cairo. 
April2001 Decree 542/2001 passed by the cabinet to evict 155,000 
residents of two islands Al Warraq and Al Dahab. 
November 2001 Demolition of 65 houses in al-Arish (Sinai). 
November 2001 Demolition of 76 homes in Khaddariya, Sharqiyya 
govemorate. 
2001 Demolition of25 homes in al-Duweiqa (Cairo) (ECHR 2003). 
2001 Forcible eviction of residents in Port Said resulting in one 
death by a bulldozer. 
June 2002 Demolition of 150 homes in Manshiet al-Awqaf, Tanta, 
Gharbiya govemorate. 
17 October, 2007 Government bulldozers accompanied by police destroyed forty 
five homes and forcibly evicted residents ofKafr Elw, 
Helwan, claiming they had no legal title to their land and 
homes (Carr 2007). 
February 2010 Forcible eviction of 67 families in Giza (AllaboutEgypt 2010). 
42 Al Marj was under the authority of the Ministry of Endowments, whose role radically changed since 
the 1990s whereby its main goal was to attract private investors to properties that fell under its 
authority. This new role has resulted in the eviction of squatters from endowment (waqf) lands. For 
more on Al Marj in the 1970s, see Abu Lughod (1971: 157). 
43 In March of2009, some of the residents and artisans of Cairo's tourist core in Khan Khalili targeted 
tourists with Molotov cocktails. Often these responses are meant for the government as a way of 
resisting eviction and the loss of livelihoods. 
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Sources: Various Egyptian Daily newspapers and the Land Centre for Human Rights 
News Releases. 
On 5th October 2010, the Secretary General of Amnesty International warned 
the Egyptian government about the risks that the implementation of Cairo 2050 
carried for the poor and their options for adequate shelter and work. He wrote that the 
displacement of 3 3 settlements in Cairo and in Giza and their relocation in the 
outskirts of Greater Cairo by 2015 had not taken into the consideration the concerns 
of residents. The Secretary General of Amnesty International pointed to the case of 
Manshiet Nasser and how the 14,800 residents were not consulted about the 
relocation plans.44 Many families ofManshiet Nasser were not offered alternative 
homes until many months later and even then the location of new homes were far 
from their work places and their communities (Amnesty International 2010; Stop 
Land Grabbing Campaign 2010). 
Another case of forcible relocation which was part of Cairo 2050 Plan will 
affect 150,000 residents of Al Warraq and Al Dahab Nile Islands. The government 
intended to turn these islands into green spaces for tourists by removing the existing 
residents, in the name of 'public utility' (ECHR 2001).45 As recently as 2011, 8,000 
residents of Imbaba (Giza governorate) were threatened with eviction by the state 
(LCHR 201 la). Imbaba is indeed an old and crowded district in the Greater Cairo 
Region and a significant portion of its housing stock is either vacant or closed. Over 
95 per cent of the houses are owned by the private sector and landlord tenant relations 
are still determined by the old rent control laws (AMCHAM 2007: 142). The forced 
44 Manshiet Nasser at the foot ofMoqattam Hills had its origins in the 1970s when a group of rural 
migrant workers established their temporary homes there. Given the absence of government housing 
for workers and equally absent employer supplied housing, the government turned a blind eye to the 
expansion ofManshiet Nasser at the time. The location was not suitable for housing because it was 
also home to limestone quarrying for the construction industry and safety standards for housing were 
not observed for the informal settlement. However, construction workers who resided in Manshiet 
Nasser had no other option for safe housing and thus remained there until the 2000s, living through 
various housing disasters. The state continued to ignore the housing needs of these workers until the 
1990s when disasters were used as a pretext for forcibly removing them and relocating them far from 
work, services and amenities (LCHR 2004: 92-109). 
45 Former Housing Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Soleiman and ex-Prime Minister Atef Obeid both 
argued that the islands belonged to the government as residents did not have deeds to claim their lands 
and homes. The government plans to offer the land to investors to build luxury housing and tourist 
resorts. The government decree violates the laws that require protection of agricultural land. Most of 
the island lands are fertile land producing vegetables for Cairo (Shahine 2001 ). 
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evictions of residents of Imbaba will in effect dismantle the old rent control laws and 
open up the way for the imposition of the new rent control law. 
Incidents such as fires and collapsing buildings provide a pretext for mass 
evictions without compensation or the provision of alternative housing for residents of 
informal areas. In other instances, informal areas where disasters have struck, serve 
as an opportunity to make a profitable bid for land by real estate developers. The 
most prominent is the community ofMoqattam Hills in Cairo. On the morning of 6 
September, 2008, a landslide destroyed part of the Duweiqa informal settlement at the 
foot of Moqattam Hills. The disaster buried whole families alive, destroyed over 
thirty five homes and resulted in the death of hundreds. Over 500 families were left 
homeless after the disaster (Saleh 2008). Prior to the disaster, the government had 
marked the community as 'unsafe' and promised alternative housing for the residents. 
However, according to residents, corruption amongst the local authorities prevented 
them from receiving the houses (Singer 2008). Residents stated that some units were 
"sold for 70,000 Egyptian pounds or near $13,000, or rented out for $73 per month. 
An average salary for an Egyptian civil servant was just under $100 per month" 
(Tahawi 2008). In the end, only 31 apartments were handed out to residents. 46 The 
authorities forced hundreds of families to move into a so-called 'temporary' camp 
nearby (Elyan and Carr 2008). Most residents became homeless and lived on the 
streets before finding their way into other informal settlements. 
Investigations into the cause of these collapsed housing structures revealed 
that, contrary to the claims of the government, it was not the low quality of the 
housing that was responsible for the landslide, but rather the building of luxury 
housing developments at the top of the Moqattam Hills by the Dubai real estate 
developer, Emmar Misr (Woods 2008). It is believed that government officials 
bought state land at very cheap prices and then sold it for huge profits to Emmar Misr 
to facilitate this development (Hussein 2008). This gated community - the 'Uptown 
Cairo' project - consisted of eleven villages over 4 million square meters in the Hills 
46 According to Egyptian Centre for Housing Rights, in 2001 the government destroyed 25 houses in 
the district without prior notice, claiming that it was illegally constructed on state land (Egyptian 
Centre for Housing Rights 2001a). 
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and included private clubs, golf courses, swimming pools and hotels.47 Waste-water 
leaking from the gated communities of Moqattam Hills had caused the fragmentation 
of limestone, leading to the landslide. A number of experts argued that the over-use 
of water for such green spaces will continue to result in rockslides and more 
destruction for the poorer residents of informal communities at the bottom of the Hills 
(El-Sayed 2008a, 2008b ). 
After the fatal rockslide of 2008 in Cairo, a total of 9, 100 families from 
Manshiet Nasser were moved to Al-Duwayqa and Al Nahda City in the north of 
Cairo. Another 2000 families from Old Cairo were moved to 6th of October City. In 
both cases, residents were not offered documents to guarantee their tenure in their 
new homes and thus left them prone to further evictions. The difference between their 
old informal houses and new ones was that in the new ones they lacked access to their 
jobs and were disconnected from their old communities and therefore had to start all 
over again to create a support network, which are crucial in informal settlements. 
In other cases of building collapses, contr~ctors violated building standard and 
safety codes while local officials turned a blind eye. For instance, on October 8th, 
2008, a four storey building collapsed in Alexandria killing at least 12 and leaving 
another 15 missing in the rubble (AFP 2008). The building's owner had violated 
housing regulations by adding two extra storeys to a building which was already in 
bad shape. This was the third building collapse in this district and such incidents were 
quite common around the country as builders violate housing regulations and 
municipalities willingly neglected to enforce regulations. In 2005, a six storey 
building had collapsed killing 19 and in December of 2007, 35 died when a 12 storey 
building collapsed, both in Alexandria. 
The Cairo 2050 Master Plan thus offered a great opportunity for investors and 
land speculators to make huge profits as informal settlements were demolished and 
highways, high rises, parks and commercial centres were built across the Greater 
Cairo Region. In anticipation of such large scale urban renewal, land prices 
skyrocketed. As Neumann (2009) pointed out, "the 2007 average price per square 
47 Em.mar Misr has planned and developed some of the biggest luxury gated communities and one of 
the biggest shopping malls in Egypt. The developer has acquired vast tracts of prime real estate across 
Egypt. -
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meter for a finished home on Cairo's outskirts is listed at $800 (LE 4,416) - up from 
$150 (LE 828) only three years prior." The benefits of Cairo 2050 based on the above 
mentioned cases, will not be flowing to residents of informal settlements. Various 
N GOs and organizations defending housing rights, such as Amnesty International, the 
Egyptian Centre for Housing Rights and the Habitat International Coalition, Housing 
and Land Rights Network, have denounced the forced eviction of slums and shacks' 
dwellers and asked the Egyptian government to prevent such forced evictions and 
protect its citizens. 
The Battle Over Property Rights 
This failure of a liberalized housing market to resolve the housing crisis can be 
understood once we take into account the complex nature of property rights that 
existed in urban areas and the political nature of the battles surrounding the 
redefinition of urban property rights since 1991. The crisis of housing was embedded 
within a larger struggle over property rights in urban Egypt. The outcome of this 
struggle was a generalization of market dependence amongst the popular classes. On 
the one hand, the elimination of informal housing and Nasser era rent controls 
represented a strategy of eliminating non-market access to housing, particularly for 
lower income Egyptians. At the same time, the promotion of home ownership through 
private mortgages strengthened the institutional power of finance capital and made 
Egyptians increasingly dependent on the market for their access to housing. 
Proponents of housing market liberalization argued that the housing crisis was 
linked to socialist era rent control laws and other regulatory and redistributive state 
policies.48 Rent control laws were blamed for creating disincentives for the private 
sector, thereby discouraging landlords from building new units and improving 
existing ones (Feiler 1992; McCall 1988). They also argued that rent control forced 
landlords to seek compensation between the market rent and regulated rent levels by 
48 Some scholars linked the housing crisis to the rise in population, See McCall (1988: 151-66). 
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resorting to key money (Mostafa 2003).49 The result was a shortage of supply and an 
increase of demand for affordable housing. 
These critics argued that the solution to the housing crisis was the 
liberalization of the housing market - resulting in liberalized rents and housing prices 
- and the removal of state's regulation of the rental market and its direct role in the 
provision of housing (McCall 1988). It was argued that the private sector should be 
encouraged to carry out production of housing and the state should limit its role to 
supplying land to the private sector (McCall 1988: 156). 
Another important step towards resolving the housing crisis was to formalize 
informal housing by empowering residents to purchase their own homes through 
private forms of financing. For de Soto (2000: 34, 254), the success of a market 
economy was particularly linked to the integration of the assets of the poor into the 
realm of the market, a process he referred to as the transformation of 'dead capital' 
into 'live capital', which he estimates at a value close to $US 241.2 billion, or 30 
times the value of all shares on Egypt's Stock Exchange. so De Soto (2000: 16) saw an 
opportunity for financial markets in countries where informal property systems could 
be absorbed into the chain of value and generate a surplus for investors: 
Formalization creates the rights, obligations, and legal 
instruments that enable the owners to relate to 
government and private business. It provides the 
mechanisms whereby the most important assets of the 
informal sector, namely real estate and businesses, can 
be used to secure the provision of goods and services, 
especially credit and infrastructure. Fonnalization 
transforms its beneficiaries into individually 
accountable customers. 
49 Among those who rented between 2001-06, over half paid key money (USAID 2007: 37). Law 
4/1996 also allowed landlords the right to charge advance rent for a number of months in order to 
ensure that the tenant had the ability to rent the place, which was in a sense legalizing the key money 
by recognizing the sole power oflandlords over tenants (Global Property Guide 2006). This exposes 
the false claim that rent control laws ofNasser encouraged key money and that rent liberalization 
would end the practice of key money (see Feiler 1992; Malpezzi 1998: 774-77). What seems to have 
happened is a change in form not in substance as landlords continue to exercise their power over 
tenants, before under the informal title of key money and now with the legal backing of Law 4/1996. 
50 Based on a 1998 survey by the ECES and the Institute of Liberty and Dem0cracy (ILD), de Soto 
argues that the extent of informal rural and urban real estate value is close to US $240 billion, which 
constitutes 64 per cent of total Egyptian real estate assets. Thus, close to 90 per cent of the population 
of Egypt "lives and works in informal dwellings and over 80 per cent of the rural population lives on 
informal holdings" (De Soto 2001: 25). 
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In June 2001, the Egyptian Assembly passed the Capital Market and Real Estate 
Mortgage Law 148 which extended rights for issuing mortgages to both bank and 
non-bank lenders. The Law provided clear procedures for foreclosures as well. In 
2002, a further attempt to boost the land market was made through reduction of 
registration fees for properties. The Mortgage Finance Law (MFL) was adopted in 
2003. The mortgage facility, which remained underdeveloped throughout the 1990s, 
became the central of focus ofNazifs government. In 2004, another law passed that 
allowed the issuance of mortgage backed securities. 51 
Although the prime objective of the MFL law (2001) was to buoy the real 
estate market that had collapsed in 2000 (evidenced by thousands of vacant residential 
and commercial properties), the persistence of high levels of unemployment and the 
high levels of down payments meant that the mortgage market remained beyond the 
reach of lower class Egyptians, as well as civil servants, doctors and teachers who live 
on fixed incomes.52 By 2005, four years after the introduction of the MFL, only two 
mortgage firms were established, offering only a dozen loans during those four years. 
Only 12 per cent of the properties across the country were registered by 2005, leaving 
financial firms in a weak position to offer credit or loans without guarantees of 
foreclosure and collateral (Sobhi 2005). 53 
51 Some of the major real estate developers (e.g. Palm Hills Development and SODIC) have argued that 
the only way for their businesses to remain viable is for the government to popularize and facilitate 
mortgages. Developers believe that they might be close to reaching the limits for luxury housing and 
for them to make inroads in middle income housing, mortgages are an essential component. In 2010, 
"Mortgages make up less than half a per cent of GDP, compared to 14 per cent of GDP in Morocco or 
over 80 per cent in Britain in 2008. Total mortgages in Egypt stand at 4.5 billion pounds and represent 
no more than 75,000 customers." See: (Zayed 2010). 
52 See: (ECHR, 2002; United Nations 2000; Wahish 2002). 
53 By 2000, real estate assets of 92 per cent of property holders were unregistered and without titles 
(Ikram 2006: 288). After the housing crisis in the US, the Egyptian government confidently argued 
that the Egyptian economy was safe from any such developments given that mortgages were not well 
developed and the economy was not based on mortgages. See: (Nafie 2008). By July 2010, there were 
13 mortgage companies in addition to the Egyptian mortgage refinancing company. Total issued 
capital of companies stood at LE 1,496.5 million with 73 per cent of the mortgages concentrated in · 
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According to Moheeb and Oteify (2006), the slow uptake of mortgages was 
the result of a confusing system of landownership; the existence of high registration 
fees on property; the absence of a credit bureau; and administrative and legal 
difficulties regarding the process of foreclosing. The success of the mortgage law 
would entail radical changes to the Civil Code, particularly Article 1052 which bans 
the confiscation of property. The government found ways of exempting banks from 
this requirement so that they could repossess mortgaged property in case of non-
payment. 54 Why mortgages were doomed to tackle the problem of affordable 
housing? During one of my interviews in Mallawi, an Upper Egyptian city, I was told 
that mortgages were not aimed at the majority of Egyptians for two reasons: first, 
many residents of Upper Egyptian govemorates relied on non-bank mechanisms for 
financing their needs by relying on community savings schemes; second, credit from 
official banks was out of reach of ordinary citizens given the interest rates of 30 per 
cent or higher and the conditionality of such credit on existing employment or 
property (Joya 2008). 
In the period 2001-06, over half of the housing acquired for purchase was 
through the informal sector (USAID 2007: 37). Under the old rent control law, the 
housing market was dominated by rental of apartments, a situation that Law 411996 
intended to reverse by promoting home ownership (USAID 2007: 34). Proponents of 
liberalization argued that with higher rents, residents would prefer to purchase a house 
supported by mortgages. However, between 2001and2006, of the 10 per cent of 
those surveyed who had acquired housing, only 18.8 per cent had opted to purchase 
their houses while the remaining majority relied on the rental market (USAID 2007: 
38). To USAID, this slow rate of home ownership was the result of an absence of 
adequate sources of financing, given that those who purchased their homes relied on 
personal savings or the sale of property. 
In urban Egypt, there have existed five main forms of property rights. 
However, each category has been further subdivided and qualified by laws that were 
Sixth of October govemorate while the remaining 27 distributed among the rest of the govemorates 
including Cairo. See: (Ministry of Investment 2011 ). 
54 Through the Mortgage Finance Law, the government created a third party to resolve the foreclosure 
disputes. Thus property appraisers would re-appraise property, determine its market value and sell it at 
auction. 
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passed under different regimes. Two centuries of various urban land policies resulted 
in the following forms of property: 
Table 8.5 Urban Land Tenure Forms 
Tenure Form Characteristics 
Leased Land Land owned by the state and leased on a long term basis to its occupants. 
Squatters may be granted this status, if they make a request to the 
Govemorate. Land that remains permanently under leasehold status and 
cannot be sold is known as hekr land. Other leased [ands can be converted 
from public to private ownership following the end of the lease period. 
Trust or Waqf It consists of property set aside for charitable or religious purposes and is 
Land usually administered by the Ministry of W aqf. 
WadAIAyad The civil code makes it possible for the possessor or user of a plot of land to 
gain ownership of that land if it is occupied continuously for 15 years and if 
the owner does not assert his rights. 
Private Private ownership or freehold. 
ownership or 
Freehold 
Public This land is registered as state property or land ownep by the state which 
Ownership serves a public purpose. It includes govemorate, Amlak land, land reform, 
antiquity and military properties. Ownership of land:, by the government in 
its various forms (public, Waqf and leased land) is the prominent type of 
ownership in Egypt as the government owns all the desert land. 
Source: Mostafa El Araby (2003: 444). 
According to this web of property forms, private property, rather than being the 
dominant form, remains one among many other forms of property. Since WWII, 
various rent control measures were adopted that provided security of tenure for urban 
tenants against evictions while giving tenants the right to pass on their leases to their 
children, spouses and other relatives (to the third degree of relation), with the 
condition that the inheritor had resided with the lease holder for one year prior to 
his/her death. Workers' access to housing was thus guaranteed by the rent control 
laws of the 1950s and 1970s, according to which rent levels were fixed and leases and 
contracts were transferrable to heirs, giving workers a sense of security. The 
significance of rent control laws for workers becomes clear from the following 
excerpt: 
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By giving tenants and their rightful heirs, including 
close relatives, a life- long right to hold onto a rented 
property, the housing laws of Egypt practically allowed 
tenants to share in property rights, especially if property 
is thought of as a bundle of rights, rather than a single 
one ... In Egypt, it is preferable to be a tenant, in 
agricultural land and in housing, because of frozen rent 
rates (Harik 1998: 61).55 
However, despite having such security for shelter, rent control laws did not offer 
permanent security of tenure. 
After 1991 radical changes in workers' rights to housing were implemented as 
the government began a process of liberalizing the housing market in the context of 
neoliberal reform. The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) played an important role 
in liberalizing land and housing markets by striking down Nasserist rent control laws 
as unconstitutional and upholding the rights of private property over other forms of 
property. For instance, in 1995, the SCC declared article 29 of Law 49/1977 
unconstitutional, which meant that rental contracts could no longer be extended to 
relatives to the third degree by marriage as this would be an "infringement on the 
rights of private property of the landlord" (Moustafa 2003: 911). This prepared the 
way for the passing of Law 4/1996 which ended rent control and its application to 
new buildings and to contracts that ended in 1996.56 
Taking effect on January 1, 1996, Law 4/1996 was applicable to rental 
contracts that ended in 1996 and to all new contracts that began in 1996. The Law 
cancelled any previous laws (Law 49/1977 and Law 136/1981) that opposed or 
contradicted any articles of Law 4. With the launch of Law 4/1996, rent control was 
dismantled as part of a larger process of creating a free market in housing and 
upholding the rights of capital over labour. Law 4, which regulates new rental 
55 For more on rent control benefits to workers see: McCall (1988: 162-63). 
56 Beside attacking socialist laws on residential tenancies, the SCC dismantled rent control for 
commercial contracts in 1996 and 1997. As a result of these rulings commercial contracts were 
liberalized and were subjected to market rents and they were no longer inheritable by children or 
partners of original tenants. The changes in the terms of commercial contracts affected more than 
800,000 commercial tenants who had lost their rights for secure contracts by 1997 (Moustafa 2003: 
911-12). The rulings in regard to commercial property subjected small businesses to market forces and 
thus facilitating the transfer of property to powerful landlords. 
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housing and units not previously rented, tied the rent to the Civil Code, i.e., freedom 
of contract between the landlord and tenant according to the principles of supply and 
demand. The Law offers no protection to the tenant. The rental relationship between 
the landlord and tenant completely terminates at the very moment the contract period 
ends. For the most part, the landlords resort to setting the contract period at one year, 
thereby giving the landlords the right to either raise the rent at the end of that year as 
much as they like or evict the tenants (El-Batran 2004). 
Despite the implementation of Law 4/1996, based on a USAID survey, two 
main tenure types dominated the urban housing market in Greater Cairo region: rental 
housing falling under the Nasserist era rent control laws (44 per cent in 2006) and old 
rental laws (27 per cent in 2006) (USAID 2008: xvii). Rental units falling under Law 
4/1996- and therefore subject to market rents -were still very limited at 9 per cent 
(ibid.). 57 Residents continued to rely on informal means for finding information about 
available houses for rent or purchase and used personal savings for purchasing homes. 
Given that Law 4/1996 subjects all newly constructed property to market 
rents, slum upgrading schemes become a mechanism to wipe out rent controlled 
property in informal settlements while opening up the possibility of constructing new 
housing subject to competitive rents. Similarly, New Towns built after 1996 are 
subject to free market rents, which explain their lack of attraction for workers. In this 
sense, urban development in the neoliberal era is characterized by two complementary 
class based processes: accumulation by dispossession and the imposition of market 
imperatives through the creation of a generalized condition of market dependence. 
The Scramble For Public/State Lands 
In the final analysis, the transformation of state property into private property was not 
only transforming the physical landscape through the creation of luxury villas and 
gated communities. This process of change was also creating new social relations 
whereby public resources such as water and especially land, are concentrated in the 
hands of a few for the benefit of a few. According to Khaled Ali, a labour lawyer and 
57 The remaining 8 per cent include purchase from the government and in-kind privileges (USAID 
2008: xvii). 
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head of the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights, under Mubarak, the 
promotion of class-based property laws intensified class conflict in the country. 
While many lived in informal settlements and cemeteries under constant fear of 
evictions by the state, a small minority benefited greatly from the liberalization of the 
housing market (El W ardani 2011 b; Reuters 2011 c ). 
While the constitution recognized different types of property rights, since the 
shift to neoliberalism, the government overlooked this constitutional right of citizens 
through its land dispossession practices. 58 For instance, in 2001, Prime Ministerial 
Decree No. 542 was issued to evict 80,000 residents of two neighbouring islands - El 
Qorsaya and El Dab.ab - in order to make way for a tourist complex. 59 The court 
ruled against the Decree stating that it was a misuse of prime ministerial power. 
While the 5,000 residents of El Qorsaya were relieved for the time being, a 
neighbouring island, El Dab.ab, was under similar attacks by the government. Despite 
the court's ruling in favour of El Qorsaya residents, the residents' rights to their land 
and homes were not recognized by the state, leaving them in fear that they might 
eventually be evicted. The Island's land is considered prime real estate that the 
government wanted to turn into a tourist complex (Hassan 2001 ). The government 
sent in bulldozers and the army to occupy parts of the island and to facilitate the 
construction work (Carr 2008c ). The dispossession of islanders, slum dwellers and 
Bedouins under the rubric of 'public utility' resulted in a direct transfer of 
expropriated lands to investors for touristic projects or other high end developments. 60 
Let us consider another example where the customary tenure rights were 
subordinated to rights gained by private land developers. Prior to the 1990s, Dab.ab -
a small town on the southeast coast of the Sinai Peninsula-was known as a small 
Bedouin fishing village, however since 1991, Dab.ab turned into a magnet for land 
developers leading to on-going unresolved conflicts over property rights. Most of the 
58 Hamzawy pointed out that Constitutional Amendments under Mubarak and Sadat gradually removed 
references to socialism, alliance of working forces and the leading role of the.public sector in 
development (Articles 4, 12, 24, 30, 33, and 56 of the Constitution). See: Brown et al. (2007). 
59 The Decree stipulated that the island of El Qorsaya and neighbouring El Dahab were to be cleared of 
their inhabitants, making way for a project described as being of 'public benefit'. See: (Hassan 2001; 
Carr 2008). 
60 Bedouins in Sinai argued that since the 1990s, the government took over their land and transferred 
them to investors for tourist projects. Bedouins saw this a clear violation of their rights and after the 
fall of Mubarak in February 2011, they began reclaiming what they considered was stolen land and 
property. See: (Amer 2011). 
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conflict surrounded public/state lands which in Dahab rested under customary tenure. 
The conflict pitched Bedouins against local government officials and land developers. 
As local governments tested their newly gained authority to dispose of public/state 
lands to investors, Bedouins' right to land crune under direct attack. While prior to the 
1990s investors had engaged in land transactions with the Bedouins, in the context of 
a liberalized land market, investors were encouraged to deal directly with local 
government officials and land deals between Bedouins and investors were no longer 
recognized as legal. Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, Bedouins lost control 
over their land and waters as developers moved in to build hotels and villas. The rush 
of developers created a property boom which benefited local government officials 
through land sales. Land prices which were at LE 10-30 per sqm in the 1990s reached 
LE 300-600 per sqm in 2006. However, there was no trickle down benefits of such 
developments to local Bedouins. Instead, locals experienced the uneven development 
of their village whereby coastal areas experienced heavy investment levels while 
inland areas were ignored, a problem that was not unique to Dahab but extended to all 
the Sinai region (World Bank 2006). 
While tenants demanded their property rights to be recognized by the state, the 
state often acted arbitrarily in regards to recognizing other forms of property rights. 
The Constitution's Article 4 recognized and offered protection for all forms of 
property. 61 However, the actions of the state under Mubarak disregarded this 
constitutional right of workers and peasants as other rights were trumped in the 
interest of upholding the rights of private property as happened in the case of the two 
Nile islands. The government refused to extend legal titles to those who had 
customary rights to land and opted to evict them, while extending free hold deeds to 
investors for thousands of feddans of state land transferred to them. This shows that 
titling is not simply a technical issue, but rather a political one that involves losers and 
winners.62 
61 Article 4 of the Constitution states that: "Economy in the Arab Republic of Egypt is based on the 
development of economic activity, social justice, guarantee of different forms of property and the 
preservation oflabourers' rights" (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971). 
62 Razzaz (1993) criticizes USAID's and de Soto's arguments that the legalization of property rights 
provides security of tenure and results in increased investments by residents. Razz.az found that legal 
property rights did not mean security of tenure, especially when home owners feared the loss of their 
homes due to inability to make mortgage payments (a common scenario in most Middle Eastern 
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Thus, contrary to de Soto's argument that the registration and titling of 
property was a step towards empowering the poor in this case, registration was not a 
mechanistic act of listing one's property. In an environment where various forms of 
property exist, the act of registration usually results in the dispossession of some and 
therefore the whole process was avoided by tenants or property holders. As Sait and 
Lim (2006: 78) point out: 
Registration may not be chosen because it is difficult to 
bring the prevailing local forms of land tenure within 
the officially recognized categories, or because the state 
refuses to register land ownership which challenges or 
impedes the state's own development plans. 
As the cases of Talaat Mostafa Group (TMG henceforth) and Palm Hills 
Development (PHD henceforth) demonstrated, the winners of this bonanza of state 
land privatization were a small number of development companies whose members 
had strong ties to government.63 The TMG and PHD companies were the biggest 
beneficiaries of land market liberalization. In 2007, with a land bank boasting 50 
million square meters of land, TMG was the biggest real estate developer in Egypt. 
Its projects included Al Rehab City (over 9.9 million square metres of land) and 
Madinaty, the latter launched in 2006 over an area of 3 3 million square metres 
(England 2007; Denis 2006: 54-55).64 
Madinaty was a signature PPP scheme that belonged to TMG, a major land 
developing company that had received 3,350 hectares of unserviced public/state land 
free of charge (World Bank 2006b: 61). In exchange for the free land, TMG had 
countries with precarious nature of jobs and low wages for the majority). Underlining the value of 
policies such as rent control in extending security of tenure, Razzaz (1993: 349) wrote: "A tenant in 
Cairo in a rent-controlled apartment might have more security of tenure than a first-time home buyer 
risking to default on his or her mortgage payments." Whatever the nature of transforming land 
relations and titling, one has to recognize that rather than being merely a technical issue in need of 
resolution, it is a political process that will result in winners and losers. For a general critique of de 
Soto's understanding of the relationship between property rights and economic development, See: 
(Samuelson 2001; Woodruff2001; Gilbert 2002; Miranda 2002; Ahiakpor 2008). 
63 Land transfers to the private sector often took the form of freehold or long-term, renewable lease 
holds. 
64 Madinaty designed by three American firms, includes residential villas, townhouses, apartments, as 
well as recreational and commercial areas, schools, medical facilities and hotels. It aims to cater to a 
population of 600,000 (Mostafa 2007). 
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agreed to install internal infrastructure services while NUCA was to deliver water 
supply, sewerage and roads. NUCA was also to receive 7% of the total cost in the 
form of housing units from TMG once the project is completed.65 
In 2008, Hisham Mustafa, then Chairman of TMG, was the Deputy Chairman 
of the Shura Council's Economic Committee, and a member of the ruling National 
Democratic Party's Supreme Policies Council. Tarek Talaat Moustafa, the current 
chairman of TMG was a member of parliament and headed the parliament's housing 
committee.66 In 2010, a court scrapped a US$3 billion land deal for Madinaty 
because it was obtained without a public auction (Al-Ahram Weekly 201 lb). Illicit 
gains investigations indicated that Mubarak's sons had shares in Madinaty which 
explains why TMG acquired such vast tracts of state land under Mubarak. 
PHD was founded in 2005 by Yaseen Mansour, the former Transport Minister, 
and Ahmed El Maghraby, the former Tourism and then Housing Minister.67 It is 
considered the second largest real estate developer despite only having been around 
for six years. Their total land bank stood at over 48.3 million square metres by 2008 
while the Company's market value was LE 19.5 billion in March 2008.68 Its projects 
are located in 6th of October City, New Cairo, Cairo-Alex Road, and the North Coast. 
The Company acquired its land at very cheap prices while its products served only the 
rich by providing luxury housing. 69 PHD was entangled in a number of court cases 
due to the illegal nature of its land acquisitions. The Company rose to prominence 
due to its links to Mubarak's family. Mubarak's son, Alaa, held LE 49,535,000 worth 
of shares in PHD (El-Karanshawi 2011). PHD greatly benefited from the 
65 In 2008, TMG profits reached LE 875 million. TMG signed a 50 year lease on a 19,589 square-
meter piece of land with the Holding Company for Tourism and Cinema, a deal that was worth LE 830 
million. TMG also won the right to build a 5 star hotel, as well as a Nile cruise ship (Hafez, Schurgott 
et al., 2008). 
66 In 2008, Mustafa was charged with the murder of his Lebanese pop star lover (Essam El-Din 
2008b). 
67 See: Palm Hills, website: http://www.palmhillsdevelopments.com. 
68 According to the Palm Hills website, Yasseen Mansour became Chairman of PHD's Board of 
Directors in January 2005. He was previously president and CEO ofMansotµ" and Maghraby 
Investment and Development Co. (MMID), as well as being a founding member and chairman of 
Manfoods, which operates the McDonald's franchise in Egypt. Mansour also acts as chairman of 
Mantrac, Untrac, Credit Agricole Egypt and Royal Sun Alliance Co. (Egypt), in addition to being a 
board member of the Commercial International Life Insurance Co. (CIL) 
(www.palmhillsdevelopment.com). 
69 Fifty per cent of the company's housing ranges between LE 500,000-1.5 million and the remainder is 
classified luxury which is over LE 1.5 million. See: (www.palmhillsdevelopment.com). 
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liberalization of the land market as it has seen the value of its.land bank rise 
exponentially, gaining one billion dollars in value in a single year. 70 Palm Hills 
Development became the subject of public criticism for its land acquisitions at below 
market values in a number of instances since 2007(Al-Ahram Weekly 2010). Ahmed 
Al Maghraby, former Housing Minister and one of the founders of PHD, was charged 
for selling to PHD state land below the market value (Aljazeera English Online 2011; 
El-Wardani 201 la). By March 2011, Palm Hills Development and Maghraby were 
under investigation over another state land deal in Aswan (Al Masry Al Youm 201 la; 
Reuters 201 la). The cases of Palm Hills' and TM G's illegal acquisition of state lands 
were not exceptions, although these may involve vast amounts of state land; other 
companies were involved in purchasing land below market value, often in closed 
deals and without public auctions, and violating the terms of their contracts by using 
agricultural land for real estate development and therefore increasing their earnings. 
Some of the other major cases involving the illegal acquisition of state lands 
and the deep ties between government officials ~d businessmen became public from 
2008 onward. For instance, in 2008, Ahmad Bahgat's Dreamland project was brought 
to a standstill when the land allocated for his company was repossessed by the 
government for Bahgat's violation of the terms of his contract (Hussein 2008a). In 
2009, documents surfaced demonstrating the involvement of businessmen and 
government officials in illegal acquisition of thousands of acres of land in Kafr El 
Sheikh Govemorate (Shalabi 2009). In the aftermath of the fall of Mubarak's regime, 
a string of other cases surfaced involving top government officials and real estate 
developers. The Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights filed a law suit 
against the Amer Group for illegally acquiring 2.8 million square meters of land in 
Fayoum Govemorate for a luxury resort project. The land was allocated to Amer 
Group based on a 99 year concession, by direct order and without public bidding 
(Farouq 2011). 
70 According to El-Wardani and Hussein, "By October 2009, CB Richard Ellis (world's leading 
commercial property and real estate services adviser) evaluated the market value of PHD's properties at 
EGP 38.1 billion (US$6.9 billion), with an increase of 15 per cent over the 1previous valuation a year 
earlier, with almost no increase in the land bank, according to a press release by PHD." See: (El-
Wardani and Hussein 2010). -
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In May 2011, former Minister of Tourism, Zohair Garana was sentenced to 
five years in jail for wasting public funds after he authorize~ the sale of state owned 
lands at well below the market price in the Red Sea tourist destination Hurghada (Abo 
Shanab 2011). In another case, 35 former members of parliament were forced to 
return illegally obtained state lands (Shalaby 2011; Shalaby and El Badry 2011 ). In a 
more prominent case, former Housing Minister, M. Ibrahim Soleiman was accused of 
selling 2550 feddans of state lands in Sheikh Zayed at below the market price to the 
Sixth of October Development and Investment Company (SOD IC henceforth). As it 
happened, the chairman of SOD IC at the time of this land deal was no other than the 
businessman Magdi Rasekh, the father-in-law of Mubarak's son, Alaa. Both 
Soleiman and Rasekh were referred to criminal court in May of 2011 (Al Masry Al 
Youm 201 lb; Reuters 201 ld). Most of these cases were brought into the open only 
after the downfall of Mubarak. It is still too early to estimate the scale of such illegal 
transfers of state lands to private investors (Nasr 2011).71 
Conclusion 
In the context of the shift towards neoliberalism, the privatization of the state 
enterprises repositioned the public sector's workers by rejecting their claims to 
benefits and fair wages from the state. Further attacks on workers' rights were seen in 
the dismantling of rent control laws which occurred due to demands of the new ruling 
class constituted of land developers. The dismantling of rent control offered a bonanza 
for capitalists who could charge unregulated rents for urban housing. 
Thus, the passing of Law 4/1996 constituted a political project of expanding 
the power of a new ruling class and subordinating workers' interests. As such, the 
last two decades of Mubarak's rule witnessed a systematic transfer of land to the 
emerging ruling class with the support of security and police forces. As the chapter 
demonstrated, moving beyond the veil of neoliberal ideology, one clearly sees that the 
71 A notable development, in July of2011, was the acquittal of Palm Hills Development and the former 
Housing Minister Maghraby by the courts. Whether officials or investors involved in illegal state land 
deals would be brought to justice and whether such lands would be repossessed is a matter that would 
be determined by the Egyptian public pressure and the court system. See Ahram English Online 
(2011c). 
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creation of 'free markets' in housing did not meet the demands of workers. Shortages 
in affordable housing have continued while the old public housing structures became 
dilapidated and unsafe for urban residents. Under these circumstances, slums and 
informal areas have continued to offer the only viable choice for those in search of 
housing in Egypt's major urban centres. The liberalization of the housing market 
underlined an important aspect of accumulation by dispossession as workers no 
longer enjoyed affordable rents or secure leases. Over the course of the 1990s and 
2000s, workers increasingly became market dependent for their housing needs being 
forced to compete for free market rents in an increasingly shrinking rental market. 
The next chapter examines rural housing in the context of a strategy of accumulation 
by dispossession that transformed social relations in rural areas. 
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Chapter 9. Peasants, Property Rights and Housing 
Perhaps the most influential Law that affected rural livelihoods and rural shelter was 
Law 96/1992 which came into effect in 1997 and resulted in the privatization of 
Egyptian agricultural sector. The Law set the stage for the transformation of social 
property relations by shifting power to landlords and entrepreneurs and away from 
peasants and tenant farmers. Law 96 removed rent controls and input subsidies for 
small farmers and peasants resulting in the dispossession of over one million peasants 
and small farmers and subjecting many others to short-term contracts and market-
based rents resulting in indebtedness. This chapter examines the changes in rural 
housing, especially the destabilization of peasant housing as a result of Law 96. In the 
first section, I discuss the context for the launch of Law 96 and the debate surrounding 
its launch. In a second part, I discuss the changing nature of property rights due to 
implementation of Law 96 and a shift in the balance of power in rural areas. In part 
three, drawing on the rich documentation of Land Centre for Human Rights and my 
own interviews with villagers in various govemorates, I attempt to demonstrate the 
impact of Law 96 on rural housing. 
As suggested earlier, the Mubarak era provides ample evidence of a 
widespread reversal of the agrarian reforms of the Nasser period. The result of these 
developments has been a large-scale transfer of land from peasants and small farmers 
to big landlords accompanied by a loss of housing experienced by those who have lost 
their lands.72 At the same time, traditional forms of property (Wad el Yad) 13 have 
been dismantled along with traditional use-rights that gave Egyptians non-market 
access to land. In general, peasants and small farmers are experiencing an 
intensification of economic insecurity and have been forced - out of economic 
necessity - to work for hourly or daily wages on the lands of others. With the loss of 
subsistence, their daily wages could not meet their cost of living forcing many to send 
72 The changes in tenancy regulations resulted in an upward redistribution of land whereby 7 per cent of 
the landed elite owned 60 per cent ofland (Farah 2009: 81). 
73 Wad el Y ad is a form of communal land tenure that was acknowledged by the Ottoman rulers of 
Egypt in the process of state formation in Egypt. In the contemporary context, it also refers to state 
lands which, if occupied for fifteen years uninterrupted and with no claimant, could be considered as 
owned by those who worked it under the 1949 Civil Code. However, most owners lack documentation 
to prove such ownership. 
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their children and women to work for bigger farms, a trend that has become dominant 
as agribusiness projects proliferated across the country. The response of the state vis-
a-vis the rural housing crisis has been twofold. On the one hand, by ignoring the 
needs of dispossessed and evicted peasants for alternative housing, the state 
positioned itself against the peasant communities. On the other, the state became the 
primary agent of dispossession by sanctioning the use of violence and employing its 
sec~ty and police forces in defence of local landlords. 
Agricultural Liberalization and the Transformation of Social Property Relations 
The liberalization of the agricultural sector embodied in Law 96 was part and parcel 
of the government's economic development strategy after 1991. Official arguments 
framed the liberalization proposal by highlighting the weaknesses of agricultural 
sector and its low contribution to GDP, however, liberalization was aimed to 
fundamentally shift the role of the state in agriculture and transform the existing 
property relations so as to make way for private investors and agri-business 
developments in Egypt.74 As Table 9.1 shows, the Nasserist reforms of the 1950s and 
1960s had reduced the concentration of land through its redistribution to peasants and 
farmers and securing their rights through rent controls. The fundamental goal of the 
proponents of reform was to re-orient the relationship of the state vis-a-vis peasants 
and small farmers by targeting state protections for the latter. 
Table 9.1 Sizes of Landholdings, 1950 and 1985-87 
Size of Share of Share of Share of Share of 
landholdings landholdings agricultural landholdings agricultural 
(fed.) (per cent) land (per cent) (per cent) land (per 
cent) 
1950 1950 1985-87 1985-87 
74 For instance only two years prior to the implementation of Law 96, proponents of agricultural reform 
pointed out that agriculture absorbed 34.5 per cent of Egyptian manpower, while contributing only 19 .3 
per cent to Egypt's GDP, which was seen by the Egyptian authorities as a sign of 'unproductivity' 
(NBE 1990; 1992). 
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100 and more 0.7 
50- <100 3.4 
10- <50 5.2 
5-<10 12.2 
3- <5 16.2 
1- <3 40.9 
<1 21.4 
Total 100.0 
Total 1,003 m 
number/ Area holdings 
Sources: (Ibrahim 2003). 
*fed. refers to feddans. 
29.7 
22.3 
11.5 
13.3 
9.8 
11.6 
1.8 
100.0 
6,144 m fed.* 
0.3 9.8 
0.12 3.0 
2.72 18.2 
7.0 16.6 
13.4 17.8 
44.43 28.6 
32.3 6.0 
100.0 100.0 
2,468 m 6,562 m fed. 
holdings 
Increasingly, the state control of pricing and marketing, ownership of 
cooperatives and agricultural industries, and support of smallholdings and traditional 
communal lands, were seen as the main determinants of agricultural stagnation. In 
1992, a year after Egypt embarked on a path of free market economy Law 96 for 
agricultural reform-which took effect in 1997-was adopted. The Law liberalized 
rents, prices and agricultural contracts. New rents were set at 22 times the land tax, 
contracts were determined by landlords and subjected to supply-demand rules and 
land prices exploded in 1997, the year Law 96 took effect. During the transition 
period, tenants were given the option of purchasing their plots at an agreed price or 
leaving the land in return for a compensation for the remaining period of the contract. 
Tenants could also continue as a tenant until the transition period eventually ended 
(Seyam and El-Bilassi 1995: 59). 
The proposed solution to the agricultural crisis was two pronged: to change the 
role of the ~tate in the sector and to transform agriculture into an export- oriented 
sector. These reforms were claimed to increase the labour absorbing capacity of the 
sector as well as increase agricultural productivity and contribution to the overall 
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GDP (Abdel Khalek 2001; Nassar and Mansour 2003; De Soto 1999).75 In order to 
attract private investors, a massive land reclamation project was launched aiming to 
bring under cultivation 3.4 million feddans ofland between 2000 and 2017 (Nassar 
and Mansour 2003; NBE 1992; EIU 1992/93). 
The introduction of Law 96 on June 28, 1992 was preceded by an ideological 
battle launched by the state media and landlords against peasants and small farmers. 
They portrayed peasants and small farmers as 'tyrants' who had victimized the 
landlords. Pro-government journalists, notably Al-Akhbar 's Jalal ad Din al 
Hammamsi, argued that tenants were raking in exorbitant profits from rising 
agricultural prices while landlords had become poor peasants. Similarly, the ex-Vice 
President of the State Council argued that the land reforms of 1952 produced a 
"feudalism of the tenant", whereby tenants oppressed the landlords (Al-Ahram 1992 
cited in Saad 2002: 108). Another justification offered by an ex-councillor of the 
Court of Appeal was that: 
For over forty years the tenant's pockets were filling 
with thousands of pounds ... that he bought agricultural 
land and rode in Mercedes and Peugeot cars. This 
happened while the owner gave up half of his land for 
the tenant so that the latter would allow him to sell the 
land so he can finance the marriage of his daughter or 
son or to be able to pay for his daily· life expenses after 
prices have rocketed. The balance was titled and the 
tenant became the owner of 70 and 80 feddans (which 
he acquired) from selling crops he planted on the 
owner's land ... It is high time, especially during the 
reign of President Mubarak, who is known for his 
tendency to issue laws that are just and do not contradict 
Islamic Shari' a and are not imported from Communist 
countries, it is high time to get rid of those laws and to 
alleviate the ip.justice befalling the downtrodden citizen 
who have lost everything except their belonging to their 
country (Al-Wafd, 17 June 1992 cited in Saad 2002: 
109). 
75 The Mubarak: National Project/or the Youth, launched in 1987, intended to distribute state lands to 
university graduates at a price of LE 1000 to LE 2000 per feddan, payable over fifteen years, with a 
grace period of four years. By early 1999, 300,000 feddans had been distributed at 5.6 feddans per 
graduate/settler (Nasser and Mansour 2003: 153; Bush 2002: 25). 
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Other proponents of liberalization attacked the tenure system that the Agrarian 
Reforms had introduced: 
[In the village] there are cafes everywhere and secret 
video clubs that show forbidden films which fellah 
youth watch until dawn. They thus wake up the day 
after unable to work and produce. I think there is a link 
between agrarian reform law and these negative 
phenomena. For the low rents make the tenant lazy and 
he does not exert any effort to increase his production, 
since the very least of produce will suffice to pay the 
rent and there will still be a reasonable amount that he 
spends on his own enjoyment [ mazaq]. And no doubt if 
the fellah knew that he has to pay a reasonable rent for 
the land he will certainly exert an effort to increase his 
production, and no doubt this increase will be beneficial 
for society as a whole (El-Gumhuriyya, 2 September 
1988 cited in Saad 2002: 109). 
Resonating with the demands of landlords, the fundamental objective of liberalization 
was the restoration and generalization of private property rights in order to attract 
private sector investment to Egypt. Warning the government about delaying the 
passing of Law 96, Al-Hamza De'bes, the Deputy Leader of Al-Ahrar-the Liberal 
Party - wrote: 
I am warning the government against giving into 
[demands for repealing or postponing the law]. I am 
drawing the attention of Prime Minister Ganzouri to the 
dangers of responding to such calls, for this would harm 
investment in Egypt and would drive away investors, 
and discourage them from investing in Egypt. For 
Egypt to them will seem under the control of 
communists, leftists and N asserists, those who do not 
respect private property (Al-Ahrar, January 1996 cited 
in Saad 2002: 119). 
In its various bulletins, the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) put up a defence of rights 
of private property and thus rights of landlords. It argued that the state should remove 
all obstacles that prevented landlords from fully enjoying their rights to private 
property. Defending the legislation, the NBE stated that the state should liberalize 
economic relations and create "appropriate conditions for peaceful co-existence 
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between landowners and tenants," as well as "fair treatment of land owners, respect 
for private ownership, safeguarding of property rights, conformity with the rapidly 
changing economic and social situation at home and elsewhere, in favour of private 
ownership" (NBE 1992: 215-16). 
Rich farmers and large landlords viewed the liberalization process as their 
chance to reverse the Nasserist agrarian reforms. They claimed that rental values had 
been kept unfairly low, thereby reducing profits and discouraging agricultural 
investment. They also argued that peasants were incapable of improving agricultural 
production either out of laziness, incompetence or due to an absence of market 
imperatives. In the meantime, landlords actively undermined peasants' rights to land 
and tenure security by circumventing rent control laws, refusing to grant written 
contracts, and pushing for short-term single season contracts that remained exempt 
from rent control. 
Those affected by Law 96 included small scale farmers such as cash rent 
tenant and/or sharecroppers, small tenants and owner-cultivators, and full and part-
time farmers who relied on a secondary source of income. Without access to media 
outlets and lacking organizational capacity and resources, the latter group faced an 
uphill battle against landlords and the state. Peasants and smal~ farmers believed that 
because they had improved the land through their labour, they had a moral and 
uncontested right to their plots. With this moral belief shaping their perceptions vis-A-
vis the Law 96, in 1997 when the Law took effect, tenant farmers and leaseholders 
reacted violently by setting fire to a branch of the Ministry of Agricultw-e in the Nile 
Delta hoping to destroy official records that could establish landownership in favour 
oflandlords. The same year, 219 meetings were called by farmers' committees. 
However, they did not put forward a strategy to stop the evictions. 
Administrative Aspects of Law 96 and Land Disputes 
Since the 1960s agrarian reforms, tenants and landless peasants had enjoyed access to 
land at fix rents, and subsidies for agricultural inputs. With the shift in the Egyptian 
economy towards a free market, the role of the state in agriculture and vis-a-vis 
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agricultural actors (tenants, peasants and landlords) changed. The government framed 
Law 96/1992 within its larger economic development strategy and the need for food 
security in an increasingly integrated world economy. The adoption of Law 96 and the 
subsequent liberalization of agricultural sector were expected to boost food security as 
well as increase the productivity of agricultural export sector. The expansion of 
agribusiness in turn depended on the availability of land. 
As Egyptian officials have repeatedly emphasized, only 3 per cent of Egypt's 
land is cultivable amounting to 8 million feddans. Of this, only 2 per cent was being 
cultivated using modem agricultural technologies in 2006 (World Bank 2006b: 73).76 
Thus, rather than tackle unequal ownership structures in a systematic fashion, various 
governments engaged in desert land reclamation projects since the 1960s in order to 
expand the total cultivable land stock. Although, land reclamation projects contributed 
3 million feddans to agricultural land however, since the 1980s, an estimated 30,000 
feddans of agricultural land have been lost to urban sprawl on the outskirts of major 
urban centres cancelling the positive impact of the additional reclaimed land (World 
Bank 2006b: 73). 
After the 1990s agricultural liberalization, government and investors' attention 
turned to public/state lands which fell under various customary forms of tenure but 
were officially controlled by the state. Control over public land for agriculture and 
agri-business development was divided territorially along the Zimam lines. Land 
outside of the Zimam was under control of mainly the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Land Reclamation (MALR)'s General Authority for Reconstruction Projects and 
Agricultural Development (GARP AD henceforth). Agricultural land within the 
Zimam is largely privately owned or falls under the MALR's Agrarian Reform 
Authority (ARA), which had allocated it to small landless farmers as part of the 
Agrarian Reform Program (World Bank 2006b ). 77 
76 CAPMAS stats indicated that by 2013, Egypt's total agricultural land constituted 3.5 per cent of the 
total land mass of the country or 8.5 million feddans. By 1964, the government program for land 
reclamation added a total of 5,388 million feddans to the total cultivated lantl of the country. By 2011, 
the total amount ofreclaimed land had reached 8,619 million feddans (CAPMAS 2013). During the 
1960s, the reclaimed land was often redistributed to landless peasants or owner-cultivators. Under 
Mubarak, most of the reclaimed land was distributed to investors either for the purpose of agri-business 
or for commercial real estate projects. 
77 
"GARPAD was established by Presidential Decree No. 269 in 1975 as the main government 
authority responsible for public land allocation for agriculture and land reclamation purposes .... 
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To make land available for investors, the government embarked on changing 
laws that had restricted investors' access to public/state lands. International Financial 
Institutions supported a reduction of state control in the distribution and managements 
of public/state lands which was in line with the former' s support for a reduced role for 
the state in the economy in general. Previously public/state land was regulated by Law 
No. 143/1981 which was seen as the state dictating supply ofland to the private sector 
by defining geographic locations for projects (World Bank 2006b: 75). Thus, legal 
changes in the management and disposal of public/state lands removed the role of the 
state in guiding regional economic development through directing investors in 
different parts of the country. 
A crucial step towards this reformed role of the state in the economy was the 
introduction of Law 96/1992, which took effect in October of 1997, effectively 
replacing the Agrarian Reform Law 178/1952. The latter Law had established rent 
control and granted tenants security of tenure including the right to transfer the 
tenancy contract to heirs and thus all these gains came under attack by Law 96. The 
new Law gave landlords the right to take back their lands which had been distributed 
as part of Agrarian Reform Law. They could charge free market rents and issue short-
term contracts with the advantage of raising rents annually. Ultimately, these changes 
directly challenged existing customary forms of tenure and access to public/state lands 
and Agrarian Reform lands enjoyed by peasants, Bedouins and tenants. 
Within the framework of the liberalized land market, disposal of public/state 
lands were re-organized under a number of newly created holding companies, the 
largest of which was the West Delta and South Valley Development Holding 
Company (WDSVDHC), established by Presidential Decree No. 25/2002. By 2000s, a 
significant portion of public/state lands had already been redistributed to the private 
sector and so Decree No. 25 only applied to lands that had not been already 
distributed which included 100,000 feddans in the west of Delta and 265,000 feddans 
around the international highway along that Mediterranean Sea. 78 
GARPAD's role was consolidated by Law No. 143of1981 which empowered it to manage all land 
reclamation activities .... GA.RP AD is responsible for financing the delivery of needed infrastructure 
and services from the budget allocated to it by the State"(World Bank 2006b: 76). 
78 The Toshka Project, which began in 1997, aimed to create an alternative delta parallel to the Nile 
Valley, involving large-scale land reclamation linked to industrial development, tourism and mining 
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At the same time, power to dispose land was devolved through Law 
No.7/1991 so that local governments could manage or dispose public/state lands 
within the Zimam (govemorate territory). 79 However, these changes did not remove 
the authority of GARP AD whose role continued to supersede those of the 
Govemorates. Nonetheless, the government implemented a series of other laws to 
facilitate allocation of public/state lands by keeping investors' choice in mind. Thus, 
Law No. 5/1996 regulated the free allocation of public land and real estate at nominal 
fee for development or investment promotion and authorized the transfer of land 
ownership after the completion of construction and beginning of operation (World 
Bank 2006b ). 
To promote the newly adopted, free market guided distribution of public/state 
lands, the Egyptian government launched a National Development Plan/Investment 
Opportunities Map in 1997 to be completed by 2017. According to the Plan, 3 .4 
million feddans were made available for potential investment through reclamation 
projects, the first 2 million feddans of which were allocated through public auctions 
according to free market mechanisms (World Bank 2006b: 77-78). 
With the withdrawal of the state from direct reclamation of public/state desert 
lands GARPAD also faced a financial crisis as it owed LE 18 billion to the National 
projects and the creation of new urban communities to relieve congestion in the Nile Valley. It was 
intended to settle six million people and cultivate between 800,000 and 2.2 million :feddans of land. 
Concentrating on growth of organic produce, the exports were aimed for Eliropean markets. Toshka 
was scheduled to be completed and running by 2017 with a total cost of LE 200-300 billion (NBE 
1997). However, others estimated that it would cost around LE 100 billion ;per year over the course of 
the Project (Moore 1997: 5). The state would fund 20-25 per cent of the Mal cost while the private 
sector was expected to contribute the remainder of the cost. The government's share in this 
development included the building of the pumping station (at a cost of LE 1.48 billion), 70 kilometres 
of canals as well as infrastructure (Mitchell 2002: 273). Five billion cubic meters of water from Lake 
Nasser (out of a total of 55.5 billion annual water allowance for Egypt) and 'as well as subterranean 
water accessed via 114 wells would irrigate half a million feddans of 'scorched desert land' (NBE 
1997: 39). By 2010, only seven years away from its projected completion, the Project was nowhere 
close to completion. Private investors had faltered on their promises of investment and development 
work and were embroiled in lawsuits over illegal acquisition of state lands. One of the main investors, 
who had received 100,000 feddans ofland as part of the Project was the Saudi financier Prince al-
Walid bin Talal (Mitchell 2002: 273). The contract of purchase had granted outright ownership of the 
land once the company had completed payments, in violation of rules stipulating that the land should 
be completely reclaimed and planted within five years before bestowing ownership upon the developer. 
79 Zimam refers to the limits of the perimeter that comprises urban lands within village cordons, as well 
as cultivated and uncultivated agricultural lands that have been surveyed by .the Egyptian Survey 
Authority and included in the register of agricultural lands and real estate maintained by the Real Estate 
Tax Department (Madbouly 2005). 
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Investment Banlc To recuperate its financial losses, GARP AD began selling 
unserviced lands generating LE one billion in the six-month period from August 2006 
to the beginning of2007. In the space left by the GARPAD, the private sector stepped 
in to provide infrastructure as well as inflate the prices of such lands (World Bank 
2006b: 92-94). GARPAD was accused of selling ~gricultural land at below the market 
prices to local power holders while depriving peasants from such access (Essam El 
Din 2004a; 2004b ). 
To operationalize Law 96, the government set up 'provincial reconciliation 
committees' in 1996 to settle potential disputes expected to arise as a result of Law 
96. According to a study conducted by the Agricultural Policy,and Reform Program 
(APRP) in 1999, the reconciliation committee members were largely composed of 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and from the cooperatives. It claimed that 
these "were community members who were trusted by both tenants and landlords" 
(USAID and the MALR 1999). However, given that most of the meetings of 
reconciliation committees were held in police stat~ons, it suggests that the government 
anticipated resistance from farmers and peasants. 
Table 9.2 offers a long historical view of the structure ofland ownership and 
following the adoption of Law 97, Table 9 .3 shows the begirullng of changes that 
were documented between 1997 and 2000. 
Table 9.2 Distribution of Land ownership in Egypt, 1896, 1952, 1995 
Land Owners Area (per Owners Area Owners Area (per 
Owned in (per cent) cent) (per cent) (per (per cent) cent) 
Feddans cent) 
1896 - 1896 1952* 1995** 1995 
1952 
50and 1.0 45.2 0.4 34.2 0.2 14.5 
more 
10- <50 5.1 20.8 2.5 21.6 1.6 18.8 
5-<10 6.7 9.5 2.8 8.8 2.3 9.6 
<5 87.2 24.5 94.3 35.4 95.9 57.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Total in 1,153 5,299fed. 2,800 5,922 3,908 5,887fed. 
1,000 fed. 
Average 4.6 fed. 2.1 fed. 1.5 fed. 
ownership 
in fed. 
Sources: (Ibrahim 2003) 
Note: These tables indicate the recorded size and structure of ownership of over 8 
million feddans. However, unregistered land (customary tenure land and state/public 
land) cannot be accurately measured due to lack of documented evidence (official and 
unofficial). 
*prior to the revolutionary land reforms of the Free Officers 
**prior to the implementation of Law 92 of 1992 
The adoption of Law 96 resulted not only in a reversal ofNasserist land 
reforms, but also entailed deeper reform of various tenure forms that predated 
Nasser's agrarian reforms. In other words, Law 96 began a process of annihilating and 
collapsing a diverse set of social relations in land and subordinating them to one 
single form of property- private property. To see this transformation through, the 
government rewrote the Civil Code in order to remove any obstacles from the path of 
institutionalizing private property as the dominant form of property in land. 
Table 9.3 Distribution of Land Ownership by Size of Holding, 2000 
Land Owned in feddans Share of Owners (per Share of Agricultural Land 
cent) (per cent) 
100 and more 0.7 8.6 
50- <100 0.9 6.4 
20- <50 1.4 9.4 
10- <20 2.8 9.7 
5- <10 4.3 10.4 
4-<5 3.7 8.4 
3-<4 5.0 9.1 
2-<3 8.4 10.5 
1- <2 14.3 11.1 
<1 58.5 16.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Total number/area 4,056,800 owners 6,108,400 fed. 
Sources: (Ibrahim 2003) 
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These changes constituted a fundamentally contentious process as they 
resulted in accelerating dispossession in rural communities. The government, in 
collaboration with USAID, released a report in 1999 claiming'that because of the 
reconciliation committees, the implementation of Law 96 was peaceful and "police 
action was rarely used to settle disputes, and the courts were seldom required to 
intervene." The report went on: "Almost all landlord and tenant relationships have 
been peacefully reconciled." Yet in the same paragraph, it is mentioned that "police 
intervention at the outset was a sign of the government's serious commitment to 
implementation; hence, tenants and other concerned parties found it necessary to 
comply" (USAID and MLAR 1999: 1, 3). 
Since the passing of Law 96, desert land, which legally belongs to the state as 
public property, was handed out to private investors. This often led to conflicts that 
involved state authorities, new landowners and Bedouins.80 Wad el Yad landholders 
often lacked documentation proving their ownership, which made it easy for the state 
to evict them off their lands. Often Wad el Yad landholders rely on custom and an 
oral history that the state no longer recognized. These two categories of land were 
transformed into private property by means of Law 96/1992. 
Another category of landed property in dispute pertained to the Agrarian 
Reform lands that were nationalized under Nasser to become state land. Under 
Nasser, Waqfland- religious land-was brought partially under state control. Private 
lands that exceeded the land ceilings established under the Free Officers, and the 
lands of the royal family members had also been nationalized and redistributed to 
peasants and small farmers. Although nationalized, the titles to these Agrarian 
Reform lands remained in the hands of their previous religious owners. Thus, 
recipients of such redistributed lands lacked official documentation that served as 
proof of ownership. Original owners who were expropriated under Nasser began 
reclaiming their rights of ownership to such lands. Various state authorities such as 
the Ministry of Awqaf, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Agriculture, Agricultural 
8° For instance see the case of Abu Fana Monastry in Minya govemorate whereby the state sold 
Bedouin land to Christian Missionaries in 2008 which led to a protracted conflict between the Bedouins 
and the Missionaries in Abu Fana (Johannsen et al., 2009). 
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Associations and various governors took advantage of the precarious nature of 
Agrarian Reform lands by forcing tenants off their land and from their homes. 81 
By 2010, USAID estimated that only ten per cent of real estate in Egypt was 
registered with the Civil Authorities (USAID 2010). The remaining unregistered 
ninety per cent were held through customary forms of contracts (e.g., Wad el Yad, 
'Urfi contracts). 'Urfi contracts prove unregistered yet legal possession ofland and 
are widely common in various parts of Egypt, especially in Upper Egypt. To claim 
full ownership of a plot of land would require the stamp of approval of local 
authorities. However, local governors could choose to ignore the validity of such 
customary forms of possession and deny full ownership of such land to their owners. 
This made the process of registration of land a very political process that could result 
in dispossession and transfer of land to new owners. 
In short, the privatization of agricultural sector served as a crucial step towards 
consolidation of property and large estates. However, this process could not have been 
accomplished without dismantling various forms of access to land that had 
historically characterized rural Egypt. The next section elaborates these diverse 
arrangements that formed the basis of rural production and reproduction and which 
became contested after the passing of Law 96. 
The Contestation Over Property Rights 
The land tenure system in Egypt has been the culmination of various laws and decrees 
rooted in Roman law, Islamic Sharia, Ottoman laws, French laws as well as secular 
Civil Codes. The last, in the form of the Civil Code of 1949, combined most of the 
former categories oflaws (see Appendice B). Outside of urban areas, land falls into 
two categories: state lands (both public and private domain) and private property. 
Public domain lands refer to lands that serve public utility and are owned by the state. 
These include rivers and streams, roads, military installations, squares, areas allocated 
81 The one category of land that does not entail disputes falls under private property or freehold, which 
is registered with the local office of the land registration division of the Ministry of Justice, and is 
owned by private persons. As this category does not form a part of the conflict over land, I have not 
focused on this form of landholding. 
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for public ways, and publicly owned land which can be used for purposes of land 
development. Private domain lands refer to desert land, uncultivated or unclaimed 
land to which the state has the ultimate legal right as any private landowner. The 
Civil Code of 1949 enabled the acquisition of such land through cultivation without 
the necessary permission of the state. Wad el Yad land and other forms of customary 
tenure, including land occupied by Bedouins, fall under this category. 82 
The 'real rights of ownership' were qualified in the Civil Code of 1949. 
Ownership rights comprised several elements, including 'bare ownership', the right of 
usufruct, the right of the user, and the right of habitation. After the adoption of the 
Agrarian Reform laws of 1952, the rights of ownership were further restricted by 
limiting the amount of land one could own, and its use was qualified by attaching the 
phrases 'public interest' and a 'social function' to ownership rights. Discrepancies 
between official laws and actual practice, however, continued to shape the nature of 
land relations. Bedouins who occupy desert lands and use it for their subsistence 
were never granted ownership of their lands and thus they continued to use their lands 
on a customary basis. In 1981, customary rights to nationalized lands were 
legitimized in cases where land had been improved, "provided that a system of 
irrigation was in place prior to 1981" (USAID 2010: 7). 
Since 1997, private property backed by deeds dating to the pre-Nasser era 
have been recognized as the legitimate form of property over and against the rights of 
property that were established by the Agrarian Reform laws of Nasser. After Law 96, 
those who had state lands, Agrarian Reform lands or Wad el Yad land were all 
subjected to potential dispossession by the state authorities across Egypt. Law 96 
shifted the balance of power in favour of landlords and rich farmers while 
dispossessing small farmers and peasants, and the stage was now set for the landlord 
offensive against peasant and smallholder tenures. The new claimants were not 
limited to deed holders and inheritors, but also included investors and political 
82 These lands were previously known as mawat lands under the Ottomans and later under Mohammed 
Ali. In nineteenth century the state offered this land to anyone who cultivated it and paid taxes to the 
state. The practice continued into the twentieth century whereby agricultural land without owners 
could be occupied on the condition that it was used for cultivation. Fifteen years of farming such lands 
would bring the cultivator closer to owning the land, but ownership rights were not granted directly. 
Often lands in Upper Egypt and in other parts fell into this category whereby cultivators continued to 
enjoy the use ofland without feeling the need to register it as private property. See: Debs (2010: 76-
79). 
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influential figures who took advantage of the opening offered by Law 96. In a sense, 
Law 96 not only restored older forms of private property by undoing Nasser's 
reforms, it also asserted the primacy of private property against traditional forms of 
tenure, thereby signifying a significant transformation of social property relations in 
the countryside. 
The state clearly played a role in this process of accumulation by 
dispossession. The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) took an increasingly active 
role in defending the rights of private property in almost all cases since the 1990 and 
weakened the rights of tenants. The Court began by reversing laws that had offered 
protection and security to tenants. The Court decided that restrictions on private 
property should not enrich the tenant while impoverishing the owners, arguing that 
giving tenants' rights that were "unjustified by his legal status," was a form of 
exploitation of the owner (Hill 1998: 136). 
Throughout the 1990s, sec rulings went further in redefining the nature of 
private property itself by stripping it of any social obligation or limitations. For 
example, the sec redefined private property as "the product of its owner's efforts" 
and "a tool of development and embodiment of free will." As such, "the owner should 
enjoy the constitutional protection of his property", and the "legislator does not have 
the right to change its nature, fragment it, or restrict the liberties emanating from it 
without a social need." In a case decided in early 1997, the Court held that the 
property right "is an affirmed right against all. Only the owner has the right to benefit 
from his property. The violation of private property is 'an aggression against a legally 
stipulated right"' (quoted in Hill 1998: 137, 139). In the process of defending private 
property, therefore, the Court redefined the status of private property and asserted its 
own role as its guarantor.83 
Dispossession took at least two different forms. In many cases - discussed in 
detail below - smallholders working on Agrarian Reform lands were forcefully 
83 Another important study of the Egyptian supreme Constitutional Court and its rulings has been 
offered by Tamer Moustafa (2003). Moustafa argues that despite an authoritarian political system, the 
Egyptian state in 1979 created an independent constitutional court that could provide institutional 
guarantees and security for private property. Moustafa examined the court rulings from 1980-2000. In 
the economic sphere, the Court embraced the regime's concerns by striking down socialist gains and 
facilitating the way for a 'free market' economic system. As a result, the Court since 1990 was actively 
engaged in overturning Nasserist social and economic reforms all in the name of defending rights of 
private property. 
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evicted by the state in the face of rival claimants bearing pre-1952 property deeds. In 
other cases, dispossession occurred through the imperatives of the market. Between 
1992 and 1997, land prices rose by 500 per cent or more depending on the 
govemorate (El-Madany 2007). 84 While peasants and smallholders had the option of 
purchasing their plots of Agrarian Reform land th~ dramatic increase in the price of 
land prevented many peasants and smallholders from being able to purchase their 
plots. Those who could often had to resort to private forms of fmancing that resulted 
in unsustainable degrees of indebtedness that eventually resulted in dispossession. 
Similarly, e rent increases, exacerbated by the proliferation of short-term (12 month), 
often unwritten and revocable contracts, meant that an increasing number of tenants 
could not pay their rent (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003: 120). 85 In Beni Suef and 
Monoufiya, Qalyoubiya, Kafr Elwan and Qena, rents had increased from LE 300-400 
to LE 3000-4000 per feddan between 1997 and 2008. Lands rented after 1997 were 
based on insecure often unwritten contracts revoked at landlords will. Tenants were 
also made responsible to pay for the general upke~p and improvement of the land. 
Outlays for irrigation, sewage maintenance, and other farm equipment became the 
sole responsibility of the tenant just as the costs of water, fertilizer, seeds and other 
basic inputs have risen. 86 
The liberalization of rents and prices, and the downloading of operational 
costs to tenants were exacerbated by the elimination of state provision of credit for 
agricultural inputs. The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit 
(PBDAC) was divested of its developmental role and transformed into a financial 
institution guided by the profit motive. It liberalized its interest rates for agricultural 
credit and eliminated agricultural subsidies at the same time that rents and land prices 
were increasing. 87 
84 Before the Law a farmer could rent three feddans for LE 400 per year; but after the Law the same 
plot of land would cost LE 6000 rent per year (El-Madany 2007). 
85 Rents increased from 7 to 22 times the land tax for a transition period of five years (1992-97) after 
which the 'free market' determined rent levels (Law 96, Art. 33). 
86 In 2005, the privatization of water delivery systems resulted in reduced access to water by smaller 
farmers as most of the water was directed towards agribusiness mega projects. In the govemorate of 
Fayoum and Beheira, farmers' acce.ss to irrigation water was completely blocked as the water was 
redirected towards mega projects. 
87 Thus in the wake of Law 96/1992, PBDAC raised its interest rates between 14•16 per cent, while 
reducing its supply of fertilizer to 10 per cent, leaving the rest of the supply to the private sector. 
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One of the landmark projects of alternative livelihoods and housing under 
Mubarak - the Mubarak Graduate Project (MGP from now on) - was illustrative of 
the pressures that direct producers became subjected to after the liberalization of 
agriculture and its associated legal reforms. The MGP headed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR), began in the 1980s and expanded since 
1988, with the aim of providing employment and housing for unemployed university 
graduates. By 2006, the project had used up 25 per cent of the r,eclaimed land 
whereby university graduates as well as dispossessed tenants and peasants were given 
5-10 feddans of land "at a price set to cover the cost of infrastructure provision 
(supply of water irrigation), and in some cases coupled with housing units and 
community services to encourage settlement in these areas" (World Bank 2006b: 
74).88 The land, mostly located in the Western Delta and the Toshka Valley, was 
given on a long-term lease with the possibility of full ownership after the full payment 
was made. During the first five years of the Project, graduates were to receive 
financial aid and agricultural expertise from the government to set up their farms, 
however, since the liberalization of the agricultural sector, state support for graduates 
was radically cut down with most graduates left to their own means often leading to 
their indebtedness (Adriansen 2009: 666). 
According to the LCHR (2004b), the MGP failed to enable graduates to 
succeed as farmers or have secure tenure in their housing. In Beheira, El Wady El 
Gedid, Fayoum and Sohag governorates, graduates were left to their own means to 
reclaim their lands. Often they had to rely on high interest loans for the purchase of 
agricultural inputs from the market and suffered from lack of access to irrigation 
water. The LCHR (2009) documented a large number of cases of graduates who were 
indebted and were threatened with imprisonment by the Bank and the state. For 
instance, in Amereya, Alexandria, Mubarak Project problems ranged from irrigation, 
debt and lack of state support graduates. In general, due to high costs associated with 
reclaiming desert land for the purpose of agricultural projects, small farmers and 
graduates did not succeed in making a living from such projects. Instead they became 
PBDAC also reduced its purchases of crops limiting it to wheat and maize while its storehouses were 
privatized and their staff either reduced or laid off (Nassar and Mansour 2003: 149). 
88 The remaining portion of the reclaimed lands has been used by the MOMDP and the Ministry of 
Interior for their own agricultural and agro-business projects. 
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heavily indebted and often abandoned their projects in search of jobs in urban areas or 
returned to their old villages as day labourers (LCHR 2008a; 2008g). Despite the 
failure of desert reclamation projects, the government was not ready to hand out such 
lands to those who had been dispossessed as a result of Law 96 as only 12,000 of 
them received alternative lands in the desert (LCHR 2005e; 2005f). Desert projects 
also failed due to absence of services such as transportation, clean drinking water and 
health facilities (LCHR 2006c; 2009f). 
Ironically, in cases of success in the reclaimed lands, due to the ambiguity of 
the land titles, the authorities deemed these lands profitable and transferred them to 
private investors. For instance, the governor of El Wadi El Gedid forcefully evicted 
graduates of MGP and took over their improved and reclaimed lands and homes for 
the purpose of selling the land to private investors for higher returns (LCHR 2007b ). 
In another case in Dar El Salaam, Sohag, the governor changed the terms of contracts 
of MGP land recipients of 1997 increasing their payments and forcing graduates into 
indebtedness and landlessness (LCHR 2009a). In the village ofEl-Mrashda, Qena, 
\ 
the governor took away 4,000 acres of reclaimed lands from 200 farmers - who had 
developed the land over a period of ten years (1998-2008) - and transferred it to a 
private Japanese company that specialized in agricultural investment (LCHR 2008f). 
In another case, farmers in Wady El N aqra who had reclaimed desert land over 
decades demanded the government to recognize their rights to the land. However, 
they were told that their improved land was sold by one of the Agricultural 
Companies of the Ministry of Agriculture to some investors and that they had to leave 
their land (LCHR 2009i). 
The inaccessibility of new loans and the burden of high interest rates on their 
past loans effectively forced peasants and tenants to abandon their lands. In 2007, in 
various governorates across the country (Sohag, Minoufiyya, Minya, Qena, Kafr el 
Sheikh, Alexandria, Qalyoubiya, Giza, Damietta), thousands of farmers were 
threatened with imprisonment because they were unable to repay their debts to the 
Bank of Development and Agrarian Trust. Most of the indebted farmers had run 
away from their homes and villages and were in hiding, some in the mountains of 
Qena. By 2010, an estimated 225,000 farmers had been imprisoned due to unpaid 
debts (Golia 2011; LCHR 2007). 
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As interest rates were liberalized, over 4,222 agricultural cooperatives were 
also liberalized leading to their loss of public sector support. 89 The agricultural 
cooperatives were expected to adjust to market forces and thus faced competition with 
an aggressive private sector that had access to available capital and machinery. 
Subjecting cooperatives to market imperatives meant that they could no longer 
perform their traditional social function, but rather had to compete in order to survive. 
These changes in agrarian social property relations increasingly made rural producers 
dependent on market imperatives for their _survival. The most prominent example is 
the case of cotton growers who- subjected to Egypt's changed policy of importing 
cheap cotton - accumulated massive debts resulting in the loss of their land (LCHR 
2005). Cases of crisis of cotton growers were noted in the govemorates of Beheira, 
Qalyoubiya, Fayoum, Minya and Beni Suef (LCHR 2007). Such forms of market 
dependence, rather than contribute to self sufficiency of farmers and peasants, made 
households more vulnerable to the global economy's shocks caused by fluctuating 
world prices of commodities. Indeed, Bush (2001) argued that Law 96 generated 
considerable insecurity for farming communities, taking away the freedom from 
market imperatives that rural producers had enjoyed so far. This made them subject 
to not only the impersonal forces of the capitalist world market, but also to the 
arbitrary and personal power of local landlords. 
The 1990s also witnessed a rise in child labour either as helping hands on 
farmers' small plots or as hired hands on big agribusiness estates as families struggle 
to meet the high cost of living. Women suffered more than men in the process of 
losing tenancies, even where they had successfully maintained agreements before 
1997. Most widowed women lost the land that was left to them by their husbands as 
the Law did not recognize their rights to such land thus leaving them without any 
means of subsistence (LCHR 2004: 60-68). Saad (2002) noted that peasants often 
sold household assets, such as livestock and women's savings and jewellery, in order 
to provide for their families. Furthermore, some peasants were forced to give up the 
use of electricity and instead returned to using kerosene lamps. The return to use of 
kerosene lamps represented something more than simply a coping strategy for the 
89 There were a total of 5,999 agricultural cooperatives in Egypt in 2004 (Abdel-Seed Mohamed 2004: 
57). . 
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peasantry. It signified the loss of freedom by peasants and a return to a life under 
semi-feudal conditions. 
Dispossession through market imperatives was supplemented by dispossession 
through the use of state power. With the state clearly privileging rights of private 
property against competing customary claims, the stage was set for the attack on the 
Agrarian Reform lands and other traditional forms of tenure. 90 After 1997, successful 
claimants did not have to pay compensation to the dispossessed and the pace of 
dispossession accelerated particularly after the appointment of Nazif and the renewed 
surge of neoliberal reform which aimed to attract large-scale agribusiness to the 
countryside. 91 A vast number of cases of violations against Agrarian Reform land 
holders occurred after 1997. For instance, an ownership claimant confiscated 
farmers' property despite farmers' legal documents and proof of rent payment for 40 
year in Ezbet-Mershaq-Dekemes station, Dakhaliya govemorate (LCHR 2006f). In 
Beheira govemorate, influential individuals expropriated 221 acres of Agrarian 
Reform land. In the village ofEzbet El-Baroudi, in the Delta go:vemorate ofBeheira, 
the family of Mohamed AshrafEl-Baroudi, the landlord who owned the village land 
prior to 1952, returned to reclaim the land. A similar case of eviction was on-going in 
the neighbouring village Ezbet Moharram at the same time as that ofEzbet El-
Baroudi village. 
In March 2005, Salah Nawar, a powerful landlord arrived in the village of 
Sarando demanding eviction of tenants from Agrarian Reform lands. Salah was 
accompanied with four armoured cars, a microbus, five jeeps and five tractors along 
with firearms and swords. The claimant's men shot at farmers who were busy 
90 In the province of Minoufiyya, one of the richer farmers that I interviewed in 2008 showed the 
'finger-printed' documents oflands that he had acquired from smaller peasants who had been forced to 
leave their lands. The farmer I interviewed was quite pleased at this development as it had allowed him 
to expand his holdings to 60 acres now by absorbing the parcels of land around: his initial plot of land. 
The case of desert development represents a different kind of large-scale agricultural development 
where farm sizes extend over hundreds and sometimes thousands of acres, a phenomenon that has 
recently occurred as a result of land reform and overall economic policy reforms. 
91 Article 33e of Law 96 states: "If the landlord chooses to sell the land before 1996/97, the tenant can 
choose to buy the land or leave it in return for a compensation by the landlord (equal to forty times the 
value of land tax, for every agricultural year from 1992-1997). Or the tenant can keep the land until 
1997." 
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ploughing their lands. Salah had filed a police report accusing the tenants of 
trespassing, stealing his crops and preventing the landlord from going to his land. 92 
In El Mounira village, Qalyoubiya govemorate, a former ambassador claimed 
ownership of a piece of agricultural land owned by the state. Peasants had farmed the 
land for more than fifty years. The powerful ex-official used the security forces and 
hired armed thugs to threaten the farmers to leave their lands and homes. They 
destroyed water wheels and burned the crops of the farmers. In 2005, in Borg El Arab 
City, Alexandria, 150 farmers and their homes were threatened by government 
officials. In 2006, the farmers of Yousif El Seddiq area, El Fayoum govemorate, filed 
a complaint with the LCHR (2006g) stating that: 
... some influential people have claimed the ownership 
of their lands. The farmers state that these people have 
ruined their plantations, assaulted them and threatened 
to kill them ... On 14/2/2006, the ownership claimer 
seized their lands and damaged their plantations with 
tractors and drilling machines that have at the same time 
planted trees to change the landmarks. When the 
farmers tried to stop them, they were threatened to be 
buried alive on this land, and all roads leading to it were 
blocked. Y oussif El Seddiq police forces have arrested 
a number of farmers and detained them for several days. 
Similarly, the property rights of thousands of farmers who had improved their lands in 
West Tahta, Sohag, were deemed invalid by the state (LCHR 2008b ). In other cases, 
the deeds to Agrarian Reform lands were ignored by the authorities who claimed that 
a certain Ministry owned the land in order to forcefully evict the tenants (LCHR 
2008e). 
Collusion among powerful local politicians and private investors resulted in 
mass forced evictions and expropriation of land and housing. Often relying on local 
police stations and security officers, local powerful authorities resorted to stealing 
lands and forcefully evicting farmers. Various state authorities including governors, 
the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Endowments, and various agricultural 
92 The police arrested the wives and children of the farmers in order to pressure them to submit 
themselves to the authorities. See: Land Centre for Human Rights (2005g). 
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associations have been involved in the eviction of thousands of smallholders and 
peasants. The Ministry of Tourism has also evicted smallholders and peasants for the 
restoration of historic sites and to develop tourism across the country. 
The residents of Ezbet Khairi, Dakahlia governorate were threatened with 
eviction from their homes by a powerful figure in _their village, Dr. Ahmad El-Hefny, 
who had cut the electricity and water supply from their homes, demolished some of 
the houses and claimed ownership of the village land (LCHR 2008h). In Ezbet El 
Arab El Soghra and El Ko bra, Alexandria, the Ministry of Endowment and the 
governorate colluded to evict 4,000 farmers and transfer 300 feddans of their land to 
private investors (LCHR 2008c ). In another case, local villagers were denied 
alternative housing because the mayor of Ezbet Mohammed Aweys, Beni Suef 
confiscated land that was designated for building a new village leaving the former 
residents homeless (LCHR 2007e). Similarly, in villages in the North of Giza, local 
authorities collude with rich landlords (Hathor) to evict tenants from their homes 
(LCHR 2008d). 
The authorities of Fayoum Governorate refused to honour the ownership 
contracts of tens of thousands of farmers on state lands and threatened to destroy their 
homes and evict them from the land. The authorities increased the rents by 160 per 
cent demanding that tenants pay this rent retroactively to the start of their original 
contracts or leave their lands (LCHR 2006). In Qena, the Governor conducted a 
property assessment according to which the value of houses was inflated subsequent 
to which the Governor not only increased the rents, but also demanded back rents 
(LCHR 2005b ). 
The governor of Sohag decided to build an airport on land that was reclaimed 
by farmers and was the main source of livelihoods for thousands in the community. 
The state delayed recognition of their property rights since 1981 when the farmers had 
begun improving the land. While there were vast tracts of desert land for building the 
airport, the farmers could not comprehend the governor's decision to build the airport 
on their reclaimed agricultural land and since the farmers' property rights were not 
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recognized by the state, they were threatened with eviction and dispossession without 
any compensation (LCHR 2007c; LCHR 2009j). 93 
Nazifs pro-investor policies increasingly resulted in the expropriation of 
agrarian lands and homes of small holders for the purpose of industrial zones or other 
projects by private investors.94 For instance, Agrarian Reform lands in the village of 
Tatwan, Fayoum was being confiscated by businessmen while 262 feddans of 
Agrarian Reform land was turned into Industrial Zone in Kafr El MahFouk village in 
addition to large plots in other parts of Gharbeya resulting in destruction of 1205 
feddans of fertile land for the purpose of industrial development (LCHR 2009g). The . 
Agrarian Reform lands in Al-Ad'adeyya village, Beheira, were transformed into an 
industrial zone by the governor. The governor of Beheira, General Mohammed 
Sha'rawy denied forcing farmers to concede their lands stating that farmers consented 
to waive their lands by signing concession forms (LCHR 2009k). In another case, the 
Governor of Gharbiya arbitrarily expropriated hundreds of feddans of agricultural 
land for the purpose of industrial zones by issuing Resolution 7 /13 (LCHR 201 Oc ). In 
the northern governorate of Kafr el Sheikh, the Governor along with the Ministry of 
Endowment expropriated the lands of farmers in the villages of Mostorod, Abyaneh 
and Al-Aaly despite the fact that the farmers had paid the entire rent for three years 
(2008-11) in advance, had dug canals and improved the lands. The expropriated lands 
were transferred to the Arab Company for Land Reclamation (LCHR 2010a). 
The Agricultural Cooperatives Associations (ACA) assumed a new role as 
they became agent of accumulation by dispossession. Between 2004 and 2011 the 
ACAs facilitated the dispossession of small holders by issuing new possession cards 
to landlords and terminating their traditional support services to tenants (LCHR 
2004e; 2004f; 2005c).95 By issuing new possession cards to landlords, the ACAs 
denied receiving decades worth of rent from peasants and farmers towards their plots 
93 In Wadi El Gedid, the governor colluded with investors and dispossessed 54 farmers from their lands 
and homes (LCHR 2009j). 
94 In 2010, in Fayoum govemorate, a gas company expropriated the lands offarmers without any 
compensation (LCHR 201 Od). 
95 The Agricultural Cooperative Associations had been disempowered under Sadat in 1976 and no 
longer served the interests of peasants and small farmers. The board of the co0peratives were 
dominated by rich farmers and landlords. However, peasants and small farmers who produced sugar for 
the state continued to enjoy services of the Associations such as seeds, credit, pesticides at subsidized 
prices. After 1991, the Associations role continued to decline as the attempts to dismantle the 
agricultural sector intensified (Abdel Aal 1998). 
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(LCHR 2006d).96 In 2006, the ACA in Edko, Beheira govemorate, took over the 
lands of local smallholders and transferred them to influential individuals through the 
use of police and armed thugs. In other words, the ACAs directly participated in 
expropriation and upward redistribution of land through their authority to issue 
possession cards. 
The Ministry of Endowments (MoE) also played an important role in evictions 
of tenants. Under Nasser, the MOE was to serve as trustee for public domain 
endowment lands. Operating under a centuries' old system of public property, the 
MOE is responsible for looking after public domain lands that cannot be mortgaged or 
sold. If any revenue is received from such lands, it is to serve the beneficiaries of the 
estate. The main goal was to prevent the sub-division of property as well as conflict 
among beneficiaries of the land. After Law 96, the MOE began acting as any other 
landlord demanding rent and threatening tenants with eviction and imprisonment. 
The MOE actively engaged in expropriating tenants with the goal of getting a higher 
price for the land thanks to liberalization of land prices because of Law 96 (LCHR 
2005h). For instance, in Ezbet El Hakim, Beni Suef govemorate, the MOE was in 
trust of 51 feddans of Agrarian Reform land for which it received LE 30 of rents per 
feddan from the farmers. By 2006, it had raised the rents to LE '1200 and had made 
the contracts yearly based thus giving itself the right to renew the contracts annually 
and increase the rents accordingly. In this instance, the MOE acted just any other 
landlord (LCHR 2006a). 
The MOE evicted farmers and destroyed their homes while transferring 1900 
feddans of farmland to a construction society for the purpose of building the new 
Damietta City (LCHR 2006h). In Ezbet Ahmed Rashed, Monofeya, the MOE 
threatened to evict and imprison 3000 tenants from their homes and land if they do 
not pay the high rents demanded by the MOE (LCHR 2007a). In Rashwan estate, 
Beni Suef, the MOE confiscated homes by using threats of trespassing and 
imprisonment against its tenants (LCHR 2009h). In another case, in Mansoura, 
Dakhalia Govemorate, the MOE destroyed agricultural land for the purpose of 
96 Possession cards were issued to small farmers and peasants to provide them legal backing for the 
Agrarian Reform lands under Nasser. The cards entitled peasants and small farmers to subsidized 
agricultural inputs provided by the state. 
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building officials' housing in violation of the Law of Endowment, which states that in 
case of sale ofland, the occupants of the land shall be given priority. Similarly, in 
Kafr Mahrouk village, Kafr El Sheikh Govemorate, 3 50 feddans of fertile land was 
turned into industrial zone while farmers were forcefully evicted without any 
compensation or alternative housing (LCHR 2009d). In Ahmed Rashid village in 
Ashmoun, Minoufiya, the MOE demanded that tenants leave their homes or face 
imprisonment for trespassing on land that farmers had worked for decades and paid 
rent for (LCHR 2009b). Farmers oflzbet Rashwan, Beni Suefwere threatened by the 
MOE and feared the loss of their land and housing. The MOE had previously seized 
their homes and claimed ownership of them in 1995, however in 2009 threatened 
tenants with outright expulsion (LCHR 2009e ). In short, the Ministry of Endowment 
has been actively pushing tenant farmers off the land through rent increases that go 
beyond the means of tenants (e.g., in the case of village of Al-Naghamish in Sohag, it 
was increased from 24 pounds per feddans per year to 3,400 in the period between 
1997-2010 (LCHR 2010b). 
The end result of this process of dispossession has seen a rapid concentration 
of land in the hands of a few. With the removal of limits on landholdings, Law 96 
resulted in the creation of large landholdings on the one hand and a mass of landless 
day labourers on the other hand or the commodification of land and labour (Bush 
2002; 2000; Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003). Before turning to those who suffered as a 
result of Law 96, let me point out that the winners did not include only big landlords, 
but also rich farmers who could afford to buy out cash strapped tenants and 
consolidate their estates. For instance, Sameeh Moustafa Darwish from Shohdee 
village in Minoufiyya was able to increase his landed estate. The four Darwish 
brothers collectively had accumulated 21 feddans of land. Initially the brothers had 3 
feddans ofland as a result of Nasser's agrarian reforms however after Law 96 was 
passed, they managed to purchase the other 18 feddans which they purchased from 
seven tenant farmers. However, the land was scattered in different areas and the 
Darwish brothers expressed interest in buying out the tenant farmers whose land 
divided their estate. In Shohdee village land rent was LE 4000-4500 and the price of 
one feddan reached 250,000 in 2007. Smaller tenant farmers could not afford either 
the high rents or the cost of the fertilizer which was also sold at free market prices and 
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no longer at subsidized prices. The Darwish brothers hired day labourers who work on 
his land as well as his kitchen garden. He paid day labourers in kind with produce and 
also provided housing for them. The Darwishes had worked in Saudi Arabia for 15 
years before returning to Egypt in the 1990s and investing in land. The Darwish 
family - who had built a local mosque and felt they were linked to the community 
closely - were critical of the government land policy that encouraged foreign 
investors to take over agricultural land (Joya 2008). 
The official response was to compensate smallholders for the loss of their 
lands. In practice, however, the state did not fulfill its promise, and in cases where 
compensation was offered, it often involved lands that were contested by others who 
had previously occupied them. Only 12,664 out of a total of 904,000 smallholders -
around 1.5 per cent - received alternative lands. Land was already highly 
concentrated in 1990, where almost 70 per cent of the landowners had less than one 
feddan of land for a total of 18 per cent of all cultivated land. At the other end of the 
scale, 0.25 per cent oflandowners (9,000) possessed 15 per cent of the total cultivated 
area (Ikram 2006: 263). The percentage of landless fellaheen reached 30 per cent 
after the implementation of Law 96 as high rents forced smallholders to give up their 
holdings (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2003: 121). Close to LE 2 billion in losses were 
incurred by peasants as a result of Law 96, and up to 400,000 peasants were turned 
into day labourers or simply left without any means of subsistence (LCHR 2004: 48-
49). 
The following interviews demonstrate the nature of market imperatives and 
how they operated by turning vulnerable direct producers market dependent. Fawaz 
Ahmed (not real name) from a village in Qalyoubiya rented 2 feddans from the mayor 
- an absentee landlord and owner of 500-600 feddans of land mainly used for 
agribusiness and export of vegetables. Fawaz paid an annual rent of LE 3500 per 
feddan. He paid LE 5 per one qirat of land for the use of a rental tractor. One qirat of 
land could produce 150 kg of wheat (1 kilo of wheat cost LE 1.50 in 2007). He made 
his living by selling his produce in the local market on his donkey cart. To support his 
family of five children, he also had a second job as a night guard. Fawaz worked in 
Saudi Arabia for four years. Fawaz built a house but the state destroyed it because it 
was built on agricultural land. The farmer built his house twice but the government 
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destroyed it because it was claimed to have been built on agricultural land (Joya 
2008). 
The Abdel Hadi family (Kafr-elwan) owned 2 feddans of land. The family 
sold the produce of the land to the government and to the local market. They produced 
wheat, com and clover. Land rent per one feddan of land in Kafr elwan had reached 
LE 3000 per year (2007-08). In 1997, rents were at LE 500-750 per feddan. 
Similarly, the Hadi family reported that to purchase one qirat of land would cost LE 
30,000-50,000 in 2007-08 (Joya 2008). 
As market dependence became generalized over the period of a decade, 
Egyptian countryside witnessed an increasing number of peasants and small holders 
turn into day labourers. The use of day labourers became a common practice even by 
small tenant farmers. Day labourers' wages varied between LE 15-30 per day 
depending on the govemorate (Joya 2007-08). 
For instance, Ahmed Abdel Bey from the village of Abu Swailem south of 
Beni Suef rented 14 qirats of land from an absentee landlord who was also a 
government employee. Abdel Bey was very upset about the Law 96 which he viewed 
as giving landlords increasing powers over tenants. In Abdel Bey's village, landlords 
kept the contract and did not indicate the number of feddans/qirats that were actually 
rented by tenants. A copy of the contract was not given to the tenant, which left 
tenants insecure and the landlord could evict the tenant anytime he wished. Prior to 
Law 96, Abdel Bey paid a fixed rent. After the implementation of Law 96, landlords 
gave no option viable option to tenants and small holders except pay higher rents or 
face evictions. Faced with unaffordable high rents, Abdel Bey lost the land he was 
renting and only in 2002 began renting again subjected to new free market rents (Joya 
2007). 
The onset of Law 96 also unleashed a wave of conflicts in rural Egypt. In the 
village of Mattiaa in Qena govemorate, Fatima (not real name) a mother of four 
described the rising levels of conflict in her village between peasants and landlords. 
Fatima's husband was a teacher but they also had half feddan of land which they used 
to cultivate food for their own consumption. Fatima said that many landlords 
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complained to the police about the large number of land occupations by evicted 
peasants who resisted landlords' new powers. Eventually, the police used force to 
forcefully and violently evict the peasants off the land. The high rents that reached LE 
4000 per feddan in this particular village did not allow any of the dispossessed 
peasants to rent land and thus many of them bec~e day labourers. The village 
witnessed increasing number of feuds over inheritance of land and sub-divisions as 
the value of land dramatically increased after 1992 (Joya 2008). 
However, the pattern of accumulation by dispossession was not uniform 
across all villages visited. In some such as the village of Abu Selim in Beni Suef 
govemorate the persisting signs of a moral economy were still quite visible. Abdel 
Hakem who owned 1 Y4 feddans of land collectively with his brothers grew potatoes 
for export and berseem and com for local consumption annually. He felt that the land 
reform had created the onset of inequality in rural Egypt. Thus he allowed children 
from his village to collect the leftover of his harvest. He also said that he considered it 
a right of the Bedouins to bring their animals and graze on his lands. He mentioned 
that a significant number of people from his village sold their land after 1997 as they 
could not afford the cost of agricultural inputs. Often, landlords took advantage of 
desperate small holders and purchased their lands at very low prices (Joya 2008). The 
dispossession that affected the livelihoods of millions of rural inhabitants also 
triggered a deep crisis in rural housing as dispossessed peasants and farmers faced 
evictions. The next section explores the loss of secure housing in rural communities 
where peasants and small farmers were uprooted and literally thrown off their lands. 
Housing in Rural Egypt 
Access to housing in rural areas did not become a pressing issue until the 1990s. Rural 
inhabitants had enjoyed the right to housing due to various arrangements at the village 
level. Traditionally, peasants and small farmers have predominantly relied on local 
materials (turb akhdar or silt) to build their shacks and hamlets on the land that they 
cultivated. Prior to 1980s, no building permits were required in most agricultural 
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areas as there was no rural planning law in place. As a result, the boundaries of the 
urban and the rural remained blurred and the construction of housing on agricultural 
land continued unabated. Under Nasser, the government sought to protect agricultural 
land by allocating waqflands for the purpose of rural housing, but permission to build 
housing on such lands had to be sought from local Endowment officials and there was 
no assurance that peasants would receive such lands for housing. Nonetheless, by the 
late 1970s, 90 per cent of rural families owned their mud houses (Mohie-Eldin 1982: 
260). Rural inhabitants continued to reside in houses built on their small plots of 
agricultural land and this continued undisturbed until the end of the 1980s and early 
1990s.97 
With the introduction of Law 96, which terminated the contracts of over a 
million peasants and tenant farmers in 1997, housing became a problem for 5 .3 
million rural inhabitants (LCHR 2011). Evictions were often accompanied by the 
destruction of housing which were built on agricultural land (Law 96, Article No. 4). 
The practice was reinforced by a Military Decree 1/1996 criminalized the building of 
residences on agricultural land. 98 The Decree introduced a fine in the amount of LE 
10,000 and jail term of 2-5 years (El Hefnawy 2004: 13-15). After the announcement 
of the Decree, a huge number of violations of Decree 1/1996 were retroactively 
recorded in various parts of the country, triggering a spate of evictions. 
My interviews revealed variations across villages and towns in Upper Egypt. 
While a significant number of villages and towns had experienced a large number of 
evictions, others had continued to remain shielded. The first set of interviews 
illustrated the persistence of old forms of access to housing and an absence of market 
dependence. For instance, in the village of El-Hadiqa in Al-Fayoum govemorate, I 
met an elderly woman and her daughter who were selling fruits and vegetables from a 
97 According to Law 49/1977, tenant-landlord relationships were to be regulated by the state. In the 
event that tenants were required to leave their land and/or place of residence located on their land, they 
were offered adequate compensation, determined by the state. Hefnawy (20q4: 11) argued that such 
the construction of housing on agricultural land was inevitable due to the gov~rnment's failure to 
design clear housing policy and thus provide a viable alternative for those in need of housing. He 
pointed out that the new cities were only accessible by the middle income households and not to rural 
households whose place of work was their plots of land. 
98 Scholars have pointed out that increasingly agricultural land is lost to urbanization. However, it is 
the state and big investors who violate the law by constructing major real estate projects whereas loss 
of agricultural land by peasants is minimal given that land constitutes their main source of livelihood 
(cf. Soliman 2004: 36). 
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basket. They said that house rents were around LE 80-125 in the village but rental 
housing was very rare. Most people owned their housing. They told me they had a 
small plot of land and used the produce either for consumption or for local sale (Joya 
2007). My next interviewee was Salah from the village of Dendara in Qena 
govemorate. He had four kids. He had built his own house forty years ago on land that 
he had purchased for it. He had retained the deed for the land and said that the 
practice of renting was not common in Dendara. While old houses remained shielded 
from government demolitions in Dendara, constructing new houses required the 
approval of Ministry of Tourism and Culture, which was not an easy task for workers 
and peasants. 
In Upper Egypt govemorate of Sohag residents were threatened either by the 
interests of the tourism industry or by the agribusiness. The provision of new services 
for tourists as well as exploration of new historic sites contributed to eviction of 
residents in the proximity of touristic locations. The following case is one example of 
this trend. 'Nasser' (not his real name) from Abidus in the govemorate of Sohaq 
worked as a night guard for the temple of Abidus. He had a small plot of land on 
which he grew subsistence crops. He had also built his house on his small plot of 
agricultural land. He mentioned that most houses in the village were owned but were 
in a dilapidated state. The houses in Abidus risked being demolished as the 
government intended to carry out excavations. Residents had been asked to move out 
or witness the demolition of their houses. Nasser said that residents resisted 
government orders and forced a delay in excavations (Joya 2007). 
In Al-Minya govemorate's village of Al-Sultan I spoke with Sana Ahmed 
Mohamed, a mother of three. She said her family had built their house with stones 
from the nearby mountains and cement from the market. It took 20 years to complete 
the building of their house which was constructed on 100 meters of inherited land 
from her father. Her family rented land which they cultivated for subsistence use. 
Many Egyptian who worked abroad had returned to their village with their earnings. 
The village had power, water for a fee, and no sewage. Some people had no 
permission to build and others could not afford it. In order to subsidize their cost of 
living, Sana made cheese and butter and sold their buffalo to pay for their daughter's 
education (Joya 2007). 
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In the village of Rafa' a in Sohag govemorate, Soleiman, father of seven, built 
his own house twenty five years ago. He mentioned that most houses in the village are 
built on agricultural land but are owned, not rented. However, due to rising costs of all 
commodities including building materials, most houses were incomplete. Most of the 
villagers worked in agriculture but some also worked in construction. For their 
financial needs, villagers relied on local community savings (Islamic Social Agency) 
due to its lax repayment conditions. The village had services such as 
communications, water and electricity but no sewage. 
The next set of examples from the Land Centre for Human Rights demonstrate 
the extent of housing demolitions and forced evictions. Often those who had built 
their houses on land titled as Wad el Yad did not have documents to prove it and thus 
feared the loss of it to authorities. However, even those with valid documents lost 
their lands because their property rights were not seen as legitimate compared to those 
of the pre-1952 deed-holders or the investors who had gained significant rights in the 
course of the 1990s. For instance, four hundred families in the village of Balay 
(Qalyoubia) were under the threat of expulsion from their houses 50 years after they 
first began renting their farms. In She been El-kom in the province of Minoufiyya, 
farmers lost their houses because these houses were considered state property (LCHR 
2004). 
In instances of resistance against eviction, which were very common across 
villages, armed police intimidated women and children and discarded their belongings 
forcing them to leave their houses. Locals incurred heavy injuries due to resistance or 
combat with police. Hundreds of evictees filed lawsuits in order to get their houses 
back or get compensation, but it was to no avail (Moustafa 2007: 127-28). In cases 
where copies of contracts were provided to the courts, the cases were dismissed 
because the original copies were not made available. In village of Atfeeh, Giza, the 
Board of the City of Atfeeh threatened 5,000 families with forced evictions from their 
homes. These homes were built on state land in the desert. Tenants were asked to 
pay huge sums to the City Board or leave their homes. In another case in Abu Shleeb 
village, Gharbiya, farmers were evicted and their houses were destroyed by bulldozers 
with no offer of alternative housing. In 2005, in Ezbet Motawe'a, Fayoum, influential 
local authorities threatened to destroy one hundred houses of farmers and confiscate. 
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148 feddans of their farm land. In Beheira govemorate, companies linked to the 
Ministry of Agriculture demanded high rents from Agrarian Reform lands or 
threatened forced evictions of the farmers. The authorities resorted to use of armed 
men, theft of animals and destruction of farms (LCHR 2005i). 
In Karnak, Luxor, in 2008, a sizeable community faced the demolition of their 
houses in order to expand the pavilion around the Luxor Temple, as part of a larger 
plan to create an open air museum in Luxor (Gabriel and Bakr 2000; Kamil 2008).99 
The construction of the open air museum would bring windfall profits to developers 
such as TMG who won the contract to build a five-star hotel and develop 19,589 
square metres of land on the Luxor Corniche as well as launch a Nile Cruise ship 
(Hafiz et al., 2008).The residents of Karnak that I interviewed were certain that they 
would not receive a fair compensation for their homes (Joya 2008). They reported 
that the state-hired property appraisers underestimated the value of their property so 
as to reduce the potential compensation the state would owe the residents. 100 
Furthermore, the residents of Karnak' s economic dispossession was accompanied by 
social fragmentation: the destruction of homes would break up families and whole 
communities that had lived together for a very long time. 
To residents of Karnak, the government's development strategy of promotion 
of tourism and tourism related projects, rather than being a solution, was seen as the 
source of their socio-economic problems. In 2008, a young man asked: "if tourism 
means the loss of our houses, do you think we would like tourists and welcome them 
here?" Other Karnak residents, expressing their frustration with their economic 
circumstances, said that tourism had not created any meaningful jobs for the local 
people. 101 At best, they got menial service industry jobs as dish~washers in the hotels' 
restaurants. They also complained about the big malls and hotel conglomerates that 
99 The Egyptian Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities contracted out the project to 
ABT Associates in 1997. 
100 In fact, in 1998, a different community in Luxor had already been uprooted from Old Gourna, and 
were forced to give up their land and housing after heavy resistance. The authorities' justified the 
demolition of the houses arguing that they were built in an 'uncivilized' manner and were obstacle to 
the restoration of Egyptian Pharoanic 'heritage' (Mitchell 2002: 186). 
101 The non-existent trickle-down effect of tourism to the residents ofLuxor is very obvious. The 
stone-cutters in the small alabaster factories said they rarely got to sell enough of their carved statues to 
make a decent income. Others in Karnak said that the locals were not hired by the hotel industry as 
most workers are brought from Cairo. The locals might, if they were fortunate, get low-paying jobs as 
dishwashers. This author's interviews were conducted in January 2008 in Luxor. 
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directly competed with local tourist guides and small shop keepers, reducing their 
already-marginal income even further. 102 
At the core of the conflict in Karnak lay the reality that the residents had 
mixed titles to the land on which their houses were built. The land was either Wad el 
Yad or land with fixed low rents introduced during the Agrarian Reform. Secure 
tenancy rights which applied equally to rural and urban lands provided security of 
tenure for the tenants and farmers through the right of transfer to other family 
members. Thus, the forced evictions of Karnak' s residence formed part of a larger 
attack on Agrarian Reform lands and customary tenancies. 103 
Article 4 of Law 96 states: "If this law results in removing tenants from their 
house and this is the only residence for him and his dependents, the government will 
provide them with housing in the same locale, and he should not leave his house 
otherwise" (Law 96, Art. 4). The inclusion of Article 4 implies that the government 
was aware that Law 96 would result in evictions across rural Egypt. However, 
alternative housing was often not provided by the state (LCHR 2004a). The 
government claimed to have offered alternative housing and land for evicted tenants 
in desert areas. In order to boost support for the land reform agenda, a campaign was 
launched to make it appear as if the state was taking care of all those who had lost 
their lands. In reality, most small farmers and peasants who were evicted, chased by 
crawler tractors and armed police forces, were left without any compensation or 
alternative housing. 
Even though the Military Decree (111996) prohibited the use of agricultural 
land for non-agricultural purposes, the subsequent use of land by the private sector 
demonstrated that the authorities were not very much concerned about the uses that 
agricultural lands were put to (See Appendix B). Most of the redistributed lands to 
private investors were put to use for tourist developments and luxury housing 
102 As recently as February 2010, people from the rural area of Maris in Luxor were being evicted from 
their homes and land while one thousands of fertile land was handed over to the tourism industry based 
on a 2007 Decree No. 264. See Mohsen (2010). 
103 Similarly, as a result of the Prime Ministers's decision No. 264/2007, 500 acres of agricultural land 
in El Marais, Luxor was confiscated resulting in dispossession of 8,000 families in order to establish an 
anchorage of floating hotels. In 2006, a real estate company, relying on forged documents and in 
collusion with local authorities in Beheira govemorate, evicted hundreds of farmers resulting in the 
expropriation of over one thousands feddans ·of land. In 2008, the Qanater Project took over 350 acres 
of agricultural land to build a promenade for officials in El Dom Island, Qena, leaving the farmers 
without any means of livelihood, see: LCHR (2008). 
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projects. For instance, 2000 feddans of fertile agricultural land in Borg El Arab, 
Alexandria was transformed into a large amusement park (Mohsen 2010). Similarly, 
close to 2,400 homes and 12,000 residents of the rural village of Maris near the City 
of Luxor faced forced eviction after over 1000 feddans of their agricultural land was 
designated for the development of a massive luxury port for tourists clearly violating 
the Decree (Mohsen 2010). 
My interviews conducted with villagers and local authorities in Upper 
Egyptian govemorates revealed that agricultural land was often expropriated for the 
purpose of tourist development facilities and luxury housing (Joya 2007; 2008). In 
the centre of Luxor for instance, construction workers I interviewed mentioned that 
the project they were working - financed by Egypt for Construction and Commerce -
was built over agricultural land. There has been an expansion of commercial buildings 
on agricultural land in the recent years. In 1997, all the commercial sites that had 
appeared in Luxor' s surroundings by 2007 had been fertile agricultural land. In 
between the commercial development projects, th~re were still some pockets of 
untouched agricultural land whose owners would not sell (Joya 2008). Another 
construction worker, 'Ahmed' (not his real name) who was around 55-60 years old 
said his daily wages were calculated by the meters of land that he worked. In general, 
construction workers received LE 250 per month in wages, with daily wages 
estimated around LE 40 or less. For example, one metre would fetch him LE 4. Work 
availability was irregular and unpredictable. Ahmed owned his house, but had no 
legal documents to prove his ownership as it fell under the category of Wad el Yad 
(Joya 2008). 
The Isis Island (Aswan) was another example of a case where agricultural land 
held as Wad el Yad was taken over by real estate developer and turned into a massive 
hotel, the Isis Hotel. The hotel opened in 1993. The people of ISIS Island were 
moved to Jabal Tajoj (Mount Tajoj). They were forced to give up their land without 
any compensation according to residents (Joya 2008). Three women from the Nubian 
village in Aswan explained the impact of tourism on their communities. They said 
that their whole community and the "authentic" fa9ade of village housing was a set up 
and enforced by the government to attract tourists to the village. For instance, houses 
could only be painted in indigo and no other colours. In the early 2000s, the 
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government forced residents to register their house in order to get electricity and 
water; unregistered houses were demolished by the government. The police normally 
began by destroying the stairs or one room or the roof in order to intimidate and 
coerce residents to register their houses. Registering houses was resisted because 
often government would demand the value of the house or back rent on unregistered 
houses (Joya 2008). 
By 2004, when evidence about similar violations by big developers surfaced, 
the government annulled Military Decree 1/1996 so as to retroactively legalize the 
violations committed by land developers on agricultural lands (See Appendix B). 
Over a decade of regressive land reform in the context of liberalization of agriculture, 
resulted in re-possession of Agrarian Reform and Endowment lands whereby "more 
than a million acres of the finest agricultural land" were transferred to land developers 
who had in contravention of the law, built on such lands (LCHR 2010b). 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the impact of economic liberalization and more specifically 
agricultural liberalization on rural livelihoods and housing. The liberalization of the 
agricultural sector and the ending of secure tenancies were directly linked to 
subsequent loss of housing by tenant farmers and peasants. Faced with rapidly rising 
free market rents, many became landless and homeless. By removing rights to 
housing on agricultural plots and subordinating the pre-existing communal land rights 
to rights of private property, Law 96/1992 led to mass eviction of peasants and tenant 
farmers from their homes. As a result, rural areas underwent a transformation of social 
relations as landlords regained power in the context of a liberalized market economy 
while peasants and tenants were subjected to market imperatives. The often violent 
dispossession of the tenant farmers was central the accumulation strate:gies that were 
promoted by the neoliberal model of development. The problem of housing which in 
Egypt's case was often associated with urban housing made its appearance in rural 
areas overnight. This may only exacerbate the existing urban housing problem as the 
state did not implement a viable policy to provide alternative housing or secure 
livelihoods for the dispossessed. 
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Part IV. Conclusion 
Chapter 10. Capitalism, Property, Housing and the State 
The Egyptian state and society has undergone fundamental changes since the 
decolonization period. The period of Free Officers' rule witnessed a re-organization 
of social property relations whereby the state sought to integrate ·workers and peasants 
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into the state. Under Sadat, the state was re-oriented to serve the interests of landlords 
and the commercial bourgeoisie. With the economic crisis that engulfed Egypt, 
Egyptian economy became gradually integrated into the global capitalist system. In 
this context, specific class interests-landlords, and state managers turned 
businessmen-began shaping state policies in their own interests. By 1991, when the 
Egyptian state signed the ERSAP, sufficient mobilization amongst members of the 
landed and other propertied classes had occurred. These interests used the ideological 
arguments coming from the World Bank and the IMF to their own interests and began 
demanding a dismantling of progressive policies that had been shaped under Nasser. 
The ruling class coalition, which coalesced in the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, 
demanded the privatization of state sector enterprises and the end of state regulations 
such as rent controls. In other words, they demanded the creation of a 'free market' 
through which they re-constituted their economic and social power. 
In this dissertation, I examined the ways in which these changes were 
experienced in the area of housing as rent controls were dismantled and secure 
tenancies came under attack. Egyptian society witnessed a radical transformation of 
social relations as more than half a century of progressive changes were brought to a 
halt. More importantly, the subsumption of customary tenure and the transformation 
of state/public lands (which constituted most of the desert lands in Egypt) meant the 
dispossession of not only peasants, but also of Bedouins who had so far managed to 
continue their ways of life without being threatened by the state. 
In order to demonstrate the deep seated power of Egyptian landlords and the 
politically contentious nature of the state, through the historical chapters I 
demonstrated how over the course of two centuries, landed and propertied interests 
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managed to survive and in particular periods of conservative rule (i.e. under Sadat) 
consolidate their power and regain their lost influence in the state and economy. 
However, as the chapter on N asserist period demonstrated, workers and peasants 
interests could become central to the state and its economic and social policies. This 
period demonstrated the 'relative autonomy' of the state as well as the relative 
weakness of the pre-existing elite. 
The Egyptian state increasingly became dominated by powerful economic 
interests of the propertied classes during the last two decades of Mubarak's rule. It 
was in this period that the state's legitimacy to rule also declined as neoliberal policies 
worsened the living conditions of workers and peasants. In my case study chapters, I 
demonstrated how the new ruling elite coalition accumulated their wealth through 
pursuing a strategy of dispossession. The ruling classes' wealth came directly as a 
result of takeover of state enterprises at below the market prices (through 
privatization) or through land acquisitions (desert and agricultural lands) whereby 
through direct help of the state security apparatuses, peasants and farmers were 
dispossessed. 
Given the focus of the dissertation on housing, my interviews revealed the 
complex ways through which peasants and workers' loss of secure access to housing 
came about as a result of neoliberal policies that sanctioned accumulation by 
dispossession. These interviews as well as reports by LCHR revealed the extent of 
state violence that was used to dispossess peasants and workers and undermine their 
ability to reproduce themselves. 
The neoliberal experience in Egypt demonstrates the dogmas of 'free market' 
proponents who supported a liberalized housing market. As I demonstrated, we 
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cannot ignore the contradictory aspects of neoliberalism whereby developers rather 
than respond to a high level of demand for affordable housing, continued to build 
luxury villas which finally resulted in a property bubble in 2000s. 
Returning to my research questions, the ev_idence in the case of Egypt 
confirms that changes in ruling class interests had a direct impact on the organization 
and distribution of public social goods such as housing. While the ruling classes relied 
on political accumulation, the provision of social goods was not so central to securing 
their interests. However, instead, they adopted cautionary policies whereby they 
reduced the threat to their rule. However, as ruling classes adopted capitalist 
accumulation, the provision of social goods increasingly fell under control of ruling 
classes, i.e. private investors. Indeed, housing which had remained a social good was 
commodified and made accessible only through the capitalist market. But as the case 
studies demonstrated, the commodification of housing and the domination of it by the 
forces of the 'free market' did not mean that workers and peasants would be able to 
access housing through the market. 
The historical chapters of the dissertation examined the process of social 
transformation through a study of social struggles, and the role of the state in 
reinforcing, transforming or challenging the pre-existing power relations. However, as 
these chapters demonstrated, while the state shaped social property relations through 
decrees, laws and enforcemt;!nt mechanisms, the state itself was also shaped and 
reshaped by classes who took control over the state in different historical periods. 
Thus, rather than assume particular powers for the state, in these chapters, I have tried 
to demonstrate the contentious nature of power that constitutes the states. 
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A discussion of the state is ultimately a discussion of how power is organized 
and how ruling elites or ruling classes establish their hegemony over society. The 
state in the Middle East has been an arena of social conflict, contested not only by 
various fractions of the ruling class, but al~o by workers and peasants from below. As 
Ayubi (1995) pointed out, the modem state with its bureaucracy and extensive powers 
over society is a recent phenomenon. Power and social relations historically have been 
organized locally through local power holders and such forms of organization of 
power have not completely withered away with the emergence of the modem state. In 
fact, the modem state has been created over and above loci of power rather than 
subsuming these localized powers into the state. Thus, we continue to see divergent 
practices across society where rules established by the central state are not recognized 
or are not implemented. 
Notwithstanding these challenges to the powers of the centralized state, a 
significant shift in the nature of the state has taken place over the course of the recent 
decades. We have witnessed a qualitative change in the nature of state- power in terms 
of accumulation as the state adopted/developed strategies of capitalist accumulation. 
As such, the state through administrative and legal changes and with the backing of its 
coercive apparatus has subjected peasants and workers to market imperatives, 
rendering them market dependent. These changes would not have been possible in the 
absence of an ideological shift that promoted virtues of individualism, competition 
and "free market" over collectivism, cooperation and regulated markets. 
A discussion of the state and its transformation is not very fruitful in the 
absence of a discussion of agents of such change-i.e. classes. In this case, the 
changes in the state occurred through policies that were thought out and planned by 
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social agents in their specific social roles and through institutions. Such changes in the 
state and its role in society often imply a shift in the balance of social power of some 
classes and its accumulation by other classes. In Egypt, the 1990s and 2000s was the 
period in which a new ruling class consolidated its power. Their economic activities 
centred on land development for real estate and agribusiness projects. In the chapter 
on Mubarak period, I highlighted the role of landlords and land developers who 
subordinated the financial sector to their own interests. However, an increase in their 
social power was only possible by dismantling workers and peasant's social safety 
nets such as statist progressive policies, rent controls and subsidized prices of basic 
commodities. It also meant ending workers and peasants' non-market ways of 
reproducing themselves, which in this case had been secured through statist policies 
under Nasser regime. Consequently, Egypt witnessed the formation of a class of 
dispossessed peasantry and small farmers as well as workers who no longer had 
guarantees of employment through the state. In short, Mubarak's rule facilitated the 
formation of a working class, which was more a class in itself at this point than a class 
for itself (Thompson 1963). 
The formation of such a class would not go unnoticed. As is known among 
scholars of the Middle East, in the Arab world in general, the contentious nature of the 
state and fragile nature of its legitimacy have kept the ruling classes in a precarious 
situation and in fear of revolt from below. The state has not developed the capacities 
to implement a sustained form of redistributive policies in society. This peculiar 
nature of the state has also required it to establish order through application of very 
coercive measures. The divisions within the ruling classes have prevented the state 
from developing its organizational capacity and hence the state has only been used to 
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serve the immediate interests of the ruling classes, without actually investing in long-
term stable capitalist development. 
As early as in 1993, in a chapter titled "The 'Fiscal Crisis' and The 
'Washington Consensus': Towards an Explanation of Middle East Liberalizations,". 
Ayubi discussed the possible contradictions that may emerge as the Arab states 
emulated other capitalist states' strategies of accumulation. Ayubi pointed out that 
while Arab states may succeed in facilitating accumulation, they may not succeed in 
fulfilling a second requirement, namely legitimation. The inability to establish 
legitimacy may then lead to a crisis of the state (Ayubi 1993). 104 
The third question that I posed in my introductory chapter related to the social 
struggles that contested the powers of the state and ruling classes in the course of the 
modem history of Egypt. As the historical chapters as well as the case studies 
demonstrated, social struggles in the course of the 19th century remained localized 
reacting to the localized strategies of political accumulation. However, under the 
period of British rule, increasingly a political consciousness emerged whereby landed 
classes mobilized peasants and workers against colonial rule. By 1952, the failure of 
the propertied classes to respond to the needs of the workers and peasants and the 
concentration of property in the hands of a minority elite brought about the revolution 
by the Free Officers. It is from this period onwards that peasants and workers played 
an important role in Egyptian politics. Although peasants continued to remain 
considerably marginal in politics due to the dominance of landed classes at the village 
and govemorate levels, workers' mobilization and protests became a constant of 
Egyptian politics. Workers protested the erosion of their rights and benefits and the 
104 Ayubi's work here was drawing upon James O'Connor's Fiscal Crisis of the State (1973). 
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loss of their secure employment in the state. By the end of Mubarak's rule, workers 
and peasants had realized that not only had they lost the progressive gains they had 
made under Nasserist rule, but they feared the neoliberal model had failed to deliver 
the goods. 
Neoliberalism and Social Property Relations 
In this dissertation, I proposed taking seriously the struggles around property relations 
in a historical comparative sense in order to understand the social base of the state and 
the political economy of different regimes. This is all the more serious in the context 
of globalization in order to understand the nature of conflict that has been emerging 
and the challenges that the new ruling classes have been facing. The embedding of 
social relations into the market as has occurred in Egypt at an increased pace since 
1991 subjected peasants and workers to market imperatives. The abolition of statist 
redistributive policies and of customary rights to land increased the levels of market 
dependence. The state over the last two decades of Mubarak's rule became the agent 
of accumulation by dispossession on behalf of a new breed of ruling class that gained 
power in the context of economic liberalization. 
When proponents of state reform criticized the statist model in the 1980s, they 
had argued that the state had been committed to redistributive policies in the interest 
of legitimacy at the expense of capital accumulation. The free market reforms of the 
1990s and later reversed this relationship as states perfected accumulation strategies 
while abandoning redistributive policies leading to a crisis of legitimacy of the state. 
Similarly, in the case of Egypt, the state managed over the course of two decades of 
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liberalization to facilitate accumulation through legal, institutional and administrative 
reforms. However, the strategy of accumulation which was distinctly based on 
dispossession faced contestation from Egyptian citizens. The social relations that were 
nurtured and created by the Egyptian state since 1991 intensified the legitimacy crisis 
of the state as workers and peasants witnessed their post-War gains disappear, leaving 
them exposed to market imperatives. Over a period of two decades, the Egyptian state 
perfected its strategies of accumulation by dispossession through legal, institutional 
and administrative changes of the state. A powerful alliance of ruling classes - in 
particular, landlords and property developers- dominated the state and used its 
various organs to speed up the process of accumulation by dispossession. 
The adoption of neoliberalism reconstituted power relations in rural and urban 
areas resulting in increased social polarization and the sharpening of class 
antagonisms. Indeed, the transition to a free market economy transformed the nature 
of class conflict by bringing peasants and workers at the centre of the conflict. The 
relationship of peasants and workers to the state in this process underwent a radical 
shift as the social contract of the Nasserist period was dismantled. Policy changes 
such as privatization directly altered the socio-economic position of workers and 
peasants as they lost non-market access to their livelihoods and their shelter. Finally, 
the privatization of land across the country resulted in the forceful and often violent 
eviction of peasants, farmers and fishermen. By the end of the 2000s, Egyptian 
society was at a point of implosion due to unprecedented levels of social polarization, 
alienation and public grievance. With levels of poverty and unemployment rising 
across the country in conjunction with rising prices and declining wages, the 
neoliberal social contract appeared increasingly unsustainable. 
311 
In summary, the neoliberal model of development has been opposed to 
progressive policies and a redistributive role for the state. Underlying this model is the 
assumption that once the state withdraws from economic planning and production, the 
bourgeoisie would step in to fill the gap and fulfil~ their historic mission of leading the 
economy. In the case of Arab countries, such a hypothetical bourgeoisie that stood 
against and outside state power and support never rose to the occasion. In fact, the 
state had to help create the bourgeoisie through a redistribution of resources and re-
orient the state so as to serve the interests of the newly created ruling class. Where the 
private sector assumed power in the case of land for industrial, agribusiness, real 
estate and tourism, profit margins and not the welfare of Egyptian workers or peasants 
dictated investment strategies. Societal needs such as housing, food security, 
transportation, infrastructure, health services and education, were marginalized as the 
new profit-driven model of development became dominant. 
The Political Nature of Access to Land and Housing 
In the context of these larger social transformations, the issue of access to housing in 
Egypt was defined and shaped by the dynamics internal to social property relations of 
specific historical periods. Thus it is important to factor into the analysis of the 
housing issue the legal framework defining access to land and the state's role in 
shaping relations of production, accumulation and surplus extraction. The historical 
chapters demonstrated how the state's role in defining the housing question changed 
from the time of Muhammad Ali when political accumulation defined social property 
relations, to Nasserism, when statist policies led redistributive measures and 
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progressive housing legislation. The adoption of strategies of accumulation by 
dispossession under Mubarak's last two decades of rule reshaped the contours of the 
issue of housing as a new set of property relations left its mark on the housing 
question. No longer was housing a problem limited to urban Egypt. By the mid-
1990s, rural Egypt was faced with a serious housing crisis as peasants were thrown 
off their land. Consequently, housing increasingly became a site of struggle involving 
the state, capitalists, landlords and peasants. Unfortunately, studies of housing have 
not kept pace with these social transformations but instead have continued to 
approach the question from the perspective of policy lagging behind demographic 
shifts. This narrow approach has not allowed for a consideration of struggles over 
property relations and the role of state in shaping power relations in Egyptian society. 
It is in response to these deficiencies that this dissertation has emphasized the need for 
a historicization of the issue of housing by contextualizing it within the study of social 
property relations in order to underline the contested nature of housing policy. To this 
end, I have relied on Wood's concept of market dependence and Harvey's concept of 
accumulation by dispossession as a way of relating the housing crisis to Egypt's 
neoliberal experiment. 
When turning attention to the 1990s period under Mubarak, it is important to 
consider that a deepening of capitalist social property relations was an integral part of 
the neoliberal project. Implementing neoliberalism entailed a speedy process of 
commodifying resources which facilitated the accumulation of capital within a free 
market framework. The role of the state in a liberalized housing market would be 
minimal as the state withdrew from planning and production of housing and adopted a 
new role that was restricted to facilitating housing financing through subsidized 
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mortgages. In a sense, the solution to the housing that has characterized Egyptian 
society for decades was to enable workers and peasants to participate in the market by 
removing rent controls and the state's role in production. Both of these were seen as 
fetters on the free market. 
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, rent controls were dismantled, 
evictions from informal housing sites picked up pace and slum clearing took centre 
stage in the government's housing policy. The goal of housing policy was to free the 
land from its inhabitants who lacked legal titles and transform it into private property. 
In the process, different categories of land ownership that were either under 
communal regulation or rent control gradually were brought into realm of the free 
market subject to its imperatives. 
This strategy can be seen as accumulation by dispossession - especially in the 
case of housing. The liberalization of the land and housing markets presented 
developers with the opportunity to engage in mass land grabs with the ·help of the 
state and its coercive and legal powers. For workers and peasants, the liberalization of 
land and housing markets wiped out past gains while subjecting them to the arbitrary 
powers of landlords and developers who came to determine access to housing. The 
consequences of neoliberalism in housing and land sectors were disastrous as the 
private sector did not respond to demands for low income housing. In fact, neoliberal 
policies exacerbated the existing housing problems leaving workers and peasants 
unprotected and subject to liberalized rents and prices. Within a few years of the 
implementation of Law 96/1992, over a million peasants and small farmers lost access 
to their land and housing. In urban Egypt, the privatization of public sector firms 
ended secure jobs for workers while the adoption of Law 4/1996 ended their access to 
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public sector housing. The combination of these two factors carried deep implications 
for workers' livelihoods and shelter. The dismantling of rent control laws and 
inheritable leases, the privatization of agricultural land and the rejection of peasants' 
claims to land and to housing led to a dismantling of social property relations that 
were based not only on Nasser's Arab Socialist ideals, but also on communal values 
and norms. 
The transformation of social-property relations was supported by state 
institutions and neoliberal ideological think tanks linked to powerful interests inside 
and outside of Egypt including the supreme court, the security apparatus, the NBE 
and the CBE as well as the Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies (ECES). Their 
intended goal was to change the balance of class power in a decisive manner in the 
interest of a ruling class that was behind the neoliberal project-and that often 
personally benefited from the acquisition of privatized assets. The consolidation of the 
power of this new ruling class within a "free market" economy framework would not 
have occurred had it not been precisely for the strategy of accumulation by 
dispossession of the state that transferred public resources to the members of this new 
ruling class. 
These transformations sharpened the existing class conflicts as workers and 
peasants saw the radical erosion of not only their livelihoods, but also of their shelter. 
Indeed, privatization of public enterprises and agricultural sector were carried out and 
enforced through violence carried out by state security personnel. As their poverty 
and misfortune deepened, workers and peasants witnessed the rise of a parallel Egypt 
where mega malls, luxury resorts and western style gated communities defined this 
new Egypt. This deepening divide was expressed clearly by a young man in Karnak, 
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Luxor who I interviewed in 2008. While preparing to defend their houses against the 
governor's bulldozer, the young man, comparing the regime of Mubarak to the 
housing demolitions of the Israeli state, stated that Mubarak was worse since he was a 
Muslim doing injustice to his Muslim subjects sanctioning expropriation and 
dispossession of his own people. In short, being subjected to the imperatives of the 
free market, workers and peasants across the country increasingly resented the 
government, its policies and especially its coercive arm - the security forces. Social 
protests which had begun in the 1990s, picked up pace after 2004 as pro-market 
reforms were deepened threatening workers and peasants' livelihoods. Workers 
increasingly resisted the privatization of public sector firms and demanded living 
wages and a cap on prices of basic commodities and rents. Over the course of the 
2000s, the number of annual workers' actions had reached hundreds resulting in the 
mobilization of youth and other sectors of Egyptian society. Finally, popular 
challenges to the newly conceived social property relations of the Mubarak regime 
grew stronger over the course of the 2000s leading to the overthrow of the 
government in January of201 l. 
The challenges faced by workers and peasants fundamentally exposed the 
myth of capitalist integration and globalization as the solution to the problems of 
poverty, unemployment and housing. A reversal of the changes carried out under 
Mubarak will require a pro-longed process of organizing by workers and peasants 
through unions and cooperatives that can democratically represent their interests. To 
reverse the trend of the rampant construction of luxury villas, resorts and gated 
communities which were bold manifestations of a neoliberal social order, and to put 
affordable and adequate housing on the political agenda, will require a fundamental 
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challenge to the neoliberal model and to the class interests that uphold and promote 
this model. A starting point entails the hard work of organizing workers and peasants 
across the country as well as building alliances with activists and progressive 
intellectuals. 
Market Transformations, Political Crisis and Future Research 
This study has made a number of contributions. First, it has contributed to the 
literature on the political and economic developments in Egypt since 1991. More 
specifically, it has made a contribution to the study of neoliberal developments in the 
Middle East. As pointed out in Chapter Two, Wood's insights on market dependence 
can inform our understanding of the coercive nature of markets that have emerged in 
Egypt since the country embarked on the path of a 'free market' economy (2002). The 
generalization of market dependence has not been separate from ruling class' 
strategies of accumulation by dispossession. As such, the liberalized markets - such 
as the land and housing markets-in Egypt assumed the new role of mediators of 
capitalist social property relations. 105 
Second, it has situated the housing crisis within the larger context of a shift 
towards neoliberalism. In doing so, this study has moved away from the narrow 
confines of housing policy as the study of market supply and demand regulated by 
interest rates and property right to examine the struggles over housing as an aspect of 
broader social struggles over rights to land and resources. As such, I have highlighted 
the manner in which deeper economic integration of the Egyptian economy was 
105 The social changes that went hand in hand with the creation of 'free markets' provoked the political 
crisis of the 2000s and the eventual downfall of the Mubarak regime. 
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coupled with an imposition of market imperatives to which workers and peasants 
were subjected. Third, through the case studies, I demonstrate the way in which 
market dependence operated and shaped access to housing in urban and rural areas. 
Finally, this study highlighted the emerging contr~dictions of deepening of capitalist 
relations in Egypt by underlining the emergence of an oppositional movement of 
workers and peasants which ultimately led to the fall of Mubarak and seriously 
questioned the strategy of accumulation by dispossession that was adopted in 1991. 
This dissertation aimed to bring into focus the issue of social struggles, 
especially those around property relations and the role of the state and the need to take 
these issues in the study of conflicts in the region seriously. A$ such, through this 
study, I hope to have opened a small window to the study of the region that avoids the 
tropes of stereotypes such as religion and culture among others which have 
traditionally been attached to the region. It is also hoped to provide a balance against 
studies that privileges inter-state conflict (Foreign Policy Studies) at the expense of 
social conflicts within states in the region. 
As the Middle East as a region has seen a radical political change that has 
opened up avenues for social struggles, an obvious direction for future research would 
be to examine the housing question in the post-revolutionary period of 2011 to the 
present, and how the revolutionary context has affected the degree of market 
dependence of peasants and workers. A second direction would be to conduct a 
comparative study of strategies of accumulation by dispossession in the region to 
assess the degree of market dependence imposed on these societies and how these 
changes have affected the nature of social conflict. Finally, a third avenue for future 
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research would be to situate the changes in social property relations in Egypt within 
the field of study of global land grabs. 
Appendices 
Appendix A. Rent Control Laws 
Pre-Nasser Land Laws related to housing and real estate 
Ottoman Land Law 1858 Defined five categories of land tenure. Anyone who 
could convert dead land to liveable use would own it. 
The law tried to control the W aqf tnovement by 
establishing a state land system. Ownership for those 
who worked and occupied state lands. Registration of 
state land under the Taboo system. 
Land Law 1936 Adjustments of tenure status for public land holders, who 
held the land for more than 15 years without any 
conflicts or disputes over it. State land holders could 
own their land, in a period of 15 years, if they would be 
able to use it in a period of 5 years. 
Egyptian Civil Law Uncultivated and unclaimed 'owned' land became state 
(1949) land. The government could sell, rent or yse these lands. 
State permission is required to use or dispose of these 
'state' lands. 
Military Order /1941 Early orders April 1941: Eliminated the owner's right to 
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evict any renter, except in the case of non-payment of 
rent. Fixed all the rent levels to the values of April 1941. 
Law No. 114of1946 Regulated the registration of title deeds (sejel shakhsee) 
in urban areas. 
Housing Law No. (World War II to 194 7) froze rent levels, and related rent 
12111947 to their total cost. 
Law 121/1947 Reduced rents by the amount of taxation on real estate 
around 13. 7 per cent. It affected houses constructed 
before January 1, 1944. 
Nasserist Land Laws related to housing and real estate 
Law 199/1952 Reduced the fixed rents in leases by 15 per cent on 
October 1952 and affected houses built from January 1, 
1944 to September 1952. 
The Egyptian Military Rent reduction by 15 per cent for all hol!lsing units 
Order 129/1952 between 1944 and 1952, with no owner's right to 
challenge it. 
Military Order 169/1952 A new tax of 13. 7 per cent of all rents, even on units 
built before 1944. 
Housing Law of 1954 New reduction for all rental units by 20 per cent without 
exemption. Article 56/1954 gave renters the right to 
complain about maintenance, which may result in a rent 
reduction. 
Law 55/1958 In July 1958, this law reduced fixed rents in leases by a 
further 20 per cent and affected houses built Between 
September 18, 1952 and June 12, 1958. 
Law No. 168/1961 Nasser's Socialist Society 1961, all rents to be reduced 
by 20 per cent, for all units, without exemption, without 
challenge. 
Nationalisation laws, Transformation of the 61 largest privately owned 
1961 properties, including residential complexes, into public 
property; Limited ownership to 100 feddans per family 
that included desert and uncultivated land. 
Law46/1962 With this law, rent committees were established to 
determine annual total rent at 5 per cent of the cost of 
land plus 8 per cent of the cost ofbuildings on houses 
built from November 6, 1961 to September 1977. 
Law 168/1961 In December of 1962, this law further reduced fixed 
rents in leases by 20 per cent on houses built between 
June 12, 1958 and November 5, 1961. Law 169/1961 
On January 1, 1962 this law reduced rents 13.7 per cent 
(deduction by the amount of taxation on real estate on 
houses built between June 12, 1958 and November 5, 
1961. 
Housing Law No. Determined rent value as 3 per cent of land value and 5 
46/1962 per cent of construction cost. 
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Housing Sector Total conversion from private ownership to public 
Socialisation Act 1964 ownership for the largest 119 construction companies. 
Combined them in 3 5 public agencies, which also 
manage the residential properties socialised in 1961. 
Law 7/1965 In March, 1965, rents were further reduced by 20 per 
cent. 
Housing Law No. Gave renters the right to inherit rental units. 
52/1969 Prohibitions of side payments, advance rent, or key 
money. 
Sadat's Land Laws related to housing and real estate 
Housing Law No. Determined rent as 7 per cent of total cost; allowed 
49/1977 foreigners to purchase units, and allowed units to be sold 
as condominiums; Article 48 of the Law gave renters 
right to exchange, release, or re-rent their units without 
owner's permission; Rent committees set annual total 
rent at 7 per cent of cost of land plus 10 per cent of cost 
of building on houses built since September 1977. 
Law No. 59of1979 concerning new urban communities 
Housing Law No. exempted luxury units from rent control; Article 15 of 
136/1981 the law gave investors access to low interest rate loans 
provided by State Agencies and public sector banks; 
Extended the power of the landlords by claiming to 
introduce an 'equilibrium' in tenant/landlord 
relationship, as it was claimed that Nasserist laws were 
too anti-landlord; made small amendments [to rent 
control law] such as allowing 30 per cent instead of 10 
per cent of the units in a building to be sold (Tamlik) 
rather than rented. 
Law No. 143of1981 Regarding desert land. 
Mubarak's Land Laws related to housing and real estate 
Urban Planning Law No. Requirements and regulations concerning urban growth 
B/1982 limitations, legal urban land subdivision, land use, land 
conversion and land invasion. 
Housing Regulation No. Gave tenants right to obtain a new, separate lease from 
2/1986 the owner, with the permission of the previous tenants. 
Law No. 10of1990 Regarding the expropriation of real estates for the benefit 
of public utilities. 
Land Law No. 7/1991 Defmed the responsibilities and the intuitions that could 
manage and exhaust land for uses included in law No. 
143/1981 with the exception ofland for military uses. 
Law No. 25/1992 Enforced measures of demolition in case of permit 
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violations, made civil engineers responsible for 
supervising construction projects, formed technical 
committees to supervise the quality and safety measures 
and standards. 
LawNo. 96/1995 Privatization act of publicly owned land by authorizing 
the selling of land through public institutions. Rules and 
requirements for subdivisions and conversions of desert 
lands to urban use. 
Law No. 4 of 1996 Deregulated the rental market and introduced a new 
relationship between tenants and landlords; short term 
leases were introduced and rent increases were legalized. 
Rents on all units are to increase annually by 10 per cent 
for five consecutive years, after which the market is 
supposed to take over. 
Law No. 230 of 1996 Concerning the ownership regulations of real estate and 
land for foreigners. 
Law No. 6 of 1997 Concerning the amendment of the second paragraph of 
Article 29 of Law No. 49 of 1977 and provisions on 
related, to the rent of non-residential premises. 
Law No. 7/1997 Requirements and regulations concerning the subdivision 
rules according to the type and pfoposed use of land. 
Law No. 3 of2001 Concerning regulation of Real Estate Issued by decree 
and its amendments. 
Law No. 148 of2001 Regarding the issuance of Real Estate financing Law and 
its executive regulation. 
Law 2003 Mortgage Finance Law. 
Law No. 137 of2006 Concerning the amendment in addition t© the provisions 
of Law No. 4 of 1996. 
Law No. 138 of2006 Concerning real estate supply wifu the necessary 
utilities. 
Law No. 144 of2006 Concerning the demolition of bui~dings and installations. 
Appendix B. The Legal Framework Governing Land Tenure 
Laws Purpose and Implication 
Ottoman Land Law Defined 5 types of land tenure; owned land, state land, Waqf 
1858 land, public use land and mawat or dead land (desert, 
unliveable ). The Law tried to limit Waqf process by 
establishing the state land authority. The developer of any 
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dead land who changed it into liveable land could own it. 
Land Law 1936 Holders of public land for 15 years without any conflicts or 
dispute could own it. 
Land Subdivision Law Regulations for agricultural land subdivision and irrigation. 
No. 152/1940 
Egyptian Civil Law Uncultivated and unclaimed owned land becomes state land. 
1949 Government controls this land. 
Agricultural Reform Limiting ownership to 200 feddans per adult and 100 
Law No. 178/1952 feddans to all family children. The government would 
compensate owners for the rest. The land taken would be 
transferred to General Agricultural Reform Authority to be 
redistributed to peasants. 
Modification to Limiting ownership to 300 feddans per family. Restricting 
Agricultural Reform the use of some desert land. Ministry of Military controls 
Law 1958 vital security lands. 
National Land Law Limiting ownership to 100 feddans per family that included 
1961 desert and uncultivated land. Nationalize the properties of 
large scale landlords. Captive land is the property of 
government. 
Agricultural Reform Under the Law, all desert land became State land. 
Law 100/1964 
Agricultural Law The maximum period for leaving agricultural land 
53/1966 uncultivated was set at two years. The Law regulated rules 
for building on agricultural land. 
Modifications Law Organized the selling/renting of captive land to recover 
50/1969 money to be used for financing agricultural projects. 
Modification to Land Regulation for converting agricultural land to urban uses, 
Subdivision Law land reclamation requirements, and establishing land 
52/1975 subdivision committee. 
Agricultural Law The Law regulated rules for subdivision and conversion of 
17011978 agricultural land to urban uses. 
Law 143/1981 The Law allowed the utilization of desert land for military, 
New cities, tourism and reclamation uses. 
Urban Planning Law The Law regulated planning, regulation, land use, urban 
3/1982 growth boundaries, land subdivisions and protection of 
agricultural land. 
Modification to The modifications prohibited the conversion of agricultural 
Agricultural Law land to urban uses without approval of minister of 
116/1983 (3rd book) agriculture. Removal/demolition decrees for any illegal 
deformation of agricultural land or construction of red brick 
factories to be issued by minister of agriculture and 
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prohibiting construction only if it was for housing or other 
uses. 
Land Law 7/1991 The Law defined institutions and responsibilities for 
managing land subjected to Law 143/ 1981 except land for 
military uses. 
Law 96/1992 The Law revoked the previous Agricultural Land Reform 
Law of 178/ 1952 through liberating the land market and 
abolished the previous lease system in an effort to cut direct 
governmental support to agricultural inputs. 
Land Law 96/1995 The Law legalized the privatization of publicly owned land 
by authorizing the selling of land through public institutions 
and regulating rules for subdivision and conversion of desert 
land for urban use. 
Military Decree 1/ The Decree prohibited and criminalized any conversion of 
1996 or building on agricultural land. 
Presidential Decree The Decree cancelled the Military Decree No. 1 /1996 
2004 
Source: Madbouly (2005). 
Appendix C. Interviews (2005, 2007-08) 
No. Interviewee Age Occupation Location Year 
Group 
1 Female 30s Housewife Nubian Village, 2008 
Aswan 
2 Female 20s Housewife Nubian Village, 2008 
Aswan 
3 Female 30s Housewife Sharq al 2008 
Batinyoul, Aswan 
4 Male 30s Government Sharq al 2008 
employee Batinyoul, Aswan 
5 Male 50s Construction worker Karnak, Luxor 2008 
6 Male 30s Construction Worker Karnak, Luxor 2008 
7 Male 20s - Construction Worker Karnak, Luxor 2008 
8 Male 30s Taxi Driver Karnak, Luxor 2008 
9 Male 20s Day labourer Karnak, Luxor 2008 
10 Male 30s Day Labourer Karnak, Luxor 2008 
11 Female 40s Housewife Karnak, Luxor 2008 
12 Male 30s Teacher Karnak, Luxor 2008 
13 Male 50s Construction Worker Karnak, Luxor 2008 
14 Male 30s Construction Worker Karnak, Luxor 2008 
15 Male 50s Retired Teacher NewGurna, 2008 
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Lux or 
16 Male 30s Tour Guide Qendara, Qena 2008 
17 Female 30s Peasant Mattia, Qena 2007 
18 Male 50s Police Chief Mattia, Qena 2007 
19 Female 30s House wife Rafa' a, Sohag 2007 
20 Male 60s Unemployed Rafa'a, Sohag 2007 
21 Male 40s Ancient Temple Abidus, Sohag 2007 
Guard 
22 Female 40s Housewife Abyouha, Asyut 2007 
23 Female 40s Housewife Minya 2007 
24 Female 30s Housewife City of the Dead, 2007 
Min ya 
25 Female 40s Small Tenant farmer Al Sultan., Minya 2007 
26 Female 30s fruit seller Et Hadiqa, 2007 
Fayoum 
27 Female 50s fruit seller ElHadiqa, 2007 
Fayoum 
28 Male 40s Small farmer ErHadiqa, 2007 
Fayoum 
29 Female 30s Hotel Cleaner Abu Selim, Beni 2007 
Sqef 
30 Male 40s Small Farmer Albu-Selim, Beni 2007 
Suef 
31 Male 30s Tenant farmer Abu Swalem, 2007 
Be.ni Suef 
32 Male 40s Small farmer Abu Swalem, 2007 
Beni Suef 
33 Male 40s Small farmer Abu Swalem, 2007 
B~ni Suef 
34 Male 30s Small farmer Minoufiyya 2007 
35 Male 40s Small farmer ~oufiyya 2007 
36 Male 30s Accountant/Medium Milnoufiyya 2007 
size farmer 
37 Male 40s Medium size farmer Kafr el Wan, 2007 
Minoufiyya 
38 Male 30s Small farmer Kafr el Wan, 2007 
Minoufiyya 
39 Male 30s Small farmer Kafr el Wan, 2007 
Minoufiyya 
40 Male 30s Farmer Qalyoubiya 2007 
41 Male 50s Big Farmer (50 Qalyoubiya 2007 
feddans) 
42 Male 30s Worker Qa1youbiya 2007 
43 Male 40s Driver Qalyoubiya 2007 
44 Male 30s Blacksmith Qalyoubiya 2007 
45 Male 40s University Professor Cairo City 2007 
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' " 
46 Male 50s Government Housing Cairo City 2007 
Official 
47 Female 40s Housewife City of the Dead, 2007 
Cairo 
48 Female 50s Housewife City of the Dead, 2007 
Cairo 
49 Female 30s Housewife City of the Dead, 2007 
Cairo 
50 Female 40s Housewife City of tlb.e Dead 2007 
51 Female 40s Housewife dity of tie Dead 2007 
52 Female 30s Journalist Oairo Cit,y 2005 
53 Male 30s Teacher Al Salam,, Cairo 2005 
54 Male 30s Journalist qairo City 2005 
55 Male 50s Journalist Oairo City 2005 
56 Male 70s The General Guide of c:airo City 2005 
the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
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